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2006 Abstract 
This thesis explores the state-labour nexus emerging out of the processes through 
which governing authorities have attempted to maintain or regain political 
stability and rates of accumulation in Malay(a)sia. Existing studies usefully 
highlight the extent to which repressive industrial relations legislation and ethnic 
communalism have weakened the trade union movement and segmented the 
labour force delivering the relative industrial peace attractive to foreign 
investors. Some suggest labour’s discontent at this repression has been 
successfully contained by Malaysia’s relatively strong economic performance. 
These approaches, however, only partially acknowledge the extent to which 
labour’s social reproduction under capitalist relations generates political and 
economic contradictions.  
 
After an initial failure to address these contradictions in the early post-colonial 
era, the Malay-dominated government has since developed avenues through 
which to deliver economic and cultural concessions in a selective and 
paternalistic fashion. This economic paternalism has contributed to social 
stability but has diverted funds from economic development and now runs 
contrary to structural reforms that seek to address Malaysia’s declining 
international competitiveness. The transition towards a knowledge-based 
economy, referred to locally as the k-economy, therefore embodies efforts by the 
political elite to contain political and societal tensions emerging out of the reform 
process. This thesis demonstrates and analyses the dynamic, contingent and 
uneven nature of these efforts as the government seeks to establish new bases of 
legitimacy more closely linked to household consumption concerns than 
  iiiethnicity. Despite the relative absence of industrial disputation, labour’s location 
in Malaysia’s system of capitalism remains a contradictory one. Politically 
motivated social policies, although under pressure and likely to take new forms, 
will nonetheless remain pivotal in the attempt to resolve the tensions that 
threaten accumulation and political stability. 
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  xiiiPreface: The régulation of labour 
Malaysia, formerly Malaya, has undergone a relatively rapid transition from a 
colonial economy dependent on the extraction and export of natural resources to 
its current status as a manufacturer and exporter of electronics goods with 
emerging export capacity in education, financial and health services. This has 
been facilitated by wide-ranging transformations in social and political relations. 
British colonial authorities, keen to exploit tin and rubber, oversaw an inflow of 
Chinese
1 and Indian migrant labourers of such great numbers that, by the 1930s, 
immigrants comprised approximately fifty per cent of the population. While also 
recruited to assist in the development of transport infrastructure, such as 
railways, Indian workers were mainly concentrated in plantation agriculture. 
Chinese workers comprised the majority of tin miners but were also active in the 
trading and retailing sectors. Malays, for a number of reasons outlined in 
following chapters, remained largely disengaged from waged labour in the 
colonial era.  
 
By way of preparation for decolonisation, a paternalistic relationship between the 
rural Malay population and the government bureaucracy was established in the 
early 1950s. This facilitated, firstly, the centralised coordination of reforms to 
agriculture to increase rice production. Secondly, it served as a means of 
placating the Malay elite who voiced concerns regarding the relative 
disadvantage of the Malay population. Thirdly, it was hoped that by preserving 
the idealised rural Malay lifestyle based on family and community co-operation, 
                                                 
1 Chinese tin mine operators were already active in the region but the British increased the scale 
of mining operations.  that the Malay population would benefit economically from agricultural reforms 
and require little in the way of further investment of public funds.  
 
At Independence in 1957, the ruling coalition of three ethnically-based parties 
gave lie to a society and labour force segmented occupationally and 
geographically by ethnicity and by gender. The United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO) dominated the ruling coalition, but British, and to a lesser 
extent, local Chinese, capital were the more dominant forces economically. The 
geographically uneven nature of economic development and a laissez faire 
approach to industrialisation by a government unwilling to risk disrupting the 
existing regime of accumulation exacerbated socio-cultural economic disparities.  
 
While these imbalances intersected society on the basis of geographic and class 
location, they were popularly and politically portrayed as greatest between the 
predominantly Malay rural population and the more urbanised Chinese. Ethnic 
unrest in 1969 resulted in the suspension of the Parliament, the elevation of a 
new Prime Minister and the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the NEP. 
This twenty-year plan (1971-1990) was designed to restructure society to 
improve the position of Malays through access to better paid non-agricultural 
employment and greater participation in the business sector. Rapid and expanded 
economic growth rather than re-nationalisation or redistribution of existing 
wealth was an essential element in gaining the cooperation of non-Malay 
political and business elites. To this end, the Malaysian government became 
more deeply enmeshed in the economy to secure funding for NEP policies, to 
raise funds from investments, and to establish state owned enterprises that in turn 
  2 provided employment and access to government-linked business opportunities, in 
the main for Malays.  
 
From the early 1970s, the government intensified efforts to encourage foreign 
investors. Free Trade Zones (FTZs) offered foreign employers a range of 
financial, infrastructural and labour-related incentives and provided relatively 
well paid, modern sector employment that alleviated high rates of unemployment 
and poverty. Centralised industrial relations and trade union legislation, much of 
it inherited from the colonial era, served to reassure local and foreign capital by 
actively discouraging independent unionisation.  
 
Despite a resurgence of Islam from the 1970s that generated debates about the 
links between faith and participation in a capitalist economy increasingly 
dependent on ‘western’ technology, Malaysia’s manufacturing sector has since 
grown to absorb a quarter of the total labour force. Slightly more than forty per 
cent of workers in the manufacturing sector are women. Approximately half of 
the manufacturing workforce is Malay. Conversely, agriculture has declined in 
economic importance although it still provides just over twenty per cent of 
employment. Although Indian workers constitute a significant minority, the 
majority of agricultural workers are Malay, a continuation of the historical 
segmentation of the labour force.  
 
Subsequent to becoming Prime Minister in 1981, Mahathir Mohamad unveiled 
various long term plans that linked industrialisation and economic progress with 
‘Asian values’ said to encourage harmony, diligent work attitudes, and 
  3commitment to family. Amongst these was ‘Look East’ which claimed to 
emulate the South Korean and Japanese models of economic development. 
Having established the central planning apparatus characteristic of the 
‘developmental state’, Mahathir implemented a costly state-led heavy 
industrialisation program from the early 1980s. The less than successful outcome 
indicated that the political leadership and the bureaucracy had, as yet, a limited 
capacity to pursue economic development independent of competing ethnic and 
political considerations.  
 
A sharp economic recession in 1986 fuelled factionalism within UMNO and a 
narrowly-defeated challenge to Mahathir’s leadership. While Mahathir 
responded in an autocratic and repressive manner, imprisoning political activists 
and reducing basic employment conditions, economic recovery in the late 1980s 
delivered employment and wages growth regardless of the legislation. This 
weakened opportunities for the trade union movement to generate any effective 
opposition to the government and its legislative reforms.  
 
As the economy continued to recover in the late 1980s, employers in the 
plantation sector, but then widening to include those in the construction and 
manufacturing sectors, complained of labour shortages. Attempts to encourage 
more women into the labour force met with only mixed success despite the 
shortage of labour. In the 1970s, women’s labour force participation rates had 
expanded with the growth in manufacturing employment. These rates stagnated 
from the late 1980s under multiple pressures including low rates of pay, poor 
career advancement opportunities, lack of child care facilities, sexual 
  4 harassment, and increased competition from relatively low paid migrant labour. 
The political tussle between the Islamic party, Parti se-Islam Malaysia (PAS) 
and UMNO, was evidenced by an inconsistent policy stance by the federal 
government towards women’s economic and social location.  
 
In the main, the shortfall in labour has been met through the use of semi-skilled 
migrant labour, formalised by agreements with Indonesia and other sending 
countries from the mid 1980s. Initially employed in the plantation sector, foreign 
workers are also widely used in the construction sector, in low skilled services 
such as hospitality and household-based domestic work, and in semi-skilled 
labour intensive manufacturing operations. It is difficult to be accurate regarding 
the number of workers given that up to half of the migrant workforce is 
undocumented. This situation lends a significant element of inaccuracy to 
employment and productivity related data and a large degree of vulnerability to 
the workers themselves. Available figures indicate that in 2006, temporary 
migrant workers constituted an estimated 20 to 25 per cent of the eleven million 
strong labour force, an outcome in complete contradiction to the government’s 
stated policy goals. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, as part of the attempted transition to a knowledge-based 
economy (KBE), known locally as the k-economy, entrepreneurship, life long 
learning and a ‘first class mentality’ have been emphasised in official planning 
documents. Critical to the KBE transition is the availability of a suitably skilled 
workforce and reduced reliance on unskilled labour. Attempts to reform the 
education and training sectors have been stymied by complex intersections 
  5between the use of education policy as both a means of development and as a 
means of pursuing pro-Malay policies. Long term investments in more skill-
intensive labour processes and industrial technologies by private sector 
employers have been limited, exacerbated by strained relations between domestic 
small to medium Chinese-owned businesses and the Malay dominated state 
bureaucracy, and by the continuing availability of relatively low-cost migrant 
labour.  
 
Abdullah Badawi, Prime Minister since 2003, chose the theme of ‘Striving 
Together Towards Glory, Excellence and Distinction’ when naming the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 (Government of Malaysia 2006). As they are 
explained through multiple government publications and conferences and 
through the government controlled media, not only will such attributes protect 
Malaysians from unfettered globalisation, they will assist in producing a 
population with little need for government protection from competition. This is a 
furtherance of moves by the political leadership since the early 1990s to reduce 
the level of subsidisation of a wide range of goods and services including health 
and education, electricity and water, food stuffs and transport fuel.  
 
As an economic institution, the family is now coming under increased pressure to 
fund health and education costs as well as saving for retirement, as the Malaysian 
government moves to privatise or impose fees for services that were once 
provided freely. In a tight labour market situation, individual employers have 
used the provision of health insurance and other ‘perks’ as a means of attracting 
and retaining labour. Employer groups, however, have lobbied against attempts 
  6 by the government to shift more of the costs of labour’s social reproduction onto 
capital. Indeed, representatives of foreign firms based in Malaysia are lobbying 
for the implementation of competition policies that would be at odds with the 
government’s policy of fixing prices and regulating the supply of a range of 
household goods and services. At this current juncture in Malaysia’s political 
economy, therefore, political and economic pressures, generated domestically 
and internationally, threaten the current nature of the state-labour nexus.  
 
Such a scenario is not unique in Malay[a]sia’s history. The past eighty years of 
dramatic yet uneven transformation have been an ongoing challenge to the 
political and bureaucratic elite in the ethno-political and economic management 
of wide ranging issues relating to labour’s social reproduction. These include 
welfare, education, land ownership, food self sufficiency, housing, income and 
prices policies, in addition to policies more directly related to employment, such 
as wage determination, skills training, industrial relations and labour migration. 
Yet analysis of Malaysia’s history of ‘labour relations’ is often restricted to the 
formal arena of the organised trade union movement and their interactions with 
employer groups, political parties and state institutions. Citing the relatively low 
levels of unionisation and industrial disputation, the focus then shifts to an 
explanation of how and why the union movement was so effectively repressed, 
and the importance of this to Malaysia’s foreign funded transition towards 
export-oriented manufacturing. The political benefits to the Malaysian 
government of a weakened trade union movement are sometimes acknowledged 
but emphasis is more usually placed on the imperative to deliver the ‘disciplined’ 
workforce demanded by foreign capital. The descriptions of the colonial 
  7administration and the post-colonial Malaysian government as politically 
repressive, and organised labour as politically excluded, resonate, but do not 
provide a broad enough account of how conflicting pressures were managed in a 
society with democratic institutions and a relatively strong record of economic 
growth. 
 
Firstly, the fact of a repressed union movement does not provide an adequate 
basis from which to make claims about the nature of labour’s incorporation 
within (Malaya’s) Malaysia’s political economy. It is necessary to transcend the 
restricted reading of ‘labour’ as ‘worker’ or ‘union member’ in order to 
encompass the scope of social relations that characterise various forms of 
capitalist societies and labour’s roles within them. Workers also become 
consumers of public and private sector goods and services; they are taxpayers, 
investors, constituents and voters; they are gendered members of ethnic groups 
defined by politically and socially prescribed values. Secondly, and also related 
to the understanding of capitalism as a set of social relations, the sphere of 
industrial relations need not constitute the only, or even necessarily the most 
important, location in which state institutions exert influence in labour related 
conflicts. To assume that it does fails to acknowledge socio-political processes 
adopted in order to gain labour’s consent through hegemonic means, or through 
the use of income, pricing and welfare policies and state funded services that 
might offset political unrest and economic hardship.  
 
This becomes apparent in analysing social welfare policies, which in the case of 
Malaysia, must be defined broadly given historically low levels of funding to 
  8 ‘welfare’. It is necessary to look beyond the Department of Social Welfare to 
those ministries overseeing poverty alleviation and land redistribution projects in 
the Malay-dominated rural areas, and to the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and 
Cooperatives which extends low cost loans, subsidises property purchases and 
business start up costs and funds community initiatives. This spending is far from 
transparent, does not always find its target, and has been uneven in its impact. It 
has nonetheless been politically important in reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
Malay based ruling party. Clearly, the Malaysian and colonial governments have 
acted to regulate labour in sites beyond those more directly related to industrial 
relations and the sphere of production. Ultimately, the industrial relations-
focused approach to capturing the nature of state-labour relations in Malaysia 
fails to make an effective contrast between the institutional capacities of the pre 
and post-NEP governments and the contribution of NEP policies to the 
management of labour-related political and economic conflicts.  
 
The question of how conflict-ridden capitalist societies balance conflicting 
pressures underpins régulation theory (RT). RT is a macro-economic, macro-
institutionalist and neo-Marxist approach that seeks to identify the historically 
specific factors that allow a level of correspondence between conflicting forces 
generated within capitalism. RT therefore bases the study of social 
transformations around class conflict. The word ‘régulation’, as applied in RT, 
refers to the ‘dynamic equilibration of complex systems’ (Delorme 2001:1) and 
therefore differs from the more limited use of the word ‘regulation’ in English. 
Far from being functionalist, RT theorists argue the processes that emerge out of 
attempts to resolve tensions may not prove to be solutions at all. State 
  9interventions may generate further tensions as there is no guarantee that the 
nature of the crisis has been understood or that the political elite has the 
autonomy to act in an effective manner. Indeed, the leadership may decide that it 
is not politically expedient to tackle the problem, preferring to implement short 
term compromises that later exacerbate the tensions. In the Malaysian case, 
delays in implementing legislative and institutional reforms are common 
strategies in situations where immediate action is deemed likely to generate 
public unrest amongst competing groups. 
 
RT is usually a quantitative approach applied to the analysis of significant shifts 
in accumulation regimes in more economically developed countries, the classic 
study being Aglietta’s (1987 [1976]) examination of the crisis of Fordism in the 
US.  
The contribution of régulation theory is to have brought to the 
forefront the idea that, in spite of its contradictions, the 
remarkable resilience of the capitalist mode of production is a 
result of adaptation and transformation … (Boyer 2002:73-74). 
 
A mode of régulation ‘is an emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, 
organisational forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct that can stabilise 
an accumulation regime’ (Jessop 2001:7). These tools are methodologically 
useful although they are not applied here in strict RT terms. What is pursued here 
instead, is the study of the state-labour nexus which focuses on the role of the 
state in managing the sites of labour’s social reproduction.  
 
One of the important contradictions of capitalism is the tension between wages 
as a cost of production, and the contribution of wages to the funding of labour’s 
social reproduction and to consumption demand. While RT would usually focus 
  10 on the quantitative expression of this contradiction at a macroeconomic level, 
here the focus is on specific political contests generated by this contradiction, 
and the economic and political resolutions that have emerged as a result.  
 
In Malaysia, attempts to resolve contradictions arising from labour’s social 
reproduction have generated ‘economic paternalism’. This phrase encapsulates a 
complex set of economic and socio-political arrangements, many of which are 
embedded within the structures of the NEP, which legitimate and facilitate the 
delivery of public services and other transfers to households. These are delivered 
through an institutional framework that, in turn, enables the government to direct 
labour’s consumption options towards the pursuit of particular economic goals. 
By delivering economic concessions to labour that are not ‘wages’, such as soft 
finance and subsidised prices, but which nonetheless contribute to consumption 
demand, the government has assisted in delivering a low wage regime yet 
without depressing consumption. The economic ramifications of this are many. 
Most important perhaps in delivering social stability, is that, firstly, household 
consumption has expanded despite low wages. Secondly, inflation has been 
contained, which also has an impact on the household income of those reliant on 
wages and borrowings. Thirdly, private consumption has been enhanced as a 
counter cyclical tool that has hastened Malaysia’s recovery from the two most 
recent economic downturns (1998 and 2001). 
 
Important to these strategies was the positioning of government actions within an 
ideological framework in order to enhance legitimacy. For example, during the 
height of the NEP, the government portrayed its role as the protector of the 
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constraints, the government has attempted to shift the basis for its legitimacy. An 
appeal to economic nationalism underpinned Mahathir’s attempt to create a 
united Malaysia in the early 1990s. Within the rhetoric surrounding the 
attempted shift towards a KBE, the government depicted its role as that of a 
facilitator, encouraging self-reliance and entrepreneurship in order that Malaysia 
improve its competitiveness internationally. Currently concerned to reduce the 
levels of expenditure on the public provision of services and subsidies, we see 
growing institutional support for consumerism as part of which Malaysians are 
encouraged to view themselves as informed consumers making choices about 
where to allocate their spendings and their savings.  
 
However, as is demonstrated through the thesis chapters, once particular 
strategies become institutionally and socially embedded, they can became 
difficult to dislodge, creating inconsistencies between government departments 
and policies. This highlights the potential for discordance between the régulation 
of labour’s social reproduction by various government institutions and the 
desires of capital for labour suited to the demands of the production regime.  
 
The goals of this thesis are pursued through a theoretical framework that 
combines régulation theory and critical political economy. These in combination 
expose the development of economic paternalism as an important contribution to 
the  régulation of labour in Malaysia. This approach is explored in the first 
chapter. The remaining chapters are in chronological order, providing an 
historical context in which to analyse various conflicts and contradictions 
  12 generated by labour’s social reproduction. The earlier chapters examine existing 
literature. However, the theoretical approach adopted here emphasises a conflict-
centred analysis that challenges existing depictions of the subdued role of labour 
in Malaysia’s political economy. The later chapters interweave original research 
with existing literature to explore the attempted transition to a KBE and the focus 
on household consumption as part of a shift in the state-labour nexus. The 
conclusion highlights the factors impinging on the sustainability of the present 
arrangements. While particular aspects of economic paternalism are shown to be 
clearly under pressure, a number of responses are already emerging. 
  13Chapter One: Régulation, the state and the  
social reproduction of labour 
 
Introduction 
The role of the state in the social reproduction of labour is generally examined in 
the context of the demands of the labour market. Through state institutions with 
responsibilities for overseeing labour’s social reproduction, such as the education 
and welfare systems, labour is readied for its role in production. In this way, 
institutional coordination underpins the matching of labour to the regime of 
accumulation. State-capital tensions emerge when demands for labour of a 
certain quality, quantity, flexibility or price are not met. What are these occasions 
when state institutions have not produced labour as required by capital? Could it 
be that governments, individual ministries or political leaders, develop 
requirements of labour that potentially run contrary to those of capital?  
 
This thesis suggests, firstly, that in relation to labour, political concerns and 
production demands do not always coincide, an outcome of the role played by 
state institutions in managing the conflicts associated with labour’s social 
reproduction. Secondly, it is argued that managing these conflicts results in 
compromises that have the capacity to transform institutions and policies, with 
implications for political stability and rates of economic growth. Thirdly, in order 
to locate these compromises, we must look beyond the labour market, industrial 
relations and the workplace. Labour occupies multiple roles in capitalist societies 
presenting governments with a range of potential conflicts beyond those related 
directly to production, and conversely, providing a number of spheres in which 
to address those conflicts. Despite the relative absence of industrial disputation in 
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Malaysia’s system of capitalism is a contradictory one, and social policies have 
been important in resolving tensions that have threatened accumulation and 
political stability. 
 
In order to explore this thesis, Malaysia’s relatively rapid socio-political and 
economic transition over the past 80 years is examined. It is a period marked by 
social upheaval and economic and political re-ordering, as well as, since the late 
1970s, relative political stability and generally high rates of economic growth. 
The dynamic and contingent processes through which governing authorities in 
Malaysia have attempted to mediate the tensions generated by labour’s social 
reproduction have resulted in particular institutional forms that support economic 
paternalism. Malaysia is not a welfare state and the government rejects the notion 
of universal income support. The redirection of economic benefits to labour has 
occurred unevenly and selectively, initially as the outcome of the government’s 
self-proclaimed role as the defender of the Malay people. This claim justified the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971-1990. During this period the form of the 
state in Malaysia was institutionally remodelled to facilitate broad ranging 
interventions into the economy and society. This was justified by the government 
as necessary to address the relatively disadvantaged socio-economic status of the 
then predominantly rural-based Malay population.  
 
Shifts in government policies have since been negotiated around the ability of the 
dominant political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), to 
maintain its role as the defender of Malay cultural and economic aspirations. The 
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ethnically-based parties representing the Chinese and Indian minorities, is now 
increasingly dependent on the votes of middle income earners of all ethnic 
groups in order to retain its two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat, the lower 
house of the Federal Parliament. It is this majority which delivers the coalition 
the ability to pass its legislative agenda with little scrutiny or interference from 
opposition parties. Therefore, while UMNO has continually sought and gained 
legitimacy from its Malay constituency on the basis of appeals to issues 
surrounding ‘ethnicity’, more recently, political legitimacy has also been based 
on the ability of the government to deliver economic goods, such as price 
subsidies and fixed interest rates, to the growing multiethnic urbanised 
population of middle and upper income earners.  
 
A shift in demographics and upward levels of consumption of state-provided or 
state-subsidised goods and services, has made this an increasingly expensive 
means of regulating labour. The costs of subsiding petrol, water, electricity, 
agricultural inputs and food products has diverted a significant proportion of 
funds from expenditure more consistent with the government’s stated policy of 
developing a knowledge-based economy (KBE). The extent to which the 
delivery of subsidies requires government intervention in the market has also 
generated a conflict with international pressures for competition policy.  
 
Given these complexities, the literature under review and the theoretical 
approach adopted here extend beyond that of industrial relations and 
employment legislation. In the main, the works reviewed analyse societal 
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They therefore provide useful insights into the various mechanisms through 
which the political leadership and various agencies of the government have 
sought to defuse or otherwise manage conflict. Few of the studies, however, 
engage directly with the potentially contradictory interdependencies that 
characterise the state-labour nexus. Important amongst these interdependencies 
are the linkages between the consumption and savings patterns of labour and 
their contribution to state revenues and rates of economic growth. Another is the 
electoral process in which labour becomes the constituent. Conversely, labour 
seeks institutional protections in a wide range of matters, including employment 
but extending to cultural and religious expression, human rights, property and 
consumer issues and the provision of public services and goods such as housing, 
health and education.  
 
This speaks to the need for including within the scope of this study a range of 
government institutions that seek to exert influence over the multiple sites of 
labour’s social reproduction. In doing so, this thesis attempts to bring to 
prominence the conflictual and thereby transformative nature of labour’s 
participation in Malaysia’s economic and political history. Secondly, it aims to 
more completely capture the wide range of state responses engendered by that 
conflict. Thirdly, it demonstrates the influence of those responses on policy 
decisions.  
 
The dialectical nature of these processes is clearly highlighted through the use of 
régulation theory (RT) which recognises capitalism as a complex set of 
  17contradictory social relations. There is nothing inherent in capitalism that acts to 
mediate these contradictions. Particular instances of crisis and periods of stability 
can, therefore, be usefully examined to identify the contributing factors and the 
political processes through which mediations are attempted, and subsequently, 
the flow on effects of the mechanisms and processes utilised in the attempt to 
restore economic growth and political stability. The contingent nature of 
politically determined outcomes means ‘the state’ is a dynamic set of relations 
that are captured and given structure in the form of institutions. This provides an 
understanding of the institutional forms of the state as acted upon as well as 
constituting a set of actors. Institutions are both the sites and the outcomes of 
attempts to resolve conflict. ‘Institutionalised compromises’ are the resultant 
mechanisms that bear the potential to stabilise certain conflicts under particular 
circumstances, but which can later become destabilising under shifting social, 
political and economic pressures. 
 
RT is a multidisciplinary approach that benefits from the contributions of critical 
work in political economy, economic sociology and labour geography. Analysts 
adopting this approach seek to identify a ‘mode of régulation’, the dynamic 
complex of processes, institutional arrangements, norms of behaviour and 
economic conditions that allow a degree of accommodation between conflicting 
tensions such that economic growth is supported and political stability 
maintained. The retention of the French form of the word régulation serves to 
differentiate it from the relatively narrow and static meaning of the word in 
English. The application of RT to the study of state-labour relations in Malaysia 
was challenging given its usual reliance on long term quantitative data. While it 
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is modified here to provide a qualitative analysis. This proved more than 
worthwhile, supporting a disciplined engagement with a number of contrasting 
explanations for the nature of labour’s participation in Malay[a]sia’s political 
economy.  
 
This chapter is structured to provide a review of the literature that contrasts the 
nature of labour’s involvement in the colonial economy with that in the period 
since Malaysia’s political independence. The chapter concentrates, secondly, on 
competing explanations for the longevity of capitalist societies, and within this, 
the importance of the means adopted to ‘regulate’ labour. Thirdly, the discussion 
engages with competing accounts of the role of social policies in Malaysia’s 
economic development. This highlights the historical importance of Malaysia’s 
economic paternalism in the régulation of labour, and emerging challenges to the 
form it currently takes. The limits to the thesis and the sources utilised are 
outlined in the final section of this chapter.  
 
Labour in Malaysia’s political economy 
To claim, as Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002:194) do, that ‘[t]he primary focus of 
colonial labor policy in Malaysia was the elimination of communist…unions and 
the establishment of compliant and “responsible” unions’, is to understate the 
complexity of labour-related arrangements undertaken by the colonial 
administration. Emerson 1964, Parmer 1960 and Stenson 1970 are amongst those 
who offer more critical accounts of the introduction of industrial relations (IR), 
employment, immigration and social welfare legislation in colonial Malaya. 
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plantation owners, local British administrators, the Colonial Office in London 
and the Government of India and the resultant impact of their varied interests on 
the formation of policy and the extent to which policy became practise.  
 
For example, Rudner (1994:349) suggests that prior to WWII, ‘the main 
objective of labour policy had been to encourage an adequate inflow of 
immigrant workers for Malaya’s expanding economy, with the Labour 
Department acting as “protector” of labour from the more obvious social and 
economic evils’ (see also Parmer 1960:249-253). The earlier efforts at 
‘protecting’ labour, such as the 1923 Labour Ordinance, were undertaken largely 
at the request of the sending governments and had a limited impact on worker 
welfare (Ramasamy 1994). 
 
While legislation played a role, as Daud 1977a, Kaur 2004a and Lee 1989 
explain, a range of local level controls were exerted over labour, which, in 
addition to the vulnerability of workers to deportation, effectively constrained 
industrial action, apart from sporadic localised uprisings particularly during 
economic downturns and periods of inflation. Workers were often geographically 
isolated, ethnically segregated and trapped in dependent socio-cultural 
hierarchical relationships that involved debts and bonds.  
 
In summary, this approximates what Burawoy (1985, chapter three) described as 
a despotic labour regime, a system of labour control that rested largely on 
physical coercion and income insecurity. Burawoy (1985) explains how, under 
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are reduced to the point of being inadequate to support social reproduction (see 
also Peck 1996:36). Further, Wolfson (2002) notes the tendency for an economic 
crisis of under-consumption when labour’s conditions fall too low. Neither of 
these concerns is directly addressed in the historical works mentioned above but 
enough clues are provided to develop at least a partial answer as to how capital 
accumulation was sustained despite the appalling conditions experienced by 
labour. Colonial Malaya was not a closed labour market; an essential role of the 
colonial authorities was to oversee the importation of fresh labour supplies and 
the repatriation of excess and ‘decrepit’ workers. Labour shortages did occur, 
which encouraged employers to hoard some labour during economic downturns 
in readiness for an upswing, but by and large, the crisis foreseen by Burawoy as a 
result of despotic labour conditions did not emerge. Neither was there a crisis of 
under-consumption.  
 
The reasons for this are found in the particular characteristics of the economy at 
that point, and in the means through which labour’s reproduction was funded. 
Malaya’s economy was geared towards natural resource extraction for export. 
The colony’s earnings came in the main from taxation on imports and exports. 
There was little in the way of local production for the market.  
The export sector in British Malaya was unusual in that it did not 
depend on the indigenous subsistence sector for any essential 
inputs. Tin and rubber, the principal exports, were produced by 
imported labor subsisting on imported rice (Kratoska 1982:282). 
 
The majority of the colony’s rice needs were usually able to be imported at 
relatively little cost in comparison with the prices gained for tin and rubber 
exports (Kratoska 1982; Rudner 1979). For the most part, domestic consumption 
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1 Exposing the 
immigrant labour force to the vagaries of the market did not, at this point in 
history, generate economic or political instability. To the contrary, the prevailing 
economic and political circumstances supported rather than being destabilised by 
the low wage regime. In the social relations of the colonial economy, the role of 
the immigrant labour force was effectively reduced to that of ‘worker’, allowing 
insecurity to function effectively as ‘the main tool of capitalist control over 
labour’ (Picchio 1992:58).  
 
However, these underlying economic conditions were changed by political 
interventions. In the late 1930s, the degree of exploitation of Indian workers 
caused the Government of India to impose a ban on further labour transportation. 
Immigrant workers were then encouraged to settle permanently within Singapore 
and Malaya to guarantee the future labour force. This raised issues regarding 
food self sufficiency and land distribution (Kratoska 1982; Rudner 1979). A 
greater proportion of the labour force was able to participate in other social and 
economic roles, engaging in household formation and placing a strain on existing 
amenities, particularly food, housing, health and education resources. The 
reliance on repression and coercion alone became less tenable, politically and 
economically. The destablising pressures foreseen by Burawoy (1985) came to 
the fore and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) grew in strength.  
 
In the post-WWII era the British sought to eradicate the MCP through a military 
offensive known as the Emergency (1948-1960), and through amendments to the 
                                                 
1 There are some important exceptions to this that are raised in the following chapter.  
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existing unions illegal. However, it was a much debated decision amongst those 
in the colonial administration whether or not to allow any further unions to form 
(Stenson 1970:140-141). The election of a post-war Labour government in 
Britain was an influential factor in this decision. So too was the ability to exploit 
ethnic identity by encouraging Indian leadership of the moderate trade union 
movement established in 1950, ‘…because of the belief that unions peopled by 
the smallest and last influential of the ethnic groups would not pose a threat to 
industry’ (Chin 2000:1041).  
 
Forced into greater reliance on the local labour force, increased public 
expenditure was allocated to health and there was increasing evidence of 
plantation employers paying a maternity allowance (Manderson 1999:105). The 
authorities entered into often acrimonious discussions with employers over 
arrangements to fund labour’s social reproduction in order to ensure a future 
labour supply and food supplies, and to contain political activism (Rudner 1994; 
White 1998). To fund the campaign against the MCP, which included the 
provision of housing and amenities for incarcerated Chinese squatters in ‘new 
villages’, and the re-housing of estate and mining workers so they could be more 
closely watched, corporation taxation was imposed on an unwilling business 
community (White 1998). A levy of five per cent of employee salaries was also 
imposed on employers by way of contributing to a retirement fund for low 
income workers, thus creating in 1951 the Employee’s Provident Fund (EPF). 
This was followed closely by the employer-funded Workmen’s Compensation 
Act in 1952. The pooled resources of the EPF were to be available to the 
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(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1955:201-202). While 
Chin (2000:1041) describes the ‘decolonization process…[as]…marked by 
contestation over which ethnic group would eventually assume control of the 
state apparatus and the country’, less frequently mentioned is the extent to which 
it was marked by debate over the future funding of labour’s social reproduction.  
 
In the period following political Independence in 1957, UMNO dominated the 
coalition of ethnically-based parties called the Alliance. Having few economic 
resources, however, UMNO was forced to a significant extent to allow foreign, 
mainly British, and domestic Chinese capital to organise accumulation. What 
little funding was directed towards poverty alleviation was focused on increasing 
the productivity of the agricultural sector in which the majority of the Malay 
population were located. Hasan (1980:32) notes, however, that most of these 
projects had long gestational periods and coincided with a downturn in 
commodity prices. They did little to improve household incomes in that sector 
through the 1960s. Meanwhile the small but growing urban Malay population 
expressed dissatisfaction with their degree of access to the business sector (Kahn 
1999).  
 
Ethnic rioting in 1969 led to the suspension of the Parliament and a declaration 
of Emergency until 1971. However, as Jomo and Gomez (1999) explain, the 
economy in 1969 was not under any immediate threat. Rather, the May 1969 
events heralded ‘the political exhaustion of the economic system…’ (Jesudason 
1989:74). By way of accounting for this, Missen (1986:84-86) and Stenson 
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hence the structure of the Alliance was fundamentally flawed. The value of their 
analysis is that it exposes, amongst other economic and political shortcomings, 
the inability of the government to regulate labour’s social reproduction to the 
degree that met societal expectations. There was in particular a disjuncture 
between the claims of UMNO to represent the Malays and its ability to achieve 
that outcome. 
 
Resolution took the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP), released in 1971. 
The NEP represented an expansion in the institutional capacity of the 
government. Social policies and economic development became linked 
institutionally and ideologically, initiating a process that would eventually see 
the embedding of an economic paternalism that was still in its infancy in the 
1960s. The political leadership justified the government’s expanded economic 
role as necessary to ensuring social and political stability. As argued by the 
newly installed Prime Minister, the societal divisions that threatened Malaysia’s 
future were caused by the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity 
amongst the three main ethnic groups.
2 ‘The Malay community saw state 
sponsorship and assistance as essential forms of protection given their historical 
experience of exclusion from the modern sector of the Malaysian economy’ 
(Khoo 1995:104). Structural changes in the financial sector enhanced the 
government’s control over the banking and finance sectors, while oil revenues in 
the post 1975 period delivered greater financial resources with which to 
                                                 
2 This view was not shared amongst all the coalition partners. Heng (1997) provides a particularly 
useful account of the efforts by members of the Malaysian Chinese Association, including the 
then Minister of Finance, to tone down both the language and the policies that emerged with the 
NEP. 
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expanding the pool of domestic funds available to the government. Importantly, 
this avoided the need to impose a higher rate of taxation which would have 
risked further alienating Malaysian Chinese on whom the burden would have 
fallen most.  
 
This description of the NEP, and the more detailed discussion in later chapters, 
seeks to expose the mechanisms within it that acted to contain potential conflicts 
associated with directing greater support to the social reproduction of Malay 
labour. Importantly, NEP policies were imposed without seriously undermining 
Chinese capital (Heng 1997) or reducing employment opportunities for non-
Malays. In sharp contrast, one factor contributing to the demise of Fordism as the 
regime of accumulation in the United States was the degree of political 
resentment generated by the use of income taxation to fund the rising costs of 
welfare. In stark contrast, Malaysia’s system of welfare has delivered funds to 
the government. 
 
Malaysia’s Free Trade Zones (FTZs) have attracted considerable academic 
attention (McGee et al. 1986; Kelly 2002). Researchers have exposed the 
repression of unions within the FTZs (Barnard 1992; Casperz 1998; Kuruvilla 
1996). Importantly though, this repression did not rely on the use of overt 
physical force (Barraclough 1985). The government was careful to justify its 
actions in ways that were consistent with its paternalistic role towards Malay 
labour (Ariffin and Lochhead 1988; Bhopal 1997). FTZs are also locations where 
the Government sought to create modern sector employment opportunities for 
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the state could pursue NEP objectives by imposing restrictions on foreign 
employers that required them to adopt employment quotas that favoured Malays. 
‘The promotion of free trade zones and the pursuit of the NIC strategy can be 
seen as a response to…growing discontent and stratification in the countryside’ 
(Johnston 1997:399). In this way Malaysia’s participation in international 
economic relations has been influenced by an institutionalised compromise 
forged through the attempt to manage state-labour relations.  
 
The participation of women in Malaysia’s FTZs has been considered the 
outcome of a deliberate development strategy to deliver low cost labour to 
MNCs (Casperz 1998). Yet, while firms in the FTZs initially attracted large 
numbers of younger, rural, Malay women into the non-agricultural labour force, 
Chin (1998, 2000) concludes this was a situation largely unexpected by the 
Malaysian government which was, at the time, more concerned about high rates 
of male unemployment. There was little institutional support for women’s 
participation in paid employment despite MNC preferences for relatively low-
cost female labour. The resulting stagnation of women’s labour force 
participation rates suggests that women’s role in the economy is less the outcome 
of policies pursued by a ‘developmental state’ and more the product of a 
government unable to negotiate conflicting ethno-cultural, political and 
economic concerns. 
 
In the early 1980s, newly elected Prime Minister Mahathir appeared impatient 
with the extent of economic and societal restructuring. He involved his 
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heavy industry. This period is generally portrayed as one in which the 
government cracked down heavily on ‘labour’ (Ayadurai 1993; Jomo and Todd 
1994). But Khoo’s (1995) apt description of the ‘paradoxes’ of Mahathirism 
more closely captures the reality. Amendments to employment and industrial 
relations legislation introduced in 1980 reflected both Mahathir’s paternalism 
towards Malay labour and his antipathy towards the union movement. There is 
little doubt that Mahathir was acting against organised labour, as evidenced by 
the 1980 amendments to the Trades Union Act and the Industrial Relations Act, 
but entitlements for lower paid workers were improved in the amendments to the 
Employment Act. It was not a coincidence that they were introduced as Malays 
increased their participation in waged labour. In the rush to depict Mahathir as 
anti-labour this paternalism has been overlooked, yet it provides another example 
of UMNO’s attempts to manage its relationship with the Malay workforce in 
ways mediated by political expediencies. Cognisant of this, Ariffin (1997:53) 
explains the legislative push for in-house unions as a compromise position rather 
than an all out attack against the union movement. The government was certainly 
hoping to retain legislative control over the union movement, and was keen to 
present such an image to foreign investors, but it ultimately did so in a manner 
less likely to generate direct confrontation between the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Malay labour or Malay union officials.  
 
A number of labour geographers (Coe and Kelly 2002; Jonas 1996; Kelly 2001a, 
2002) have examined FTZs as specific locations where local labour and 
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which foreign firms relied on local factors in order to control labour.  
…labour control is actually a process that is constituted in the 
relationships at multiple scales between various dimensions of 
local capital, the local state, family units, and individual workers. 
Thus, while the demands of global capital provide the ideological 
justification for the suppression of labor rights, it is within highly 
localized and geographically differentiated systems of repression 
that labor control is constituted, and not just in the direct 
relationship between global capital and local labor (Kelly 
2001a:2). 
 
Kelly’s (2002) study of industrial workers in Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines highlights a ‘spatialized politics of labour’. This approach is 
particularly useful for identifying mechanisms of control that operate to 
physically divide and isolate workers, either as individuals, or as employees of 
separate workplaces or industrial parks, thus encouraging in-house as opposed to 
industrial unions, and fostering ethnic rather than class identification. Where 
workers might congregate outside of the workplace, the provision of company 
housing or social activities restricts the possibility of politically motivated 
collective action.  
 
By extending their reach into local communities, employers have divided 
workers and diluted antagonisms through the provision of concessions such as 
health and financial services, transportation and education facilities, and 
scholarships. Backing up these mechanisms are institutional arrangements 
including influence over high-school curricula and the tacit approval by local-
level government authorities to ignore the illegal exclusion of union 
representatives. Utilising local power networks and reinforcing existing 
stereotypes of gender and ethnicity, firms can institute effective control over the 
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norms.  
Gendered regimes of control within the factory setting are not 
only constructed by MNCs, but are produced in relation to 
localized social power relations and inequalities (namely, 
ethnicity and class) that are, ultimately, the product of political 
construction… (Elias 2005:206). 
 
The types of labour control mechanisms that emerge with this local level 
approach are therefore ‘not necessarily…brutally coercive’ (Kelly 2001a:13) and 
this goes some way to explaining why they were able to be implemented and 
sustained.  
 
The absence of unions and limited industrial disputation is not cited as evidence 
of an absence of conflict or as the result of repressive industrial relations. 
Instead, Kelly’s (2002) examination indicates that conflict has been mediated, 
partially through the [mis]application of industrial relations legislation and 
workplace controls, but also through the imposition of controls over sites of 
labour’s social reproduction consistent with existing societal values. ‘It is 
precisely the prevention of labour collectivity that constitutes the politics of 
labour in such circumstances’ (Kelly 2002:408).  
 
The relevance of this discussion to the development of a theoretical approach 
that seeks to highlight the contradictory nature of labour’s participation in 
capitalist societies is two fold. Firstly, as emphasised by Kelly, levels of 
industrial disputation are not the only indicator of labour-related conflict. This 
sounds a cautionary note regarding the claimed dominance of industrial relations 
legislation in ‘successfully controlling’ labour to achieve industrial peace. 
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managing labour through the extension of controls over sites of labour’s social 
reproduction. Acknowledging that such efforts are ongoing, and that they 
contribute to the prevention of conflict, foregrounds the conflictual nature of 
labour’s social reproduction within capitalist economies.  
 
The mediations that prove effective in managing these conflicts are culturally, 
geographically and temporally specific and require local or company level 
studies to be exposed as such (Chan and Kelly 2004:129). However, as Elias 
(2005:206) also notes; ‘…one needs to acknowledge the role of the state in the 
construction of gendered and racialised labour markets for productive labour’. 
The meso-level rather than workplace focus of this thesis, identifies institutional 
and ideological structures, mediations and processes that are played out at the 
national level which may prove useful to employers in the management of 
conflict. However, they may also present obstacles. For example, while foreign 
employers in many instances welcomed the willingness of the Malaysian 
Government to repress independent unionisation, particular businesses have 
expressed resentment at the Government’s imposition of ethnic based 
employment quotas.  
 
In contrast to these observations, Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1995:174) conclude:  
In sum, it is clear…[the] state’s role as an employer and its 
dependence on foreign investment for its manufacturing, 
particularly in its most important electronics industry, has created 
a labour relations system that is repressive and government-
dominated. The shift from ISI to EOI was the primary catalyst for 
the tightening of labour relations policies, and the specific cost 
containment policies were determined by the government in 
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dependent. 
 
This position is developed further in Kuruvilla (1996), and Kuruvilla and 
Erickson (2002). In summary, with reference to Malaysia specifically, the 
authors argue: 
There is a consensus in the literature that the demands of the 
export-oriented strategy and the need to continually attract foreign 
investment were the prime motivations for the government’s 
repressive IR policy (Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002:195). 
 
Their conclusions can be contested in a number of ways. Firstly, Kuruvilla 
(1996:646) makes only a brief mention of the complex socio-political 
arrangements necessary to the government’s ability to implement a repressive 
industrial relations regime. Secondly, while arguing the dominant factors in 
determining the nature of industrial relations systems are economic, the authors 
acknowledge 
that there have been many differences in the ways the various 
Asian nations sought to attain this goal of industrial peace…And 
[sic] it is also true that the goal of maintaining labor peace was 
influenced strongly by political considerations in some countries 
(Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002:175).  
 
These comparative variations and the political considerations that have 
contributed to them deserve to be given much more consideration before an 
assumption can be made regarding causal linkages. For example, in contrast to 
the dependent relationship between the Malaysian Government and foreign 
employers described by Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002), Jesudason (1989:167-
168) argues that foreign firms provided an important source of investment 
funding and employment and also delivered UMNO a level of independence 
from domestic Chinese capital.  
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economic growth, attract foreign investment and retain the support of voters, 
have impacted on the nature of labour-related legislation. The political 
implications of ignoring constituents were made only too clear in the 1969 riots. 
‘As an electoral regime, the pressure of mass demands could not be so easily 
dismissed as in more authoritarian societies’ (Jesudason 1989:168). In focusing 
on industrial relations legislation alone, Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002) have 
overlooked the complexities of state-labour relations and given little 
consideration to the role of the state other than its presumed ability to impose a 
repressive industrial relations environment on behalf of foreign capital.  
 
Given that a wide range of government institutions have responsibility for 
different aspects of labour’s social reproduction, there is considerable 
opportunity for their mediations to run counter to those preferred by various 
fractions of capital. Another example of this, expanded upon in a later chapter, 
relates to public higher education. The Ministry of Education
3 embodies a range 
of political and socio-cultural compromises in existence since Independence but 
further strengthened in the NEP era. These compromises served at the time to 
contain Malay nationalism, for example by requiring the use of Malay language 
rather than English in the education system. This has since resulted in Malay 
graduates lacking attributes preferred by private sector employers. State-labour 
compromises that have emerged outside of employment relations have, therefore, 
generated tensions in state-capital relations. The inability to resolve those 
tensions is one indicator of the extent to which UMNO remains beholden not 
                                                 
3 In 2004, the Ministry of Education was restructured resulting in a separated Ministry of Higher 
Education with the continuing Ministry of Education responsible for non-tertiary public 
education. 
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society who also benefit in various, if uneven, ways from the government’s 
continued interventions in the economy.  
 
The critical studies above incorporate ‘those social and institutional 
considerations which orthodox economics [and industrial relations] shunts into 
the background’ (Peck 1996:16). This complex array of institutional, political, 
socio-cultural and macroeconomic factors in various ways contribute to a more 
complete understanding of why and how labour’s participation in Malaysia’s 
political economy has generated tensions and conversely, how it has been 
sustainable and reproducible over some decades. The question becomes how to 
harness these approaches to an examination of the shifting nature of the 
attempted mediations developed historically through and by the institutions of 
the state in response to the many layers of tension and conflict arising in 
response to labour’s social reproduction under capitalist relations.  
 
Régulation theory and systems of labour control 
Many analysts have searched for the mechanisms that support the reproduction, 
transformation or adaptation of capitalist societies. For Polanyi (1947), this was 
the ‘double movement’ in which civil society emerged as a counter measure 
against the worst injustices of the market, allowing the emergence of social 
protections. In contrast, Gramsci (1971:80) argued that the institutions of the 
state expanded and extended, creating ‘civil society’ and thereby providing a 
platform from which the political elite were able to exercise hegemonic control, 
reinforced where necessary by the coercive apparatus of state institutions. 
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that  
…instead of destroying itself, as classical Marxism had predicted, 
capitalism had created institutions and organizations in the space 
between state and economy that prolonged its existence, 
containing and absorbing the contradictions…. 
 
If classical Marxism is based on an evaluation that capitalism sows the seeds of 
its own destruction on the path to socialism, then régulation theory (RT), in 
positing reasons for the ability of capitalism to reproduce itself despite its 
inherent contradictions, is perhaps better classified as neo-Marxist. 
 
RT emerged out of Aglietta’s (1987 [1979]) search for the factors that 
underpinned post-war economic growth in the United States. Fordism, as a 
regime of accumulation, was regulated by a labour-capital accord in which wage 
demands were argued collectively and linked to productivity, guaranteeing a 
level of stability in the rate of profit. In return, labour received job security and 
access to consumer finance which, in combination with prevailing ideologies of 
progress and growth, facilitated increased domestic consumption and household 
formation. There was therefore a degree of separation of labour’s reproduction 
from the market, a role performed by the US variant of the welfare state and by 
tariffs that protected domestic production. The level of support for labour’s 
reproduction stimulated mass consumption and supported mass production in the 
protected domestic market, at least for a time (Boyer 2000:280).  
 
In regulationist terms, the demise of Fordism in the US is attributed to an 
economic failure compounded by the inability of the social and institutional 
forms of régulation to secure a new regime of accumulation. Capital suffered a 
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pressures outpaced improvements in productivity. Wages were therefore 
increasingly depicted as a production cost rather than as a stimulus to production 
through increased consumption. As described by Lipietz (1987a:34), ‘the 
potential of the regime of accumulation has been exhausted given the prevailing 
mode of regulation’. The institutional structures that had developed in support of 
Fordist social values, such as tripartitism and a strong organised labour 
movement, largely prevented attempts by capital to reorganise employment 
relations such that labour costs could be lowered. Particular fractions of capital 
therefore searched off-shore for opportunities to relocate labour intensive 
manufacturing thus interrupting the coherence of the nexus between productivity 
and wages at the national level.  
 
Since the late 1970s, RT has developed so that it is more truly a range of 
approaches than one theory. However, all of these approaches are underpinned 
by a central focus on explaining the adaptive capacity of capitalist societies 
despite their inherent contradictions:  
…the most fundamental question raised by regulation theory was: 
how can capitalism, as a highly fragmented society characterized 
by competing and struggling individuals, enterprises, and opposite 
classes, be stable at all and how does it reproduce itself? (Hirsch 
2000:103).  
 
In asking such a question, functionalism looms. Looking back at an historical 
period it is possible to identify the features that gave balance to an era. It would 
be flawed however to assume that an outcome occurred because of the 
functionality it provided (Robles 1994:84). As noted by Deyo (1987:193), ‘…the 
functions of social phenomena do not explain their causal origins’. It is necessary 
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which they emerged. Here the French meaning of the word ‘régulation’ is 
important. As applied in RT, it refers to the ‘dynamic equilibration of complex 
systems’ (Delorme 2001:1) and it therefore differs from the more limited use of 
the word ‘regulation’ in English.  
 
Regulationists analyse economies at varying levels of abstraction, the most 
abstract being the mode of production, of which capitalism is an example (Boyer 
and Saillard 2002:38). Less abstract is the regime of accumulation, which can be 
understood as, ‘a complementary pattern of production and consumption which 
is reproducible over a long period’ (Jessop 1993:330). Five institutional forms 
coalesce under particular conditions to define a regime of accumulation; these 
are, money and credit, competition, the socio-technical system, forms of state 
intervention, and international economic relations (Guttmann 2002:57). Long 
term econometric data are utilised in determining the relative contribution of 
each of these forms to accumulation. Contributing to the maintenance of the 
regime of accumulation is a meso-level concept, the mode of régulation: 
A mode of regulation is a set of mediations which ensure that the 
distortions created by the accumulation of capital are kept within 
limits which are compatible with social cohesion within each 
nation (Aglietta 1998:44, emphasis added).  
 
The ‘mode of régulation’ is the concept most relevant to this thesis and therefore 
receives more consideration below.  
 
Institutions represent the history of previous compromises or mediations between 
the conflicting and contradictory pressures inevitably exerted within capitalist 
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outcomes of societal conflict and its mediation.  
Institutionalised compromises result from situations of tension 
and conflict between socio-economic groups over a long period, 
at the conclusion of which a form of organisation is established, 
creating rules, rights and obligations for those involved. 
Institutionalised compromises act as frameworks in relation to 
which the population and groups involved adapt their behaviour 
and strategies; their founding principles remain unchanged over 
the long term. These types of arrangements prove to be 
particularly resistant to change and exert a decisive influence over 
public intervention (André 2002:95). 
 
In regulating labour, and capitalist social relations in general, the role of the 
national form of the state is considered vital. However, the ‘state’ is not 
perceived as guaranteeing capitalism. Conflicts shape state institutions, meaning 
the role undertaken by the state in the régulation of labour is contingent, not pre-
determined by the ‘needs’ of capital. This contingency becomes one of the 
factors that generate further contradictions as different aspects are overseen by a 
number of institutions. These may act in a contradictory fashion, creating 
institutional mismatches that can themselves generate further political and 
economic instability. Therefore, the institutions of the state are considered as 
possessing their own social and economic logic in the sense of being locations in 
which, and through which, compromises become embedded or institutionalised, 
which may or may not be compatible with the demands of production regimes 
(Hirsch 2000:104; Nadel 2002:34 citing Theret 1992).  
 
This acknowledgement makes more apparent the potential for conflict between 
various government bodies and particular fractions of capital in issues of labour 
control. The resolution of crises is contingent upon historically specific factors 
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while a number of countries may exhibit similar levels of technological and 
industrial development, it does not necessarily follow that each will share 
common state-labour-capital relations (Lipietz 1987a:47).  
 
National and international pressures 
One of the more detailed critiques of the various practitioners of RT has been 
produced by Robles (1994). He suggests that RT theorists faced a dilemma in 
focusing so heavily on the role of the national form of the state in an era 
characterised by internationalisation. He questioned the ability of a mode of 
régulation to emerge and be effective given the porous boundaries of a nation 
state. Probably the most sustained critique of RT, however, has come from 
within the RT school itself (Grahl and Teague 2000). Boyer (1996, 2000, 2005), 
Aglietta (2000) and Lipietz (1995, 1997), for example, have all provided 
reconsiderations of their earlier assumptions and conclusions in response to the 
greater preponderance of multinational firms and the internationalisation of 
financial markets particularly.  
 
According to Hirsch (2000:105-106), however, ‘…the connection of “national” 
with “international” accumulation and regulation…depends upon social 
processes and conflicts unfolding at the national level’. Therefore, even while 
these processes and conflicts are themselves subject to international pressures, it 
is within the institutional framework provided by the national form of the state 
that a mediation of conflict is attempted. Furthermore, the history of previous 
compromises, being the outcome of political processes that may be far less 
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responding to international pressures (Vidal 2002:114).  
 
As an illustration, Boyer (1996) identifies trends emerging in industrial relations 
and wage bargaining arrangements that can be linked to international pressures, 
but he nonetheless observes that particular governments have responded in 
different ways to such pressures. As is argued here with reference to Malaysia, 
openness to the international economy has provided options as well as 
constraints. Political leaders have developed powerful ideological responses to 
justify closing off certain aspects of the economy to international competition 
while simultaneously arguing the requirement to be internationally competitive 
as the basis for structural reforms in other economic sectors. For example, the 
Malaysian Government has been subject to pressure to allow greater 
participation by foreign firms in professional services under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). To date the government is resisting 
this pressure as a means of protecting the Malay professional services sector in 
which it has invested considerable resources and political credibility. In contrast, 
demands by the union movement for a national minimum wage have been 
rejected on the basis that it will introduce rigidities into the labour market that 
will discourage foreign investors.  
 
There is, as is further discussed by Boyer (1996), an observed discrepancy 
between the claims made by governments to various actors in the international 
community regarding future policy directions, and their eventual ability to 
convert these claims into domestic policies. With regard to the future of 
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distinguish intents and statements from actual practices and transformations’. 
Again, Malaysia provides a clear example of a mismatch between stated 
intention and practice. In accounting for this, institutionally embedded political 
mediations, many of which emerged through the NEP, have since presented 
obstacles to the government’s ability to respond to demands by employer groups 
or international agencies. While international pressures clearly exist, they are 
negotiated within a national institutional framework in a manner shaped by 
domestic political and economic imperatives. Therefore, state institutions remain 
important locations in which competing pressures act upon existing mechanisms 
of mediation. However it is acknowledged that ‘…the particular relationship with 
the international political economy influences policy options and functions as a 
direct and indirect pressure on the state’s ability to respond to societal pressures’ 
(Schmidt 1998:41). This tension is discussed later with regard to the economic 
ability and political willingness of the Malaysian government to continue to fund 
subsidised health services, discounted consumer prices and other goods, the 
withdrawal of which poses domestic political risks.  
 
The wage-labour nexus, systems of labour control and social regulation 
The concept of a wage-labour nexus is central to RT. Boyer (1990:38) has 
defined the wage-labour nexus as:  
the type of means of production; the social and technical division 
of labour; the ways in which workers are attracted and retained by 
the firm; the direct and indirect determinants of wage income; and 
lastly, the workers’ way of life.  
Controls extended over labour at the point of production and in sites of labour’s 
social reproduction are encapsulated within this definition.  
  41For  régulation theory the wage-labour nexus is defined by the 
complementarity of the institutions framing the employment 
contract and their compatibility with the current mode of 
régulation. As a result, the wage-labour nexus varies historically 
and geographically, with configurations that differ according to 
economic performance (Boyer 2002:72). 
 
The differentiation between the goals of this thesis and the notion of a wage-
labour nexus is one of focus. Firstly, RT attempts to define ‘brands’ of capitalism 
based on various combinations of the regime of accumulation and the mode of 
régulation (Boyer 2005).
4 This requires the compilation of extensive economic 
data relating to all aspects of the economy. As I have focused only on state-
labour relations and thus excluded capital to an extent, this precludes my use of 
RT terms such as the mode of régulation given that I am only exploring a portion 
of possible contributions. 
 
Secondly, efforts undertaken by governments in managing labour’s social 
reproduction to an important degree take place in institutions not directly linked 
to production, for example, through government ministries responsible for 
education, health, welfare, housing, finance, and national unity. There is, 
therefore, ‘…no guarantee of conformity between accumulation possibilities and 
the actual regulation mode’ (Grahl and Teague 2000:161-162). This thesis, rather 
than ‘proving’ the economic contribution of features comprising the mode of 
regulation, instead makes concrete those occasions where ‘conformity’ is lacking 
and highlights specific actions by particular government agencies or political 
figures that run contrary to the demands of accumulation. This addresses to an 
extent the concerns raised by Elgar and Edwards (1999:5) that RT ‘tends to 
                                                 
4 These are ‘market oriented’, ‘meso-corporatist’, ‘statist’ and ‘social-democratic’. The 
characteristics of each is provided in Boyer 2005:530-532, citing Amable et al. 1997. 
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periods of growth and to relegate conflict to moments of transition between 
regimes of accumulation’.  
 
Deyo and Agartan (2003:56) define labour systems as: 
the institutionalized social processes through which particular 
types of labor are socially reproduced, protected, mobilized and 
allocated via markets or other social arrangements into productive 
activities, managed and motivated at sites of production, and 
valorized into profit or surplus.  
 
This definition is similar to that of the wage labour nexus. Deyo and Agartan 
(2003) extend their focus beyond the workplace to acknowledge that sites of 
labour’s social reproduction provide an opportunity for exerting control. The 
basis of the typology of labour systems is the production regime. For example, 
Deyo (2001) suggests labour system s in South-east Asian economies can be 
termed ‘developmental’, to explain the re-orientation of labour controls away 
from the earlier political imperatives of nation building and towards ‘economic 
strategies and initiatives’ (2001:265). This, Deyo observes, was particularly 
evident during the shift towards export oriented industrialisation (EOI) which 
required an inflow of foreign investment and exposed previously protected 
industries to international pressures. Deyo and Agartan (2003:56) argue, 
therefore, that labour systems ‘harness society to the requirements of economic 
accumulation’.  
 
Suarez (2001:57) claims that Deyo (2001) fails to  
emphasize that labor control strategies are not only associated 
with the requirements of a new economic strategy, but follow a 
political logic that in many cases represents a continuation of 
prior labor relations policies.  
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In terms of methodology, Deyo offers a more politically nuanced account of 
labour control strategies than is suggested by Suarez and this is particularly 
apparent in the more recent work (Deyo and Agartan 2003). Tensions and strains 
within institutions become the drivers of change as governments, responding to 
global economic pressures, attempt to implement labour reforms. These in turn 
generate political dissatisfaction for which some level of accommodation is 
required in order to regain stability. The resolution of these tensions, if such is 
reached at all, and the nature of that resolution, is politically and economically 
contingent. The description of transformative political processes as emphasised 
by Deyo and Agartan (2003) avoids the functionalism of claiming that the state 
acts in certain ways because it is necessary to the regime of accumulation. Hence 
their critical political economy approach, while qualitative, has a theoretical 
consistency with that of RT without recourse to the need for extensive 
econometric data. I believe their qualitative critical political economy approach 
to be particularly useful in the study of the situation in Malaysia and it has, 
therefore, been adopted in the arguing of this thesis.  
 
However, Deyo and Agartan’s (2003) definition of a labour system is geared 
towards the needs of a production regime. In contrast, this thesis, firstly, 
examines the many occasions where the ‘harnessing of society to accumulation’ 
is  loosened rather than effected by the mediations organised through state 
institutions. Secondly, motivations other than the demands of production are 
highlighted for the interventions by government in capital-labour conflicts. For 
example, Deyo’s (2001:266) focus leads him to conclude that the ‘…twin 
pressures of cost-containment on the one hand, and multi-national locational 
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stringent constraints on labour’. However, as a later chapter of this thesis 
outlines, even as organised labour was more tightly constrained, the Malaysian 
government acted in other social policy areas in an attempt to contain and 
ameliorate the impact of the repression. The political elite in Malaysia, 
particularly in the post-NEP era, were conscious of the need to retain political 
legitimacy. Even where capital has been permitted to impose a high degree of 
workplace control or exploitation, the government has attempted to limit the 
social and political backlash through other arenas.  
 
Therefore, while the critical political economy approach as outlined above is 
adopted, the focus is on the state’s institutional capacity to regulate labour’s 
social reproduction. This refers not only to the shaping of labour for employment 
but necessarily includes labour’s participation in political processes and labour’s 
contribution to consumption demand and sources of state funding. These are 
factors which provide the opportunity to highlight the contradictory requirements 
of labour demanded by particular state institutions and various fractions of 
capital.  
 
Peck (1996:17) uses the term ‘social regulation’ to encompass a dialectical 
relationship between the market, government action, societal processes, 
behaviours and norms that ‘begins not by abstracting labor from its social 
context but by concentrating on the ways in which it is embedded in and shaped 
by that context’. Overall, Peck’s goals are not those of this thesis as he seeks to 
provide an analysis of the social regulation of the labour market. However, his 
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the approach being developed here. Firstly, Peck notes the inherent 
contradictions between the processes of labour’s social reproduction and the 
processes of capital accumulation, and secondly, the relative autonomy of the 
sphere of labour’s social reproduction from the sphere of production. This leads 
thirdly, to his conclusion that:  
Pressures for regulation do not necessarily result in effective 
regulation. The plethora of ways in which the state alone exerts an 
influence on labor regulation – through the framework of 
employment legislation, structure of the welfare and education 
systems, policy interventions in industrial training and labor 
market programs, regulation of marital and family life – are likely 
to be associated with a myriad of intended and unintended 
consequences…state intervention should be seen as not only 
problem-solving but problem-creating (Peck 1996:41, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Therefore, while usefully acknowledging the importance of institutions, in 
emphasising the contingency of institutional forms and responses, Peck’s 
approach ultimately delivers a conflict-centred analysis. This serves one of the 
goals of this thesis which is to highlight the contradictory nature of labour’s 
participation in Malaysia’s political economy despite the effective subjugation of 
organised labour politically and industrially.  
 
Throughout the thesis, rather than attempting to identify a complete ‘mode of 
régulation’, which has a broader meaning in RT than this thesis can encompass, I 
will instead refer to components which would contribute to the mode of 
régulation. These are referred to as ‘structural forms’, ‘mediations’ and 
‘institutionalised compromises’ (Grahl and Teague 2002:161; see also Elgar and 
Edwards 1999). Rather than a system of labour control, or the wage–labour 
nexus, reference will be made to the state-labour nexus, understood as a 
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institutional interventions in labour’s social reproduction. 
 
The definition of the state-labour nexus combines the insights of the literature 
reviewed above with the critical approach of political economy, incorporating the 
spheres of labour’s social reproduction, and RT’s search for the factors that allow 
for an accommodation of the contradictory forces inherent in capitalism. The 
discussion moves now to examine a critical aspect of the state-labour nexus, 
economic paternalism. This term captures the politically motivated, yet 
economically vital, mobilisation and redistribution of state-controlled resources 
and is underpinned by the expansion and extension of the government’s 
institutional capacities in the régulation of labour’s social reproduction.  
 
Economic paternalism  
Jesudason (1996:129) describes the state in Malaysia as having developed a 
‘broad array of economic, ideological, and coercive elements in managing the 
society’. The ‘economic elements’, he suggests (1996:134), are distributed on the 
basis of ‘regime calculations on the electoral pay-offs of these provisions’. This 
section explores how ‘economic elements’ have been mobilised within the state-
labour nexus such that they have not only delivered ‘electoral payoffs’ but 
additionally, so that they have delivered economic benefits, and thus a degree of 
policy autonomy, back to the government. Herein lies the dialectical nature of 
the state-labour nexus,
5 which I have attempted to capture with the term 
                                                 
5 This description was influenced by Peck’s (1996:17) discussion of social regulation as a 
complex dialectic. 
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nature of economic paternalism. 
 
Firstly, rather than income support, various government agencies dispense 
subsidies and low cost finance that have multiplier effects in the economy. These 
have been strategically and successfully utilised by the government under 
Mahathir to generate a significant counter cyclical impact during economic down 
turns. Secondly, low wages are ameliorated by facilitating household 
consumption and home ownership through access to low cost finance, often 
underwritten by the government. This has limited wage inflation but at the same 
time, has supported household consumption, particularly by the expanding 
portion of middle income earners. Thirdly, since the implementation of the NEP, 
the government has drawn on labour’s savings in the EPF in order to fund its 
social re-engineering program. This has been vital in delivering a level of policy 
autonomy by avoiding the political backlash likely to have been generated had 
the government been forced to increase income taxation. The capital mobilisation 
that results has also appeased the concerns of the business sector. 
 
Economic paternalism however, exerts constraints, albeit unevenly, on both the 
giver and receiver of the economic goods being distributed. Its continuation as a 
means of regulating labour is dependent on the capacity of the political elite to 
garner sufficient funds for its politically motivated social spending without 
generating too great a degree of opposition. The nature of the spending must 
also, therefore, be consistent with existing bases of political legitimacy. These 
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characterisation of Malaysia as a ‘developmental state’. 
 
Welfare and development 
Johnson’s (1982) initial claims regarding the ‘developmental state’ have since 
generated a wide range of responses.
6 Essentially, Johnson described Japan’s 
economic rise as the outcome of the government’s active and successful pursuit 
of development while relatively insulated from political pressures and supported 
by a highly skilled bureaucracy. Societal improvements flowed from economic 
growth and from investment in health and education rather than ‘welfare’ 
spending. There are two aspects of the developmental state model that will be 
questioned here with regard to Malaysia. The first regards the extent to which 
social welfare has been subjugated to economic policies. The second relates to 
the extent to which the political leadership and bureaucracy were able to identify 
and implement economic policies free from political pressures.  
 
Historically, the vast majority of what is formally termed ‘social spending’ in 
Malaysia is allocated to education; most of the remainder goes to health and 
housing. Very little of the budget is directed to ‘welfare’ or ‘social security’. This 
suggests that Malaysia can be encapsulated within the developmental welfare 
state model (Kwon 2005) or the productivist welfare model (Holliday 2000), 
each of which is consistent with the developmental state thesis. 
 
                                                 
6 Onis (1991) provides a useful review of the literature as it emerged in the 1980s, including 
Johnson’s original text (1982), as well as contributions by Amsden (1989), Deyo (1987) and 
Wade 1990. In 2004, in the wake of the 1997/8 financial crisis, the concept was redefined as the 
‘adaptive developmental state’ in a special edition of the Journal of East Asian Studies.  
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1965-1985 (per cent) 
  1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 
Economic  63.3 72.3 59.3 57.9 
Social  17.7 13.7 17.6 16.2 
Security  15.7 10.4 20.3 23.8 
General 
administration  3.3 3.6 2.8 2.1 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971:70-71; Government of Malaysia 1976:240-241; 
Government of Malaysia 1981:241-243. Data for 1965-1975 are actual expenditure. Data for 
1976-1980 are revised allocations. Data for 1981-1985 are allocated expenditure. 
 
Table 1.2 Government development spending and allocations to social 
welfare, Malaysia, 1965-1985 (per cent of total allocations) 
  1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 
Education  and  training  7.8 6.9 6.9 7.6 
Health  3.5 1.8 1.7 1.5 
Housing  4.6 2.4 5.5 3.7 
Local authorities and 
welfare  services  1.4 1.4 0.7 0.9 
Village and community 
development -  -  0.6  0.5 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971:70-71; Government of Malaysia 1976:240-241; 
Government of Malaysia 1981:241-243. Data for 1965-1975 are actual expenditure. Data for 
1976-1980 are revised allocations. Data for 1981-1985 are allocated expenditure. 
 
Gough (2001:181) describes Malaysia as an example of ‘productivist welfare 
capitalism’ in that social policy has been ‘subordinated to economic policy and 
the imperatives of growth’. Analysing the impact of the 1997/8 financial crisis, 
Gough (2001:184; 2003:21) observed little evidence of innovation in social 
policy in Malaysia. Being based on a standard definition of ‘social policy’, this 
conclusion does not acknowledge a number of efforts in the early post-crisis 
period that, while not strictly ‘welfare’, nonetheless delivered economic benefits 
to labour as well as being of strategic political importance to the government’s 
relationship with labour.  
 
As is explained in more detail in Chapter Five, income-enhancing initiatives 
were implemented in the post-crisis period that resulted from the leadership 
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Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. On sacking Anwar, who had overseen the 
implementation of an austerity program when the crisis initially emerged, 
Mahathir took on the Finance portfolio himself and brought down an 
expansionary budget that increased the allocations to health and education as 
well as delivering bonus payments to civil servants (Mahathir 1998). This 
assisted in the recovery of the rate of domestic consumption. In 1999, newly 
appointed Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, a long term ally of Mahathir, 
announced a one per cent cut to the rate of personal income taxation (Daim 
1999).  
 
Most discussions of ‘social welfare’ spending are narrowly focused and therefore 
capture only what is strictly termed ‘welfare’ spending. Ramesh (2000:25-26), 
while acknowledging that the quantitative data he presents would be significantly 
altered if he included mandatory employer contributions to retirement benefits 
and workplace injury insurance, chose to focus only on ‘social security, health 
and education’. Data on ‘poverty alleviation’ in Malaysia is difficult to locate 
and far from transparent (Henderson et al. 2002:13-14). Crone (1993:256), for 
example, described the NEP as ‘an almost bewildering series of programs 
intended to extend social welfare’. Therefore, while there are understandable 
reasons for adopting the narrower approach, the conclusions drawn from it fail to 
capture a range of politically motivated yet economically important transfers to 
select sections of society that have contributed to the régulation of labour.  
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economic development, the East Asian region became a ‘social-policy free 
zone’. Chang (1998:88) cites the importance of ‘a range of measures to 
redistribute income’ in stabilising societies, measures that are overlooked in 
discussions that focus narrowly on ‘welfare’. Razavi and Pearson (2004) 
therefore argue for a broadened definition of social policy. 
These states may not have nurtured European style welfare states, 
but they underwrote the low money wages paid to industrial 
workers with a range of implicit or ‘surrogate’ social 
policies…These implicit social policies included extensive land 
reforms, some protection of labour, public housing programmes, 
inter-ethnic income distribution and welfare provisioning by the 
corporate sector (Razavi and Pearson 2004:4). 
 
Early post-NEP development plans (Government of Malaysia 1971, 1976) 
included the extension of low cost loans to farmers and purchases of land by the 
government at market prices then resold to small landholders at heavily 
discounted prices. In the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 (Government of 
Malaysia 2006), funding to the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development in which resides the Department of Welfare, constituted only 0.3 
per cent of the total allocation. Yet the Ministry of Rural and Regional 
Development and the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Cooperative 
Development, which oversee major poverty alleviation projects affecting the 
rural, predominantly Malay population, account for 8.4 per cent of the total 
allocation (Government of Malaysia 2006:530). As Gough (2001:169) notes, 
‘welfare’ is not a positive term in many Asian countries and is more likely to be 
termed ‘development’ spending. 
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Malaysia’s emphasis on funding to education would appear to be consistent with 
the productivist and developmental welfare models. However, the 
accommodation of Malay nationalism and the interests of Malay middle income 
earners have influenced the education system in ways which have made it less 
compatible with the needs of production. The use of Malay language in 
classrooms has produced Malay graduates unable to compete in the private sector 
economy where English language competency is expected. Of the 2.7 per cent of 
GDP allocated to tertiary education, a relatively high 0.6 per cent is directed to 
households in order to fully subsidise the educational and living costs of Malay 
students in public higher education (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
2005:51). In the case of Malaysia’s post-secondary education sector particularly, 
ethno-political influences have shaped education policy and spending such that it 
has not necessarily served the needs of capital nor produced graduates able to 
participate in the economy. An analysis of the ‘politics of social policy’ (Kwon 
2005) alerts us to the need for a more detailed exploration of the quantitative 
data. In particular, we require an understanding of the social and political context 
in which policies emerge. 
 
Gough (2001) does acknowledge that civil servants, including those in Malaysia, 
are in receipt of a relatively generous, publicly-funded pension. He suggests that 
this is a means of ‘securing loyalty’ (see also Ramesh 2000:154-155). It is 
argued here that the relatively favourable employment conditions of civil 
servants continue to exist, and take their particular form, for reasons beyond 
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as well as political reasons.  
 
Since Malaysia’s independence, the civil service, which contributes from ten to 
fourteen per cent of the formal labour force, has been staffed predominantly by 
Malays. There are currently (2006) in total more than one million civil servants 
in a labour force approaching 11 million. Their employment security, publicly 
funded entitlements, and the government’s ability to influence and direct their 
consumption, has ramifications for political stability, economic growth, budget 
financing and counter cyclical economic measures. To an extent, Malaysia’s civil 
servants provide the political leadership with a captive source of household 
consumer spending. The particular uses to which this consumption has been 
directed are described in the following chapters but have included, for example, 
supporting the sales of Malaysia’s first locally manufactured vehicle, the Proton. 
Civil servants are entitled to apply to their employer, the government, for low 
cost car finance. From 1982, approval of the loan became dependent on the 
purchase of a Proton.  
 
This discussion highlights the dialectical nature of economic paternalism. 
Through the auspices of a number of ‘social’ programs, including many that are 
packaged under the NEP and available only to Bumiputera, but including others 
that are available to all ‘consumers’, the government is able to mobilise capital 
and direct private expenditure towards targeted economic sectors. This has 
included residential construction, domestic automobile manufacture, the retail 
sector, particular financial institutions and financial instruments and domestic 
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government’ when delivering these measures, the economic impact has also been 
of vital importance.  
 
State capacity and the politics of social policy 
Ramesh (2000:154) describes the period since the mid 1980s as one in which 
UMNO has tried to distance itself from its traditional role as the ‘only party 
capable of furthering Malays’ interests’. This claim is consistent with the 
discussion of poverty in Malaysia’s most recent five-year plan, Ninth Malaysia 
Plan 2006-2010 (Government of Malaysia 2006) which also indicates an attempt 
to shift social benefits such as subsidies for housing, training and scholarships, 
away from entitlement on the basis of ethnicity, which is becoming increasingly 
expensive, and towards entitlement on the basis of economic need. This would 
result in far fewer households retaining eligibility for subsidies.  
Table 1.3 Government development spending and allocations, Malaysia,  
1985-2010 (per cent) 
 1985-1990 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005  2006-2010
Economic  58.8 50.6 47.6 38.5 44.9 
Social  22.5 24.8 31.6 40.5 37.5 
Security  11.7 20.1 11.8 13.0 10.6 
General 
administration  7.0 4.5 9.0 7.7 6.9 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1996:177, Government of Malaysia 2001:164; Government of 
Malaysia 2006:529. Doling and Omar 2002:38 for 1985-1990. For 1990-2005, data refers to 
actual expenditure. Data for 2006-2010 are allocated expenditure and excludes expected private 
sector commitments. 
 
However, this attempt to shift the basis of legitimacy from being pro-Malay to 
being pro-development has a long history having been a focus of Mahathir’s call 
in 1991 for a Bangsa Malaysia (united Malaysia). Secondly, while the official 
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limited support to the argument that ‘social’ spending is on the decline.  
 
Table 1.4 Government development spending and allocations to social 
welfare,  
Malaysia, 1985-2010 (per cent of total allocations) 
 1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2010 
Education and 
training  13.9 13.4 19.9 25.7 20.6 
Health  1.8 4.4 3.8 5.6 5.3 
Housing  4.9 3.3 3.4 4.1 5.2 
Local authorities 
and welfare 
services 
 
1.3 1.6 3.5 4.1 
Village and 
community 
development 
1.8 
1.0 1.3 1.0 1.1 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1996:177; Government of Malaysia 2001:164; Government of 
Malaysia 2006:529. Doling and Omar 2002:38 for 1985-1990. For 1990-2005, data refer to actual 
expenditure. Data for 2006-2010 are allocated expenditure and excludes expected private sector 
commitments. 
 
Ramesh (2000:155) has argued that the ruling coalition has been able to 
‘maintain an overwhelming dominance over the political system and devise 
policies relatively unencumbered by popular pressures’. Yet the mismatch 
between stated policy goals and practice is more suggestive of a government 
lacking the insulation from competing pressures that has been attributed to 
developmental states. The argument offered by Ramesh (2000) overlooks the 
political and social obstacles that must be overcome in order to shift UMNO’s 
legitimacy away from that of the Malay defender and more clearly towards that 
of a developmental state. Due to the constraints of previously embedded state-
labour compromises, changes have been implemented only in a marginal fashion. 
Policies that indicate a greater commodification of labour, such as the 
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wages, have been introduced only very gradually and in a modified form.
7  
 
The direction of resources to social policies has been attributed by Crone 
(1993:256) to Malaysia’s relatively strong ‘state capacity’. Crone argues that the 
Malaysian government has broad coalitions of support. But this does not sit 
comfortably with the government’s long term limitations in addressing, for 
example, structural labour force problems that are the outcome of the previous 
support of Malay nationalism but which now present an obstacle to economic 
upgrading. It is argued here that the ‘policy autonomy’ demonstrated by UMNO 
in acting against the market in the pursuit of Malay nationalism and other 
politically motivated social policies, can be explained, at least in part, by the 
ability to source funding domestically and, from non-income taxing sources. This 
argument is outlined below. 
Table 1.5 Sources of federal government revenue  
as a percentage of total revenue 
  1982 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Direct  taxes  38.3 43.9 35.2 44.5 47.1 50.3 
Indirect  taxes  37.1 35.2 35.5 37.2 29.1 25.4 
Non-tax  revenue 21.1 18.8 23.5 16.6 22.8 23.6 
Total revenue 
(RM millions)  16,690 21,115    29,521 50,954 61,864 106,304 
Source: Author’s calculations derived from BNM (2006b, table VII.2). 
 
Taxation currently provides just over 75 per cent of federal government revenue. 
A significant portion of taxation revenue is derived from the government’s 
control of Petronas, the national petroleum company. For example, in 2005, this 
amounted to RM6,813 out of a total RM73,137 earned in taxation revenue 
                                                 
7 Deyo and Agartan (2003:66) refer to this strategy as the ‘default option: slowing reform’. 
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8 Overall, oil related revenues contributed 
almost 40 per cent of total revenue in 2005 (Abdullah 2006a:5).  
 
Non-tax revenue is relatively high,
9 reflecting the level of government activity in 
the economy, and is earned mainly through investments, with contributions from 
the issuance of licenses and permits, as well as through rents on infrastructure 
(Ministry of Finance 2005:51).  
 
The historically large pool
10 of domestic savings, captured in unit trust funds and 
compulsory pension and insurance schemes, is available to the government to be 
borrowed for reinvestment. Since the mid 1980s, the government has been able 
to source most of its borrowings domestically (see Table 1.6) and so has been 
able to fund its programs without high levels of income taxation or foreign debt. 
Investment returns delivered almost a quarter of government revenue in 2005. 
 
Table 1.6 Sources of federal government borrowings, RM million (net) 
Source    1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Domestic 
borrowing   3,591 3,793 0  12,714  12,700 
External 
borrowing   956  -767  -1,635  864  -3,503 
Source: BNM 2006b:107, table VII.1 
 
Historically, the finance sector was dominated by foreign banks (Liow 1986, 
cited by Lim 1996:8), but this has since reversed as part of the NEP policy to 
                                                 
8 Petronas provides both direct and indirect taxation revenue to the state. The bulk is income 
taxation, the remainder is export duties. 
9 For example, taxation accounts for over 95 per cent of Australian and UK government revenue. 
These two countries have otherwise been influential in shaping Malaysia’s legislation. 
10 National savings levels in Malaysia are high for a number of reasons, well explained by M. 
Zainudin Salleh and Zulkifly Osman (1982:127), including the forced savings into pension and 
social security funds. 
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Meyanathan 1993). Not only has banking been profitable for the government, it 
has delivered the ability to influence lending patterns to meet national objectives.  
The government has a strong influence on the financial system 
through its stakes in the major banks and development finance 
institutions which were established in the 1970s. Bank Negara’s 
guidelines on lending and the regulation of interest rates shaped 
the direction and the cost of credit throughout the country (Salleh 
and Meyanathan 1993:31, emphasis mine).  
 
McKinnon (1996:55) has described access to domestic funds as vital to the 
Government’s ability to pursue NEP policies that would otherwise have failed to 
attract funding on purely economic grounds. The federal government holds 
effective control over national pension and insurance funds, including the EPF, 
the Social Security Organisation (SOCSO), the Pension Trust Fund, and the 
Pilgrims Fund Board: ‘…in spite of their legal status, the pension fund bodies in 
Malaysia do not enjoy functional autonomy’ (Asher 2000:Annexe B6:9). The 
amounts pooled in insurance, provident and pension funds constituted between 
19 and 20 per cent of the total funds in the Malaysian financial system in 2000-
2005 (Government of Malaysia 2006:172). 
 
These funding arrangements have delivered a degree of policy autonomy that has 
not been available to other developing economies more reliant on foreign lenders 
(Bowie and Unger 1997), or to economies reliant on electorally unpopular 
income taxation. However, Malaysia’s oil and gas reserves are finite, and the 
funding directed to subsidies has grown rapidly in association with increases in 
consumption. Funds directed to politically important but economically 
unproductive spending are generating more resistance from capital and labour 
  59elites as income taxation becomes a more important source of government 
revenue. 
 
In summary, the language of recent policy documents indicates an attempt by the 
political leadership to gain legitimacy from the pursuit of productivist welfare 
policies of a type more closely associated with the ‘developmental state’. 
However, in contrast to the developmental state model, it has been argued here 
that Malaysia exhibits relatively weak state capacity (Henderson 2003). The 
government is forced to negotiate the ‘politics’ of policy changes, thus limiting 
the pace of reforms even as economic pressures for change have mounted. At 
times, political and societal stability has been valued over economic rationale. 
Such compromises, difficult to dismantle once they have become embedded, 
then contribute to the institutional mismatches and policy inertia discussed in the 
chapters relating to the attempted introduction of a KBE. The final chapter of the 
thesis, and the conclusion, examine in more detail the attempt to shift the 
emphasis of social policies and the basis of the government’s legitimacy. 
 
Sources and limitations 
This thesis grew initially out of an examination of the legislative inertia 
hampering the Malaysian government’s attempts to bring about labour force 
reforms to assist in the transition to a KBE, plans announced in the mid 1990s. 
There seemed to be little explanation for this inertia given the political weakness 
of peak labour organisations and low levels of industrial disputation. The goal 
initially was to uncover the obstacles to labour force reform in the attempted k-
economy transition. 
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Interviews were therefore conducted in 2002 with staff in the Ministry of Human 
Resources (MHR) involved in negotiations with employers and unions in the 
drafting of amendments to employment, industrial relations and trade union 
related legislation. While most depictions of the National Labour Advisory 
Council, the peak tripartite consultative body, suggested it was largely 
ineffectual (Wangel 1999), MHR staff suggested the situation was more 
complex. They expressed concerns regarding the need for consensus decision-
making. This in effect delivered more weight to the Malaysian Trade Unions 
Congress (MTUC) than could have been assumed from the low levels of 
unionisation (just under ten per cent) and the limited ability of the MTUC to 
garner media attention. These interviews therefore suggested a far greater 
emphasis should be allocated to the influence of labour in the policy-making 
arena. 
 
This view was reinforced in semi-structured interviews with employer and 
industry lobby groups conducted in 2001 and 2002. The peak employer group is 
the Malaysian Employers’ Federation (MEF). In 2000, the 3,400 members of the 
MEF employed 1.3 million workers (MEF Annual Report 2000) out of the total 
labour force of approximately nine million. The Federation of Malaysian 
Manufacturers (FMM) represented approximately 1,960 businesses employing 
1.6 million workers (personal correspondence FMM 2001). The Malayan 
Agricultural Producers’ Association (MAPA) is the other major domestic 
industry lobby group in addition to the three national level chambers of 
commerce and industry organised on an ethnic basis. The Malaysian 
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Malaysian Chamber of Manufacturers (AMCHAM) overlap somewhat in 
membership being the peak lobby groups for businesses with foreign interests or 
ownership.  
 
Representatives of these groups were chosen because of their profile in the 
media, their membership of formal government think tanks and committees and 
their contribution to relevant government research and publications. This 
reflected their access to government-established decision-making forums (Biddle 
and Milor 1999) and would appear to have indicated their ability to influence the 
nature of the emerging k-economy and its surrounding discourse. Somewhat 
negating this assumption, in interviews (2001, 2002) the Executive Director of 
the MEF expressed concerns about the lack of influence employers were able to 
exert over education. Such views have been frequently echoed in the press by 
representatives of the FMM and MICCI. In this case, an important factor limiting 
their attempts to reform curricula was the historical use of the education system 
to forward the interests of Malay nationalism. The Malay-dominated government 
was now politically constrained by this historical compromise, meaning that calls 
to reform education, voiced from the 1980s by employer groups and international 
agencies such as the World Bank, had been of limited impact in influencing the 
public education sector. 
 
The hesitancy in reforming the major pieces of employment and labour 
legislation, and the limited reform of the public education sector, was in stark 
contrast to announcements collected from a number of official sources, including 
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Many of these stated that the need for reforms to the labour force and the 
education sector were vitally necessary to re-establishing Malaysia in an 
international trading niche more suited to a middle income country.  
 
In searching for a useful explanation for these apparent contradictions between 
stated policy and reality, a more historical view was then adopted. The attempted 
transition to a k-economy, although important, was only the most recent example 
of an attempted economic transition shaped by a strong socio-political agenda. 
Looking back at particular historical junctures, it became clear that the 
government’s role in economic development, particularly in the post-NEP 
period, was built around a political rationale with the potential to influence 
outcomes for labour beyond those indicated by economic demands.  
 
In adopting the broader time scale, a more meso-level approach to each period 
eventuated. This precludes a comprehensive treatment of each era and relies 
instead on particular case studies to support the claims offered here. The 
treatment of the earlier period is relatively compact. Existing literature was 
reviewed and analysed using the methodology outlined above. The chapters 
dealing with the k-economy are also based on my own interviews and analysis as 
outlined below. 
 
Initially, the analysis of press coverage was limited to the late 1990s and early 
2000s and to issues relating to the k-economy transition. As the goals of the 
thesis shifted, so did the analysis of the press coverage. While I was able to 
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appointment as Prime Minister, in the earlier period, I have relied on secondary 
sources. The electronic databases of the official government media agency, 
Bernama, whose press releases strongly fashion the nature in which stories are 
reported in the mainstream print press, have been searched. Coverage by the 
mainstream English language press of topics such as legislative amendments and 
policy documents relating to the k-economy, industrial relations, labour issues 
and consumption was analysed. Data was collected from the web sites of 
political parties and the web based media. On return to Australia, the press 
coverage has continued to be followed using electronic versions. This has helped 
to construct the shift in emphasis of government concerns regarding particular 
economic problems and their proposed solutions.  
 
Interviews were also conducted with the leadership and some officials of the 
peak private and public sector union bodies, the MTUC and the Congress of 
Unions of Employees of Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS), and with a 
limited number of Malaysian-based NGOs and opposition politicians concerned 
about labour conditions, consumer rights, censorship and intellectual property 
issues. I felt it necessary to interview these organisations given their limited 
coverage in the press relative to the widespread reporting of official government 
views. 
 
Finally, given the importance of regional and international political and 
economic pressures, publications, texts of speeches, and policy related 
documents were also collected from the Association of South East Asian Nations 
  64(ASEAN), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Productivity 
Organisation, the European Community, the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
Limitations 
In the pre-war colonial period discussed here, the data and discussion includes 
Singapore until 1948 when it was excluded by the British from the newly created 
Federation of Malaya. In 1963, Singapore, and Sabah and Sarawak on the island 
of Borneo, joined the Federation. Chinese-dominated Singapore was then 
expelled in 1965 after which point the Federation was referred to as Malaysia. 
However, this study is restricted to the area of Peninsular Malaysia, also known 
as West Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak, referred to jointly as East Malaysia, 
represent about 15 per cent of the total Malaysian population. They are ethnically 
diverse regions, with ethnic groups and ethnically based political parties that 
have no representation on the peninsula. The geo-political, economic and ethno-
cultural histories of the two states differ considerably from each other and from 
the peninsular states. Since becoming part of Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak have 
been governed by legislation on employment, labour and immigration matters 
that is separate to that governing Peninsular Malaysia.
11  
 
There are of course regional differences amongst the eleven peninsular states, 
and to a degree, throughout the thesis, differences between rural and urban areas 
are noted. Tensions always exist between acknowledging the local and making 
claims for the national space over which a government attempts to exert 
                                                 
11 Shafruddin Hashim (2001:71-73) provides a concise discussion of the historical background 
that explains the current status of Sabah and Sarawak within the Federation of Malaysia.  
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being the two states most separate physically, historically and legislatively from 
the rest of the federation, and regarding which, least economic data is available 
(Lim 1988:100).
12 On occasion, where data are only available at the national 
level, it will obviously include Sabah and Sarawak but this will be evident in the 
naming of the table or in footnotes. 
 
The reliance on mostly English-language sources is a potential restriction on this 
thesis, the most obvious being the lack of access to scholarship in languages 
other than English. Daily newspapers in Malaysia are published in the national 
language of Bahasa Melayu (BM), in Mandarin, other Chinese languages, in 
Tamil and in English. English-language newspapers account for an estimated 40-
45 per cent of newspaper circulation (Shahrin 2001:44). The three English 
language newspapers most utilised in the thesis are distributed nationally, but are 
less well read outside the urban areas and in East Malaysia. A significant (but 
unknown) proportion of the population do not read English. However, most of 
the media outlets publish both English and non-English publications. For 
example, The New Straits Times also publishes Berita Harian, Berita Minggu 
and Harian Metro in BM. According to local (multilingual) readers I spoke with, 
similar stories are published in each of the editions, partly due to the reliance on 
press releases from the government news agency, Bernama, published in both 
English and BM, which are frequently reproduced almost verbatim. Other 
analysts have made the comment that the mainstream press in all languages 
                                                 
12 ‘Only Peninsular Malaysia is covered because data for East Malaysia where labour market 
experiences have been very different are lacking’ (Lim 1988:100). Similarly: ‘Manpower 
information relating to the East Malaysian States is scanty’ (Government of Malaysia 1971:100). 
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(Kelly 2001:729). In his analysis of speeches given by Mahathir over the 
duration of the 1997/98 financial crisis, Kelly (2001:729) observed that Mahathir 
retained similar content whether the speech was delivered in BM or English, 
although there were some modifications for domestic audiences.  
 
Another important impact of not sourcing materials in BM relates to my inability 
to access materials in which Islam has been used to generate particular values or 
consensus. Doling and Omar (2002), for example, have found that the appeal to 
Islamic values has been used by government agencies to reinforce a sense of 
family and community responsibility so that there should be little reliance on 
government agencies to support family members. The invocation of Islamic 
virtues has also been evident in references by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi 
(Bernama 17 May 2006) to Islam Hadhari, which has been translated in English 
to mean ‘civilisational Islam’. While I have been able to follow this discourse 
where it has addressed an international audience and is therefore in English, its 
enunciation for a domestic audience is often in BM. I must therefore 
acknowledge that my reliance on English sources is a restriction. 
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Introduction 
This chapter identifies the defining features of labour régulation in Malaya, now 
Malaysia, from the late colonial era until 1969. These features emerged through 
processes of societal conflict and found expression in institutional arrangements, 
such as legislation governing industrial relations, labour migration, conditions of 
employment, social welfare, housing, consumption and education, as well as in 
the workplace relationship between capital and labour. This discussion does not 
focus on the workplace, production technologies or labour processes. Instead, the 
focus is at the macro level, examining the varying contributions of particular 
institutions to the régulation of labour. This role includes, but clearly extends 
beyond, managing the supply of labour for production purposes.  
 
The colonial administration was able to maintain a harsh regime of labour 
control with little regard for the sustainable reproduction of labour given the use 
of an immigrant labour force in which the costs of reproduction were largely 
borne by the source countries, and in the absence of accountable democratic 
institutions. International criticism of Britain’s imperialism contributed to the 
introduction of basic welfare measures for the labour force. Generally, though, 
employers were able to rely on physical force and financial insecurity, in which 
they were often assisted and occasionally chastised by the colonial 
administration in order to maintain the economic advantages gained through the 
exploitation of Malaya’s physical resources. 
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occupations became closely associated with a particular ethnic group and gender, 
were divisions deliberately and effectively exploited by the colonial authorities. 
In contrast, in the post-Independence era, ethnic and social divisions that were 
once the tools of control instead contributed to growing social and political 
tensions linked to communal disparities in access to education, employment and 
health services. This situation was further complicated by the geographically 
uneven nature of Malaysia’s economic development. The chapter examines the 
rise in social and industrial unrest that emerged due to the failure of Tunku 
Abdul Rahman’s Government to develop means of regulating labour that were 
more suited to the demands of the newly independent, democratic industrialising 
nation.  
 
Although many of the problems facing this first administration were the legacy 
of the colonial era, the laissez faire economic policies of the late 1950s and early 
1960s exacerbated the poor economic and social situation facing the working 
class generally, and rural Malays particularly, ultimately proving politically 
unsustainable. While coercion of the predominantly immigrant labour force 
sufficed to deliver capital accumulation in the colonial era, the failure to 
implement alternative means of régulation in the independence period 
contributed to violent unrest and the suspension of Malaysia’s Parliament in 
1969, twelve years after achieving political independence. 
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At the time of Malaysia’s independence in 1957, the British had been active in 
the region for more than 170 years,
1 administering Singapore and much of the 
peninsula while overseeing the exploitation of tin and rubber resources and in 
doing so, attempting to control the multi-ethnic labour force, much of it 
immigrant. The Chinese had been active traders throughout the region, and from 
the 1850s, Chinese men
2 had emigrated to work in Chinese-owned tin mines. 
The colonial authorities had only a limited role in recruiting and transporting 
Chinese workers given the highly organised nature of the Chinese clans 
overseeing employment arrangements (Todd 1998). An estimated six million 
Chinese arrived between 1895 and 1927, many as indentured labourers, with 
working class Chinese providing more than 90 per cent of labour for the tin 
mines. Approximately ten per cent of these mine workers were women. The petit 
bourgeoisie Chinese increasingly dominated the retail sector (Bhopal 1999:275). 
Von Vorys (1975:5) partially attributes this economic success to the ‘access to 
and control by Chinese businessmen of cheap labour. Whenever required, on 
short notice, a heavy stream of immigrants could be recruited’ (emphasis in 
original).  
 
                                                           
1 The British had colonised the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore between 
1786 and 1819. The Federated Malay States, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang came 
under indirect British control from between 1874 and 1888 and under official control from 1895. 
The five Unfederated Malay States were effectively bought under control from 1909. The 
Federation of Malaya existed from 1948 until 1963 when joined by Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore. Since Singapore’s expulsion in 1965, the country is officially known as the Federation 
of Malaysia. 
2 Citing Purcell (1967:174), von Vorys (1975:48) provides a sex ratio of 1:10 for the Chinese 
population in 1900. Only the wealthy Chinese were able to bring the female members of their 
families along with them. According to the British Protector of the Chinese in the late 1880s, 
William Pickering, the few working class Chinese women in the region at the time were 
generally employed as prostitutes (Jackson 1965:92, cited in von Vorys 1975:48). This changed 
with the influx of Chinese women from 1933 to 1938 who arrived in greater numbers than men 
during this period due to an anomaly in immigration legislation. 
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  1911 1921 1931 1938 
Malays  1,438 1,651 1,962 2,211 
Chinese 917  1,175  1,709  2,220 
Indians  267 472 624 744 
Europeans  11 15 18 28 
Eurasians 11 13 16 18 
Others  29 33 56 58 
Source: Malayan Year Book 1939 cited in Hua 1983:48, table 2.8. 
 
Chinese workers generally experienced harsh conditions, and were controlled by 
a combination of vulnerabilities caused by their remoteness from home, 
indebtedness to their employer, gambling, and the provision of opium
3 (Andaya 
and Andaya 2001:178-180). The colonial authorities initially voiced concerns 
about the maltreatment and established a Chinese Protectorate, but in effect, little 
was done to ameliorate working conditions. In contrast, the administration 
demonstrated more interest in the political activism of leftist Chinese 
organisations as workers eventually garnered enough resources and local 
knowledge to establish unions.  
…with their independent migration and employment systems, 
their tradition of worker combination, their determination to rise 
in the social scale and their capacity to take up other employment, 
the Chinese labourers threatened a system of production that 
needed their labour but feared their power (Stenson 1980:23). 
Concerns regarding political activism later led to restrictions on further Chinese 
immigration, over which the administration proved willing to clash with 
employers (Latiff 1977:82-83).  
                                                           
3 ‘One of the more unpalatable aspects of the colonial [sic] revenue system was the high 
dependence on taxing opium consumption (principally by the Chinese working class) to finance 
government expenditures. In the early twentieth century, as much as 45 per cent of revenues in 
the Straits Settlements came from opium, declining to around 30 per cent in the mid-1920s and 
12 per cent in 1928’ (Li Dun Jen 1982:102-4, cited in Jesudason 1989:45). 
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Government and the colonial authorities mainly for work in the rubber 
plantations. The British viewed Indian labour as far more easily controlled than 
Chinese: ‘…from the point of view of the European employers, the main virtue 
of South Indian labourers as compared with the hard-working Chinese was their 
docility’ (Stenson 1980:17). Nonetheless, concerns were raised that unemployed 
Indian workers laid off during seasonal downturns might cause ‘trouble’. The 
Controller of Labour therefore actively encouraged employers to keep workers 
on even when this was not warranted by the work load (Parmer 1960:207). The 
exceedingly poor economic conditions in India at the time increased the 
willingness of Indian workers to tolerate harsh conditions in Malaya despite high 
death rates amongst estate workers.
4 Largely at the insistence of the Indian 
Government, welfare measures and a centralised wage setting system were 
introduced via the 1923 Labour Code to improve the conditions for Indian 
workers and their families in Malaya (Ramasamy 1994:46). Amongst other 
facilities, the Labour Code required the provision of primary schools for the 
children of estate workers. However, as noted by Emerson (1964:477), the 
‘governments have a direct interest in the maintenance of low wage rates and in 
ignoring the generally miserable conditions of the housing supplied to the labor 
forces…[being themselves]…large employers of coolie labor’.  
 
Employment in rubber plantations provided work for men, women and children 
and so whole families were sometimes recruited. Between 1930 and 1940, Indian 
women constituted approximately 20 per cent of the female labour force with 
                                                           
4 As noted by Ramasamy (1994:43-46), however, there were high rates of desertion of Indian 
workers from bonded labour in the 1910s and 1920s, and strikes were recorded in this period in 
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Complex hierarchies of intra-ethnic control existed on the rubber estates, 
whereby the kangani, or labour recruiter, was given direct control over the 
workers he recruited. These workers were socially dependent and often 
financially indebted to the kangani (Satyanarayana 2001:21), reducing the 
bargaining power of Indian labour. Being geographically isolated in employer-
provided housing on the plantations, the ‘atmosphere of their combined work-
place and home was stultifyingly paternalistic’ (Snodgrass 1980:40). These local 
level regimes of control were able to exist given the persistent failure of the 
colonial administration to enforce the provisions of the Labour Code (Jomo and 
Todd 1994:4-5).
5
 
Table 2.2 Distribution of estate population by ethnic group (per cent) 
 1921  1931  1947 
Malays 10.2  6.7  12.8 
Chinese 19.0  20.3  27.8 
Indians 69.5  71.7  58.5 
Source: 1947 Census:113 cited in Missen 1986:74 
 
The Malay population, which averaged just short of 50 per cent of the population 
in the first half of the 20
th century (Lee 1989:318), remained concentrated in the 
non-commercial production of rice and agricultural staples (Stenson 1980:4).
6 
The Malay Reservations Enactment of 1913, later reinforced by the Rice Lands 
Enactment, effectively prevented Malays from selling their land to non-Malays 
                                                                                                                                                             
response to poor treatment, non-payment of wages and other breaches of contract by employers. 
5 There were instances of the Controller of Labour acting in support of employee complaints, 
however, and employers were given warnings against extreme maltreatment of workers. See 
Ramasamy 1994:43. 
6 The extent to which Malays rejected waged employment should not be ignored. Snodgrass 
(1980:30) comments that ‘the plantations required disciplined low wage labour while the 
kampung economy, with its favourable land-man ratio, probably offered a comparable living 
standard within a more comfortable social framework’. 
  73or utilising their land for the more profitable pursuit of rubber production. This 
approach initially satisfied a number of issues for the British. Firstly, Malays in 
kampungs (villages) remained enmeshed in existing means of social control 
exercised by the Malay royalty. ‘Colonial political rule over the Malays was 
facilitated by preserving their social structure as much as possible and using the 
co-opted Malay elite as a buffer between the government and the rest of society’ 
(Jesudason 1989:39). Secondly, as Malaya was only producing from between 20 
to 40 per cent of its domestic rice needs, it was necessary that supplies be 
imported to feed the Chinese and Indian labour forces. Malays however, by 
remaining in subsistence agriculture were able to meet their own food needs at 
little expense to the British. Thirdly, those Malays who did participate in waged 
labour were able to fall back on the existing support mechanisms provided by the 
kampung and access to land. The colonial authorities were therefore able to avoid 
the expenditure otherwise required for the reproduction of a local labour force. 
This was to have a profound effect on the socio-economic status of rural Malays 
in the post-colonial period. 
 
The co-option of well connected Malays, including many of the male 
descendents of the royal families, was pursued in part through their heavily 
subsidised attendance at the English-language Malay Residential School, 
established in 1905 in Kuala Kangsar (von Vorys 1975:41). The provision of 
English-language education contributed to the formation of the Malay 
bureaucratic elite (Bhopal 1999:275). Senior civil service posts in the Malayan 
Civil Service were initially available only to the British.
7 To circumvent Malay 
                                                           
7 English educated Sri Lankans and Indians were employed in lower level civil service positions, 
while Sikhs were often employed as guards and police (Andaya and Andaya 2001:181). 
  74criticism of this, a Malay Administrative Service was created (Puthucheary 
1978:52). Malays were eventually allowed to transfer from this junior service 
through the ranks to more senior posts (Emerson 1964:514-515). In contrast, the 
education system implemented in rural areas largely served to keep Malays in 
agricultural pursuits. ‘In order to avert possible “economic dislocation and social 
unrest”, government policy deliberately limited the provision of English 
education for Malays’ (Rudner 1994:285).
8 This policy would prove a major 
obstacle to the movement of Malays into modern sector employment (Marimuthu 
1986:151; Searle 1999:29; Snodgrass 1980:31).  
 
By 1929, the population of the Malay Peninsular and Singapore was estimated at 
just over four million. The Depression resulted in widespread unemployment, a 
problem the authorities and employers chose to deal with largely through 
repatriation of migrant workers instituted under the Aliens Ordinance of 1933. 
However, rather than be returned to China, unemployed Chinese moved from 
Singapore onto the mainland, squatting on unoccupied land in order to grow food 
and cash crops. This failure to address the welfare of the unemployed was to 
become a major issue for the authorities in the post-war period as several 
hundred thousand Chinese had, by then, settled in remote rural areas and would 
constitute an ongoing problem during the war against the Communists (Caldwell 
1977:234).  
 
Commodity prices improved during the mid-1930s but wages did not, 
contributing to the formation of the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union 
                                                           
8 Rudner is citing R. O. Winstedt 1942, Education in Malaya. ‘The phrase “economic dislocation 
and social unrest” was to become the conventional slogan in official publications for rationalizing 
  75(PMGLU)
9 in 1934, largely through the efforts of the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP). Organised union activism became a more pressing problem for capital 
and the authorities in the mid to late 1930s as the bargaining power of labour 
improved due to the increased demands of war preparations and reductions in the 
inflow of migrant workers. Fear of the leftist nature of Chinese politics led the 
authorities to apply restrictions on the number of Chinese workers allowed entry 
(Morgan 1977:152), raising the ire of employers more concerned about the 
impact of a labour shortage (Latiff 1977:82). In 1938 the Indian Government 
banned the further transportation of Indian workers, a decision the British 
authorities were still trying to reverse at the outbreak of war (Parmer 1960:213). 
Unions remained active in Singapore and Malaya through the late 1930s proving 
able to work across the lines of ethnicity at times,
10 and achieving some 
worthwhile improvements in conditions. Morgan (1977:153) describes the 
passing of the Trades Union Ordinance 1940 and the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act 1940 as a belated effort by the British government to improve its 
image in the colony as war broke out (see also Jomo 1995:191). 
 
Post-War Malaya 
During the Japanese occupation of Malaya there was a widespread loss of lives, 
mainly Chinese and to a lesser extent, Indian, much of it due to forced labour in 
remote areas aggravated by inadequate supplies of food, housing and medical 
assistance. The closure of mines and the interruption of rubber production left 
                                                                                                                                                             
the denial of English education to the Malay community-at-large’ (Rudner 1994:296). 
9 The PMGLU became the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions in August 1946 in an effort 
to avoid registration under the restrictive provisions the Trades Union Ordinance (Morgan 
1977:175). 
10 As Missen (1986:79-80) notes, cross cultural co-operation by workers was, however, very 
difficult given language differences, the geographical and occupational segmentation of the 
  76vast numbers without a source of income (Robinson 1956:16-17). The Japanese 
adopted a policy that favoured Malays above the other ethnic groups,
11 and also 
encouraged anti-colonial nationalism amongst the Indian population (Andaya 
and Andaya 2001:260). On returning to Malaya in 1945, the British Military 
Administration (BMA) found it difficult to rely on previous cultural notions of 
European superiority in order to exercise control (Snodgrass 1980:20).  
 
‘Perhaps more than in any other sphere of public policy, the effects of war 
engendered confrontation over the fundamental norms, policies and institutions 
of labour relations’ (Rudner 1994:361). In the absence of the British, the MCP 
had developed networks amongst Chinese workers and rural communities, and in 
the post-war period, attempted, albeit with limited success, to incorporate other 
ethnic groups within the organised labour movement. By 1947, at the peak of its 
power, the PMGLU had organised the affiliation of an estimated 80-90 per cent 
of all unions (Morgan 1977:170).
12 Singapore (governed under a separate 
authority from 1948), the more industrialised regions of Penang, Selangor, and 
Port Swettenham (Klang), and the large rubber estates, were affected by ongoing 
labour stoppages from 1945, generated by spiralling inflation, rice shortages, 
poor housing conditions and declining real wages.
13 The Price Control Act was 
introduced in 1946 which fixed the cost of basic commodities in short supply, 
                                                                                                                                                             
labour force and the low numbers of Malays engaged in waged labour. These factors were 
actively enforced and exploited by capital and the Colonial authorities. 
11 The Malay population suffered nonetheless, as food crops and other economic resources were 
confiscated and people were forced to abandon their villages, relocating to more marginal 
locations. 
12 Andaya and Andaya (1982:257-258) suggest that the overall level of unionisation was around 
21 per cent.  
13 ‘By forcing Malaya’s post-war money-cost structure to adjust to the pre-war sterling exchange 
rate, rather than the reverse, Malayan planners no doubt contributed to the political unrest 
culminating in the Communist Emergency that broke out in 1948, instigated in good measure by 
the post-war income deflation’ (Rudner 1994:10). 
  77including rice. Overall, however, fiscal and monetary policy adopted by the 
BMA strongly favoured the sterling requirements of London. ‘The real burden of 
inflation was borne by Malayan wage labour and government salaried personnel, 
whose money incomes were still geared by policy to their pre-war scales’ 
(Rudner 1994:10). Keen to extract funds from the colony, London also proved 
reluctant to accede to employer demands for greater protection of mine sites and 
plantations. ‘…the protection provided by the government for British enterprises 
was often regarded as inadequate; and British firms suffered both higher taxes 
and the costs of defending private property’ (White 1998:153). 
 
In 1946 the BMA was replaced by a civilian administration which attempted to 
bring the growing unions under control by requiring their registration under the 
Trades Union Ordinance, administered through the newly created Department of 
the Registrar of Trade Unions. John Brazier, a trade union advisor, was brought 
from the United Kingdom to help create a more compliant trade union 
movement. Brazier, and staff from the Department of the Trade Union Advisor, 
were utilised by employers in the attempt to reduce the incidence of strikes (Kaur 
2004:12). While some employers were willing to pay higher wages in order to 
maintain productivity, the response by employers and the authorities to 
widespread worker activism became increasingly harsh, including the use of 
police and troops against striking workers. The sacking of striking workers 
received judicial support, giving employers license to dismiss union members 
and reduce wages (Morgan 1977:181). Plantation and mine owners were vocal in 
their criticisms of the administration in Kuala Lumpur for its handling of the 
unrest and industrial disputes (White 1998). However, newspaper closures, 
  78deportations, the arbitrary arrest and detention of labour activists, the outlawing 
of union federations, raids on union premises, and the executions of the former 
President and the Vice President of the Pan Malaya Federation of Trade Unions 
in 1949, signaled an increasingly repressive response.
14  
 
Table 2.3 Number of unions and union members 
number of unions   
Year  private sector  public sector 
number of 
members 
1948 104  52  198,  713 
1950 84  84  54,000 
Source: ILO 1962:34 and 37. Data relates to the Federation of Malaya. 
 
The Trade Unions Ordinance amendments passed in May of 1948 ‘in effect 
destroyed Malayan trade unionism’ (Morgan 1977:185). ‘The only unions 
permitted to survive were the “tame” unions sponsored by John Brazier and 
approved by the Registrar of Trade Unions…’ (Stenson 1980:168). The ongoing 
repression of trade unionists, the jailing of 185 union leaders and the consistent 
accusation of association with Communism, resulted in a severe and long term 
decline in Chinese participation in trade unionism, and the loss of more than 65 
per cent of trade union members (Jomo and Todd 1994:22). Although the British 
military had been willing to form an alliance with the MCP during the Japanese 
occupation, in the midst of labour unrest and the growing attraction of workers 
for leftist political parties, an ‘Emergency’ was declared in 1948 that allowed the 
British authorities to resume an armed battle against the Communists. This 
facilitated tightened control over organised labour.
15 Employers, particularly 
                                                           
14 White (1998:169) however, provides examples of employers expressing dissatisfaction with 
the level of support from the authorities during strikes. In one, the Commissioner of Labour 
refused a plantation owner’s request to break a strike that had become violent, arguing that it was 
a security matter.  
15 ‘This military offensive by labour was only quelled by legal and military force through the 
enforcement of Emergency rule in 1948-1960’ (Fatimah Halim 1981:294). 
  79those on estates, were given policing powers through their participation in an 
armed Special Constabulary created in 1948 in order to prevent workers from 
supporting the MCP. These powers were used in effect to restrict the activism of 
Indian plantation workers (Stenson 1980:168). The impact of the new legislation 
and physical restrictions is evident in the strike data provided in Table 2.4 below. 
 
It was during the Emergency that the government and employers were to face the 
legacy of inadequate welfare provisions for the large number of Chinese 
unemployed who, in the aftermath of the Depression, had settled on the fringes 
of Malayan jungles. In an effort to cut off supplies of food and personnel from 
these former workers to the now underground MCP, the British instituted the 
Briggs Plan from 1950. The Briggs Plan required the incarceration of 
approximately 462,000 Chinese squatters into prison camps (Sunderland 
1964:45)
16, euphemistically termed ‘new villages’ (Caldwell 1977:236). The 
‘communities were protected by barbed wire from Communist predatory 
initiatives…By 1954 some 680,000 squatters were resettled into 600 new 
villages’ (von Vorys 1975:87). In addition, a plan to ‘regroup’ 650,000 estate and 
mine workers was also implemented. This meant in effect, re-housing the 
workers so they could be subject to curfew and their movements could be 
monitored to prevent any from giving assistance to members of the MCP 
(Sunderland 1964:50-52).  
                                                           
16 Snodgrass (1980:39) writes that 400,000 Chinese were held in the New Villages, while Hua 
(1983:208) quotes a figure of 1 million, mostly Chinese, residents by the early 1970s. Sunderland 
(1964) citing original documents, provides a figure of 461,822 of whom the overwhelming 
majority were Chinese.  
  80Table 2.4 Strike action and working days lost, 1947-1956 
Year  no. of strikes  no. of workers  working days lost 
1947 291  69,217  696,036 
1948 181  34,037  370,464 
1949 29  2,292 5,390 
1950 48  4,925 37,067 
1951 58  7,454 41,365 
1952 98  12,801  44,489 
1953 47  7,524 38,957 
1954 78  10,011  50,831 
1955 72  15,386  79,931 
1956 213  48,677  562,125 
Source: Jomo and Todd 1994:49, table 2.16. Data relates to the Federation of Malaya.
17
 
As discussed by White (1998) and Sunderland (1964), these monumental efforts 
were funded in the main by the British Government. Funding allocated to 
‘defense, police and emergency’ amounted to just over 42 per cent of the 
colony’s recurrent expenditure by 1952 (IBRD 1955:191). Funds were raised 
partially through the much-contested imposition of income taxation on 
corporations. Initially introduced at the rate of 20 per cent in 1947, this was 
raised to thirty per cent in 1951 (White 1998:173).
18 Fortunately for the British, 
tin and rubber were again in great demand due to the Korean War and revenue 
earned from export levies helped to offset the costs of the plan. The inhabitants 
of the ‘villages’ provided the labour force for the tin mines and rubber 
plantations, many of which had been abandoned during the Japanese occupation.  
 
The Malayan Trade Union Council (MTUC) formed in 1949. With the outlawing 
of the leftist union federations, the colonial authorities were initially undecided 
over whether to ban all union activity or to attempt to create a more compliant 
                                                           
17 Working days lost due to industrial action in Singapore: 1946, 845,637; 1947, 492,708; 1948, 
128, 657; 1949, 7,074; 1950, 4,692; 1951, 20,640 (Gamba 1962:288, cited in Morgan 1977:198). 
18 White (1998:173) provides a breakdown of some of the costs. He details complaints by local 
employers and owners generated by the refusal of the colonial government and London to bear 
the costs of ‘regrouping’ labour and protecting plantations and minesites. 
  81labour movement. Despite the antipathy of most employer groups and local 
senior bureaucrats, including the Commissioner for Labour, under pressure from 
the Colonial Office in London the High Commissioner for the Malayan Union 
found in favour of developing a union movement (Rudner 1994:351). This was 
to occur largely through the sponsorship of Indian moderates (Bhopal 1999:277).  
 
Weakened by restrictive labour policy and the generally repressive political 
atmosphere of the Emergency, the MTUC initially found it difficult to operate 
effectively. The Malayan Labour Department remained ‘ambiguous’ towards the 
union movement, placing numerous administrative obstacles in the path of new 
unions yet at the same time reiterating official support for a harmonious 
industrial relations environment based on collective bargaining and consultation 
(Rudner 1994:353-355). The MTUC was also hampered in the recruiting of 
Malay and Chinese workers by its overwhelmingly Indian membership.
19 As 
Jesudason (1989:42) explains, this new organisation had little reason to court 
Chinese membership, wishing to distance itself from accusations of being 
Communist, and was not attractive to Malays, the majority of whom remained in 
rural occupations outside of waged employment. 
 
Table 2.5 Wage earners as a percentage of employed by ethnic group, 1947 
 Malays  Chinese  Indian 
Males 30.9  58.2  86.3 
Females 19.1  64.9  98.1 
Source: 1947 Census:111, cited by Missen 1986:75, table 3.4. 
 
                                                           
19 In 1950, 58 per cent of union members were Indian, 26 per cent were Chinese and 12 per cent 
Malay (Jomo 1995:210). 
  82The provision of welfare was minimal. While a Department of Social Welfare 
had been established in 1945, a review by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD 1955:631) concluded: ‘The Federation 
needs a large number of new social welfare institutions, and some of the present 
facilities…are now meager, dilapidated, primitive and unsuitable’. Doling and 
Omar (2002:4) state that ‘from the very beginning, social welfare programs were 
viewed as burdens on public expenditure that detracted from the resources 
available for economic growth’.  
Table 2.6 Revenue and recurrent expenditure,  
Federation of Malaya ($ million) 
  1949 1959 1951 1952 1953 1954 
 
Revenue  327 469 796 784 665 593 
Recurrent 
expenditure        
Economic  services  37 41 45 65 78 75 
Social  services  54 57 93 118  131  159 
Defense, police, 
emergency  82  101 217 287 296 250 
Other  155 152 181 209 237 219 
Total  328 351 536 679 742 703 
Source: IBRD 1955:191 
 
As part of the preparation for decolonisation and independence, in 1950 the 
Federal Government developed a Draft Development Plan which covered a 
range of welfare issues including that of food supply (Rudner 1979). Out of this, 
the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) was established, initially to 
develop the rural areas by overseeing the modernisation of food production. 
Rudner (1979) argues that at the same time, RIDA’S activities were also to 
preserve and promote idealised kampung values.  
RIDA was to function, therefore, not so much as an instrument of 
public investment, though the provision of financial and 
administrative backing was of course not unimportant, but as a 
  83revivalist agency for the reactivation of pristine Malay values of 
self-help and, particularly, co-operative effort (Rudner 1979:24). 
 
The establishment of the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) in 1951 had a much 
broader impact than the limited operations of the Department of Social Welfare 
yet required minimal input of public monies. Contributions of five per cent from 
both employer and employee were held in the government controlled fund to be 
distributed to workers on their retirement. Eligibility was restricted to lower paid 
workers in formal employment in the private sector.
20 Each member 
accumulated funds in an individual account, hence the amount received on 
retirement was determined by the length of the time an individual was in formal 
employment, and the level of wages received. Over 700,000 workers were 
registered by 1954 (IBRD 1955:161). Even at this stage, the EPF was considered 
to have a dual role. ‘It is expected that the bulk of domestic funds available for 
loans to the government would be from the Employees [sic] Provident Fund…’ 
(IBRD 1955:201-202). 
 
The Workmen’s Compensation Act was introduced in 1952which centralised and 
upgraded previous state-level legislation. It required employers to contribute 
towards a compensation fund for injured workers and gave increased powers to 
the federal government to ensure compliance. The Employment Act, which had 
been in the making since 1949 but strongly resisted by employer groups, was 
passed in much amended form during the final sitting of the Legislative Council 
prior to the first General Elections in June 1955 (Rudner 1994). The Employment 
                                                           
20 This did not cover domestic workers or the self employed. 
  84Act, in specifying the minimum conditions of employment, also formalised 
maternity leave provisions (Bernasek and Gallaway 1997:96). 
 
The Government Pension Ordinance was enacted in 1951 providing government-
funded pensions for eligible civil servants; that is, permanent staff who had 
served for at last three years (Ramesh and Asher 2000:49). While the pension 
scheme was a relatively generous one, active bargaining on wages and equal pay 
for women had been rejected by the administration. ‘As a matter of principle, the 
colonial government had long taken care to avoid having its own position as 
Malaya’s largest single employer exert pressure on private sector wages’ 
(Rudner 1994:359). Following the British example, Whitley councils were 
established in 1953 to adjudicate on wage levels. As part of the preparation for 
political independence, a system to replace British civil servants was discussed. 
In 1950, expatriates, mainly British, occupied over 90 per cent of senior civil 
service positions while Malays held almost five per cent, Indians, two per cent 
and Chinese just over one per cent (Puthucheary 1978:53). Chinese and Indians 
were essentially barred from administrative roles, being largely restricted to 
technical and professional posts.
21 The lack of formally qualified Malays had 
resulted in a predominance of Chinese and Indians in these areas.  
 
The policy of ‘Malayanisation’ of the civil service was commenced in 1952. This 
allowed the entry of Chinese and Indians into the wider Malayan Civil Service 
                                                           
21 ‘To the contention of an Indian member of the Federal Council in 1936 that “no distinction can 
properly be drawn between Malay and non-Malay subjects: they are all the subjects of the same 
sovereign and enjoy the same rights and privileges”, the new High Commissioner, Sir Shenton 
Thomas, replied in language worthy of precise analysis: “This is the sixth country in which I 
have served, and I do not know of any country in which what I may call a foreigner – that is to 
  85but only in a ratio of four Malays to each non-Malay (Malaya 1954:17). In 
making this determination, the authorities were caught in a dilemma. To give too 
great a role to non-Malays risked the credibility of the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO) which had publicly campaigned on the matter in a bid to 
defend Malay privileges (Puthucheary 1978:54-55). But by keeping Chinese 
completely outside the fold, the opportunity to allow moderate Chinese to be co-
opted would have been lost and Chinese resentment further aroused. In 1956, the 
Public Service Commission was established to further the implementation of the 
Malayanisation process in the civil service, replacing the role previously 
undertaken by London’s Colonial Office (Lee 1974:55). At the request of the 
British government, current serving British civil servants were allowed to serve 
out their time in Malaya, or alternatively, received ‘generous compensation’ (von 
Vorys 1975:124). At Independence, over 65 per cent of civil service posts 
remained filled by British expatriates (Abdullah 1997:60, citing Tilman 1964). 
 
From amongst the Malay elite who had entered the civil service
22 emerged many 
of the founding UMNO members (Bowie 1989:111).
23 Moderates of the Chinese 
and Indian elites formed the other main parties of the Alliance, Malaysia’s first 
independent government.
24 One of the opposition parties was the Pan-Malayan 
                                                                                                                                                             
say, a person not native of the country or an Englishman- has ever been appointed to an 
administrative post”’ (Emerson 1964:515). 
22 Eighty per cent of UMNO candidates for the 1955 elections were ‘former’ civil servants. The 
Pensions (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance of 1955 allowed for early retirement with full 
pension benefits. Thus civil servants were able to ‘retire’ in order to contest the elections 
(Puthucheary 1978:34-38). 
23 The United Malays National Organisation was formed in May 1946, the Malayan Indian 
Congress in August 1946 and the Malayan Chinese Association in 1952. The All-Malaya Islamic 
Association also referred to as the Pan-Malaya Islamic Party, adopted the name Parti Islam Sa-
Tanah (PAS) to contest elections in 1955 (Andaya and Andaya 2001:278). 
24 It is significant that in a period that was otherwise marked by political repression, particularly 
against organised labour and the Malayan Communist Party, that these civil servants were given 
time during working hours to attend political meetings and were not punished for taking a 
  86Labour Party, or Socialist Front. Established in 1953, it was an initially moderate 
grouping supported by the British. From its ranks emerged V. David who would 
later leave to form the political party, Gerakan, and, in the 1970s, became 
MTUC Secretary General. 
 
The revival of the MTUC from the mid 1950s took place in a pre-Independence 
atmosphere where political parties actively sought the support of the population, 
including organised labour, in order to counter British plans for a Malayan 
Union. The positive economic impact of the rubber boom was becoming evident, 
and the Emergency regulations had been somewhat lessened (Rudner 1994:354). 
Throughout the decade trade union numbers again rose, from a low of 41,000 in 
1949 to 222,000 in 1957 (Jomo and Todd 1994:23).  
 
Labour and economic development after Independence 
By 1957, the year of Malaya’s political independence, the population had 
increased to almost 6.3 million. In contrast to the immigrant status of the 
majority of waged labourers in earlier colonial era, by this point, 76 per cent of 
ethnic Chinese residents and 66 per cent of ethnic Indian residents were locally 
born (Bussink 1980:97). Malays comprised almost 50 per cent of the population 
while a further 37 per cent were of Chinese ethnicity and eleven per cent were 
Indian (Soman 1986:145). However, this distribution of the population was not 
reflected in employment patterns. ‘When colonialism ended, the three ethnic 
groups were entrenched in virtually isolated occupational and spatial 
                                                                                                                                                             
blatantly political position against decisions of the British authorities (Bowie 1989:111; 
Puthucheary 1978, Chapter III). 
  87development, sharing little inter-ethnic cultural attributes’ (Rajah 1997:124). 
Table 2.7 below illustrates something of this uneven distribution.  
 
The segmentation of the labour force was not only on the lines of ethnicity but 
also by gender. In 1957, the rate of labour force participation by women at 30.8 
per cent, was considerably lower than that for men at 88.7 per cent (Kamarudin 
1982:81). The Employment Act 1955 placed restrictions on the employment of 
women by, for example, barring their employment in underground mining and at 
night (Kaur n.d.:17). As Malay men were increasingly forced to participate in 
waged labour, to purchase new chemical fertilisers and other modern farm inputs 
and also due to the loss of small holdings, Malay women increasingly bore the 
load of household work. ‘By the end of the colonial period, Malay women were 
largely displaced from the “productive” sector’ (Kaur n.d.:17). 
 
Table 2.7 Industry employed by ethnicity, 1957 (per cent) 
Industry sector  Malay  Chinese  Indian  Total 
Agriculture, forestry, 
livestock, fishing  46 13  2 27 
Agricultural products  29  28  55  32 
Mining and quarrying  1  5  2  3 
Manufacturing 3  13  3  6 
Construction 2  4  4  3 
Utilities 0.4  0.4  1  1 
Commerce 3  17  11  9 
Transport and 
communications 3  4  5  4 
Services 13  15  16  15 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Source: Jomo 1988:294 
 
While the working class within all three ethnic groups had considerable 
experience of poverty, Malays, being less urbanised, lacked access to the better 
  88paid employment opportunities more likely to be obtained in urban areas (see 
tables below). This outcome, and the fear of ethnic unrest that might result, 
would later underpin the political, social and economic policies of subsequent 
administrations.  
 
Table 2.8 Income and ethnicity, 1957/8 
Ethnic 
group 
mean income per household 
($/month) 
Percentage of households with 
income less than $120 per month 
Malays 139  55.7 
Chinese 300  13.1 
Indian 237  19.8 
Source: Snodgrass 1980:80, table 4.9, and 1980:83, table 4.12. 
 
Table 2.9 Percentage of population in urban areas by ethnic group 
                 Per cent urban to total population           
Census year  Malay  Chinese  Indian 
1947 7.30  31.30 25.80 
1957 11.21  44.73 30.73 
Source: Kok 1986: 59, table 57. 
 
Table 2.10 Ethnic composition of the urban population by ethnic group,  
Peninsular Malaysia 
Census 
year Malay Chinese  Indian Other 
Total 
urban 
population 
1947 19.0  63.1  14.7  3.2  929,928 
1957 21.0  62.6  12.8  3.6  1,666,969 
Source: Kok 1986:59, table 56. 
 
Malayanising the civil service 
‘After Independence in 1957 the Deputy Prime Minister mounted a patient and 
unremitting campaign to modernize the civil service’ (Esman 1972:135). The 
Malayanisation of the civil service continued, with expatriate officers replaced 
by local recruits. The quota system favouring Malays allowed for their increased 
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25 However, the greater 
availability of qualified Chinese and Indian applicants led to their continued 
domination of professional and technical positions in the senior levels of the 
bureaucracy. Sensitive to this, the newly independent Malay-dominated 
government encouraged the creation of more junior and middle level 
administrative roles as a means of increasing Malay representation.  
Table 2.11 Ethnic representation in the senior bureaucracy, 1950-1962 
 1950  1957  1962 
Ethnic  group  no.  % no.  % no.  % 
Expatriates  1,763  92.4 1,687  61.1 409  14.1 
Malays  86  4.5  390 14.1  850 29.3 
Chinese  22  1.2  366 13.2  987 34.0 
Indians  and  others  37  1.9  318 11.6  656 22.6 
Total  1,908 100.0 2,761 100.0 2,902 100.0 
Source: Puthucheary 1978:53, table 5.1. 
 
Esman (1972:75) argues that this strategy demonstrated the willingness of the 
UMNO-dominated government to compromise economic goals in order to 
achieve political needs.  
So concerned were the Malays with maintaining firm control of 
the MHFS that in 1965, when there were a hundred vacancies due 
to an insufficient supply of Malay honours graduates, these posts 
were kept vacant rather than filled with qualified non-
Malay…There can be little doubt the country paid a price in 
reduced administrative effectiveness. 
 
The Congress of Unions of Employees of Public and Civil Services (CUEPACS) 
had formed in 1957 (Rohanna 1997:48), attempting to provide some unity for the 
136, mostly very small, civil service unions already in existence, some of which 
were affiliated with the MTUC (Rohanna and Lochhead 1988:19). While the 
Whitley Councils had been created to formalise bargaining processes in the 
                                                           
25 M. Shamsul Haque (2003:247) provides a useful elaboration of the increasing complexity of 
the quota system after Independence. 
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rejected union claims and imposed a wage freeze until mid 1959. Rudner 
(1994:379) suggests that in the build up to the 1959 election, ‘the government 
relaxed a little and indicated its readiness to be “fair” with wage claims based on 
“efficiency and equity”’, allowing a slight pay rise. Rohanna and Lochhead 
(1988:30-31) note that by the early 1960s, a sizeable backlog of claims existed. 
Post-election, it appears the Whitley Councils were no longer allowed to operate 
with any independence.
26  
 
Cabinet effectively took over responsibility for public sector wages, establishing 
the Suffian Salary Commission in 1963. The government linked wage increases 
to concerns regarding the state of the economy and the risk of wage inflation in 
the private sector. This led to picketing and rallies by a number of the public 
sector unions in mid 1966. For example, a campaign led by the teaching 
profession unions for equal pay for women in the civil service gained 
government approval in 1964 but the implementation was delayed until after 
1969. ‘If our country is in financial difficulties, we expect everyone, including 
women, to sacrifice a little bit’ (Khir Johari 1968, Straits Times, 5 July cited in 
Manderson 1979:265). Despite the size of the civil service, which was at this 
point approximately 310,000 in total, industrial action was largely unsuccessful 
given the fragmented nature of both the service itself and the multitude of unions 
that attempted to represent these workers. The Suffian Salary Commission finally 
reported in 1967, and its recommendations, by then dated, began to be 
                                                           
26 American academic Milton Esman, employed through the Ford Foundation in the early 1960s 
to devise a plan for administrative change in the Malaysian Civil Service, noted that the civil 
service unions were ‘virtually ignored’. Senior civil service staff communicated only reluctantly 
with ‘unions dominated by lower-status, non-Malay officers’ (Esman 1972:171-172). 
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and eleven per cent of the Malaysian labour force, which was relatively high 
(Esman 1972:70). 
 
With Independence, the Trade Union Advisor’s Department had been dissolved 
and a new Department of Labour and Industrial Relations created. The Pioneer 
Industries Act of 1958 attempted to encourage foreign investors by, amongst 
other offerings, limiting unionisation. The moves were criticised by the MTUC 
and the Socialist Front.  
Let no foreign capital think they could get cheap labour in this 
country; they must recognize that the trade union movement is a 
growing force and they are going to live in a community where 
trade unions have developed (MTUC President, P. P. Narayanan, 
cited in Rudner 1994:375-376). 
 
The Trade Unions Act was introduced in 1959, which essentially revised and 
consolidated all previous legislation from the colonial era, continuing the 
requirement that trade unions must apply for formal registration and that their 
activities be subject to the scrutiny of the Registrar of Trade Unions. As a reward 
for shunning the advances of the Socialist Front and retreating from party 
political activities, the MTUC President, Dr P. P. Narayanan, was appointed a 
Senator (Rudner 1994:367). A mission by the International Labour Office (ILO) 
to Malaya in the late 1950s, requested by the MTUC, concluded that ‘public 
policy was a compound of paternalism in politics and laissez faire in economics’ 
(ILO 1962:26).  
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Year 
no. of
strikes
no. of
workers
working days 
lost 
1957 113 14,067 218,562 
1958 69 9,467 59,211 
1959 39 6,946 38,523 
1960 37 4,596 41,947 
1961 58 9,045 59,730 
1962 95 232,912 449,856 
1963 72 17,232 305,168 
1964 85 226,427 508,439 
1965 46 14,684 152,666 
1966 60 16,673 109,915 
1967 45 9,452 157,984 
1968 103 31,062 280,417 
1969 49 8,750 76,779 
Source: Jomo and Todd 1994:48, table 2.16. 
 
However, the nature of political control took a more repressive turn soon after. 
At the end of the Emergency in 1960, Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Government 
introduced the Internal Security Act (ISA) in order to retain a level of control 
over society in the event of a resurgence in Communist activity. The ISA 
provided the authorities with the power to detain without laying charges. The 
legislation was used to detain union officials involved in the 1962 strikes by the 
Railwaymen’s Union and the Cement Workers’ Union (Hua 1983:164). Both 
disputes were for the purpose of recognition of the union. Union membership 
grew considerably in the wake of the success of prolonged industrial action in 
1963 by the railway workers which generated widespread support and activism 
amongst other unions affiliated with the MTUC. Prime Ministerial intervention 
was required to end the dispute. By 1965, official union membership had reached 
almost 333,000, over 30 per cent of whom were Malay while approximately 23 
per cent were female (Jomo and Todd 1994:23-31). 
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known as the ‘Konfrontasi’ (the Confrontation), resulted in another period of 
Emergency. These circumstances afforded the government an opportunity to 
restrict the increasingly militant activities of trade unions (see Table 2.12), 
including a threatened general strike by public sector unions. In 1965 the 
Minister of Labour, V. Manickavasagam, introduced the Essential (Prohibition of 
Strikes and Certain Prescribed Industrial Action) Regulations, which banned 
strike action by workers in any industry considered to be essential to the nation’s 
security (Stenson 1970:240). Soon after, the arbitration system moved from a 
voluntary to a compulsory system, effectively allowing the Minister to ban strike 
action in any industry (Suhanah 2002:73).  
Table 2.13 Employment share by economic sector, 1965 and 1970 
‘000 %   
Sector  1965 1970 1965 1970 
Agriculture 1,350  1,454  52.1  49.5 
Industry 389  456  15.0  15.5 
Mining 66  64  2.5  2.2 
Manufacturing 217  270  8.4  9.2 
Construction 90  103  3.5  3.5 
Utilities
a 16 19 0.6  0.6 
Services 851  1,030  32.9  35.0 
Commerce 287  340  11.1  11.6 
Transport, storage 
& 
communications 
101 110 3.9 3.7 
Other services  463  580  17.9  19.7 
Total employed  2,590  2,940  100  100 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971:198, table 7.1. Data relates to West Malaysia. 
a Utilities 
includes electricity, water and sanitation. 
 
These, and other measures to control the activities of societies, including peak 
employer organisations, unions and political parties, were incorporated in the 
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27 and the Industrial Relations Act passed 
in 1967. In 1969, regulations were added to the Industrial Relations and Trade 
Unions Acts which removed a number of issues from eligibility for negotiation 
under collective agreements and prevented managerial workers from joining the 
same union as non-managerial workers (Hua 1983:165; Jomo 1995:204).  
 
During the same period, the government introduced several pieces of protective 
labour legislation, including the Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act 
of 1966, and the Factories and Machinery Act 1967 which sought to introduce 
safety measures in the growing numbers of industrialised workplaces. In 1969, 
the Employees Social Security Act was passed which attempted to address 
shortcomings in the administration and delivery of workers’ compensation 
entitlements. This Act required employees to contribute 0.5 per cent of their pay 
and employers to contribute 1.5 per cent of workers’ salaries to a centralised 
fund (SOCSO) overseen by the federal government. The provision of public low 
cost housing was commenced to facilitate home ownership among low income 
earners (Doling and Omar 2002:10). This became a more important strategy 
from the later 1970s as part of the effort to encourage more Malays into newly 
established urban areas to meet the growing demand for labour. 
 
By the close of the 1960s, despite efforts to improve agricultural productivity and 
to encourage foreign investment in the industrial sector, the government’s 
policies had largely failed to generate widespread employment growth or to offer 
alternative employment opportunities outside of the agricultural sector. As 
                                                           
27 Importantly this piece of legislation gave the police the power to approve or deny applications 
for public gatherings, and to disperse any assembly deemed a threat to public security 
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development was between 1.3 and 3.3 per cent of total development spending in 
the first three five-year development plans from 1957-1970. Meanwhile, the 
changing structure of ownership in the plantation sector from the late 1950s 
onwards led to widespread retrenchments of Indian labourers (Stenson 
1980:204),
28 and the subsequent radicalisation of some Indian-led unions 
(Bhopal 1999:278).  
 
Table 2.14 Labour force, employment and unemployment, 1965 and 1970 
1965 1970  (estimated)   
West 
Malaysia
East  
Malaysia 
West 
Malaysia 
East  
Malaysia 
Labour force (millions)  2,730  516  3,150  618 
Employment (millions)  2,550  498  2,990  593 
Unemployment 
(thousands) 
180 18  250  25 
Unemployment (%)  6.5  3.5  8.0  4.0 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971:102, Second Malaysia Plan, table 7.2. 
 
Unemployment generally rose throughout the 1960s, and was particularly high 
amongst younger people in urban areas, a product of laissez faire economic 
policies, post war population growth and the surge of urbanisation that followed 
the lifting of movement restrictions associated with the Emergency. In 1967, 75 
per cent of the unemployed were under the age of 25 leading to government 
claims that the young, urban unemployed, many of whom had achieved ten years 
of education, were unrealistic in their occupational preference being unwilling to 
accept manual work (Government of Malaysia 1971:99). In rural areas, a greater 
problem was that of underemployment in low productivity agricultural 
occupations. For the bottom 40 per cent of households, mean monthly income 
had decreased in real terms by 13 per cent from Independence until 1970. For the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Barraclough 1985:810-811).  
  96top 20 per cent, income had increased by 43 per cent (Snodgrass 1980:81, table 
4.10). 
 
Lobbying by the frustrated Malay business community generated government 
action in the holding of the first Bumiputera [sic] Economic Conference in 1965 
with another held in 1968. In 1965, Bank Bumiputera [sic] was established and 
plans to create the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) were 
announced. This finally came into being as the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority in 1968, during which year the Investment Incentives 
Act was introduced, as part of which, employment of Malays by foreign owned 
manufacturing firms was rewarded with tax reductions. These were relatively 
tentative moves but they attracted the criticism of Chinese business 
representatives (Gomez and Jomo 1999:21). 
 
The regime of accumulation that evolved under the Tunku’s leadership had, to 
this point, facilitated continued dominance by foreign capital and domestic 
Chinese capital. In this, Bowie and Unger (1997:76-77) suggest that the Prime 
Minister had little choice. While making some attempt to alleviate conditions in 
the Malay-dominated rural areas, UMNO ‘recognized that the Chinese and 
Indian communities’ acceptance of their political hegemony was conditional on 
the state not interfering in private commerce and industry’. Bowie and Unger 
argue further, that should the Government have acted to develop the industrial 
sector, this would have been perceived by the Malay electorate as benefiting the 
Chinese business community.  
                                                                                                                                                             
28 According to official data, almost 20 per cent of the estate work force was displaced in the 
period 1962-1967 (Government of Malaysia 1971:96-97). 
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the nature of political relations between ethnic groups militated 
against the Alliance government adopting anything other than a 
market-led approach to industrial development (Bowie and Unger 
1997:77). 
 
However, rather than a ‘market-led’ approach, Stenson (1980:193-197) describes 
the progression of industrialisation as actively hampered by UMNO’s efforts to 
retain the support of rural Malays. Policies that allocated Malays land and other 
small scale economic opportunities frustrated the Chinese business community. 
Additionally, the uneven distribution of wealth, with wide scale poverty amongst 
the working class, meant that there was a very limited domestic market for goods 
produced by the fledgling manufacturing sector (Jomo 1990:12, cited in Gomez 
and Jomo 1999:17). Realising the need to shift production towards an export 
orientation, but not wishing to rely on domestic Chinese capital, the Investment 
Incentives Act in 1968 was a bid to attract foreign investors. While these 
initiatives would later have an impact on the economy, they came too late to 
quell public protests and rioting. These events have had a marked impact on 
government policy ever since. 
 
The contours of control fail 
Social unrest erupted in May of 1969, initially sparked by the release of 
preliminary election results that appeared to favour the Chinese opposition 
parties, suggesting that Chinese voters had rejected the Alliance and its 
underlying ‘bargain’. Rioting in the streets of Kuala Lumpur, reportedly by 
Malay youths who targeted Chinese homes and businesses, officially resulted in 
196 fatalities and 439 injuries (Bowie 1989:166). The Parliament was suspended 
and another period of Emergency declared.  
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Explanations for the unrest vary.
29 Mahathir offered the following explanation in 
a letter to the Prime Minister three weeks after the riots.  
Your “give and take” policy gives the Chinese everything they 
ask for...The Chinese…regarded you and the Alliance government 
as cowards…The Malays in the Civil Service…have lost faith and 
respect for you…it is high time you resign as our Prime Minister 
and UMNO leader (Mahathir June 1969 cited in von Vorys 
1972:373). 
 
Mahathir had lost his own seat in the election. He had advised his Chinese 
constituents not to vote for him on the basis that he would not be able to 
represent their interests. As a result of his letter to the Prime Minister, Mahathir 
was expelled from the party until 1972. He then rejoined and was appointed a 
Senator until winning back his lower house seat in the 1974 elections. 
 
Missen (1986:84-86), similarly to Stenson (1980), argues the Alliance was 
fundamentally flawed from the beginning. The credibility of UMNO rested on its 
ability to deliver economic growth and cultural dominance to the Malay 
population. Given that most economic resources remained in foreign and, to a 
lesser extent, Chinese, hands, it inevitably proved impossible for the Malay 
government to deliver broad scale development and opportunities to its Malay 
constituency. Missen therefore attributes UMNO’s poor electoral performance, 
particularly the loss of votes to PAS, to the inability of the Alliance to deliver 
                                                           
29 For example, von Vorys (1972:308), focuses on communal hostilities, describing, perhaps with 
some editorial license, the events that followed the initial release of the election results: ‘At the 
end of an arduous election night vigil, some, mostly Chinese and Indians, were in a high state of 
excitement…they celebrated with gusto what they thought to be their hour of victory…yet they 
felt no reassurance. More perhaps, than ever before, their political future appeared unclear, their 
security precarious…Underneath all the ecstasy and bravado they were afraid…Others, mostly 
Malays, were appalled and perplexed. They huddled with grave foreboding in their urban 
enclaves in and around the federal capital…Many had felt deeply that the Alliance was “too fair” 
to the Chinese and that the incumbent (UMNO) did not champion Malay communal interests 
vigorously and uncompromisingly enough.’ 
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cent of the Malay population, including urban and rural dwellers, supported PAS 
in 1969 (von Vorys 1975:305).  
 
Reintroducing a role for the ‘middle classes’, Kahn (1996:68-69) argues that the 
major policy response in the post-riot Government, the New Economic Policy 
(NEP),  
while often said to be a direct response to the 1969 ‘racial riots’ in 
Kuala Lumpur, in fact had its origins in the pressure exerted by 
middle-level Malay bureaucrats and (to a lesser extent) 
businessmen at the Bumiputra [sic] Congresses of 1965 and 1968.  
 
That is, he argues the influence of more urbanised and educated Malays whose 
aspirations remained unmet. Their rising educational opportunities were not 
matched by similar economic opportunities. Gomez and Jomo (1999:21-22) also 
highlight this factor, and, conversely, note the growing concerns of the Chinese 
business sector over moves made by the government in the mid to late 1960s to 
extend its reach into the private sector in order to appease the aspiring Malay 
business sector.  
 
To Jesudason (1989), the hostility between the Chinese and Malays taking part in 
the riots was an expression of dissatisfaction with their ‘relative’ economic and 
cultural positions more than an expression of ‘underlying economic grievances’. 
Neither UMNO nor the MCA appeared able to convince its supporters that the 
policies of the government would protect their relative interests.
30 The 
‘agreement’ that Malay political dominance would not infringe upon Chinese 
                                                           
30 ‘The Alliance received approximately 54 per cent of the Malay vote and 43 per cent of the non-
Malay vote in 1969. Comparable figures for 1964 are 67 per cent of the Malay vote and 48 per 
cent of the non-Malay vote’ (Snodgrass 1980:54-55). 
  100economic dominance was viewed as under threat by Malays who feared that the 
Chinese now wanted to extend their dominance to the political sphere. 
Conversely, the  
Chinese population began to see themselves as second-class 
citizens and came to resent a number of specific issues, such as 
high quotas allocated to Malays in the civil service, the 
preponderance of Malays in the army and police, their inability to 
get Chinese listed as an official language and to obtain greater 
assistance for Chinese education (Jesudason 1989:68). 
 
Given their intersections, it is in fact very hard to disentangle the concerns of 
‘ethnicity’ from those that might be termed ‘class’. Poverty was experienced by 
all ethnic groups (see Table 2.15 below) and was correlated with geographical 
location.  
 
Table 2.15 Households in poverty by ethnic group, Peninsular Malaysia, 
1970 
 
All 
households 
(‘000) 
Poor 
households 
(‘000) 
Poverty 
incidence (%) 
Percentage of 
total poor 
households 
Malay  901.5 584.2 64.8  73.8 
Chinese  525.2 136.3 26.0  17.2 
Indian 160.5  62.9  39.2  7.9 
Others 18.8  8.4  44.8  1.1 
TOTAL 1,606.0  791.8  49.3  100.00 
All rural  1,166.7  683.7  58.6  86.3 
All  urban  439.3 108.1 24.6  13.7 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1976:180, table 9.6.  
 
Inequalities in the distribution of wealth were growing more rapidly within each 
ethnic group,
31 strongly suggesting that economic policy was largely benefiting 
the urbanised elite of all ethnic groups, while leading to a worsening of 
conditions for the working class and small land holders in the rural sector 
(Snodgrass 1980, chapter 4). Malay and Indian households were increasingly 
                                                           
31 For example, the Gini co-efficient in 1957/58 was 0.342 for Malays, 0.374 for Chinese and 
0.347 for Indians. A decade later, these figures had widened to 0.400, 0.391 and 0.403, and by 
1970 the figures had worsened again. While Snodgrass makes it very clear that these figures must 
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households suffered a decline in real income under the prevailing economic 
system as unemployment worsened. Further, by virtue of their rural location and 
historical exclusion from modern sector employment and education, Malays 
were over represented amongst the poor. Chinese located in the semi-rural ‘New 
Villages’ also experienced high levels of poverty and underemployment (Heng 
1997). Rural Indians located in plantation housing were likewise denied 
educational opportunities and received low and fluctuating wages. Conversely, 
the educated youth of all ethnic groups recorded some of the highest rates of 
unemployment, supporting Kahn’s (1996) observations of the frustrations facing 
urbanised, educated, middle income earners. 
 
Despite the obvious contribution of economic conditions to the unrest, the 
collapse of the Alliance was not due to an economic crisis. Instead, Jesudason 
(1989:74) describes the May 1969 events as heralding ‘the political exhaustion of 
the economic system…On purely macro-economic terms, the laissez-faire 
system was relatively successful in generating national income and diversifying 
the economy…’. Gomez and Jomo (1999:19) also comment that levels of growth 
were steady and inflation generally low. This suggests that Malaysia would have 
remained economically viable by continuing along the same development path 
with limited government involvement in the private sector. In this understanding, 
the 1969 crisis can be better understood as a political one, generated by a lack of 
societal support for the nature of capital accumulation, in which wealth 
distribution was increasingly skewed, white collar employment opportunities 
                                                                                                                                                             
be understood as flawed, he nonetheless finds them consistently pointing to an increase in 
inequality (Snodgrass 1980, chapter 4). 
  102remained limited, and the communally based ruling parties were unable to 
deliver the cultural, political or economic advances demanded by their 
constituents.  
 
This analysis is consistent with the understanding in régulation theory that a 
regime of accumulation
32 requires a corresponding mode of regulation, ‘a set of 
mediations which ensure that the distortions created by the accumulation of 
capital are kept within limits which are compatible with social cohesion within 
each nation’ (Aglietta 1998:44). The ‘inadequacy of neo-colonial capitalism’ 
(Stenson 1980:192) was the inability to regulate labour in the sense of gaining or 
enforcing labour’s co-operation and participation in the processes of capital 
accumulation. ‘A new set of relations between capital and labour had to be 
negotiated that would allow for labour’s continued domination by capital’ 
(Loong 1998:10-11). Workers were now voters, with the ability to express their 
dissatisfaction electorally, a marked difference from the colonial era. 
 
The suspension of Parliament ended ‘the least regulated phase of post-colonial 
Malaysian capitalism’ (Khoo 1997:53). Widespread economic, socio-cultural and 
political changes, encompassed within the NEP, supported the rise of a Malay 
business community and the rapid enlargement of Malay waged labour. The role 
of the NEP in reshaping and regulating the Malaysian labour force is discussed in 
detail in the following chapter. 
 
                                                           
32 The regime of accumulation can be understood as, ‘a complementary pattern of production and 
consumption which is reproducible over a long period’ (Jessop 1993:330) 
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Operations Council headed by Tun Razak, took the opportunity to cast the unrest 
in ways which focused on inter ethnic differences. ‘The forces of class 
dissatisfaction were easily realigned into racial hatred and utilised by the Malay 
bourgeoisie in their struggle with their Chinese counterparts’ (Halim 1981:275). 
The ‘ethnic’ origins of the unrest were used to underpin greater involvement by 
the Malay-dominated administration in wide ranging aspects of the economy and 
society, arguably as a means of redressing the relatively poor economic and 
social position of the Malay population.  
 
Conclusions 
The regime of labour control that developed under the British colonial authorities 
and European employers was largely reliant on the immigrant status of the 
waged labour force. This meant; firstly, that workers were vulnerable to 
repatriation; secondly, that they lacked a local support base from which to 
organise politically; and, thirdly, that their employment contract was often tied to 
a specific agent or place of employment thus limiting freedom of movement. The 
uneven nature of early economic development, with the overwhelming reliance 
on tin and rubber, also provided employers with the upper hand in that workers, 
particularly less-skilled workers, lacked alternative employment opportunities. 
Deliberate strategies of dividing workers along the lines of ethnicity, and the use 
of existing intra-ethnic hierarchies to exert control over workers resulted in a 
geographically, ethnically and industrially segmented labour force (Missen 
1986:8).  
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contributed to capital accumulation given political and economic realities 
particular to the era. Malaya’s economy was intricately linked to the imperial 
economy. Small scale local production was negligible in comparison with the 
economic importance of exports of tin and rubber. There was little economic 
reliance on consumption by the domestic market. This reduced the economic 
imperative on the authorities or employers to improve the welfare and income 
levels of workers. Given that the workforce was largely imported, there was also 
little pressure to keep wages above a level that would support labour’s social 
reproduction. The absence of democratic institutions meant few political 
pressures were placed on the colonial authorities to improve conditions for the 
labour force. Under the colonial arrangements, therefore, a coercive system of 
labour control was able to be maintained both politically and economically. 
 
In the case of the majority of the Indian and Chinese working class, the nature of 
labour control is somewhat captured by Burawoy’s (1985) term ‘colonial 
despotism’: ‘…despotic, because force prevails over consent; colonial, because 
one racial group dominates through political, legal and economic rights denied to 
the other’ (Burawoy 1985:226). The colonial authorities extended considerable 
managerial prerogatives to employers who were legally allowed to use physical 
force against employees. Little was done to shelter workers from fluctuating 
economic conditions. Income insecurity was the norm for the majority of the 
Indian and Chinese working class, as wages were allowed to drop on a seasonal 
basis and during recessions, and workers were repatriated when no longer 
required. Hence workers were also exposed to ‘the economic whip of the 
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Malaya also differed from the situation Burawoy described, in which capitalism 
becomes unstable under a despotic regime when labour is undercut to the extent 
of failing to reproduce itself. In contrast, where an economy is able to import 
both a large immigrant labour force and cheap food supplies, labour can be 
exposed to the market without disrupting accumulation. In this way, the system 
of labour control that emerged in Malaya was dependent on the relatively poor 
economic and political circumstances facing labour in China and India.  
 
Despotic and physically coercive means of labour control became less 
sustainable due to a range of factors. Political circumstances changed in China 
and India that limited emigration. This coincided with restrictions on the 
availability of food imports in the pre-war period. The decline of Britain as a 
colonial power and changing political, economic and socio-cultural 
circumstances in post war Malaya, signalled a shift in the balance of economic 
and social forces that had previously supported the regime of accumulation, and 
within it, the mode of régulation.  
 
That the majority of the Malay population remained engaged in subsistence 
agricultural activities generally worked to the favour of colonial economic 
arrangements, as little was required by way of investment in local infrastructure 
to generate employment opportunities or provide public services. The failure to 
support the social reproduction of Malay labour contributed to growing 
inequalities and resentment that found expression in the rioting and social unrest 
of the late 1960s. 
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During the campaign against the MCP and in the build up to Independence, 
responses by the colonial authorities and some employers indicated an awareness 
of the need to direct greater resources towards labour’s social reproduction. For 
the soon to depart British, the motivations for doing so were political as well as 
economic. This was evidenced by the provision of basic infrastructure to the 
incarcerated Chinese in the ‘New Villages’, and by increased public expenditure 
on health services (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
1955) and the provision of employer-paid maternity leave for women plantation 
workers (Manderson 1999:105-106). However, disputes between the departing 
colonial government, London and local employers over responsibilities for 
funding meant that much of the spending was ad hoc, reliant on private 
charitable organisations and unevenly distributed with a focus on urban areas. 
 
The British embarked on the destruction of the Communist inspired labour 
movement in the post-war period, and, amongst divided opinion, sponsored a 
conservative union movement to manage worker activism. The MTUC was a 
legacy of international political pressures being brought to bear as Britain’s 
imperialism came under negative scrutiny in the period just prior to, and 
immediately following, the Second World War. A paternalistic relationship 
developed between the under-resourced, Indian-dominated, moderate MTUC and 
the institutions of the state, a role which at times emphasised industrial peace 
above the demands of particular businesses. Driven by the need to maintain the 
level of tin and rubber exports and concerned at the ramifications of drawn out 
labour disputes, the bureaucracy became involved in the resolution of deadlocked 
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movement itself lacked the power to engage in collective bargaining with largely 
disinterested employer groups. Rudner (1994:360) argued that the MTUC 
similarly pushed for the passing of the Employment Act as a means of ensuring 
the government’s involvement in policing minimum conditions of employment.  
 
The union movement never managed to assert itself as a partner in economic 
development, being disparaged by expatriate civil servants, considered 
‘outsiders’ by Malay nationalists and shunned by many Chinese workers for fear 
of being labelled Communist. Reliant on the recognition granted by legislation 
enacted in the build up to Independence, the paternalism so central to the 
relationship between government and union movement was established early in 
the history of the MTUC and the institutions responsible for overseeing its 
activities. 
 
One of the most important colonial contributions to the régulation of labour’s 
social reproduction was the introduction of the Employee’s Provident Fund. This 
served a dual purpose of providing a measure of retirement income for its 
members as well as a pool of domestic funding available to the government.  
 
Once Malaysia had achieved independence, the accompanying changes in 
political circumstances were not adequately matched by changes to income, 
welfare and labour policies. Apart from continuing its surveillance of organised 
labour, and reducing the ability of leftist opposition parties to publicise labour 
issues, little was done to ensure labour’s support or cooperation in accumulation. 
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effective tool of control under the British, became problematic during the laissez 
faire era of the late 1950s until the late 1960s. Little was done towards creating 
employment opportunities for the expanding post-war population.  
 
Tentative moves towards widening economic support to Bumiputera outside of 
the agricultural sector were evident in the holding of the Bumiputera [sic] 
Economic Congresses in 1965 and 1968. An important outcome of the earlier 
congress was Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA, Council of Trust for Indigenous 
People) formed in 1966 out of a reorganised RIDA. While MARA would later 
become a significant institution for delivering benefits to Malays, other than 
these early efforts, welfare provision by the state was limited. Of all government 
funding allocated to ‘development’ in the mid 1960s, approximately 18 per cent 
targeted ‘social’ aspects and 63 per cent was directed to ‘economic’ aspects 
(Government of Malaysia 1971:70-71).
33 Responsibility for retirement funds and 
workers’ compensation was placed on the employer and the employee, with little 
assistance available to those outside of formal employment relations. A notable 
exception was the state funded pension scheme and the provision of housing for 
federal civil servants, who nonetheless, were otherwise constrained politically 
and industrially. Modifications to the means of labour control throughout the 
1960s acted in the main to increase the repressive aspects, as outlined above, but 
delivered only minimal concessions, opportunities or benefits to the working 
class and the rural population.  
 
                                                           
33 ‘Social’ spending was defined by the Government of Malaysia as that relating to education, 
housing, local authorities, welfare services, and village and community development.  
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failed to garner adequate social support for the existing regime of accumulation 
(Aglietta 1998:44). In agreeing not to interfere in economic matters, the Alliance 
formula constrained UMNO’s ability to guarantee social cohesion; few options 
remained available to be utilised in the régulation of labour. Those means of 
labour control that were implemented did not adequately address or manage to 
contain the aspirations of the working class, and also contributed to a distancing 
between the institutions of the state and middle and upper income Chinese (Heng 
1997). It similarly failed to deliver on the economic and cultural aspirations of 
those Malays who felt threatened and excluded by the economic dominance of 
domestic Chinese capital. That both Malays and Chinese moved away from the 
Alliance in the 1969 elections indicates that dissatisfaction with the economic 
and political situation was experienced across the lines of ethnicity. While the 
moves towards export oriented industrialisation in the late 1960s signalled a 
change in economic direction, it came too late to deliver either the economic 
benefits or the societal reassurance required to prevent unrest. The response to 
the social unrest, the NEP, embodied attempts to institute a new set of political 
and economic arrangements through which to manage these conflicting, and at 
times contradictory, demands.  
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Our people of all races and all social groups should therefore 
regard the Second Malaysia Plan as a great opportunity to 
participate in the whole process of social change and nation-
building. It is now, more than ever before, necessary for each 
member of our society, whether a politician, civil servant, farmer, 
employer, worker, trade unionist or journalist, to join in the 
common endeavour to ensure the progress and well-being of the 
community and the nation as a whole. The Government is 
determined that the Plan must succeed and, in the final analysis, it 
can only succeed with the acquiescence and enthusiastic support 
of the people (Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, preface to the 
Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Government of Malaysia 
1971:vi). 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the May 1969 riots, the country was effectively ruled by then 
Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, through a National Operations 
Council (NOC) that wielded considerable power under the Emergency provisions 
of the Constitution. By September 1970 Abdul Razak had become Prime 
Minister. He began his period of leadership with a concerted effort to redirect 
Malaysia’s economic development efforts towards addressing what was 
identified politically as an ethnically unbalanced distribution of wealth and 
opportunity. The government released a White Paper, Toward National 
Harmony, which stressed the economic and social inequalities between the ethnic 
groups as the root cause of the 1969 events (Firdaus 1997:191). In widely 
promulgating statistical data that emphasised inter ethnic inequalities, for 
example, in income, access to education, and occupational status, the 
government sought to justify the pro-Malay affirmative action policies contained 
within the New Economic Policy (NEP).
1  
                                                           
1 The factors contributing to the relatively poor position of Malays have been widely discussed. 
Many conclude that inequalities of wealth were evident within each ethnic group and that poverty 
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The NEP (1971-1990) marked a period of increased government interventions in 
the economy and society, dismantling the previous political alliance which had 
left the economic sphere largely to foreign capital and to Malaysia’s Chinese 
business community. The emphasis now was on achieving a high rate of 
economic growth, and on redirecting a greater proportion of the benefits of that 
growth to the relatively disadvantaged Malay population. One goal of the NEP 
was the creation of a ‘Malay entrepreneurial community’. This was to be 
achieved through the expansion of share ownership and the direction of 
government-controlled licenses to Malay-owned businesses. The second major 
prong was the creation of non-agricultural employment opportunities that would 
flow predominantly to Malays (Government of Malaysia 1971:47). These goals 
presented a challenge given that the majority of the Malay population remained 
in rural areas and the economy remained dominated by British, and to a lesser 
extent, local Chinese capital.  
 
Wide ranging policies were documented in the Government’s Outline 
Perspective Plan (1971-1991). Faaland et al. (1990:77) suggest this was the 
‘highwater mark of the NEP’, being the document in which the NEP was most 
clearly presented as a long term strategy. Within the NEP, therefore, was the 
potential to develop a new state-labour nexus in the broadest sense. Yet it was 
also a strategy that raised tensions within UMNO and amongst its coalition 
partners, and more broadly between the government and many non-Malays. It 
                                                                                                                                                             
was associated with geographical location and access to non-agricultural employment. 
Particularly useful discussions are available in Snodgrass 1980 and Bussink 1980. 
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leadership in the management of economic, political and socio-cultural tensions. 
 
The ideological appeal by the state for all Malaysians to accept that the Malays 
were a disadvantaged group was an important aspect of the government’s post 
1969 response. However, the authorities were not going to rely on persuasive 
arguments alone to ensure future social, political and industrial ‘harmony’. For 
example, while the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75 (Government of Malaysia 
1971:266, 262) allocated $316.47 million Malaysian dollars towards Social and 
Community Services, in contrast $1,100.07 million was allocated for the Armed 
Forces and the Police Service and $21.51 million was allocated for prisons. The 
Sedition Act was amended before the resumption of Parliament in 1971 in order 
to make any criticism of Malay Special Privileges a punishable offence. This was 
to prevent further comments similar to those made by DAP parliamentarian, Goh 
Hock Guan in 1968. He was publicly critical of the pro-Malay civil service 
recruitment process. His comments were raised in the White Paper as directly 
contributing to the unrest between Malays and Chinese (Puthucheary 1978:65). 
In 1972 the Official Secrets Act was introduced and the Internal Security Act 
was further strengthened. The NEP era therefore signalled not only a greater 
economic role for the government, but also a strengthening of the state’s 
repressive apparatus, arguably to preserve stability and allow the pursuit of 
reforms. 
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Firdaus (1997:201) describes Malaysia’s second PM as an ‘innovative’ leader 
who softened the impact of the ‘authoritarian’ NOC with the ‘consultative’ 
approach of a National Consultative Council (NCC). Mahathir (1999:34) also 
described the NEP as resulting from widespread consultations carried out by the 
NCC. 
Representatives from all the major races were then brought 
together in a National Consultative Council to help formulate a 
new policy to restructure the economy in order to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of wealth. 
 
The pro-Malay NEP clearly indicated a change in policy making arrangements 
within the federal civil service where economic planning had previously been 
dominated by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU). Heng (1997:265-267) 
describes in detail the behind-the-scenes tussles between the newly created 
Malay-dominated Department of National Unity and the MCA-controlled EPU in 
drafting the NEP. Torii (1997) and Lee (2005, chapter 2) highlight the disputes 
amongst UMNO members over the extent to which the Malay agenda could be 
pursued without generating social unrest or a flight of capital.  
 
The new primacy of Malay interests was reflected in the reshuffling of cabinet 
positions in the broadened National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition that 
governed from 1971. The weakened position of the MCA saw it lose important 
portfolios (Gomez and Jomo 1999:44). From 1971 the crucial Ministry of Trade 
and Industry was allocated to UMNO. With the retirement of MCA leader Tan 
Siew Sin in 1974, this was also the case for the sensitive Ministry of Finance. 
The Labour portfolio, renamed Labour and Manpower in 1972, has, since 1974, 
been held by the MCA. Newly appointed MCA leader, Lee San Choon, took 
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the federal civil service, increasingly staffed by Malays, whose role it was to 
advance and implement the pro-Malay policies of the NEP. Economic planning 
powers were incrementally centralised within the Prime Minister’s Department.  
 
The Prime Minister was upfront about the need to secure domestic funding to 
enable the implementation of the NEP agenda. 
…foreign financing alone cannot be relied upon to the extent 
thought possible…The experience of the last five years has shown 
that preparing projects to met lenders’ demands is a difficult and 
time-consuming process…The bulk of the funds is expected to 
come from institutional sources. The Employees’ Provident Fund 
alone is expected to provide more than one-half of the total. Other 
major institutional sources will be the other provident and trust 
funds, social security funds arising from the new Social Security 
Act and the Post Office Savings Bank. Insurance companies and 
finance companies, which are obliged to hold a certain portion of 
local assets, are also expected to increase their purchases of 
Government securities’ (Government of Malaysia 1971:76, 79). 
 
EPF contribution rates were increased in 1975 from ten to thirteen per cent in 
1975 (Government of Malaysia 1981:129).  
 
In 1972, sales tax was introduced, followed in 1975 by a services tax. As 
employment opportunities expanded through the decade, so did revenue earned 
through direct taxation of individuals and companies (see Table 3.1). A major 
increase in government revenue came from oil discoveries. In 1974, the 
Petroleum Development Act created Petroliam Nasional Berhad, the national 
petroleum company known as Petronas. This legislation overturned the previous 
concession arrangements in which foreign oil interests had considerable control 
over Malaysia’s reserves of oil and gas. The government claimed the new 
arrangements would ‘ensure that maximum benefits accrue to the country [and 
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1976:327). In 1975, income derived from the petroleum industry amounted to 7.8 
per cent of total government revenue. By 1980, this would be approximately 20 
per cent (UNDP 2006:29).  
 
Table 3.1 Federal and state government revenue by source  
(Malaysian $ million) 
 1970  1975  1980 
Direct taxes  701  2,021  5,466 
Companies’ income tax  489  1,166  2,276 
Petroleum income tax  -  322  1,595 
Individual income tax  168  438  1,250 
Petroleum royalties  -  78  295 
Others 44  17  50 
Indirect taxes  1,299  2,555  6,457 
Export duties  258  625  2,420 
Import duties and surtax  557  801  1,686 
Excise duty  249  450  994 
Sales tax  -  272  647 
Road tax  169  241  378 
Others 66  166  332 
Non-tax revenue  400  541  947 
Total revenue
b 2,861 5,929 15,048 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1981:130. 
 
The post-1969 period also heralded changes in the education and vocational 
training sectors. The most immediate was the implementation of the policy 
replacing English as the language of instruction in the state funded education 
system (Snodgrass 1980:58). From 1970, Bahasa Melayu was introduced into 
primary schools, with English gradually phased out in all levels of education by 
the early 1980s. The number of universities in Malaysia increased from two in 
1970 to five by 1980, with enrolment quotas and scholarships targeted towards 
Malay students. Considerable funds were allocated to increase the number of 
primary and, particularly, secondary schools. A stronger commitment towards 
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Advisory Council on Industrial Training.  
 
Table 3.2 Employment share by economic sector, 1970 and 1975 
‘000 %   
Sector  1970 1975 1970  1975 
Agriculture 1,786.8  1,936.8  53.5  49.3 
Industry        
Mining 87.3  86.6  2.6  2.2 
Manufacturing 289.9  398.2  8.7  10.1 
Construction 90.6  113.2  2.7  2.9 
Utilities
a 18.6 23.9 0.6  0.6 
Services        
Transport, storage & 
communications 
133.4 179.4  4.0  4.6 
Wholesale & retail  379.9  495.9  11.4  12.6 
Banking, insurance 
& real estate 
26.8 32.7 0.8  0.8 
Public 
administration, 
education, health and 
defence 
403.9 508.8 12.0  13.0 
Other services  122.3  152.3  3.7  3.9 
Total employed  3,339.5  3,927.8  100  100 
Total labour force  3,606.8  4,225.0  100  100 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1976:140, table 8-1. Data relates to Malaysia.   
a Utilities includes electricity, gas and water. 
 
While the manufacturing sector had grown through the mid to late 1960s, it had 
contributed little by way of employment (Zulkifly 2001:7). The NEP aimed for 
annual employment growth of three per cent (Department of National Unity 
1970, cited in Faaland et al. 1990:309). It was made very clear in the Second 
Malaysia Plan that the creation of employment opportunities was a major goal of 
the NEP.  
Economic growth will also be pursued with an emphasis on 
employment. Investment incentives will be geared to take account 
of employment needs. In implementing development projects, 
particularly in the public sector, deliberate efforts will be made to 
use more labour-intensive techniques (Government of Malaysia 
1971:5).  
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employment in agriculture, secondary and tertiary sectors were 66.2%, 12.1% 
and 21.7% respectively in 1970…The NEP aimed at restructuring these figures 
to 37.4% in agriculture, 26.8% in secondary and 35.8% in tertiary sectors 
respectively in 1990’ (Rasiah and Ishak 2001:59). The NEP also outlined 
employment quotas. Initially these were voluntary, rewarding firms employing a 
certain percentage of Malays with corporate tax exemptions via 1971 
amendments to the Investment Incentives Act (Andaya and Andaya 2001:314).  
The Government has declared that the employment structure in 
factories must reflect from top to bottom the multi-racial 
composition of the population. It is recognised that the Ministry of 
commerce and industry [sic] has imposed the condition of 
proportional racial employment on firms awarded pioneer status. 
However, it is now necessary to extend the condition to cover also 
non-pioneer firms (Department of National Unity 1970, cited in 
Faaland et al. 1990:314). 
 
Table 3.3 Employment by ethnic group and industry,  
Peninsular Malaysia, 1970 
 
Industry 
Malays
per cent
Chinese
per cent
Indian
per cent
Total 
‘000 
Agriculture, forestry 
& fishing 
68 21 10 1,406.0 
Mining 25 66 8 85.3 
Manufacturing 29 65 5 263.9 
Construction 22 72 6 77.6 
Utilities 48 18 33 16.6 
Transport & 
communication 
43 40 17 119.4 
Commerce 24 65 11 350.9 
Services 49 36 14 474.0 
Total 51 37 11 2,793.7 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1976:187, table 9.10. 
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non-Malays
2 could be attributed to the low productivity agricultural occupations 
in which the majority of Malays remained engaged in the less industrialised, 
poorly serviced rural areas (Bussink 1980). The NEP therefore ‘…also aimed to 
eliminate identification of race with geographical location’ (Lucas and Verry 
1999:56). 
Malay migration of all kinds is being accelerated by the various 
government policies which encourage them to urbanise, 
commercialise and industrialise, with the intention of “catching 
up” with the non-Malays and of changing the present rural-urban 
ethnic balance (Nagata 1974:311).  
 
While willing to relocate, the majority of rural-based Malays however preferred 
to remain in rural or semi-urban areas, finding employment in government 
projects and in enterprises newly established by Malay recipients of government-
sponsored low cost loans, licenses and contracts administered by Majlis Amanah 
Rakyat (MARA) (Halim 1981). Over 45 per cent of internal migration during the 
decade was rural to rural. From the 1970s, plantation employers complained of 
the competition for labour created by government employment in rural areas 
(Ministry of Labour 1986:114). 
 
Rural-urban migration accounts for between a quarter and fifth of internal 
migration recorded between 1970-1980 (Lucas and Verry 1999:41), increasing 
the urbanised proportion of the Malay population particularly. This group of 
Malays was more able to take advantage of new employment opportunities in 
existing urban areas and newly established semi-urban areas surrounding the 
                                                           
2 This is clear when analysing intra-ethnic income differences. For example, plantation workers, 
many of whom were Indian, were notoriously poorly paid. Yet when expressed as an ‘ethnic’ 
average, their poverty was disguised by the higher earnings of formally educated, urbanised 
white collar and professional Indians. Similarly, there were pockets of poverty amongst 
Malaysian Chinese with the inhabitants of the ‘New Villages’ particularly disadvantaged.  
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urbanisation to the extent recorded in other newly independent nations where 
capital cities have drawn in vast numbers of underemployed rural workers. Many 
Malays in fact retained economic, cultural and social connections to kampungs 
and smallholdings, which continued to provide support during times of 
unemployment and hardship, an important factor in reducing the pressure on the 
government to do so. Conversely, urbanised family members repatriated income 
to family members remaining in rural areas (Jesudason 1989:179-180). 
 
The Free Trade Zone Act was enacted in 1971 (Rasiah 1995:74) with Malaysia’s 
first FTZ established in the Beyan Lepas area on the island of Penang.
3 By the 
early 1970s, fifty-nine Industrial Estates were established which included nine 
FTZs, located mostly on Penang and in the Sungai Wai region of the Klang 
Valley near Kuala Lumpur (Warr 1986:181). The NEP and the FTZs became 
complementary policies in terms of regulating the Malay labour force. Writing 
about the introduction of the NEP, Rasiah (1995:77) states: 
Efforts to uplift the livelihood of the poor, especially the Malays, 
restructure employment to eliminate occupational identification, 
and educate the population formed the basis for the formation of a 
massive reservoir of labour. 
 
The FTZs were to provide modern sector employment opportunities for this 
emerging pool of Malay labour. Johnston (1997:399) views the renewed efforts 
to attract labour intensive foreign investment as both a political and economic 
                                                           
3 The Beyan Lepas FTZ was in fact an initiative of the State Legislative Assembly in Penang as 
part of an effort to revitalise its economy. The Federal Government had established Licensed 
Manufacturing Warehouses which were similar in that they were effectively a customs free zone, 
but the FTZ format proved more effective for a number of reasons and so was adopted at the 
federal level. Warr (1986) provides useful historical background on Malaysian FTZs, while 
Kankesu Jayanthakumaran (2002) provides an overview of similar initiatives in several Asian 
countries . 
  120response to the previous ethnic unrest. By the mid 1970s, an estimated 55 firms 
had employed almost 32,000 workers; by the early 1980s this figure would more 
than double with the majority of the workers employed in electronics firms 
(Warr 1986:190-192). 
 
FTZs as sites of labour control 
The FTZs have been the subject of considerable research given their prominence 
in the economic development of recently industrialised economies, including 
Malaysia. Harrod (1987:210) observes that ‘[t]he majority of FTZs are subject to 
special national legislation that either prohibits or severely restricts the activities 
of trade unions’. Depicting FTZs as repressive locations for labour, Kuruvilla 
and Arudsothy (1995) argue this as an outcome of industrial relations legislation 
shaped by the demands of economic policy. Their argument, briefly, is that the 
shift in Malaysia from import substituting industrialisation towards export 
orientation industrialisation encouraged the government to act against labour on 
behalf of foreign capital. 
In sum, it is clear…[the] state’s…dependence on foreign 
investment for its manufacturing, particularly in its most 
important electronics industry, has created a labour relations 
system that is repressive and government-dominated. The shift 
from ISI to EOI was the primary catalyst for the tightening of 
labour relations policies, and the specific cost containment 
policies were determined by the government in response to 
pressure from foreign companies on which it became dependent 
(Kuruvilla and Arudsothy 1995:174). 
 
In the case of Malaysia, the cordoning off of foreign-owned firms in the FTZs 
has afforded them with conditions differing from those outside of the FTZs. For 
example, being considered as Pioneer Industries under the Investment Incentives 
Act 1968, many firms in the FTZs were effectively sheltered from unionisation. 
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the FTZs cannot exceed the minimums specified in the Employment Act 
(Arudsothy 1990:324).
4 This circumvents demands by workers or unions for 
greater benefits, thus reducing the attraction of union membership and collective 
bargaining (Casperz 1998:270). These are direct means through which 
government agencies have influenced the nature of labour control strategies 
within the FTZs. The absence of state legislation for minimum wages
5 or anti 
discrimination in remuneration has also indirectly extended control over wages 
to managers of FTZ firms, although this is also true of the employment situation 
beyond the FTZs.  
 
In order to enhance the attractiveness of FTZ employment for Malays, the 
government began more strictly enforcing the ethnic employment quota with the 
introduction in 1975 of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA). Licenses issued 
under the ICA to foreign-owned manufacturing firms carried with them the 
requirement to employ Malays at all levels of seniority in a proportion that 
reflected their representation in the general population. The government 
therefore directly intervened in the relationship between employers and 
employees in order to effect the increased participation of Malays in the 
industrial sector. Employers in many of the FTZ firms, but in Penang 
particularly, voiced concerns about their inability to attract sufficient numbers of 
qualified Malay workers to meet the ethnic recruitment quotas imposed (Warr 
1986:198-199). In this regard, MNCs faced constraints not placed on domestic 
firms, an outcome of the ethno-political considerations driving the NEP. This 
                                                           
4 The Employment Act does not specify minimum wage rates for any workers. 
5 An exception to this is the setting of wages that cover a small percentage of private sector 
workers in a very few areas. 
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were driven by the demands of MNCs.  
 
Unions in the FTZs 
In its attempts to control unionisation in the FTZs the government has faced 
domestic political constraints as well as international economic pressures. This is 
evident in the long running battle by electronics workers to join the Electrical 
Industry Workers’ Union (EIWU). The EIWU commenced organising amongst 
foreign-owned electronics firms in 1971, but efforts to enlist electronics workers 
as members were rejected by the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU). The Director 
General of the RTU, citing the Trade Unions Act, initially argued that ‘electrical’ 
and ‘electronics’ workers belonged to different industries and therefore required 
different unions, a restriction which is also imposed outside of the FTZs. The 
EIWU then attempted to form a National Union of Electronics Workers 
(NUEW). The rejection of this claim for recognition by the RTU was justified, in 
the view of the government, on the grounds that allowing the formation of a 
national union would create an ‘unwieldy’ union and that foreign investors might 
be deterred. There was, further, the concern that ‘the workers could be subject to 
manipulation by trade union leaders, contrary to their own and the nation’s 
interest…’ (cited in Ariffin and Lochhead 1988:45). On occasion, replies from 
the Minister for Labour and Manpower indicated that electronics workers would 
soon be allowed to form a separate union. By the close of the 1970s though, the 
situation remained unresolved with the government unable to prevent outright 
the attempts by the EIWU to organise in the FTZs, thereby attracting criticism 
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1988:43).
6  
 
Little ground was given to attempts by the union movement to organise 
electronics workers until the early 1980s when Ministers began making 
statements in the mainstream press to the effect that unions might be allowed. As 
is discussed in more detail in the following chapter, the government then 
announced in 1983 that in-house unions were considered conducive to economic 
growth (Jomo and Todd 1994:151). In a move that raised the ire of the 
multinationals (Business Week, June 1983), telecommunications manufacturer 
ITT was directed by the Ministry of Labour to recognise EIWU’s claims to 
organise its workforce (Barnard 1992:5).  
 
The situation meanwhile headed towards a very public confrontation involving 
several players. The U.S.-owned electronics firms were represented by the lobby 
group, Malaysian-American Electronics Industry (MAEI). The MTUC, the 
International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) and the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were involved for 
the union movement. The U.S. Government had been petitioned by the AFL-CIO 
to withdraw the Malaysian Government’s preferential trading status (GSP)
7 
because of its alleged repression of unions (Arudsothy 1990:324). Finally, ‘…a 
combination of recession, political instability, opening of the domestic political 
regime, and international pressure led the government to concede unionization in 
1988’ (Bhopal and Todd 2000:203). Bhopal (1997:578) reports that in the period 
                                                           
6 These included Monsanto, Matsushita, Motorola, Western Appliances and Digital (Ariffin and 
Lochhead 1988:42-43). 
7 Referred to formally as the generalised system of preferences. 
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coverage critical of the multinationals and their alleged disregard for Malaysian 
workers.  
 
However, this was not the end of it. After further pressure was applied by the 
MAEI and a number of Japanese firms (Mai 1989:2), and once the GSP petition 
was decided in favour of the Malaysian Government, the Minister for Labour, 
Lee Kim Sai, then announced that only in-house unions would be allowed to 
form. Lee further stated that the decision ‘may appear to contradict law, but it is 
policy’ (Star 21 October 1988, cited in Barnard 1992:5). 
 
The government was clearly not in favour of union formation yet remained 
engaged in a protracted and very public dialogue with the union movement 
throughout the 1970s, even as this attracted the criticism and concerns of firms. 
This indicated the extent to which the government was constrained by domestic 
political concerns and hampered by the inability to confidently defend its 
decisions. The government was unable to simply give in to the demands of 
foreign-owned firms as it would have appeared unable to protect Malay workers 
(Bhopal 1997:576). Supporting Malay workers was central to the maintenance of 
UMNO’s post-NEP legitimacy. At the same time, the government was unable to 
exert control over the union movement to the extent of completely stifling their 
demands without acting beyond the bounds of its own legislation. In conclusion, 
far from being assumed as sites of multinational dominance, assisted by a state-
imposed regime of coercive labour control, the FTZs in the 1970s can be more 
usefully examined as sites of contestation, the outcomes of which later 
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to the challenges of labour régulation in the 1980s.  
 
The NEP, FTZs and the regulation of women workers 
Women remained concentrated in agricultural occupations in the early 1970s, 
with paid domestic work the second most important occupational category. Both 
were weakly regulated sectors of employment. Domestic workers were excluded 
from coverage under the Employment Act despite claims for recognition in the 
1950s by the Domestic Employees’ Union and a threatened strike in 1963 by 
‘amahs’, as female domestic workers were commonly known (Chin 1998). 
 
Table 3.4 Percentage distribution of the female workforce by occupation 
Occupation 1975  1980 
Professional and technical*  5.5  8.3 
Administrative & management  0.1  0.3 
Clerical 6.8  10.9 
Sales 7.9  7.1 
Services 10.5  8.8 
Agriculture 51.6  45.5 
Production 17.5  17.3 
Source: Ministry of Labour 1986:59, table 6-34. *Includes teaching and nursing. 
 
The success of FTZs has been associated with the availability of a female labour 
force willing to tolerate low wages and mundane semi skilled work (Jomo and 
Edwards 1993).  
When the New Economic Policy was launched, the Ministry of 
Labour already anticipated the growth in employment 
opportunities for women. As the Minister stated in a speech in 
1973, there were ‘vast new opportunities for women workers’ in 
the manufacturing sector (Ariffin and Lochhead 1988:6). 
 
Yet, it is difficult to understand why the government would have targeted the 
female population as a potential workforce when unemployment rates amongst 
men in the 1970s were still high (Zulkifly 2001:8). 
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Table 3.5 Employment in manufacturing sector by gender 
 1970  1980 
Males 235,377  453,599 
Females 111,017 389,875 
Source: Chin 1998, Table 3.1, citing ILO 1994. Data relates to Peninsular Malaysia only. 
 
Arguments have been put forward that suggest women were preferred by 
multinationals  despite the preferences and policies of the Malaysian 
Government.  
That Malay women received the benefits of the NEP is accidental 
for there was no explicit recognition in the [NEP] policy that 
Malay women’s participation was equally important in the 
restructuring of occupations (Zainab Wahidin cited in Chin 1998, 
chapter 6).
8  
 
It appears the relationship between the government, economic development and 
women was far from straightforward. While the availability, docility and 
dexterity of female labour has been used as a selling point by the government to 
attract foreign investment (Barnard 1992), the preference of MNC employers for 
young female workers created conflicts for UMNO. Its chief political rival for 
Malay votes was the Islamic based party, PAS, which was actively involved in 
the 1970s revival of an Islamic ideal of women as wife and mother. Further, the 
increasing participation of Malay women in factory work contributed to a 
shortage of women available to undertake paid domestic work, leading to 
complaints in the media from middle and upper income householders unable to 
locate domestic servants with a resultant increase in the recruitment of foreign 
maids, often illegally (Chin 1998, chapter 3).  
 
                                                           
8 A complete reading of the NEP policy statement, issued by the Department of National Unity in 
March 1970 (reprinted in Faaland et al. 1990:305-318) reveals no mention of gender imbalances 
in labour force participation. The focus is clearly on ‘racial’ imbalances with some attention 
given to geographical disparities such as the economic under-development of the East Coast 
relative to the West Coast, and of rural areas in comparison with urban centres. 
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 1970 1975 1980 
Agriculture 37.0 40.8 39.6 
Mining 12.8 12.3 13.7 
Manufacturing 29.0 39.3 40.7 
Utilities 5.2 3.2 5.7 
Construction 7.1 6.4 5.7 
Transport etc  4.2 6.3 7.9 
Finance, commerce  17.9 26.9 28.7 
Retail & wholesale 
trade   29.7 37.9 31.5  
Other services  35.3 
Total 31.8 34.5 33.5 
Source: Lucas and Verry 1999:51, table 3.11. 
 
Institutionally, there is little to suggest that the government was prepared for the 
increased entry by women into non-agricultural, non-domestic waged labour. 
Ritchie (2005:751) refers to government efforts towards female employment as 
‘truncated reform’, an outcome he ascribes to ‘religious and cultural reasons’. 
Apart from the 1969 amendment to the Employment Act which allowed women 
to work night shifts, and this required the written permission of the Minister 
(Rasiah 1995:77), little was done by the government to facilitate the move by 
women into the manufacturing sector. Rather than taking the lead in the 
restructuring of the female labour force, Chin (1998, chapter 3) argues that the 
government was just making the most of a situation that was largely the product 
of employer preferences, and the preference of women themselves for factory 
work over low status and poorly paid agricultural labour.  
Table 3.7 Labour force participation rates by gender,  
Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1976 
Year  Male (per cent)  Female (per cent) 
1957 88.7  30.8 
1970 81.3  37.2 
1975 86.0  47.3 
1976 85.3  46.1 
Source: Kamarudin 1982:81, table 4.7. 
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women’s participation in waged labour is reflected in the labour force 
participation rates. These leapt in the first half of the 1970s from 37 to 47 per 
cent, but then quickly plateaued. By 2000, the rate of women’s labour force 
participation at 46.7 per cent, was only marginally different to that recorded in 
the mid 1970s. The short lived increase in participation rates is also evident in 
Table 3.5 which shows the proportion of female manufacturing workers 
increased from twenty-nine to over thirty-nine percent from 1970 to 1975, but 
only by another 1.5 per cent in the following five year period. The liberalisation 
in the use of migrant labour in the 1980s and 1990s increased the proportion of 
migrant workers in the manufacturing sector, suggesting these workers have to 
some degree displaced local female workers (Lucas and Verry 1999). 
 
A number of socio-cultural and economic factors shaped the preference by 
manufacturing employers for female workers. Malaysia’s ‘confrontation’ with 
Indonesia in the 1960s had temporarily reduced the availability of Indonesian 
migrant labour. The largest increase in women’s labour force participation rates, 
recorded between 1970 and 1975, therefore coincided with a period in which 
migrant labour was in particularly short supply. Data on wages in the FTZs are 
contested,
9 but all available data consistently points to a large wage differential 
between male and female workers in Malaysia generally (ESCAP 2002:96).
10 
This increased the attractiveness of female labour to employers in labour 
                                                           
9 While Athukorala (2001) and Jayanthakumaran (2002:14) have argued FTZ wages in the 1990s 
are favourable in comparison with average wages elsewhere in the manufacturing sector, Jomo 
and Edwards (1993:27) argue that FTZ wages were relatively low, in part due to the large 
proportion of women workers in this sector.  
10 For example, in Malaysia female wages were on average 57.9 per cent of male wages in 1998 
while the same figure for Thailand was 63.9 and for the Philippines, 84.0 (ESCAP 2002:96, table 
III.14). 
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provided a pool of relatively low cost labour willing, for various cultural, 
geographical and economic factors, to accept the repetitive, closely supervised, at 
times unsafe, and often monotonous, work available in the manufacturing sector 
(Bernasek and Gallaway 1997:101; Elias 2004; Wee n.d.:18-20).  
 
Finally, and consistent with the discussion above that the control of labour in the 
FTZs is a complex and contested situation, Bhopal (1997) suggests that the 
government’s sensitivities on behalf of Malay workers were strongly gendered. 
While the sacking of male Malay workers was likely to generate a political 
fallout, existing social values that depicted women as marginal to the formal 
labour force acted to dissipate political concerns regarding the employment 
conditions imposed by employers over their female employees, Malay or 
otherwise. This then added further weight to the preference for female workers, 
and later, the shift to similarly marginalised foreign workers who also failed to 
garner much sympathy from the Malaysian Government, the media, the union 
movement or wider public. 
 
The concentration of women in the FTZs and other low paid, less skilled 
occupations, appears less the product of government legislation relating to 
industrial relations or human resources, and more the outcome of the exploitation 
by capital of existing social and cultural views that women were ‘naturally’ 
accepting of highly detailed, dextrous, repetitive work carried out under 
paternalistic forms of supervision (Elias 2004:8-9). The pre-existing socio-
  130economic location of women was to the benefit of foreign and domestic 
manufacturers seeking low cost, ‘obedient’ labour.  
 
The ways in which the state has historically reinforced these gendered values 
have been critically exposed by Casperz (1998), Chin (1998) and Elias (2004, 
2005). However, this in turn generated political difficulties for UMNO. The 
régulation of women as workers is politically fraught for UMNO given the 
nature of its competition with PAS for Malay votes. These cultural and political 
constraints contributed to the emergence of contradictory policies towards 
women and subsequently undermined efforts to increase women’s participation 
in the labour force. This conflict is examined in later chapters as women’s labour 
force participation rates continued to stagnate despite consistent labour shortages 
from the late 1980s, and in the context of attempts by the government to increase 
household incomes yet without generating wage inflation. This is clearly a 
difficult task in one income households. 
 
The NEP and the politicisation of the public sector 
It is in the management of the civil service that the Federal Government was 
most directly involved in determining employment conditions. It was during the 
1970s that major contradictions in this role were to develop, an outcome of both 
the opportunities, and the complications, that resulted from the NEP. 
Employment in the public sector grew at seven per cent during the Second 
Malaysia Plan (1971-75) providing increased opportunities particularly for 
Malays to gain employment. By 1975, government employees at all levels 
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below). 
Table 3.8 Employment in government services 
  estimated employment  
(‘000) 
share of total employment 
 (%) 
1970 396.6 11.7 
1975 555.8 13.1 
1980 710.0 13.9 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1981:81, table 4.6 
 
The ratio of Malays to non-Malays in the government sector was 5 to 3 in 1970 
(Government of Malaysia 1971:38). By 2000, this would be approximately 8.5:1 
(Turner 2003:13-14). This was an outcome of several factors including the 
determination in the late 1960s that Bahasa Melayu was the sole national 
language and would therefore be used in the civil service, and that qualifications 
gained in Chinese-language high schools were not considered valid in 
applications for public sector employment.  
Table 3.9 Ethnic composition of the Federal Civil Service, 1969 and 1972 
 1969  1972 
Ethnic group  No.  %  no.  % 
Malays  36,618 60.8 45,617 65.7 
Chinese  12,181 20.2 12,504 18.0 
Indians  10,499 17.4 10,409 15.0 
Others  986 1.6 932 1.3 
Total  60,284 100.0 69,462 100.0 
Source: Puthucheary 1978:56, table 5.6. The Federal Civil Service is one level of the Malaysian 
civil services.  
 
With very limited bargaining powers, CUEPACS adopted a generally 
conciliatory relationship with the government, with rare but notable exceptions, 
and was in turn treated in a generally paternalistic fashion. Although CUEPACS 
was affiliated with some of the largest unions in the country, including those 
representing teachers and the communications and transport sectors, all were 
prevented by legislation from taking industrial action. In 1973, as a means of 
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through which unions and the employer were to determine wages (Ayadurai 
1977:66-68). In comparison with the private sector, union membership was high 
amongst civil servants. For example, in 1975, there was a combined membership 
of 191,837 amongst unions representing workers in the federal, state and local 
governments and statutory bodies (Jomo and Todd 1994:34-35), meaning that 
almost 35 per cent of workers were unionised. 
 
Senior bureaucrats had been influential in the formulation of the NEP, the 
policies of which were then ‘…implemented by an army of experienced public 
servants…charged with a strong sense of nationalism’ (Firdaus Abdullah 
1997:190). According to Esman (1972), by the late 1960s, a generational change 
in attitude was evident amongst the post-Independence civil service appointees.  
The new official defines his role as the friend and tutor of the 
peasants. He is interested in knowing their needs and problems 
and in devoting himself to improving their welfare (Esman 
1972:132). 
 
Puthucheary (1978:48), writing a little later in the decade, offered the following 
assessment: 
…civil servants are not expected to be completely impartial. The 
policies and programmes of the government are distinctly partial 
towards Malays and this has been accepted by the majority of the 
people who voted in favour of the Barisan Nasional. Thus the 
civil servants, in implementing these policies, are not expected to 
be strictly impartial but to consider the special position of the 
Malays as is also provided for in the Constitution of Malaysia. 
Thus emphasis is placed more on the ability of the civil service to 
achieve the targets of the government’s pro-Malay policies than 
on its ability to implement the laws impartially and fairly. 
 
The politicisation of the civil service has since been argued as creating an 
obstacle to the development of the private sector. For example, Heng (1997:274) 
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responsible for approving business permits and licenses were growing 
increasingly inflexible and uncooperative in their dealings with the Chinese 
business community’. Additionally, the greater use of Bahasa Melayu and the 
subsequent decline in the use of English by civil servants generated greater 
problems in communication between the predominantly Malay civil service and 
the largely non-Malay private sector. M. Shamsul Haque (2003:259, citing Lim 
1999 and Stafford 1999), suggests that favouring ethnic preference rather than 
merit as the basis for recruitment into the civil service had negative implications 
for efficiency and discouraged potentially more able non-Malay applicants from 
considering the civil service as a career option.  
 
In expanding the civil service in order to implement the NEP, the government 
had negotiated one set of labour issues, but in doing so, had generated resentment 
within amongst non-Malay employer and industry groups. The political and 
socio-cultural goals of the NEP which had been institutionalised within the civil 
service generated obstacles to the government’s later attempts at economic 
reform. The embedded nature of the NEP within the civil service would prove 
difficult to dislodge even when those arrangements presented an obstacle to later 
labour force reforms in both the private and public sector labour forces.
11  
 
By this point in history, Mahathir had re-emerged as a pivotal political figure. 
Abdullah (1997) credits Mahathir, then deputy Prime Minister, with the creation 
of the Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit 
                                                           
11 ‘The arrangements corresponding to these compromises are linked with specific problems 
created by a given historical context. Subsequent historical developments have led to a 
disjunction between the existing arrangements and new areas of tension’ (Andre 2002:99). 
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the Malaysian civil service…established after Cabinet approval through Cabinet 
Paper no. 207/1079/97’ in 1978 (Abdullah 1997:66). In his dealings with the 
civil service, Mahathir was both critical and paternalistic. Throughout his 
premiership he would direct considerable attention to attempts at reform. As later 
case studies indicate, however, his efforts had mixed success, highlighted by the 
emergence from the 1980s, of quasi-state forums which effectively bypassed, 
rather than reformed the civil service and offered direct access by elite capital to 
senior bureaucrats and Ministers, fuelling patronage networks (M. Shamsul 
Haque 2003:259 citing Means 1986:114).  
 
Legitimacy and mediating mechanisms 
As becomes evident in the discussion to follow, the government was able to 
strengthen its repressive legislative apparatus and used the ideological appeal of 
tripartitism in an effort to discredit industrial disputes. These, however, proved 
inadequate to balancing the political and economic contradictions that emerged 
in the régulation of labour during the difficult economic climate of the early 
1970s when the employment benefits of the NEP were yet to impact on a broad 
scale. Jomo (1995:209) has written that Abdul Razak was concerned that his 
government should ‘project a new consensus or social contract’ given the 
increased participation of Malays in waged labour. The tentative moves towards 
tripartitism by Abdul Razak did not amount to a reconfigured institutional 
compromise, but were rather a continuation of the paternalistic political 
relationship between the ruling elite and organised labour.  
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Malaysia in the early 1970s. According to the Ministry of Labour (1986:200) this 
was the underlying cause of the rise in industrial disputes at the time. Rice 
increased in price by more than 23 per cent between 1972 and 1973, and then by 
a further 38 per cent between 1973 and 1974 (Government of Malaysia 
1976:130). In November 1974, an estimated 12,000 rural dwellers marched in 
protest against the high rice prices (Halim 1982:272). In December, university 
students joined in the ‘hunger protests’. The Federal Reserve Unit and the Police 
Field Force were used to end the demonstrations. Over 1,000 students and 
academics were arrested. Others were threatened with the suspension of 
scholarships and enrolments, while some were detained under the ISA 
(Barraclough 1985:814). In an attempt to subdue further unrest the government 
strengthened the Price Control Act, introduced taxes on excessive profits, offered 
subsidies on basic food and agricultural items to the poor in rural areas, and paid 
a ‘special relief allowance’ to lower-level civil servants (Government of 
Malaysia 1976:130). To prevent further student activism, in May 1975, 
Mahathir, then Minister for Education, put forward amendments to the 
Universities and University Colleges Act, the impact of which, Khoo argues 
(1995:275), ‘ended university autonomy in the country’.  
 
As the recession deepened, the political leadership gave assurances that 
retrenchments would be minimal. The Government insisted that in signing the 
Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony (CCIH) in February 1975, both 
management and unions had demonstrated a ‘high sense of social 
responsibility…The Code provided inter alia that retrenchment of workers 
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1976:131). The ‘inter alia’ included an appeal to employers and political labour 
to work together in order to avoid industrial strife. 
…only with an abundance of goodwill combined with constant 
consultation and communication…we can hope to contain the 
destructive expression of industrial conflict and encourage a more 
equitable and efficient system for the benefit of those involved 
and the community at large (CCIH).  
 
Balakrishnan (2005:431) suggests three factors motivated the government 
towards creating the Code. Firstly, the goals of the NEP were premised on 
achieving high levels of economic growth. The increase in industrial disputation 
and social unrest in the first half of the 1970s was not conducive to this. 
Secondly, in placing the responsibility for industrial peace on employers and 
workers, the government was trying to reduce its own burden. Thirdly, by widely 
publicising the Code, it was hoped that a change of attitude might be achieved, 
creating a greater spirit of cooperation through improved workplace 
communications. The Code was signed by representatives from the Ministry, the 
MEF and the MTUC. The Code clearly suggested that industrial action would 
place at risk Malaysia’s economic growth and social stability. 
…industrial peace is essential for a sound and stable economy, 
especially at a time of stagflation, and that a sound and stable 
economy is of paramount importance for achieving the objectives 
of the national development plans which are committed to the task 
of creating a united, socially just, economically equitable and 
progressive Malaysian nation… (CCIH).  
 
Yet the Code was never enforced legislatively. Workers in the private sector 
were more affected by the 1971 inclusion to the Industrial Relations Act of 
Section 13, known as the ‘managerial prerogative’ section. This excluded a range 
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not caused by redundancy or relocation (Anantaraman 2001:12).  
 
Tens of thousands of private sector workers were retrenched in 1974 and 1975. 
Although the MTUC would frequently cite the Code over the next decades, 
particularly with regard to retrenchment procedures, it was not legally binding. 
The National Joint Labour Advisory Council (NJLAC, later the National Labour 
Advisory Council) lacked legislative power and met infrequently (Ministry of 
Labour 1986:6; Ariffin and Lochhead 1988:14). The offer of involvement in the 
NJLAC did not extend any degree of influence to the MTUC other than that 
which the government and the Ministry were prepared to give. In 1976, the 
Minister of Labour and Manpower introduced amendments to the Employment 
Act that repealed some sections protecting workers’ rights to retrenchment and 
retirement benefits. More than 20,000 workers took part in official industrial 
action that year, more than doubling the number of working days lost compared 
with 1975. Nonetheless, these figures were still significantly lower than those 
recorded in the 1960s (see Table 3.10). 
 
Table 3.10 Strike action and working days lost, 1970s 
Year  no. of strikes  no. of workers  working days lost 
1970 17  1,260 1,867 
1971 45  5,311 20,265 
1972 66  9,701 33,455 
1973 66  14,003  40,866 
1974 85  21,830  103,884 
1975 64  12,124  45,749 
1976 70  20,040  108,562 
1977 40  7,783 73,729 
1978 36  6,792 35,032 
1979 28  5,629 24,868 
1980 28  3,402 19,554 
Source: Jomo and Todd 1994:49, table 2.16. 
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Institutionalised compromises and economic conflicts 
Here, three occasions are examined whereby the government, under Hussein Onn 
from March 1976 following the death of Abdul Razak, demonstrated a 
willingness to act against the interests of particular fractions of capital in order to 
attempt to resolve political tensions associated with the régulation of labour. In 
the first instance, that of the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act, the government 
imposed equity ownership levels and ethnic employment quotas on 
manufacturing firms. In the second instance, the government sought to improve 
the economic position of the predominantly Malay civil service by awarding 
wage rises unrelated to productivity increases. This invoked the criticism of 
private sector employer groups. Thirdly, in what was otherwise an attack on 
organised labour, a range of concessions was delivered to lower paid manual 
workers via amendments to the Employment Act in 1980.  
 
The introduction of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) in 1975 indicated 
something of a victory amongst those in the cabinet who believed it was time for 
the state to deepen its control over the economy on behalf of Malays (Bowie 
1989:202-203; Halim 1982:266). Notably, UMNO waited for the retirement of 
then MCA President and Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin before making 
moves to introduce the ICA (Heng 1997:263). The ICA gave increased powers to 
the Minister for Trade and Industry, a position now held by UMNO (Jesudason 
1989:131), and essentially required the licensing of all larger manufacturing 
businesses. Although not initially stated in the proposed legislation, this power 
was to be used to enforce the goals of the NEP, including equity and employment 
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consultation with the private sector before the legislation was introduced and not 
surprisingly, the move was poorly received by the non-Malay business sector. 
The ICA was very publicly criticised by the Associated Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (ACCCIM), the peak private sector lobby group 
representing domestic Chinese capital (Bowie 1989:203; Gomez and Jomo 
1999:41). The Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(MICCI) also appealed to the Minister for changes (Jesudason 1989:137).  
 
In response to the flight of capital that resulted, Mahathir, then Deputy Prime 
Minister and considered to be less in favour of the statist position, chaired a 
quickly-established cabinet level committee on investment that re-affirmed its 
confidence in the private sector (Bowie 1989:204). Additionally, a Consultative 
Committee on Industrial Co-ordination was established that provided a (less 
public) forum in which business leaders and lobby groups could express their 
concerns. This led to amendments to the ICA in 1977. These amendments, and 
the conciliatory words used by members of UMNO, including the Prime Minister 
and deputy Prime Minister,
12 ultimately failed to convince domestic Chinese 
business although it went some way towards placating international investors 
(Jesudason 1989:142). Consequently, Malaysia recorded somewhat stronger 
economic growth and a falling rate of unemployment through the second half of 
the decade. 
 
                                                           
12 Jesudason (1989:141) cites Mahathir’s address to the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 
in 1976 where assurances were given that ‘the Act will not be allowed to become a disincentive 
to private investment’, originally quoted in MICCI, Yearbook 1976/7:125). 
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business and labour through the imposition of share ownership and employment 
quotas clashed with the desires of domestic and foreign investors.  
The NEP state was simultaneously an expansive provider, a 
determined regulator, and an aggressive entrepreneur. Its 
relationship with private capital – popularly seen as a relationship 
between a Malay government and a Chinese private sector – was 
seldom easy (Khoo 1995:106).  
 
A further constraint on the government was its reliance on achieving high rates 
of economic growth in order to meet the goals of the NEP. The government 
faced a dilemma between its approach to the régulation of labour, encompassed 
with the goals of the NEP, and its relationship with capital, particularly domestic 
Chinese capital. Further, as Hing (2000:226) notes, it was not only the flight of 
domestic Chinese capital that threatened the economic aspirations of the 
government. The loss of Chinese professional and skilled workers also presented 
a dilemma between the goals of greater economic growth and pro-Malay 
affirmative action. The conflict split the cabinet (Bowie 1989:205), and caused 
considerable friction between UMNO and the MCA. In the final analysis, the 
government was willing to trade off some of the rights of labour in its efforts to 
win back Chinese and foreign capital but it was a far from straight forward 
decision, and one which would later be modified. 
 
In 1980, at much the same time as changes were being made to private sector 
employment legislation, conditions for civil servants were improved when the 
Cabinet Committee reviewing their conditions awarded a ‘somewhat handsome 
and substantial’ increase in allowances (Pathmanaban 1980:7). The Deputy 
Minister of Labour and Manpower, Pathmanaban, was invited to address 
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the private sector legislation soon after their introduction. A Committee 
Chairman of the FMM, Sopiee Sheikh Ibrahim, in making a ‘welcoming’ address 
to Pathmanaban, commented that he had ‘not the slightest doubt’ that the 
‘amendments to the three principal labour legislations [sic] and the generous 
wage increases awarded to public servants’ had ‘created the momentum for an 
across-the-board upward adjustment in the wage level’ (Sopiee 1980:2). This in 
turn caused the Deputy Minister to devote a considerable portion of his speech to 
defending the increase to the civil servants.  
 
He argued that the government was forced to award the pay increase to ‘avoid 
not only disenchantment and disillusion among Government employees, but also 
to ensure that it can recruit and retain the services of the better brains in this 
country’ (1980:7-8). However, Pathmanaban went further, arguing that the  
criteria of wage determination in the public sector necessarily 
differ from the criteria adopted in the private sector…the criteria 
of ability to pay and productivity must always be the chief basis 
on which private sector wage adjustments and wage determination 
is made (1980:8). 
 
The Deputy Minister of Labour and Manpower was exhibiting signs of conflict 
in his defence of wage increases for public servants on the basis of retaining their 
services and containing their ‘disenchantment’, while at the same time insisting 
that wage increases in the private sector be linked to productivity. The emphasis 
on linking wages to productivity was driven by concerns about inflation but also 
due to the sensitivities about wage levels in attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Government of Malaysia 1981:167). As already noted, FDI was essential 
in developing the manufacturing sector, which, under the NEP, was to be the 
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practice was to continue in the 1980s and 1990s as the Ministry of Labour and 
Manpower struggled with conflicting roles and responsibilities. The NEP 
policies had similar implications for the Ministry of Education and the 
Department of Immigration, both of which struggled between their roles of 
meeting the socio-cultural and political aspirations of Malays while attempting to 
deliver the skilled labour force consistent with Malaysia’s economic 
development goals. As was neatly concluded by Snodgrass (1980:57): ‘The 
actions which the government took in the economic field after May 1969 were, 
as usual, conditioned by the need to make political comprises and were not 
wholly consistent with each other’. 
 
In the third example of the state’s conflict between its political and economic 
goals, revisions to the three main pieces of labour legislation overseen by the 
Ministry of Labour and Manpower are analysed. The 1980 amendments have 
been described as heralding a new era in industrial relations. For example, 
Shamsul (1992:10) claimed: 'It was not difficult to notice that it was during 
Mahathir's reign first as Minister of Trade and Industry and then, immediately 
after, as Prime Minister that authoritarian and anti-labour policies were brought 
in quick succession'.
13 In reference to the same period, Jomo and Todd concluded 
that 'amendments to the labour laws…were largely to the detriment of labour' 
(1994:149).  
 
                                                           
13 Mahathir’s antipathy to organised labour was made clear in The Malay Dilemma (1970:108). 
Here he argued against trade unions as useful to the creation of a competitive labour force. 
However, Mahathir also stated that an ‘impartial body’ should be established to protect the 
interests and welfare of labour.  
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Both the Industrial Relations Act and the Trade Unions Ordinance were amended 
in ways that delivered greater control to the Minister for Labour and Manpower. 
This crackdown has been understood in part as a response to the industrial action 
taken by an estimated 4,000 Malaysian Airlines Systems (MAS) staff, whose 
1978 dispute attracted international attention and caused the ruling party 
considerable consternation given many of the employees were Malay (Bhopal 
1999:286; Jomo 1995:206). The union was subsequently deregistered, 231 of its 
members were sacked or suspended, and 11 union officials were detained under 
the ISA (Halim 1982:272). Under the amendments to the legislation, unions 
could be more easily suspended and strikes were more difficult to organise, 
requiring a secret ballot of 2/3 of the membership. Results then had to be filed 
with the Registrar of Trade Unions. Restrictions were placed on affiliations with 
‘consultative bodies’ and additional occupations were defined as ‘essential’, thus 
prohibiting strike action by those employees. The period of notice before a strike 
was increased from 14 to 21 days, and further restrictions were placed on who 
could picket and where (Kirubanathan 1980:10-12). The amendments were 
clearly designed to restrict the ability of the union movement to represent its 
membership. The MTUC temporarily withdrew from all government consultative 
bodies by way of protest (Barraclough 1985:802). 
 
However, the 1980 amendments also contained further evidence of the 
government’s paternalistic approach to labour. The amendments to the 
Employment Ordinance delivered concessions to lower paid workers that 
particularly benefited the growing numbers of Malay factory workers. For 
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payments was increased; limits were placed on the number of hours that could be 
worked consecutively and on the time span for split shifts; the rate of payment 
for working on public holidays was increased; maternity allowance entitlements 
were improved; contract workers gained entitlements; annual leave entitlements 
were increased; the amount of notice required to be given to a terminated 
employee was extended; and, the number of days of sick leave was increased 
(Diong 1980:13-16). These concessions can be understood in part as an attempt 
to encourage more Malays into the waged labour force and as a demonstration 
that the government, rather than the union movement, had the ability to deliver 
real improvements in working conditions. This paternalism underwrote the 
bargain between labour and the state evident in the quote below from the Deputy 
Minister of Labour and Manpower. He explained that the motivation for enacting 
the legislation was  
…to shield this young nation and its growing economy from the 
undesirable influences of partisan politics and the infiltration from 
beyond our shores whereby we would let people come in here to 
exploit the tender basis of our economy or the basis of our labour 
relations… (Pathmanaban 1980:5). 
 
However, as is explained in chapters to follow, in the aftermath of the economic 
recession and political turmoil of the mid to late 1980s that weakened labour’s 
bargaining position, the government withdrew several of these improvements.  
 
The position of labour at the close of the 1970s 
The labour force increased from 3.7 million in 1970 to 5.4 million in 1980 
(Government of Malaysia 1981:73-74). Union membership had risen from 
275,238 in 1970 to 531,740 in 1980 (Jomo and Todd 1994:48) with an estimated 
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to the growth in employment share of the manufacturing sector, which recorded 
the highest rate of employment growth throughout the decade, and the growth of 
employment in government services, which averaged six per cent per annum 
(Government of Malaysia 1981:81). Related to the changing structure of 
employment was the shift in population from rural to urban areas. In 1970 
approximately 29 per cent of West Malaysians lived in urban areas. This 
increased to 35 per cent by 1980 (Government of Malaysia 1981:78). 
 
Wages data over the period are far from comprehensive. What data are available 
suggest that wages in the agricultural sector did grow but generally did not keep 
pace with inflation. Wages growth in the manufacturing sector kept pace with the 
high inflation of the early 1970s, and rose by over 5 per cent in 1978-79 
(Government of Malaysia 1981:86). Construction sector wages also rose in the 
late 1970s (Ministry of Labour 1986:115). As Jesudason (1989:171) notes, 
however, these increases were from very low base rates, and the rises occurred in 
line with the lowering of the unemployment rate. ‘…the chief determinant of 
wage levels has been the market rather than the institutional role of unions’ (see 
also Jomo 1995:225). Despite the difficulties facing unions attempting to 
organise in the manufacturing sector throughout the decade, between 25 and 50 
per cent of recorded industrial disputes were by manufacturing workers, 
including a series of wildcat strikes in the Beyan Lepas FTZ in 1980 (Jomo and 
Todd 1994:50). However, the number of disputes overall was markedly lower 
than occurred throughout the 1960s. 
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were also made into the alleviation of poverty and a reduction in the socio-
economic gap between rural and urban dwellers (Faaland et al. 1990:215). 
According to official data, the incidence of poverty in West Malaysia fell from 
over 49 per cent of households in 1970 to just over 29 per cent in 1980 
(Government of Malaysia 1981:33, table 3-1). The 1970s had started with an 
unemployment rate for all of Malaysia of 7.8 per cent. By 1980, this rate had 
dropped to 5.3 per cent, but unemployment rates of over 15 per cent were 
experienced by job seekers under 24 years of age, in both rural and urban areas, 
and were closer to 20 per cent for those young people who had completed 
secondary education, suggesting that much of the growth in employment was for 
semi skilled or unskilled labour. There was an increase in the numbers of urban 
poor and urban unemployment remained relatively high at 6.7 per cent in 1978 
(Government of Malaysia 1981:42). In 1970, the unemployment rate for the 
population of West Malaysia was 8.1 per cent for Malays, 7.0 per cent for 
Chinese and 11.0 per cent for Indians. In 1980, the comparable figures were 5.1 
per cent, 5.3 per cent and 7.5 per cent.  
 
Table 3.11 Mean monthly household income, lowest four deciles 
    Annual  growth  rate 
  1970 1976 1979 1971-76  1971-79 
  ($) ($) ($) (%)  (%) 
Malay 56.76  101.95  140.35  10.3  10.6 
Chinese  135.93 247.27 280.11 10.5  8.4 
Indian  112.48 197.21 263.43 9.8  9.9 
Total 75.90 142.19  186.19  11.0  10.5 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1981:37, table 3-3. Data relates to Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
Overall, these numbers suggest a mixed outcome for the working class. The end 
of the decade witnessed the growth of a Malay middle income stratum, increased 
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increase in the numbers of Malay professionals. ‘The most tangible benefit of the 
NEP was the creation of a larger Malay middle class and the shift of the Malay 
population from predominantly agricultural occupations to more diversified 
occupational activities’ (Jesudason 1989:111). More Malays, including younger 
females, found work in the non-agricultural sector, particularly in manufacturing, 
although many of these positions were at the lower end of the pay scale with few 
opportunities for career progression or skills training. 
 
The 1970s witnessed the implementation of institutional changes that would later 
deliver the political leadership the ability to influence household income and 
consumption. Restructuring of the finance and banking sector would contribute 
funding for government policies as well as delivering subsidies to sections of the 
population. A number of ‘development’ banks that targeted specific economic 
sectors or particular NEP goals were established by the government in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. For example, in 1974 Bank Simpanan Nasional was 
established in a take over of the colonial era Post Office Savings Bank. Deposits 
increased from $276 million Malaysian dollars in 1970 to $1,084 million in 
1980. In the words of the government, the bank ‘played an important role in 
mobilising savings among the general population [and was] an important means 
of financing development needs in the country’ (Government of Malaysia 
1981:306). In 1978 Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) was created to fund the 
purchase of shares on behalf of Bumiputera. In practice, funds pooled in PNB 
became a useful domestic source of debt financing. Greater control over the 
private banks was achieved by strengthening the powers of the central bank, 
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soon after, finance companies, to comply with regulations on the direction of 
loans and other forms of financing (Government of Malaysia 1981:305). 
Amongst other major industrial development strategies, this power would also be 
used to increase the access of low income households to housing finance.  
 
The government also increased its commitment to the provision of housing, 
particularly from the mid 1970s with the establishment of the National Housing 
Department (Government of Malaysia 1981:361-362). The housing program was 
to cater ‘…to the needs of the low-income groups of all communities irrespective 
of race’ (Government of Malaysia 1971:257).
14 In one scheme, $400 million 
Malaysian dollars was borrowed from the EPF and directed to low income 
earners at fixed rates of interest through the Malaysian Building Society. Public 
sector employees were also able to access low cost loans through the 
Government Officers’ Housing Company established in 1971 (Government of 
Malaysia 1981:363-364). This early development of networks between 
government agencies, finance, housing and individuals indicates the emergence 
of economic paternalism as a central aspect of the state-labour nexus. 
 
Competing bases of legitimacy 
Under the NEP, UMNO’s legitimacy rested not just on the delivery of economic 
growth, but on the visible redirection of some portion of that growth towards the 
Malay population yet without destabilising societal relationships with non-
Malays. Determining exactly how large the redirected portion should be, and 
                                                           
14 Agus 2002 and Drakakis-Smith 1979 provide examples of political influences on the allocation 
of housing. 
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one. Despite the institutional responses introduced through the 1970s, Halim 
(1982:273) argues that the disjuncture between political and economic goals was 
yet to be securely addressed: 
…while international capital and the national bourgeoisie have 
been able to expand their interests they have not been able to 
organise accumulation and redistribution of surplus in a way that 
permits stable domination.  
 
Although presenting a slightly different focus, Khoo (1995:104) concurs with 
this. ‘On balance, the NEP’s implementation during its first ten years generated 
inter-ethnic tensions even as it was designed to dissipate them’. This chapter 
closes by reviewing those tensions most closely related to the state-labour nexus. 
 
The incorporation of Malays in the waged workforce created a new set of 
challenges for the government. The targeting of Malays in order to deliver 
affirmative action was previously possible on the basis of their separate location 
geographically and occupationally. How was the state now to direct preferential 
treatment when Malays were incorporated within the working classes alongside 
other ethnic groups? The disciplining of the union movement was a more 
straightforward matter when the MTUC had been dominated by the marginalised 
Malaysian Indians, and previously, the Communist Chinese. It was a more 
complicated matter for the government to discredit a union movement in which 
significant numbers of Malays were participating as members and organisers. A 
similar dilemma arose in the rejection of the claims by Malay workers for better 
conditions when UMNO had proclaimed itself the defender of Malay interests. 
The ethno-political commitment to the advancement of working class Malays 
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subduing labour.  
 
The resentment of non-Malays was expressed in the outflow of both capital and 
people, particularly skilled and professional non-Malays whose departure added 
to the already serious shortage of skilled labour. Poor working relations between 
the increasingly Malay-dominated civil service and the non-Malay private sector 
contributed to structural imbalances in the economy. Increasingly, businesses 
preferred to invest in areas that were beyond the reach of the bureaucracy 
(Ritchie 2005:748), adding to the development of patronage networks that 
bypassed formal civil service arrangements. In 1980, ACCCIM displayed its 
dissatisfaction with the NEP by developing an alternative national economic 
framework entitled, ‘Towards faster growth and greater national unity’. This 
document has been interpreted as effectively ‘a dismantling of the NEP’ (Faaland 
et al. 1990:169. See also Heng 1997). 
 
Rather than relying on local Chinese funds, the government sought foreign 
investors to create labour intensive industries, a decision driven by ethno-
political sensitivities. It was a decision that delivered employment growth that 
was then deliberately directed towards Malays. However, by inviting foreign 
investment, Malaysia became incorporated within an international division of 
labour that generated another set of political and economic tensions. ‘Yet, despite 
their favored position, MNCs were not immune to the NEP’s redistributive 
reach’ (Ritchie 2005:748). Finally, in becoming the single largest employer of 
Malays through the expansion of the civil service, while easing Malay poverty 
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created.  
 
The institutional framework and political rationale of the developmental state 
was taking shape, but was yet to be fully embedded, politically or economically. 
There was a consolidation of various utilities including the water and power 
authorities, a vast increase in the size of the civil service, and the creation of 
pubic enterprises and statutory authorities. Current expenditure grew an average 
of almost 19 per cent per annum throughout the decade (Government of 
Malaysia 1981:130). However, lacking adequate domestic funding and revenue 
sources at this stage, the government was forced to borrow extensively in order 
to fund its agenda (Yeoh 2002). The bulk of domestic funding was sourced from 
the EPF, but commercial and foreign borrowings were also substantial and 
attracted much higher rates of interest.  
 
Worsening terms of trade and inflation in the early 1970s led to demonstrations 
by farmers, workers and students with protests erupting again in response to 
inflationary pressures in the late 1970s. Legislative responses to political labour 
under Abdul Razak were in the main repressive. In a bid to appeal to the growing 
proportion of Malays in the workforce and amongst union membership, an 
invitation to participate in the National Joint Labour Advisory Council was 
extended, but this move was not reflected in institutional arrangements. In 
uncertain international economic conditions, the benefits of institutional 
measures to enhance household incomes and living standards were yet to 
emerge. The political and economic constraints imposed by adherence to the 
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conditions that were favourable to the emergence of a new leader presenting as 
strong yet adaptable.  
 
As Minister for Education and Minister for Trade and Industry, Mahathir had 
already demonstrated a willingness to repress political activism amongst students 
and by organised labour (Jomo and Todd 1994:146).
15 Due to the ill health of 
Hussein Onn, Mahathir was acting Prime Minister in 1980. He oversaw the 
amendments to the Trade Unions Ordinance, the Industrial Relations Act and the 
Employment Act. Once in the position of Prime Minister, he moved quickly to 
ensure labour’s compliance with his two main economic aims: the further 
development of export oriented manufacturing, and the establishment of heavy 
industries, in which the government would take a lead through the Heavy 
Industries Corporation of Malaysia Berhad (HICOM) and through a set of 
policies collectively termed ‘Look East’.  
 
To achieve these policies required a number of changes to the labour force, 
socially, politically and geographically. Mahathir therefore began his leadership 
with a two pronged approach to the control of labour: his approach was 
paternalistic towards labour in general, particularly Malay labour, but overtly 
repressive when dealing with organised labour, the repression being carefully 
legitimated through legislation (Barraclough 1985). Look East, as it unfolded, 
contained elements of both paternalism and repression. According to Bhopal 
(1999:286), Look East represented ‘the state’s strategy for a Malay-oriented 
                                                           
15 ‘Referring to the powers of the Societies Act, in 1979, Mahathir warned that any society or 
political party which carried out activities detrimental to the nation’s stability would be 
deregistered’ (Barraclough 1985:809).  
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policy emphasis from the outset was clearly on labour….Malaysians, especially 
Malay workers, were exhorted to work harder to raise productivity’. Mahathir 
was under pressure to keep wages attractive to international and local employers, 
to deal with the looming labour shortage, to increase and broaden skill levels, 
and to contain the labour movement and the Islamic opposition party, PAS, while 
maintaining the support of Malays for UMNO. Look East will be discussed in 
the following chapter as the new attempt to incorporate labour within Mahathir’s 
plans for Malaysia’s economic progress. 
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1
 
Introduction 
In the 1980s, the contradictions and tensions inherent in the NEP became 
disruptive to the extent that some resolution was required to ensure the high rates 
of economic growth which in turn provided funding for the government’s 
policies. Structural imbalances in the labour market were emerging as a result of 
the government’s approach to industrial development under the NEP which was 
geared towards the expansion of employment opportunities. There was little 
emphasis directed towards the use of labour saving technology, labour processes 
that encouraged productivity, or the adequate provision of technical training. 
Political concerns had also arisen. A growing proportion of Malays was now 
dependent upon income derived from participation in the waged labour sector, 
some of this employment being directly controlled by various levels of 
government. A revised approach to the management of industrial relations issues 
became politically necessary as UMNO attempted to negotiate these ethno-
political sensitivities.  
 
From the early 1980s, employers in export-oriented manufacturing faced 
shortages of skilled labour that frustrated their attempts to upgrade production 
technologies under the pressure of international competition (Rasiah 1995:78). 
Closer enforcement of employment quotas for Malays from the mid 1970s had 
discouraged professional and skilled non-Malay workers who recorded high rates 
of outmigration (Andaya and Andaya 2001:314) thereby further exacerbating the 
                                                           
1 Khoo (1997:61) refers to the period from 1981 as the Mahathirist Phase. 
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disenchantment amongst those non-Malays who felt that educational and 
employment opportunities were being increasingly denied to themselves and 
their families. Employers in the plantation and construction sectors also faced 
labour shortages, due in part to the loss of rural populations to urban areas, but 
also due to competition with government funded projects in rural areas that 
provided Malays with better income and conditions than generally prevailed in 
the plantation sector.  
 
Under the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85, economic development expenditure 
allocated to the industrial sector increased to over twenty per cent. By 1980, 
manufacturing contributed 20.5 per cent of Malaysia’s GDP and employed 
almost 16 per cent of the labour force, which equated to slightly more than 
800,000 workers (Government of Malaysia 1981:293-294, see Table 4.1). While 
positive economic growth was recorded in the early 1980s, it was largely driven 
by state expenditure funded by high commodity prices and the exploitation of 
newly discovered oil reserves. This ultimately proved unsustainable, leaving 
Malaysia vulnerable to less favourable international economic conditions, 
resulting in a recession in the mid 1980s (Jesudason 1989:196). When Malaysia 
emerged from recession and political infighting in the late 1980s, labour related 
legislation had been significantly amended. However, while Ramesh (2000:155-
156) describes the ruling coalition as powerful enough to embark upon the shift 
away from the NEP and towards a greater focus on economic development, this 
chapter describes the attempted shift as negotiated and partial. 
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compromises had to be reworked. This included significant shifts in the 
ideological and structural means of labour control, including those that delivered 
concessions to the Malay population. It was the continuing tension between 
managing its identity as a party dedicated to improving the lot of Malays and that 
of being a strong economic manager, that presented UMNO with some of its 
greatest challenges in the régulation of labour. This chapter will focus on the 
major instances of conflict and resulting institutional changes, and the shifting 
means of labour regulation embedded within them. Clearly, political and 
economic concerns were both relevant factors in shaping labour related policies 
and institutions.  
 
Looking East to control labour 
Mahathir’s early premiership has been variously described as a period which saw 
‘The unions in retreat’ (Jomo and Todd 1994, chapter 8) and as the ‘Year labour 
took a beating’ (Star 1 January 1982). Reflecting back on the period, Mahathir 
had the following to say about Look East, first announced in late 1981.  
The single most important factor in Japan’s meteoric postwar rise 
appears to have been their work ethic…Thus, our Look East 
Policy focused primarily on learning and implementing Japanese 
and South Korean work ethics…I was very enthusiastic about this 
attempt to enhance the attitude of the Malaysian people towards 
work…the Japanese work ethic we aimed to emulate also 
included a dedication to quality and to keeping deadlines…there 
seems to be very little conflict between the workers’ unions and 
corporate management and this leads to stability and builds trust 
in the organisation. Japanese corporations are obviously quite 
paternalistic towards their employees, and the workers reciprocate 
this with loyalty towards the corporation (Mahathir 1999:84-86). 
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somewhat premature. ‘At first it was unclear what was intended and government 
spokesmen were kept busy issuing clarifications and explanations’ (Means 
1991:92). Besides this fluidity, the promises of industrial harmony, and the 
positive emphasis on so-called ‘Asian’ cultural values made Look East initially a 
difficult set of policies for the union movement to criticise.
2 Look East was 
couched in terms that appeared favourable to working people and even to 
organised labour. Further, as Khoo (2002) noted, Look East was packaged as 
part of a plan that sought to reassure the public on a range of political concerns, 
rather than focusing on the labour movement exclusively.  
…when Mahathir became prime minister, he launched several 
policies and campaigns – ‘Look East’ bersih, cekap dan amanah 
(‘clean, efficient and trustworthy’), kepimpinan melalui teladan 
(‘leadership by example’), and penyerapan nilai-nilai Islam (‘the 
assimilation of Islamic values’) – which collectively constituted 
an attempt to reform and reorientate the values, attitudes and 
outlook of not only Malaysians in general and the Malays in 
particular, but also politicians from the ruling coalition, 
bureaucrats and businessmen Khoo (2002:55). 
 
The policies of Look East capture the contradictions and paradoxes of 
Mahathirism (Khoo 1995, 1997) while giving some indication of the difficulties 
faced by the union movement in challenging the policies of the administration. 
From a regulationist perspective, the variety of policies that emerged as part of 
Look East can be understood as an attempt to institute a new range of 
institutional compromises and ideological arguments in order to deal with 
                                                           
2 As the intent behind the policies became more obvious, the MTUC became more critical. For 
example, at a conference on labour legislation in 1985, Narayanan, President of the MTUC, was 
sharply critical of the government’s push for in-house unions. He argued that it could ‘only lead 
to splinter groups which may lead to disunity and indiscipline [sic] amongst the nation’s work 
force’ (Narayanan 1985:125). 
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the newly appointed Prime Minister (PM) in 1981. 
 
Dr Mahathir had been acting PM during 1980 due to the illness of Hussein Onn. 
He was officially appointed to the role in June 1981 in a transition of power 
Brown (2004:4) has described as the ‘most ordered political transition in 
Malaysia’s history’. CUEPACS’ president, T. Narendran, welcomed the new PM 
while calling for more dialogue sessions between the government and the civil 
service unions. Zainal Rampak, Deputy President of the MTUC, was more 
circumspect, expressing ‘the hope that the Government would be more 
sympathetic to the problems of the trade unions’ (NST 30 June 1981).  
 
Earlier in the year, both the MTUC and CUEPACS had been in dispute with the 
government over a variety of issues. CUEPACS raised concerns regarding 
restrictions that prevented higher level staff from joining unions, a ruling that 
was overturned in the union’s favour (Star 7 February 1981). The MTUC 
managed to garner media attention on several issues including complaints about 
the increasing number of foreign workers (Star 28 February 1981), an attempt to 
include a cost of living clause in collective agreements, (Malay Mail 6 May 
1981), and an ongoing protest against the 1980 amendments to labour legislation 
and the Societies Act (NST 24 March 1981; NST 12 April 1981). The MTUC had 
also criticised the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85 arguing it ignored the interests 
of labour (Star 20 March 1981). The MTUC and CUEPACS had also argued 
with each other, leading to the acrimonious departure of CUEPACS-affiliated 
unions from the MTUC. 
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As Mahathir was aware from his previous tenures as Deputy Prime Minister 
(from 1976) and as Minister for Trade and Industry, the Malaysian economy, 
despite the immediately buoyant conditions, faced a number of challenges 
including constraints on the structure of the labour force.  
 
Table 4.1 Employment share by economic sector, 1980 and 1990 
‘000 %   
Sector  1980 1990 1980 1990 
Agriculture 2,066.9  1,738.0  40.6  26.0 
Industry 1,205.0  1,841.0  23.7  27.5 
Mining 89.6  37.0  1.7  0.6 
Manufacturing 803.1  1,333.0  15.8  19.9 
Construction 262.8.6  424.0  4.0  6.3 
Utilities
a 49.5.5 47.0  0.8  0.7 
Services 1,821.6  3,107.0  35.7  45.6 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels and 
restaurants 
648.5 1218.0 12.7  18.2 
Transport, storage & 
communications 
193.2 302.0  3.8  4.5 
Finance, insurance, 
real estate & 
business services 
52.1 258.0 1.0  3.9 
Other services
b 927.8 1,329.0 18.2  19.0 
Total employed  5,093.5  6,686.0  100.0  100.0 
Total labour force  5,380.0  7.042.2  -  - 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1981:81, Fourth Malaysia Plan, table 4.6. Government of 
Malaysia 1991:78 Seventh Malaysia Plan, table 3.2 Data relates to Malaysia.   
a Utilities includes electricity, gas and water. 
bIncludes public services. 
 
Realising the importance of labour issues to future economic development, the 
government released the first Labour and Manpower Report in 1981. Minister 
for Labour and Manpower, Richard Ho, claimed the plan ‘would end ad hoc 
solutions to labour issues’ (NST 28 April 1981). Wage inflation and the 
relocation of rural populations had increased pressure on the government to 
allow foreign workers to be employed in the plantation sector where the presence 
  160of undocumented foreign workers was already making media headlines (Star 28 
February 1981; NST 27 May 1981). According to Ho, local workers were 
prejudiced against blue collar work (NST 13 March 1981), and appeared 
reluctant to take on work in the plantation and construction sectors. Labour force 
participation rates for males remained fairly stable while those for women 
increased only marginally, falling short of the level forecast by the government 
(World Bank 1995:vi; see Table 4.2 below).  
Table 4.2 Labour force participation rates, Malaysia 
Gender  1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Male  87.6 87.4 87.5 85.6 85.9 85.6 85.3 
Female  43.1 44.3 44.2 47.5 47.7 46.7 47.8 
Total  65.3 65.8 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.2 66.5 
Source: Department of Statistics 2001a:331, table 2.1; Department of Statistics 2001b:146-147, 
table 8.1; Athukorala and Menon 1996: 18 (1980, 1985, 1986). 
 
Meanwhile, employers in the manufacturing sector lodged complaints about job-
hopping and unrealistic wage demands (Rasiah 1995:78-79). Further industrial 
deepening was frustrated by the low wage regime, which, along with a poorly 
coordinated tertiary education system, was contributing to the lack of skilled 
workers, particularly those with technical skills (Fold and Wangel 1998; Rasiah 
1995:80; World Bank 1995). The new PM therefore came to the job with a 
number of policies designed to deliver the labour force required for his economic 
and cultural vision of Malaysia. 'We have all the basic ingredients that will make 
it possible for Malaysia to become an important industrialized country in 
Asia…something more is needed…the work ethic' (Mahathir cited in Khoo 
1995:69).  
 
The PM promoted Look East as an alternative to the social and economic ills 
allegedly responsible for the decline of the West (Khoo 1995:42-44). According 
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which the government adopted an interventionist stance, based on the success 
stories of Japan and South Korea (Biddle and Milor 1999:14). Initially then, 
Mahathir’s vision received the public support of P. P. Narayanan, President of 
the MTUC, and Tan Lee Leng, secretary-general of the National Union of 
Teaching Professions, who commented favourably on the employment security 
and welfare provisions said to characterise Japanese employment relations.
3 
Employers were more positive regarding the productivity implications of the 
shift which was considered by then-president of the Malaysian Employers’ 
Federation (MEF), Tan Sri Ubaidulla, as the path to increased wages and ‘a 
better standard of living for all’ (NST 22 December 1981).  
 
However, the Look East policies have also been understood as a direct attack on 
the organised labour movement (Ayadurai 1993; Jomo and Todd 1994; Jomo 
1995; Wad and Jomo 1994). According to Wad and Jomo (1994:219), ‘it has 
become apparent that the objective is to cut the ground from under the feet of 
existing unions as far as possible’. Similarly: 'The real thrust of the campaign 
appears to be the promotion of labour discipline through reorganizing industrial 
relations to promote company loyalty…increase productivity…and reduce losses' 
(Jomo 1994:8). Western style unionism was held up as a negative example that 
Malaysian workers were urged to avoid. As Khoo (1995:43), citing page 
numbers in The Challenge (Mahathir 1970), summarises: 
For example, workers in the West have abused the ‘right to go on 
strike to prevent oppression by employers’ and turned it into ‘a 
                                                           
3 Wad and Jomo (1994:222-3) have written that it was the MTUC and larger, more conservative 
unions that initially welcomed Look East, with smaller manufacturing unions being more critical 
from the outset. However, as the potential impact and intent of Look East became more obvious, 
the MTUC also became more critical. 
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[‘self-seeking’] workers…do not even listen to their own leaders’ 
(p. 138).  
 
Ayadurai (1993:87) suggests the policy of Look East ‘provided the government 
with an ideological standpoint to press for the establishment of in-house unions’ 
which the Ministry of Labour had linked to higher rates of productivity. 
In-house unions are deemed to be predisposed to increase 
productivity in that they are particularly more appropriate for the 
establishment and operation of quality control circles (QCC) in 
industries much needed in a rapidly industrialising economy like 
Malaysia’s…the prevalence of national unions in the Malaysian 
context is not conducive to sustain industrial growth and 
expansion (Labour and Manpower Report 1983-84, Government 
of Malaysia 1985:180, cited in Ariffin 1997:54). 
 
Wad and Jomo (1994) consider Mahathir’s positive endorsement of in-house 
unions a significant departure from his previous wholesale rejection of trade 
unions. They see this as evidence of his awareness that the larger industrial 
labour force emerging as a result of industrialisation and the NEP required a new 
means of containment. ‘…the new labour policy sought to shift the very basis of 
trade unionism away from the collective representation of workers to new 
relations which should ensure their systematic cooptation…’ (Wad and Jomo 
1994:217).  
 
It was not simply the increase in the overall numbers of industrial workers that 
created concerns for the government, but the changing ethnic structure. Malays 
by then comprised 45 per cent of workers in the production and transport sectors 
(see Table 4.3) and from 1980, constituted fifty per cent of Malaysia’s 503,686 
union members (see Table 4.4). This figure rose to 57 per cent by the mid 1980s 
(Jomo 1995:210). 
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Table 4.3 Employment by occupation and ethnicity, 1980 (per cent) 
 Bumiputera  Chinese  Indian 
Professional & technical  50  37  11 
Administrative & managerial  32  57  6 
Clerical & related  55  36  7 
Sales & related  23  70  8 
Services 48  40  12 
Agricultural 70  20  12 
Production, transport & others  45  43  11 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1981:59, table 3.11 
 
Bhopal (1999:286) therefore describes Look East as ‘the state’s strategy for a 
Malay-oriented industrial relations policy’. The government promoted in-house 
unions as part of a new strategy to discipline an organised labour movement and 
industrial workforce no longer dominated by Indians or Chinese (Ariffin 
1997:53).  
Table 4.4 Union membership by ethnicity (per cent) 
Year Malay  Chinese  Indian 
1968 27.0  23.0  49.0 
1978 38.2  27.2  33.3 
1980 50.6  21.6  26.9 
1985 56.6  17.7  25.0 
Source: Ariffin 1997:52, table 2. 
 
The Ministry of Labour attempted to avoid an outright confrontation over the 
issue by making in-house unionism voluntary, while simultaneously placing 
legislative impediments in the way of the formation of the less desired national 
unions (Ariffin 1997; Bhopal and Todd 2000:207; Wad and Jomo 1994:220). In 
the same vein, Mahathir resurrected the former National Joint Labour Advisory 
Council in 1983, renaming it the National Labour Advisory Council (NLAC). 
This tripartite body was initially established in 1957 but had met only irregularly 
in the intervening period and not at all since 1980 (Ministry of Labour 1986:6). 
Hence there was a nominal return to the notion of unions as partners in economic 
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Ideologically, Look East gave legitimacy to in-house unions while at the same 
time giving support to the repression of larger industry unions and political 
activism by organised labour on the basis that they were detrimental to 
productivity. 
 
Despite this stance against organised labour, there is evidence of Mahathir’s 
commitment, albeit selective, to improving the conditions of Malay workers. 
Indeed, Bowie (1988:55) has argued that Mahathir’s heavy industry push and the 
establishment of the Heavy Industries Commission of Malaysia (HICOM) in the 
early 1980s was overwhelmingly motivated by a sense of frustration at the 
continuing poor economic and social position of Malays. ‘‘Look East’ contained 
Mahathir’s hopes of Malay advancement’ (Khoo 1995:74). In 2002 while on a 
visit to Seoul, Dr Mahathir stated: ‘It has been a success…I am very happy with 
the Look East policy’ (Star 24 May 2002).  
 
Foreign labour in the state-labour nexus 
The strong economic growth recorded in the late 1970s contributed to a shift of 
population from rural to urban areas.
4 In 1980 approximately 34 per cent of 
Malaysians lived in urban areas. Over the decade, this would increase to 51 per 
cent (Government of Malaysia 1996:107).
5 This both reduced the labour force 
available to the plantation sector and increased the demand for workers in the 
urban construction sector (Hing 2000:226). Malaysian employers and lobby 
groups such as the United Planting Association of Malaysia looked increasingly 
                                                           
4 It is should be noted that population growth of itself increased the number of regions classified 
as urban so most data on rural urban migration in Malaysia is somewhat exaggerated. 
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Labour 1986:114), attracting criticism from the union movement: ‘We don’t 
need alien workers says union’ (Star 28 February 1981).  
 
Between 1975 and 1980, 119,000 temporary labour migrants were officially 
approved to work in Malaysia (Government of Malaysia 1996:106). In 1981, the 
Minister for Labour and Manpower, in response to rising concerns about the 
undocumented status of many foreign workers, announced that a policy on the 
issue would soon be released, stating ‘it was the government’s view that there 
should be no exploitation of cheap labour, no matter where they came from’ 
(NST 27 May 1981). In 1982, Mak Hon Kam took over the portfolio (now 
renamed the Ministry of Labour), and by July of that year, formal approval was 
granted for the use of foreign workers in the plantation and construction sectors 
(UNESCO 1997).  
 
The Medan Agreement of 1984 formalised temporary labour migration 
arrangements between Malaysia and Indonesia. At that point, the Malaysian 
government estimated that about 500,000 foreign workers were employed in 
Malaysia, mainly within the plantation and construction sectors (Pillai 
1999:180). Wages data provided by the Ministry of Labour (1986:30) 
demonstrated clearly that in the construction sector, Indonesian workers, despite 
being considered the most skilled of the foreign workers, were paid less than 
local workers in the seven occupational categories surveyed.  
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Some of this increase can be attributed to definitional changes that exaggerate the figure. 
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ethnic group, 1984 (RM) 
Occupation Malay  Chinese  Indian  Indonesian 
Bar bender  690  889  688  645 
Carpenter 765  878  690  635 
Plasterer 769  1,015  723  509 
Bricklayer 777  759  605  580 
Concreter 739  758  631  564 
Mason 728  925  727  652 
Labourer 517  860  569  651 
Source: Ministry of Labour 1986:30, table 5-1. 
 
Wad and Jomo (1994) argue that employers used migrant labour as a means of 
undermining local labour organisations, with migrants viewed as a ‘reserve army 
of labour’ acting to dampen the wage demands of local labour. Zulkifly et al. 
(1998) provide some empirical support for this claim. They conclude that in the 
plantation sector, locals and migrants competed for the same jobs but that local 
workers were displaced by the availability of relatively cheaper migrant labour. 
Hussein Ali (1995:75) similarly argues that migrant labour ‘has been used by 
employers in the agricultural and building sectors to weaken unions, depress 
wages and even displace local workers’. Jomo (1995:228) agrees: ‘Since the late 
1970s, plantation wages have been successfully depressed by the use of 
disenfranchised immigrant workers willing to work for lower wages’. Rasiah 
(1997:78-79) notes that a small but increasing number of migrants were 
employed within the manufacturing sector by the mid 1980s, being preferred 
over local workers who were considered more likely to be poached or to job hop. 
He concludes (1995:80) that the preference for foreign labour arose at least 
partly out of the concern to maintain a low wage regime: ‘In approving the 
utilization of foreign labour in manufacturing, the government not only helped 
reduce the problem of labour shortages but also reduced upward pressure on 
wages’. 
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The arrangements to allow migrant labour entry to Malaysia were criticised by 
the MTUC President who argued the union movement had been excluded from 
the discussions despite the reconstitution of the National Labour Advisory 
Council since 1983. 
…the government has recently made decisions on labour issues 
without consulting or “informing” labour organisations. I am 
referring to a pact between Malaysia and a neighbouring country 
on the recruitment of labour. We in the labour movement were 
distressed to read about the pact in the newspapers. In whose 
interest was this agreement signed. We cannot but conclude that 
the government made this decision to satisfy a handful of vested 
interest groups (Narayanan, MTUC President, 1985:3). 
 
After Mahathir was cited in the Malaysian media as saying ‘our workers are not 
willing to work’, the MTUC urged the government to investigate: ‘Is it because 
the working conditions and wages of these sectors is so low that it would be 
impossible for a worker to provide the basic necessities for his family?’ (Star 26 
March 1985).  
While Malaysians themselves are being retrenched we cannot see 
the logic on [sic] recruiting immigrant labour. This decision is not 
in the interest of the majority of the citizens nor good for the 
future social stability of the country (Narayanan, MTUC 
President, 1985:3).  
 
The political sensitivities surrounding the use of migrant labour heightened 
particularly in the depths of the recession in the mid 1980s when local workers 
engaged in renewed levels of industrial disputation (see Table 4.7).  
 
While Mahathir and his Minister had essentially blamed fussy local workers for 
the influx of foreign workers, in another example of contrasting institutional 
responses, the Labour and Manpower Report of 1984/86 (Ministry of Labour 
1986:30), adopted a position critical of employers.  
  168…the present influx of legal and illegal immigrant labour has led 
to a situation where employers particularly in the construction and 
plantation sectors prefer to employ migrant labour because it is 
advantageous to the employers themselves….illegal immigrant 
labour has also begun to displace Malaysians in petty trades and 
has led to some social problems as well…the influx of immigrant 
labour [is] a major issue requiring the attention of the 
Government…As for employers who are found to engage illegal 
migrant workers, such employers can be prosecuted under Section 
5(1) of the Employment (Restriction) Act 1968…(Ministry of 
Labour 1986:30).  
 
By September of 1985, with an estimated 450,000 Malaysians unemployed, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs upgraded the monitoring of migrant labour. In 
September 1986 the new Minister for Labour, Lee Kim Sai announced a ban on 
the further employment of migrant workers. After the press ran a series of 
complaints from families unable to employ maids, this ban was moderated by the 
Home Ministry to allow continued employment of foreign domestic workers 
(Chin 1998, Chapter 3).  
 
As Pillai (1999) highlights, this short-lived crackdown on migrant labour was 
part of a pattern that would be repeated during times of economic downturn but 
rescinded as the economy improved and employers lobbied for more access to 
labour. The demand for foreign labour continued throughout the economic 
recession (Pillai 1999:180). An estimated 300,000 migrants were officially 
granted permission to work in Malaysia during the period 1986-1991 
(Government of Malaysia 1996:106). In short, illegal labour was cheaper than 
legal labour, was more easily and more cheaply controlled, and increasingly, was 
widely available (Rudnick 1994; Ruppert 1999; UNESCO c1997).  
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Malaysia’s foreign workers are generally marginalised in the labour market, 
being vulnerable to repatriation and with little recourse to protective labour 
legislation, an outcome reinforced by ineffective enforcement of this legislation 
by government agencies. Jonas (1996) has discussed the existence of ‘local 
labour control regimes’, which effectively permit forms of labour control not 
generally acceptable to the less marginalised workforce. This has been observed 
in a number of Western European countries for example, where foreign workers 
or other socially marginalised groups are used to undertake less skilled, low 
status work (Harrod 1987:204). The segmentation of the labour force, by 
citizenship as well as ethnicity and gender, has been a central means by which 
the Malaysian government has contributed to the maintenance of low wages. As 
noted by Coe and Kelly (2002:347), the state plays a vital role in providing the 
discursive and institutional supports that allow capital to treat some workers 
differently to others (see also Crinis 2006 and Kaur 2004).  
 
Institutionally, the forms of governmental control exerted over migrant workers 
differ to those exerted over the local labour force (Rodgers 1994:11). The 
Ministry of Labour oversaw the legislation shaping labour relations, occupational 
safety and welfare amongst the domestic workforce. Migrant workers were often 
located outside of formal employment relations. They were more subject to the 
actions of private labour recruitment agencies and controls imposed by the Home 
Ministry, and within it, the Departments of Immigration and Police. Hence, the 
state’s actions with regard to migrant labour were predisposed to police and 
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social security and levels of remuneration (Liow 2003). 
 
The lower rates of pay earned by this segment of the labour force have added 
significantly to Malaysia’s economic growth and thus contributed to meeting the 
cost of the concessions and benefits delivered by the Malaysian government and 
employers to local workers. Reminiscent of the colonial era, the temporary 
nature of the foreign labour force has allowed the government (and capital) to 
lessen its contribution to the reproduction of this segment of the labour force. 
Neither the Malaysian taxpayer nor Malaysian capital was required to contribute 
the expenditure in health, education, training, housing and other infrastructure 
that would otherwise be required to deliver a labour force of more than one 
million workers.  
 
However, the presence of large numbers of low skilled, low paid migrant 
workers and the maintenance of a low wage regime has created dilemmas for the 
government. Apart from the political and social discontent, there were long term 
structural impacts on the quality and characteristics of the labour force. The 
constraints placed on wages growth contributed to high emigration levels by 
skilled and professional workers searching for higher wages and better 
conditions in nearby Singapore and further afield.  
The emigration of Malaysian workers to Singapore is a definite 
loss to the country in terms of human capital. In fact labour 
immigration [sic] is partly responsible for the labour shortage 
situation (Ministry of Labour 1986:32). 
 
Additionally, the low wage environment encouraged job hopping amongst local 
workers, and thereby discouraged investment in training by employers, 
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on the nature of the Malaysian labour force identified what was termed a 
‘disturbing trend’; a deterioration in the skill intensity of the labour force 
between 1985 and 1991. Rasiah (1995:78-79) therefore views the presence of 
low skilled, lowly paid migrant labour as an impediment to Malaysia’s shift 
towards more competitive, capital intensive manufacturing, a shift that would be 
reliant on the presence of more skilled labour. The dependence on migrant 
labour, while facilitating savings in the funding the social reproduction of twenty 
per cent of the labour force, contributed to labour market contradictions that 
remained unresolved into the 2000s.  
 
The contradictions inherent in the NEP (Khoo 1997)
6  
The mid to late 1980s were marked by economic recession, high levels of 
unemployment and rising state debt. Factional disputes within UMNO seriously 
threatened Mahathir’s leadership. Institutional mismatches emerged as a result of 
the competing socio-cultural, political and economic aspirations that drove 
labour policies. Jesudason (1989:200) argues that government policies of the 
NEP period generally did not deliver sound economic development but aimed 
instead at ‘short term political payoffs’. Lim (1992:111) similarly suggests that 
the ‘political imperatives’ driving economic management in the NEP period 
negatively influenced decision making. Khoo (1997:61-70) and Jomo et al. 
(1995:19-20) usefully outline a number of economic and political tensions 
emerging after the first decade of NEP policies. Here the focus is on the 
contradictions relating to the labour market and labour control issues.  
                                                           
6 Khoo 1997 uses a similar phrase. 
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On the education system 
A lack of coordination amongst public technical training institutions was noted 
in a World Bank study of Malaysia’s labour needs published in 1995. Shortages 
of technical skills had affected the supply of labour throughout much of the 
1980s and extensive recommendations for improving the efficiency of public 
training were made (World Bank 1995:92). In the case of the university sector, 
the situation was particularly complex given the role of the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) in the promotion of Malay culture and the implementation of 
affirmative action for Malays.  
 
In the university sector, an ethnic quota system guaranteed fifty-five per cent of 
places to Bumiputera students. ‘Between 1980 and 1985 Malay students made up 
about 65 per cent of the total enrolment in Malaysian universities, as against 27 
per cent Chinese and 6 per cent Indian’ (Andaya and Andaya 2001:312). In stark 
contrast, 63 per cent of Malaysian students studying overseas in 1980-1985 were 
ethnic Chinese (see Table 4.6). Chinese families able to afford it sent their 
children overseas to gain a university education, a move that commonly became 
permanent, thus representing a further loss of human capital. Hence the 
implementation of affirmative action on behalf of Malays risked the alienation of 
the non-Malay population with negative implications for increasing the 
proportion of skilled workers in the labour market. A further criticism of the 
quota system was that it resulted in places being allocated to students on the 
basis of ethnicity rather than academic merit, thus demeaning the quality of local 
university qualifications in the view of employers (Lee 2003:25-26).  
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Table 4.6 Students studying overseas by ethnic group 
 Bumiputera  Chinese  Indian 
 no. % no.  %  no.  % 
1980 7,199  24  18,447  63  3,845  13 
1985 8,360  24  21,428  63  4,463  13 
Source: Ministry of Labour 1986:71, table 7-9. 
 
Related to this were the high levels of unemployment recorded amongst 
Malaysia’s university graduates. Despite the overall shortage of labour, 
Malaysia’s university graduates were recording higher unemployment levels than 
they had a decade earlier, leading to an unemployment problem that initially was 
more of a political embarrassment than a serious economic problem.
7 Employers 
were particularly critical of the lack of English competency amongst graduates 
with the introduction of Bahasa Melayu as the main language of instruction. As 
described by Jesudason (1989:187), 
…the educational system suffered from major weaknesses, 
especially at the tertiary level. It was preoccupied with questions 
of ethnic representation in the student body and faculty, as well as 
the use of the Malay language. Academic excellence and the 
development of a skilled technical cadre enjoyed low priority. 
 
The role of the MOE as a vehicle for promoting Malay cultural values and 
delivering specific NEP goals continued to clash with the demands of employers 
for graduates with professional degrees and proficiency in English. It forms a 
case study in Chapter Six in which the MOE is analysed as an example of an 
‘institutional mismatch’. In the 1980s, it appears that political leaders were either 
unwilling or unable to institute widespread changes to the university system, 
                                                           
7 Secondary school leavers comprised a much larger proportion of the young unemployed (Lucas 
and Verry 1999:258). 
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employers for greater attention to employment-related skills.  
 
Regulating the civil service 
Lim (2002:190-195), citing evidence from Puthucheary 1978, Lim Lin Hean 
1988, and Shamsul 1996, has argued that since the late 1970s the government 
has been able to exert only a relatively weak level of control over the civil 
service. This can be partially attributed to the role of the civil service in 
promoting the policies of the NEP. Expanding the civil service through the 
employment of Malays initially served a two fold purpose. Firstly, it provided 
the state with the institutional support to implement and police NEP policies. 
Secondly, the employment of vast numbers of Malays of itself went some way 
towards meeting the NEP goal of restructuring the labour force so that more 
Malays were in better paid occupations and industries. The expanding ranks of 
the civil service absorbed more than 20 per cent of new employment growth in 
the 1970s (Mazumdar 1991:32-33). The number of civil servants rose throughout 
that decade with the creation of an additional 313,500 positions (Government of 
Malaysia 1981:82). Operasi Isi Penuh (Operation Fill All Vacancies) was 
undertaken in the early 1980s as the government attempted to stimulate the 
economy away from recession (Jomo and Todd 1994:156). Yeoh (2002) 
describes the public sector in this period as the ‘employer of last resort’ for all 
unemployed Bumiputera graduates. In 1980, there were an estimated 790,000 
civil servants. This represented approximately 14 per cent of the labour force. By 
1985 the number of civil servants had risen to almost 900,000. The rapid 
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of civil servants were under the age of 40 (Ministry of Labour 1986:47).  
 
The government had attempted to manage this labour force in a variety of ways, 
delivering a range of concessions largely unrelated to economic conditions in the 
private sector.
8 Entry-level wages were not high relative to the private sector
9 
but security of tenure was guaranteed. Unlike workers in the private sector, civil 
servants received a government-funded pension on retirement at age 55 under the 
provisions of the Pensions Act. Low interest loans were available for the 
purchase of cars and housing.
10  
 
While employment conditions were relatively generous, the industrial relations 
sphere was repressed. CUEPACS, the peak civil service union association, was 
not permitted to bargain, only to engage in consultation. From 1978, negotiation 
on issues such as wages was not allowed (Jomo and Todd 1994:156). Further, 
public servants do not have a constitutional right to union membership; 
technically they are granted permission by Malaysia’s titular head, the Agung 
(King). This right was generally granted automatically, however, and the rate of 
unionisation was actually higher within the civil service than in the private 
                                                           
8 The previous chapter discussed the rationale provided by the government in 1980 when 
delivering public sector wage rises unrelated to productivity and the criticism this attracted from 
the private sector. 
9 In fact Biddle and Milor (1999:42), citing research by Campos and Root (1996:144), suggest 
that of all the high performing East Asian economies, the gap between public and private sector 
wages was greatest in Malaysia. 
10 Consumer spending by civil servants became increasingly important to the Malaysian 
economy. For example, when a locally produced car, the Proton, became available, civil servants 
were allowed to access car loans only for the purchase of a Proton. During the recession of the 
mid 1980s, the construction and real estate sectors were especially hard hit as civil servants were 
less able to make purchases (Jomo 1995:228). The relationship between consumption and labour 
control is more fully explored in Chapter 8. 
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11 The exception is that members of the police and armed forces and other 
security related positions are forbidden union membership. Technically, 
CUEPACS cannot actively bargain on behalf of its membership. The 
government found it useful, following the split between MTUC and CUEPACS 
in 1981, to promote CUEPACS over the more politically vocal MTUC in 
particular forums such as the ILO (Jomo and Todd 1994:157-158). As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the relationship between CUEPACS and the government 
had been largely paternalistic.  
 
However, sensitive to criticisms directed at the civil service by the private sector, 
and keen to pursue his development agenda, Mahathir often voiced a critical 
view of the civil service. ‘Dr Mahathir suggested that many civil servants were 
not pulling their weight and suggested that mismanagement and corruption were 
undermining government policies’ (Means 1991:84). A series of reforms aimed 
at producing a modern and accountable public service was therefore introduced.  
 
Some of these were obviously designed to gain positive publicity and reassure 
the public; for example, through the introduction in 1981 of punch-in time 
clocks. Reflecting the paternalism of the relationship between the PM and some 
of the public sector unions, the move received positive comments from the 
Public Works Department Employees Union. ‘Our union strongly backs the 
energetic drive of the Prime Minister and his deputy and we welcome the move 
to make the punch clock system applicable to all’ (General Secretary, S. 
Santhanasamy, quoted in the Malay Mail 22 August 1981). The President of 
                                                           
11 In 1985, 313,374 civil servants were union members (Asnan 1987:93). 
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(Star 13 August 1981). Civil servants were required to wear name tags so they 
could be identified by members of the public wishing to report any poor 
behaviour. The Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management 
Planning Unit (MAMPU), ‘… was located within the Prime Minister’s 
Department to give it sufficient political leverage to carry out directed programs 
of reform’ (Abdullah 1997:66). MAMPU was directed to raise the productivity 
of the civil service while the National Bureau of Investigation was to pursue 
corruption. The Public Complaints Bureau was reactivated to allow criticisms of 
the civil service to be aired and reviewed. The Anti-Corruption Agency was also 
reactivated, and senior civil servants were required to declare their assets (Means 
1991:84-85).  
 
While Look East has been described as a new means of regulating industrial 
relations in the private sector, Malaysia Inc., announced by Mahathir in 1983, 
was the means of ensuring ‘close and mutually supportive cooperation between 
the public and private sectors’ (Mahathir 1984, cited by Biddle and Milor 
1999:15). Tensions were evident in the relationship between the civil service and 
the largely non-Malay private sector. Heng (1997:274) identifies a 
‘…widespread perception that Malay government officials responsible for 
approving business permits and licenses were growing increasingly inflexible 
and uncooperative in their dealings with the Chinese business community’. As 
noted by Khoo (1997:61-70; see also Jomo et al. 1995), there was considerable 
distrust within the business sector of the discretionary power of civil servants. 
For example, the MEF was critical of decision making processes within the civil 
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procedures which are cumbersome and slow…In many instances, the decision 
making process is highly politicised’ (Abdul 1987:106).  
 
According to interviews of former civil servants conducted by Biddle and Milor 
(1999:16-18),  
…economic bureaucrats perceived themselves in an adversarial 
role vis a vis [sic] the business community. Their job was to 
closely scrutinize and regulate the business community. 
Furthermore, during the 1970s and 1980s, when the NEP was 
being implemented, the role of bureaucrats in monitoring and 
enforcing policies such as the Industrial Coordination Act 
exacerbated this social distance… 
 
The response by the business sector, domestic Chinese capital particularly, was 
to bypass the state where possible, to appeal directly to politicians, and to adopt a 
‘short-term investment outlook’ (Jesudason 1989:163).  
 
While Jesudason (1989) attributes this to the failure of Chinese capital to form a 
satisfactory alliance with political elites, the antipathy between the civil service 
and the private sector was also an outcome of the government’s failure to 
manage civil servants in a manner that was conducive to economic development. 
Studies of the attitudes of civil servants towards Malaysia Inc. throughout the 
1980s indicated very little understanding or support for the concept (Biddle and 
Milor 1999:17). It was not to be effectively institutionalised until the early 1990s 
(Government of Malaysia Circular No. 9/1991). Meanwhile, those departments 
more closely attuned to the needs of the private sector, for example, the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry, formed consultative bodies that facilitated 
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ranks of the civil service and to the Cabinet.
12
 
The predominantly Malay character of the civil service made it a politically risky 
undertaking to attempt significant reform. For example, Jomo and Todd 
(1994:156) report that when Daim Zainuddin, a long term Mahathir confidant 
who was appointed Minister of Finance in 1984, attempted to reduce the level of 
benefits delivered to civil servants, he was unable to gain enough support to push 
through his recommendations. Further, despite the worsening economic 
conditions of 1985, Mahathir conceded to CUEPACS’ long running and 
unusually acrimonious battle for a wage increase.
13 ‘In 1985 a 6 percent [sic] 
wage increase was granted to about 800,000 category C and D employees - that 
is, those on the lowest two scales of the civil service’ (Jomo et al. 1995:29). 
While this was significantly less than had been requested, the outcome contrasted 
with the government’s rejection of the MTUC’s call for a minimum wage of 
RM500 for private sector workers (NST 1 May 1985).
14  
 
Privatisation, announced as a policy direction in conjunction with Look East and 
Malaysia Inc. in 1983, would also appear to have offered the executive a means 
of wielding greater power over the civil service. However, not until 1985, during 
the recession, was the state ready to make the policy official. At an ILO-
sponsored conference in Bangkok in February of 1987, the Malaysian Deputy 
                                                           
12 This tendency to bypass the civil service in favour of high level consultative groups is 
discussed further in chapters 6 and 7. 
13 Jomo and Todd (1994:158), provide details of the pickets carried out by particular civil service 
unions in order to win their pay rise. 
14 In 1981 the Deputy Minister for Labour and Manpower had advised that ‘this matter is 
presently being looked into’ (Star 6 November 1981, ‘Minimum wages: Not yet, but…’). 
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‘to assist in reducing the size and presence of the public sector’ (Asnan 1987:95). 
However, the rules governing privatisation specified that privatised employees 
would retain the same benefits, entitlements and security of tenure enjoyed by 
civil servants. Asnan argued (1987:97) that privatisation would in fact extend 
greater bargaining powers to the privatised employees, given the restrictions on 
unions in the public sector. He suggested privatisation would pose no problems 
to existing unions as ‘by merely amending its constitution [a union] can continue 
to represent the workers involved’ (Asnan 1987:97).
15 Given that privatisation in 
the Malaysian context was to an extent a political exercise designed to meet the 
NEP goals of creating a Malay business elite, it did not constitute an attack on 
the civil service in the same way that privatisation exercises driven by a neo-
liberal ideology can be understood. In Malaysia, neo-liberalism was not the 
dominant ideology and civil servants formed an important urban Malay support 
base for the Malay dominated ruling coalition. 
 
Nonetheless, criticisms from the private sector regarding the size of the civil 
service continued. For example, the MEF voiced its disapproval:  
The government has almost 900,000 employees…The Pension 
Scheme is by far the most generous in this region. It is anticipated 
that unless the number of potential pensioners is gradually 
reduced, the Treasury may not be able to find enough money to 
pay them by 2000 (Abdul 1987:105).  
 
It was only during the height of the recession that Mahathir and Daim were able 
to move against the civil service without attracting much in the way of public 
                                                           
15 This appears to have been an accurate prediction. In the case of Pos Malaysia, which was 
corporatised in 1992, and then privatised in 2002, union membership is over 98 per cent and the 
number of workers employed has increased (paper delivered to the 4
th UNI-Apro Postal and 
Allied Services Sector committee Meeting June 6, 2002). 
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housing allowances were withdrawn (Jomo 1995:227) and, as part of the 1987 
budget speech delivered in late 1996, Daim announced a wage freeze. This 
delayed further wage adjustments for civil servants ‘…until a few months before 
the general election of October 1990 – after several years of sustained and 
impressive economic recovery…’ (Jomo and Todd 1994:157). Over the 1980s 
the civil service continued to grow in absolute terms but absorbed a declining 
proportion of the labour force (Mazumdar 1991:33). 
 
The slow down in recruitment imposed upon the civil service and the resultant 
decline in the ability to absorb Malay graduates contributed to the emergence of 
another problem for the ruling party. As mentioned above, by the mid 1980s, 
several thousand Malay graduates were unemployed.  
With state revenue in a perilous condition, the government’s role 
in providing employment for Malays in the bureaucracy and 
state enterprise sector was in jeopardy. Graduate unemployment 
became a serious matter… (Jesudason 1989:187). 
 
Lucas and Verry (1999) discuss the situation as one in which young graduates, 
failing to gain attractive offers from the private sector, deferred taking lower 
status employment, preferring to wait for a position in the civil service. They 
concluded that, given the security of tenure, the prestige still attached to civil 
service posts, and the fact that;  
from 1977 to 1984 the number of Civilian Public Servants 
expanded by a remarkable 90 per cent…it seems likely that 
expectations with respect to such jobs remained high among the 
large number of graduates emerging from the educational system 
(Lucas and Verry 1999:258-259).  
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dependence of these graduates on civil service employment as their 
unemployment rates worsened (Yeoh 2002). Lucas and Verry (1999:261) argue 
that the government contributed to this problem by creating the perception that 
entry to the civil service was a likely proposition for graduates. This encouraged 
graduates to delay searching for alternative employment.  
 
The NEP and the disenchantment of skilled and professional non-Malays 
Hing (2000:227-228) cites Pereira (1997:10), who estimated that 40,000 
Malaysian professionals emigrated during 1983-1990, while only 600 returned. 
The World Bank estimates were similar, suggesting on average that 5,000 
professional Malaysians departed annually throughout the 1980s (1995:83). It is 
further claimed that approximately 150,000 non-professional skilled Malaysians 
were working temporarily overseas, including Singapore, earning between 2-4 
times the wages that could be earned in Malaysia (World Bank 1995:82). 
 
However, departing professionals and skilled workers provided reasons other 
than low wages for their decision. ‘What the Malay politicians and intelligentsia 
tended to laud as the NEP’s affirmative action was apt to be resented as ethnic 
discrimination by many among the non-Malay communities’ (Khoo 1995:104). 
Affirmative action quotas to increase Malay participation in tertiary education 
were particularly resented by non-Malays (Hing 2000). Gunasekaran and 
Sullivan (1990:53, cited by the World Bank 1995:84) concluded that ‘…the 
predominantly non-Malay migration out of multi-racial Malaysia is hypothesized 
to be mainly the result of an uneven opportunity structure for non-Malays in 
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disenchantment, high school qualifications earned from Chinese Independent 
Secondary Schools were not recognised by the Ministry of Education in 
applications for entrance to public universities nor by the Public Service 
Department in applications for civil service appointments (Lee 1999:76). 
 
The NEP and the role of women 
Despite a steadily worsening shortage of labour, women’s labour force 
participation rates had plateaued from the early 1980s onwards. This was 
discussed in the previous chapter as an outcome of the government’s conflicting 
policy objectives towards women. Institutionally, little was done to facilitate 
women’s greater participation in the paid labour force. Some attempt towards 
this was made in 1976 with the establishment of the National Advisory Council 
on the Integration of Women in Development (Ahmad 1998:21). 
 
Chin (1998) discusses the government’s conflicting objectives in the context of 
Mahathir’s pro-Malay National Population Policy (NPP). Announced in 1984, 
the policy aimed for a population of 70 million by 2100, compared with the 
existing population that was just short of 13 million. Chin (1998) argues the 
government was therefore emphasising the role of women as child bearers. The 
1985 amendment to the Employment Act increased from three to five the number 
of births for which a female employee could claim maternity allowance. The 
daily rate of the maternity allowance was also increased (Ministry of Labour 
1986:6). Maternity allowance is funded by the employer.  
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population policy than being part of any coherent policy to increase women’s 
participation in waged labour. For example, Elias (2004:9) notes an absence of 
policy statements regarding women’s labour force participation until the 
publication of the Sixth Malaysia Plan (Government of Malaysia 1991). Even 
then, while women’s contribution to Malaysia’s economic development was 
acknowledged, stress was placed on their primary role as wives and mothers 
(Andaya and Andaya 2001:317; Elias 2004:9).  
 
In the 1980s women’s labour force participation rates stagnated despite their 
increasing levels of education, reflecting a serious loss of human capital in a 
labour market already suffering from skill shortages. While recent research 
(Amin 2004) has questioned the extent to which the NPP influenced the 
employment decisions of married women, the point remains that the political 
leadership often demonstrated an inconsistent stance towards women and their 
involvement in the paid labour force, and proved unwilling to initiate 
institutional changes supportive of women’s participation in the paid labour 
force.  
 
According to the World Bank (1995:v), the relatively generous maternity 
benefits required to be paid to female employees has, firstly, discouraged 
employers from employing women and, secondly, has pushed down female 
wages as employers seek some compensation for the higher non-wage costs 
associated with employing women. Hence the NEP emphasis on expanding the 
Malay proportion of the population and emphasising the role of women as child 
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private sector labour market, despite a growing shortage of labour. In summary, 
the lack of clear direction regarding female labour force participation is not 
indicative of a ‘developmental state’ able to implement policies that support 
economic growth. Rather, this outcome is more suggestive of a government 
unwilling to directly challenge conflicting political and socio-cultural concerns.  
 
The mid 1980s’ recession: Trading labour rights for FDI?  
The recession of the mid 1980s hit Malaysia at a time when government 
expenditure had reached historically high levels as it funded the NEP and 
attempted the push towards heavy industrialisation through HICOM. The 
recession exposed a divide in opinion amongst Malaysia’s political and business 
elites as to whether the NEP’s emphasis should have shifted away from 
redistribution toward ensuring economic growth (Khoo 1995:106), a shift that 
would have amounted essentially to ‘holding the NEP in abeyance’. The 
ramifications of this debate for state-capital-labour relations are many and 
provide an opportunity to explore the responses of the Malaysian government to 
the pressures to contain labour costs and oppress labour rights as economic 
growth slowed. As is demonstrated below, it is possible for a government to act 
in a repressive manner towards organised labour, thereby assuaging the demands 
of foreign and local capital, yet simultaneously addressing domestic political and 
economic concerns by delivering concessions to labour outside the sphere of 
industrial relations. The emphasis in régulation theory on identifying the factors 
that de/stabilise capitalist societies proves useful here.  
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High levels of government spending and less favourable international conditions 
had placed the country’s finances under pressure from the early 1980s. ‘In 1985-
6, the combination of the commodities collapse, diminished state revenues, 
reduced state expenditure, and a decline in private capital investment sent the 
Malaysian economy into a recession’ (Khoo 1995:138).  
 
Table 4.7 Government revenue by source (RM million) 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 
Direct  taxes  9,259 8,653 8,468 7,508 
Companies’  income  tax  3,920 3,446 2,783 3,146 
Petroleum income tax  3,130  3,072  1,533  2,208 
Individual income tax  1,749  1,761  1,812  1,779 
Stamp  duty  340 246 257 278 
Others  120 128 83  97 
Indirect  taxes  7,441 6,029 6,006 7,200 
Export  tax  1,839 1,141 1,267 1,395 
Import  tax  2,518 2,066 1,934 2,406 
Excise  tax  1,376 1,410 1,310 1,536 
Sales tax  1,234  992  1,090  1,456 
Service tax  107  50  63  73 
Others  367 360 342 334 
Non-tax  revenue  3,975 4,356 5,134 6,623 
Total  revenue  21,115 19,518 18,143 21,967 
Source: BNM 2006b:108,  table VII.2. 
 
With the decline in international demand for tin and palm oil came a dramatic 
fall in export earnings. The government’s response produced a deflationary effect 
as amongst other cost savings, concessions to public sector employees that had 
supported the real estate and construction sectors were withdrawn (Jomo 
1995:227). High unemployment worsened the downturn in demand: ‘…the 
economic crisis of 1985-86, which was the culmination of a wide-ranging 
malaise from the early 1980s, accelerated changes in capital-labour relations…’ 
(Jomo 1995:228, emphasis mine).  
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A rise in the rate of unemployment was evident from the early 1980s as foreign-
owned and local firms lost orders and the government reduced its expenditure 
(Jomo et al. 1995:27). The new Minister of Labour, Lee Kim Sai, citing 
officially registered redundancies, reported a loss of almost 45,000 jobs in 1985. 
Over 60 per cent of these were from the manufacturing sector, particularly from 
failed foreign firms established in the FTZs (Saravanamuttu 1987:54). In total, 
however, more than 450,000 Malaysians were unemployed, the numbers being 
swelled by the return of an estimated 60,000 Malaysians who had lost their jobs 
in Singapore (Jomo and Edwards 1993:33, citing Ariff and Semudram 1987:25). 
The recession challenged the bases of the government’s legitimacy as benefactor 
to the Malays and as a sound economic manager.  
 
According to Saravanamuttu (1987:54), ‘the anger of workers was the source of 
great consternation for the government’. A larger number of workers participated 
in industrial action in 1985 but the increased activity was short lived.  
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Year  no. of strikes  no. of workers  working days lost 
1980 28  3,402  19,554
1981 24  4,832  11,850
1982 26  3,330  9,621
1983 24  4,832  11,850
1984 17  2,437  9,269
1985 22  8,710  34,773
1986 23  3,957  14,333
1987 13  3,178  11,035
1988 9  2,912  5,784
1989 17  4,761  22,877
1990 17  98,510  301,978
Source: Jomo and Todd 1994:49, table 2.16. 
 
Chin (2000:1045) accounts for ‘labour’s acquiescence’ in this period as the 
outcome of the harshness of ‘labour legislation’ and a poorly organised union 
movement. Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1995:174) similarly describe Malaysia’s 
‘labour relations system’ as ‘repressive and government-dominated’, an outcome 
of the need to contain labour costs for MNCs. Their argument goes some way to 
explaining the impact of the recession on the private sector labour force.  
 
Firstly, it is clear that the government assisted capital in controlling wages and 
delivering labour force flexibilities, and this was particularly apparent during the 
recession. For example, by not properly enforcing the protective provisions of 
the Employment Act, and by placing administrative obstacles in the path of the 
union movement, the state further weakened labour’s bargaining position. This 
impacted unevenly on the labour force being particularly harmful to less skilled, 
low status workers. Amongst these were the younger women concentrated in the 
FTZs, as well as geographically isolated Indian workers in the plantation sector, 
and migrant workers, all of whom lacked the capacity to elicit public sympathy 
for their predicament.  
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As mentioned previously, the role of the government in allowing the migration 
of foreign workers to Malaysia has also delivered numerical
16 and wage 
flexibility to employers. In addition to the 1984 agreement with the Indonesian 
Government, arrangements were made throughout the 1980s with the 
governments of Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines to allow recruitment of 
workers for employment in the domestic sector, in plantations and in the 
construction sector (UNESCO 1997). Given the tacit approval of illegal labour 
migration by the Malaysian Government, (Jomo and Todd 1994), ‘there was, by 
the late 1980s, a large reserve of illegal aliens in the country whom employers 
could recruit easily’ (UNESCO 1997.) 
 
Table 4.9 Comparison of annual wage increases to productivity increases 
Average annual percentage increases
  1982-84 1985-86 1987-89 1990  1982-1990 
Labour 
productivity 
14.6 1.5  5.1  -1.6 6.6 
Average 
wages 
13.0 3.8  0.3  3.3  5.7 
Source: Lucas and Verry 1999:27, citing Bank Negara Malaysia 1993. 
 
Employers were able to reduce wages considerably during the recession without 
breaching the employment contract or the Employment Act. The lack of a 
mandated minimum wage had allowed employers to develop the practice of 
keeping base rates of pay low but supplementing them with generous non-
contractual bonuses. This allowed a high degree of wage flexibility, which 
                                                           
16 Numerical flexibility is a term that captures the ability of an employer to expand or reduce the 
number of workers employed and their hours of work. When numerical flexibility is high, this 
has implications for the security of the employment contract, the levels of variability in the hours 
of work and the span of hours worked. It also suggests an available pool of unemployed labour 
and high levels of income insecurity. Boyer (1998) provides a detailed discussion of competing 
views on flexibility. See also Deyo 2001 and Standing 2002. 
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drop the bonus payment during downturns (World Bank 1995:51). Lower level 
employees in particular experienced high levels of income insecurity during the 
recession. For example, employers made increasing use of temporary, contract, 
and casual workers, and adopted practices such as extending probation periods in 
order to avoid making workers permanent and therefore eligible for redundancy 
payments (Kuruvilla and Arudsothy 1995:179 citing Standing 1991). Data from 
the Household Income Surveys demonstrate that production workers, along with 
most of the rest of the working class, suffered a loss of real income between 
1984 and 1987 (Mazumdar 1991:34). The incomes of almost a quarter of a 
million plantation workers dropped from between 16 to 25 per cent (Jomo 1995).  
 
In a further risk to political stability, Mahathir had been quoted in the media as 
willing to ‘hold the NEP in abeyance’ (cited in Khoo 1995:140). Further, the 
government was about to embark on a privatisation program which, one deputy 
Minister claimed, was motivated in part by the need to reduce the costs of 
maintaining the civil service (Asnan 1987). Mahathir, in the aftermath of a 
leadership challenge and resultant split in the party, initiated a repressive 
crackdown on civil society. Why then was there relatively little in the way of 
social unrest despite the harshness of the economic environment and the apparent 
abandonment by the government of labour and the pro-Malay NEP? The 
following sections examine these factors in more detail before summarising a 
range of initiatives that, while outside of formal workplace relations, were 
nonetheless measures that impacted on household income. 
 
  191Holding the NEP in abeyance? 
In August 1985 the Minister for Labour, Mak Hon Kam, forewarned employers 
and the union movement of the government’s plan to amend the Industrial 
Coordination Act to remove restrictions requiring that Malays receive a quota of 
shares. ‘As you are aware, Government is considering to amend [sic] several 
provisions in the Industrial Coordination Act to stimulate productive investment’ 
(Mak Hon Kam 1985:6).  
 
Yet despite the pragmatic willingness to suspend the share quotas, Mahathir and 
his Ministers emphasised the government’s continued support for workers by 
retaining the requirement of firms that ‘employment in all work categories had to 
reflect the racial composition of the population’ (Jesudason 1989:189. See also 
Jomo et al. 1995:28). The Minister advised that the ‘creation of jobs for the 
unemployed is a priority’ (Mak Hon Kam 1985:6). In fact, concerned to retain 
the political support of the Malay working class, Mahathir justified his decision 
to ‘hold the NEP in abeyance’ on the basis that it would deliver more jobs when 
they were most needed. 
NEP is not just equity distribution. It is equally important that job 
opportunities are also evenly distributed. In a situation where 
unemployment is rampant it is invidious to protect the interests of 
certain categories of investors at the expense of unemployment 
for workers. We will, therefore, modify the NEP conditions 
regarding equity in order to implement the stipulations regarding 
employment. The government is studying very specific conditions 
so that investors will not be left in any doubt as to when and how 
we are prepared to forgo equity participation in favour of jobs for 
Malaysians (Mahathir, Speech at the Annual Dinner of Financial 
Institutions, 25 August 1986, cited in Khoo 1995:142. 
 
As the defender of Malay interests, UMNO risked a loss of credibility and a poor 
performance electorally had it failed to publicly express support for the Malay 
  192workers suffering under the recession. The continued requirement of foreign 
firms that they meet the NEP ethnic employment quotas, even when other 
aspects of the ICA were modified, indicates the government’s sensitivity towards 
the issue of Malay unemployment.  
 
Acting to offset some of the less favourable economic conditions were legislative 
amendments in March 1985 that extended the coverage of the Employment Act 
to an additional 100,000 lower paid workers (Ministry of Labour 1986:6). At the 
same time maternity leave provisions were enhanced. In 1988, shortcomings in 
the Factories and Machinery Act were acknowledged. The government 
committed itself to the implementation of more comprehensive occupational 
safety and health legislation (Ayadurai 1993:94).
17  
 
Similarly, Malaysia’s civil servants appeared to have been targeted in the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan 1986-1990 which was released in the middle of the economic 
downturn.  
The high level of public investment, particularly during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, imposed considerable strain on the 
financial resources of the Government. Steps will be taken to 
gradually reduce the size and role of the public sector as well as to 
ensure greater consolidation and efficiency in the management of 
Government departments and public enterprises…The 
Government will further enhance the implementation of the 
Malaysia Incorporated concept… (Government of Malaysia 1986, 
Fifth Malaysia Plan, cited in Asnan 1987:94).  
 
However, as discussed above, plans to reduce the size of the civil service through 
privatisation, while slowing the rate of growth of the civil service, did not reduce 
its numbers overall. A wage increase ranging from one per cent to twelve per 
  193cent was granted to civil servants in July 1985, although Jomo (1995:207) points 
out that this was below the percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index.  
 
Repressive state legislation 
The repression of organised labour has been a feature of Malaysian industrial 
relations from the colonial era. The nature of the control exerted has varied over 
time, since Independence being achieved more often through legislative and 
administrative means rather than the physical coercion that was apparent in the 
colonial period (Barraclough 1985). That the repression of union activities is 
governed by legislation is an important legitimating factor. Further, the 
repression of NGOs, unions included, is consistent with the paternalistic 
ideology of the Malaysian government that public debate on sensitive political 
issues threatens the delicate balance of societal wellbeing.  
 
The repressive actions of the state that were directed at organised labour were 
backed in the 1980s by the ideological stance of Look East. This depicted 
politically active unions as a product of confrontational ‘Western-style’ industrial 
relations that threatened economic growth and undermined more harmonious 
Asian-influenced workplace relations. The attempt to ensure the union 
movement did not grow in strength as the industrial workforce increased was 
conducted in the manner least likely to create a politically awkward 
confrontation with the labour force. In this sense, while the promotion of in-
house unions since 1983 was in part an attempt to keep organised labour weak 
(Jomo 1995:230), it was also a strategy that sought to avoid outright 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 This eventually resulted in the passing of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994 and the 
  194confrontation between the Malay dominated government and its working class 
constituency. 
 
Mahathir acted in an increasingly repressive manner towards civil society 
throughout the 1980s. Amendments to the Societies Act, enforced from 1981, 
had provoked widespread protest by the MTUC, NGOs and professional 
organisations (Barraclough 1985:803). In 1984 the Printing Presses and 
Publications Act was implemented which imposed tighter control over media 
freedoms than had existed in the previous legislation of 1971 (Zaharom 
2002:128). In November 1986 the Official Secrets Act was tightened. In 
December 1987 the Printing Presses and Publications Act was again amended 
along with the Police Act (Saravanamuttu 1987:69). In 1989 Mahathir sacked the 
Lord President of the Supreme Court and the Internal Security Act was amended 
to remove the opportunity for judicial review (Wu 1999:134). Although 
encompassing labour activists within its reach, restrictions on freedoms of 
speech were not directed at organised labour particularly. Party political factors 
account for the detention in 1987 of several labour activists along with a hundred 
or so other political figures under the ISA as Mahathir moved to defend himself 
against factionalism within UMNO.  
 
However, the late 1980s appeared increasingly hostile for organised labour, with 
the government supporting the establishment in 1989 of an alternative peak 
union body, the Malaysian Labour Organisation (MLO). The rival organisation 
‘enjoys the blessing of the government…the government’s support for MLO was 
                                                                                                                                                             
establishment of the tripartite National Council for Occupational Safety and Health. 
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Industrial Relations Act, the Trade Unions Act and the Employment Act came 
into effect in February and May of 1989. These effectively withdrew many of the 
improvements to worker entitlements that had been granted in 1980.  
During periods of crisis, it is common for capital and the state to 
attempt to reverse the gains in wages and living standards made 
by labor during an expansionary phase, tipping the balance of 
power in favour of capital. In the process of restructuring, the 
contours of labour control are reworked and remade (Peck 
1996:240).  
 
This delivered increased flexibilities in labour arrangements to employers and 
further concentrated power in the positions of the Directors General of Industrial 
Relations and Trade Unions. Section 15 of the Industrial Relations Act was 
amended in 1988 to protect pioneer status firms in that no collective agreement 
could include demands for conditions better than those laid down in the 
Employment Act. There was, therefore, little reason for employees to join a 
union as it was illegal to make demands greater than those already guaranteed by 
the Employment Act.
18 ‘The 1989 Amendments were clearly meant to lower 
employment costs to enhance labour demand by foreign investors and others, 
both to enhance international competitiveness and to diminish unemployment…’ 
(Lucas and Verry 1999:251; see also Wad and Jomo 1994:216). 
 
Yet for workers generally, the late 1980s marked a turnaround from recession 
(Khoo 1997:70) while tightening labour market conditions helped to shift wages 
upwards (Rasiah 1995:85, see Table 4.10 below). The market, rather than 
legislation, has been the most important factor in shaping wages in the private 
sector in Malaysia. Very little labour-related legislation deals directly with 
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covered by any employment legislation that relates to conditions of service.  
 
Table 4.10 Average annual wages growth, 1981-91, manufacturing 
Nominal Real   
Textiles  5.2 2.4 
Garment 8.4  5.5 
Electric/electronic 5.9  3.1 
Manufacturing 5.9  3.0 
Source: Rasiah 1995:85, table 8. Note: Real wages obtained by deflating nominal wages with 
consumer price index, (1980=100). 
 
Apart from rising wages, real improvements in levels of education and health 
were recorded by the close of the decade (Government of Malaysia 2000:138) 
and according to the World Bank’s research, income inequality in Malaysia 
narrowed (World Bank 2000b). A range of other policies implemented by 
Mahathir’s government throughout the 1980s also impacted on household 
incomes and consumption options. In 1981 the unit trust fund Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad ( PNB) was established as an investment opportunity for 
Bumiputera, and, in 1983, the Islamic banking system was established. In 1982, 
with Mahathir’s commitment to HICOM, production of Malaysia’s ‘national 
car’, the Proton, commenced. This provided secure industrial-sector employment 
to a predominantly Malay workforce. Protons were made available to the public 
on finance schemes that charged very low rates of interest. Car ownership was 
made even more attractive by the government’s commitment to subsidising the 
pump price of fuel.  
 
While the annual rate of inflation in the early 1980s had climbed as high as 9.7 
per cent, by the mid 1980s it was under control at below one per cent and 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 The ILO considers this amendment a violation of ILO Convention No. 98. 
  197remained fairly stable (from two to three per cent) even as the economy 
recovered from recession (Ragayah et al. 2002:9). In 1986, as part of the move to 
encourage home ownership amongst low and middle income earners particularly, 
the National Mortgage Corporation (CAGAMAS) was established which offered 
housing loans at low interest rates. Funding for these projects was largely 
sourced domestically through the EPF (Government of Malaysia 1981:131-132). 
Despite this, throughout the 1980s, the EPF returned a dividend of eight per cent 
or more to its members, above the rate of inflation (Asher 2000).
19
 
By 1990, with the assistance of favourable economic conditions internationally, 
and with most of his political opponents successfully marginalised or co-opted, 
Mahathir was more firmly entrenched in the positions of Prime Minister and 
UMNO President. His enhanced security was reflected in the number of broad 
announcements made in 1991, including Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020), 
Mahathir’s all encompassing plan to modernise Malaysia by 2020. As a result of 
the 1990 election,  
…the Barisan Nasional was back in power, UMNO was 
dominant, and Mahathir was in charge… The critical year of 1990 
having ended in twin economic and political triumphs for 
Mahathir, Mahathirism could now and truly look ‘beyond 1990’ 
(Khoo 1995:327). 
 
However, in contrast to Ramesh (2000:154) who concluded that the political elite 
was able to ‘maintain an overwhelming dominance over the political system and 
devise policies relatively unencumbered by popular pressures’, the 1990s in fact 
presented Mahathir with new challenges in balancing conflicting political and 
economic goals. By the close of the decade, close to full employment was 
                                                           
19 Asher (2000) provides details of how EPF funds are invested and the rate of return. 
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FDI and maintaining competitive wage rates would continue to clash with the 
need to meet the aspirations of the urban middle classes and the growing 
importance of private consumption to government revenues.  
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Introduction 
The social engineering integral to Malaysia’s economic transformation had 
significantly enlarged the tertiary educated, urbanised, white collar, middle and 
upper income stratum of Malay society (Rahman Embong 2001). According to 
Crouch (1993:142 cited in Searle 1999:46), the proportion of Malay workers in 
‘middle class occupations’ increased from approximately 13 to 27 per cent 
between 1970 and 1990. Their material success was not only symbolically 
important to the Malay-based ruling party, it was also increasingly important 
economically.  
 
Yet the political and cultural aspirations of the new middle and upper income 
Malay population was difficult for the ruling party to discern and target, given 
the muted voice of civil society and the increasingly diverse range of occupations 
and industries in which urbanised Malays were now able to participate alongside 
ethnic Chinese and Indians in similar class locations. The integration of Malays 
into the multiethnic white collar and professional labour force therefore created 
new challenges in the control of labour by a ruling elite that had, as yet, to 
develop a consistent position on issues of national as opposed to ethnic identity 
(Nair 1999:93). Mahathir’s ‘Vision 2020’ speech, delivered to the Malaysian 
Business Council in early 1991, is discussed in the following section in terms of 
the appeal it presented to those educated and skilled workers most likely to 
participate in, and benefit from, Malaysia’s push towards becoming a fully 
industrialised economy. 
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Malaysia’s rural working class had also benefited economically during the 
previous two decades, but clearly had gained less than those able to take 
advantage of employment and education in the industrialising urban regions. The 
earnings gap between urban and rural dwellers, and between skilled and 
unskilled workers, widened in the 1990s, in contrast to the earlier improvement 
experienced from the 1970s until the mid 1980s (Fields and Soares 2002:1). 
While Look East and HICOM were policies in the early 1980s that clearly 
offered employment opportunities for less skilled workers, the appeal of Vision 
2020 appeared limited for this group.  
 
Less skilled workers instead found themselves increasingly subject to the 
vagaries of labour market and commodity market fluctuations as well as facing 
direct competition from foreign workers as labour migration arrangements were 
liberalised from the early 1990s (Edwards 1997:32-33). The government’s 
continuing refusal to impose a national minimum wage delivered considerable 
wage flexibility to employers. While the labour shortage situation delivered 
wages growth for many Malaysian workers regardless of the state’s efforts 
otherwise, during economic fluctuations, the lack of income security and welfare 
provisions impacted most heavily on less skilled and rural based Malaysian and 
foreign workers. 
 
This outcome contrasts with policies contained within the Sixth and Seventh 
Malaysia Plans (Government of Malaysia 1991; Government of Malaysia 1996), 
each of which highlighted the importance of upgrading the labour force in order 
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value-added manufacturing. From the mid 1990s, with the announcement of 
plans to transform Malaysia into a knowledge based economy (KBE),
1 and with 
the commencement of construction of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), the 
contradictions between existing labour arrangements and the visions for 
Malaysia’s future economy and workforce become even more stark. This 
resulted in a number of institutional mismatches and inconsistencies in policy, 
many of which remained unresolved by the close of the decade.  
 
Class and ethnicity in Mahathir’s Vision 2020 
With the official demise of the NEP in 1990, a new statement to inform 
Malaysians of their leader’s intentions regarding future social and economic 
direction came in the form of the ‘Vision 2020’
2 speech delivered by Mahathir to 
the Malaysian Business Council (MBC) in February 1991 (Shamsul 1992:11). It 
was a lengthy speech to an elite business audience. It attracted widespread media 
attention and made clear Mahathir’s goal of moving Malaysia to developed 
country status by the year 2020. There were obvious impediments to this 
transition, not the least of which was the structure of the labour force. 
Addressing this was therefore one focus of Vision 2020.  
In our drive to move vigorously ahead nothing is more important 
than the development of human resources…the most important 
resource of any nation must be the talents, skills, creativity and 
will of its people…Our people is our ultimate resource…Malaysia 
must give the fullest emphasis possible to the development of this 
ultimate resource… (Mahathir 1991:9-10, excerpts from The 
Vision 2020 speech). 
                                                           
1 The knowledge based economy is commonly referred to within Malaysia as the ‘k-economy’. 
2 Mahathir’s speech was officially entitled ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’ but the Malaysian press 
picked up on the term Vision 2020 and it has since remained in popular use. Mahathir has 
himself adopted the phrase, commenting that the term has positive connotations in English, 
Bahasa Melayu and Mandarin (1999:43). 
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In terms of substance, Khoo (1995:327-331) noted that much of the speech was a 
reiteration of policies and values adopted by Mahathir since the mid 1980s’ 
recession. Gomez and Jomo (1999) largely agreed, although they, along with 
Khoo (1995:331), understood the mention by Mahathir of the need to create a 
Bangsa (united) Malaysia as a new attempt to invite the ethnic Chinese business 
community into a partnership with the predominantly Malay government and 
bureaucracy, a partnership that was now considered necessary in the face of 
international economic pressures.  
 
However, Mahathir’s appeal for a Bangsa Malaysia was not only a pragmatic 
response to the fact of continuing Chinese dominance of the Malaysian economy. 
It was also a response to major societal changes that saw the growth of a multi 
ethnic middle income stratum of society with whom a new means of engagement 
was required. State-labour relations had, since the early 1970s, been largely 
negotiated around ethnic communal concerns, but with the increasing move of 
Malays into middle income and white collar occupations in urban locations, 
Malaysia’s middle income group was becoming increasingly multi-ethnic. 
Economic growth had increased the percentage of professionals, managers and 
other middle to high income white collar workers to whom the government now 
attempted to appeal on the basis of their economic interests rather than ethnic 
identity.  
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Melayu Baru, the ‘new Malay’,
3 and the middle income urban Chinese whose 
political support was becoming increasingly important to the ruling coalition. 
However, too obvious courting of the Chinese population would have been 
politically risky for the Prime Minister.  
 
Table 5.1 Employment by occupation and ethnicity (per cent) 
    Bumiputera        Chinese       Indian 
Occupation  1970 1995 1970 1995 1970 1995 
Professional & 
technical 
4.3 16.7  5.2 11.0  4.9 11.4 
Administrative & 
managerial 
0.5 1.8 1.8 4.8 0.8 1.6 
Clerical 3.0  10.5  6.3  11.2  8.1  9.0 
Sales  4.7  7.4  15.3 18.9 9.5  8.5 
Service  workers 6.8 13.1  8.6 9.1 10.9  12.5 
Agricultural  workers  62.3 24.1 21.1 8.7  41.0 18.3 
Production  workers  18.0 26.3 41.6 36.3 24.7 38.5 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971:59; Government of Malaysia 1996:82-83. 
 
Table 5.2 Registered professionals by ethnic group (per cent) 
Year Bumiputera  Chinese  Indian  Others 
1970 4.9  61.0  23.3  10.8 
1975 6.7  64.1  22.1  7.1 
1980 14.9  63.5  17.4  4.2 
1985 22.2  61.2  13.9  2.7 
1990 29.0  55.9  13.2  1.9 
1995 33.1  52.4  12.9  1.6 
Source; Jomo 1999:137, table 6.5. There are slight definitional differences between years.  
 
Instead, as described by Williamson (2002), Bangsa Malaysia reduced the focus 
on communal identity by attempting to develop an ‘economic’ nationalism, 
describing a Malaysian society and economy in which dedication to a career or a 
                                                           
3 The new Malay is understood as a middle to upper income, tertiary educated, urbanised first 
generation product of the NEP. Rahman Embong (1996; 1999; 2001) provides an in-depth 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. See also Kahn (1996) and Saravanamuttu (2001). 
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lifestyle and guarantee Malaysia’s future.  
By the year 2020, Malaysia can be a united nation, with a 
confident Malaysian society, infused by strong moral and ethical 
values, living in a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, 
caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and 
prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is 
competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient (Mahathir 1991, 
excerpt from Vision 2020 speech). 
 
Bangsa Malaysia as described in the Vision 2020 speech invites the participation 
of the growing section of the population whose cooperation was necessary in 
achieving the transition to a modern successful Malaysia; the educated, urbanised 
middle income white collar and technically skilled professionals of all ethnic 
groups. As understood by Gomez and Jomo (1999:169),  
the policy envisaged a more competitive, market-disciplined, 
outward-looking, dynamic, self-reliant, resilient, diversified, 
adaptive, technologically proficient and entrepreneurial economy 
with strong industrial links, productive and knowledgeable human 
resources, low inflation, exemplary work ethnics and strong 
emphasis on quality and excellence. 
 
Bangsa Malaysia can therefore also be seen as reassuring to those in the business 
sector who felt the labour force was sheltered and required to be productive. In a 
Bangsa Malaysia, workers would be recruited and remunerated on the basis of 
individual merit and productivity.  
 
At the same time, Vision 2020 attempted to reinforce the argument that special 
assistance to Bumiputera was no longer necessary. This was because ‘the welfare 
of the people will revolve not around the state or the individual but around a 
strong and resilient family’ (Mahathir 1991, Vision 2020 speech).  
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‘establishing a fully caring society and a caring culture’ (Mahathir 1991, Vision 
2020 speech) did not require greater public spending on ‘welfare’. This remained 
insignificant at less than one per cent of overall spending. A reduction of 
government support to low income earners was signalled in the National 
Development Plan 1990-2000 (NDP) that replaced the NEP and in the Sixth 
Malaysia Plan 1991-1995 (Government of Malaysia 1991) released soon after 
the Vision 2020 speech. Each forecast a reduced social welfare commitment by 
the state with increased emphasis placed on individual and family responsibility. 
Along similar lines, Henderson et al. (2002:11-12) identified within the NDP an 
increased emphasis on economic growth as the means of addressing poverty, 
especially for the hard core poor who were given increased access to micro 
finance in order to work themselves out of poverty. For example, in 1992, 
Bumiputera identified as ‘hard core poor’ were offered interest free loans of 
RM5,000 to be used for the purchase of unit shares in government-controlled 
Amanah Saham Bumiputera. According to the EPU (2004a:27), this initiative 
was not only  
…another means towards increasing their income. More than that, 
their participation in the scheme gave them a sense of being part 
of the development of the modern sector of the economy even 
though they were poor. 
 
As explained by the Minister of National Unity and Social Development, the 
National Welfare Policy released in 1990 is based on the belief that ‘…the 
strengthening of the family institution is vital towards contributing to and 
producing responsible citizens to face the challenges arising from rapid 
economic development…’ (Siti Zahara 2000:3). Families are encouraged to care 
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“missing link” in South East Asian welfare regimes.  
Table 5.3 Government development spending and allocations,  
social welfare, 1985-2000 (per cent of total allocations) 
 1985-1990  1990-1995  1996-2000 
Education and training  13.9  13.4  19.9 
Health 1.8  4.4  3.8 
Housing 4.9  3.3  3.4 
Local authorities and 
welfare services 
 
1.3 1.6 
Village and community 
development 
1.8 
1.0 1.3 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1996:177; Government of Malaysia 2001:164; Government of 
Malaysia 2006:529. Doling and Omar 2002:38 for 1985-1990. For 1990-2005, data refers to 
actual expenditure. Data for 2006-2010 is allocated expenditure and excludes expected private 
sector commitments. 
 
Despite this, the data in Table 5.3 do not reflect a serious shift away from social 
welfare spending. As was discussed in Chapter One, spending allocated to 
‘welfare’ does not capture the majority of spending allocated to poverty 
alleviation in Malaysia. Nor does it capture the full range of policies having an 
impact on household income and purchasing power. The federal government, 
while rejecting the direct provision of ‘welfare’, nonetheless remained active in 
the control of prices and interest rates, and in the delivery of subsidised goods 
and services.  
 
In yet another example of the ‘paradoxes of Mahathirism’ (Khoo 1995), the 
Prime Minister sought to reassure his Malay constituency that their wellbeing 
was central to that of the nation.  
…in the development of human resources we cannot afford to 
neglect half the population…the Bumiputeras…No nation can 
achieve full progress with only half its human resources harnessed 
(Mahathir 1991:9-10, excerpts from The Vision 2020 speech). 
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the primacy of Malay cultural and economic status remained salient and could 
not be overlooked by political elites still unsure about the relative merits and 
appeal of national identity and ethnic identity: 
…while the state had dealt with ethnic divisions by managing a 
compromise on the national question, an exclusionary discourse 
of “race” and ethnicity has emerged alongside a more inclusive 
discourse of nationalism. Both continue to be propagated by the 
state. Consequently, we find that official nationalist thought in 
post-colonial Malaysia reflects deep ambiguities and 
uncertainties… (Nair 1999:93).  
 
The withdrawal of concessions for Malays therefore had to be negotiated in a 
graduated fashion. By placing the arrival of Bangsa Malaysia in a future where 
economic prosperity for all had been achieved, the ruling elite attempted to 
mollify any immediate negative reaction to the withdrawal of affirmative action 
for Malays. In the meantime however, government ministers selectively retained 
the practice of justifying government interventions in society and the economy as 
necessary to the support of Malays so that they could attain equal status with 
other Malaysians. Bangsa Malaysia therefore managed to retain crucial elements 
of ethnicity even while it heralded a future in which ethnicity would not be a 
determining factor. ‘The creation of a people known as the Malaysian 
nation…would require a definite time frame and societal engineering’ (Ghazali 
Shafie 1995, Business Times 19 August, cited in Williamson 2002:411). 
 
Given the segmented nature of the labour force, the implications of Vision 2020 
for labour and society were varied. While Mahathir appeared to emphasise the 
importance of modernising the entire labour force and delivering benefits to all 
workers, employment and training opportunities were focused on those whose 
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industrial advance, and to select sectors of the Malay workforce, particularly the 
growing numbers of unemployed Malay graduates. Despite the rhetoric in Vision 
2020 about the move towards a ‘mature consensual, community-oriented 
Malaysian democracy that can be a model for many developing countries’ 
(Mahathir 1991, Vision 2020 speech), few concessions were made in the first 
half of the decade to accommodate the trade union movement. ‘Mahathir’s 
difficulty in incorporating labor into his vision of Malaysia points to the limited 
space for poor Malaysians…’ (Williamson 2002:410). Not until the aftermath of 
the recession in 1997/98 when Mahathir’s political position was threatened by 
Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister popular with many unionists and 
other pro-labour NGOs (Rowley and Bhopal 2005), were moves made to 
incorporate the organised labour movement.  
 
Controlling the civil service: The state as employer 
The active recruitment of Malays into the civil service provided an important 
vehicle through which the ruling party sought to contain and utilise the political, 
cultural and economic aspirations of Malays (Rajah and Ishak 2001). Given the 
civil service constituted almost 13 per cent of the entire domestic labour force in 
1990, its effective régulation became integral to achieving a range of economic, 
cultural and political goals for the state. Firstly, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
the expansion of the civil service assisted to deliver the NEP targets of 
improving the socio-economic status of Malays and the promotion of particular 
aspects of Malay culture. Secondly, by controlling the terms and conditions of 
employment of civil servants, it became increasingly possible for the government 
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economic objectives, boosting demand for domestic goods and services, such as 
real estate, housing, cars and tourism during periods of economic downturn. 
Thirdly, in return for a broad range of financial perks and a high level of 
employment security,
4 civil servants were expected to be loyal to the 
government
5 (Lim 2002; RIAP 2001:118) and failing that, were anyhow 
prevented by the terms of their employment from making critical public 
comment against the government.  
 
Given an ethnically divided civil society lacking effective public interest groups 
able to exert a checking role over the civil service (Lim 2002:177),
6 the 
disciplining and control of public servants was largely the responsibility of the 
ministerial executive branch, particularly the Prime Minister who chaired the 
Cabinet Committee on Public Sector Employees' Salaries and Posts. 
Administratively, the Public Service Department has responsibility for 
recruitment and overseeing conditions of service including disciplinary 
procedures against civil servants. Being placed in the role of employer, however, 
generated a number of conflicts and tensions for Mahathir and the Cabinet. This 
section of the chapter examines the criticisms made of the public sector and the 
responses of the government to them. As the section concludes, the failure on the 
part of the executive to effectively control the civil service was not due to the 
bureaucracy wielding more power than the political executive. Rather, the 
                                                           
4 Ramesh and Asher (2000:50) describe the retirement scheme for civil servants as ‘highly 
generous…compared to what is available to workers in the private sector’. 
5 Lim (2002:189, citing Crouch 1996:62-62) notes that large numbers of lower level Malay civil 
servants, particularly in the rural areas, have been mobilised on behalf of UMNO during periods 
of political campaigning. 
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were flawed by inconsistencies that could be attributed to the complex political, 
financial and socio-cultural pressures that constrained and divided political 
leaders.  
 
Contradictions in the régulation of the civil service 
The first point to be clarified is the nature of the problem. As Lim demonstrates 
(2002:171-172), this was not a situation whereby the political executive was 
unable to determine policy due to the presence of a powerful bureaucracy. 
Rather, the problem Mahathir faced was that of being unable to guarantee that 
the civil service would, at all levels, implement his policies. For example, noted 
in the previous chapter was the largely failed attempt of the Malaysia Inc. policy 
to improve relations between the Malay civil service and the predominantly 
ethnic Chinese private sector. Industry lobby groups remained critical of the 
attitude of civil servants.
7 Also relevant here were the criticisms made by the 
World Bank (1995, 1997) and Mazumdar (1991) of the public sector higher 
education and industrial training sectors, the poor performance of which 
contributed to the structural problems evident in the labour force from the mid 
1980s. While Lim (2002:172) partially attributes the uncooperative nature of the 
civil service to ‘slackness and incompetence’, research by Biddle and Milor 
(1999) suggested that many civil servants held values that had their origins in the 
NEP era, an era in which civil servants were actively and heavily involved in 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 ‘…politics, however imperfect, is one of the main channels through which the mistakes of the 
state bureaucracy can be detected and corrected’ (Chang 1998:74). 
7  For example, Abdul (1987:105) who represented the Malaysian Employers’ Federation at a 
tripartite conference on privatization, held in Bangkok by the ILO. 
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8 These values were now 
inhibiting their full cooperation with more recent policies introduced by 
Mahathir that appeared to challenge the goals of the NEP. It is no coincidence 
that two of the underperforming ministries, the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Human Resources, had each played important roles in delivering 
NEP objectives.  
 
Lim (2002) also examines another causal factor in the underperformance of the 
civil service and the inability to bring about reform; the lack of transparency that 
characterises the relationship between civil society and the operations of 
government. The constraints on political activism in Malaysian society, of 
themselves a tool of control over labour, have resulted in a lack of organisations 
or interest groups able to play a critical role in forcing the civil service to meet 
the goals laid out for it by government policy.  
Table 5.4 Civil service employment, 1990-2000 
Size and percentage of the labour force  net job creation 
1990 1995  2000
a 6MP 7MP 
‘000 %  ‘000 %  ‘000 %  ‘000  %  ‘000  % 
850.0 12.7  872.2 11.0  894.2 9.9  22.2 1.8  22.0 1.9 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1996:110, table 4-2. 
a Forecast. 
9
 
The second aspect of the problem relates to the relatively large size of the civil 
service and the cost and nature of benefits delivered to civil servants. By 1995, 
civil servants (including state and Federal levels of government) comprised over 
eleven per cent of the labour force, more than double the regional average 
(Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997:27; Yeoh 2002).  
                                                           
8 Earlier research by Esman (1972, chapter 4) found similar results, whereby civil servants felt it 
was their responsibility to actively assist and support the Malay peasantry. 
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Employer groups questioned the generous nature of the public sector pension 
scheme
10 and in the 1980s had welcomed Mahathir’s push towards privatisation 
in the hope of reducing this burden (Abdul 1987:105). However, Ramesh and 
Mukul (2000:50) note that the number of retired civil servants in receipt of a 
pension had increased from 107,490 in 1981 to almost 295,000 by the mid 
1990s. In the early 1990s the payment of pensions amounted to almost RM two 
billion annually,
11 all of which was funded by the government. Unlike private 
sector employees, civil servants were not required to make personal contributions 
to the scheme. The government defended the level of benefits, arguing they were 
necessary to retaining quality staff, and that the loyalty of civil servants should 
be rewarded (Public Service Department Malaysia, n.d.). Other benefits available 
to civil servants include low interest loans for housing, computers and education, 
and a range of medical, housing and educational benefits for family members.  
 
The yearly bonus, usually a month’s salary or a minimum of RM1,000 for lower 
paid civil servants, has provided the Prime Minister with a means of chastising or 
rewarding the civil service. In the annual build up to the Budget, CUEPACS 
attempts to presents its case for the bonus through the media, to which the Prime 
Minister often responds with reflections on the state of the economy. ‘They 
(CUEPACS) can ask, we can only give what we can afford’ (NST Sunday 4 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The forecast figure of 894,200 in fact turned out to be an underestimate as later figures 
(Government of Malaysia 2001:620) indicate 911,000 civil servants were actually employed by 
2000. 
10 Unlike the Employees’ Provident Fund covering eligible private sector workers, the pension 
scheme for civil servants was non-contributory. Their entire pension benefit was drawn from 
government funds. 
11 This was over RM4 billion by 2000 (World Bank 2000:12 citing Bank Negara Malaysia data). 
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12 Bonuses are sometimes reduced to a half month and sometimes 
postponed.
13 The political leverage Mahathir attempted to exercise through his 
control over these optional payments is discussed in more detail below in the 
context of his attempt to regain popularity and credibility in the wake of the 
political turmoil that led to the sacking and arrest of popular former Finance 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. It is an incident 
that highlights the political and communal sensitivities that impact on levels of 
remuneration and yet constrain the state in exerting control over labour. 
 
From the early 1990s Mahathir introduced a flurry of measures designed to 
address the criticisms made of the civil service. Some measures involved a 
reworking of previous attempts at control, such as the formalisation of the 
Malaysia Inc. Policy in 1991. Others aimed to achieve an attitudinal shift 
amongst civil servants, being related to productivity and the importance of 
developing a ‘client focus’. The entire remuneration, appraisal and promotion 
system was restructured in 1992, new disciplinary measures were introduced and 
the shift towards privatisation intensified with the stated goal of reducing the size 
of the civil service. Later in the decade, further anti-corruption legislation was 
enacted. Each of these strategies invoked a mixture of controls; legislative, 
financial and ideological, combining punishments, inducements and concessions.  
 
                                                           
12 “The money spent by civil servants will boost economic growth”. Siva Subramaniam October 
5 2000, media release available http://www.cuepacs.org/nyata04.htm. 
“We hope the bonus for civil servants will not be left out this year because it’s important for civil 
servants to prepare for their children’s schooling”, CUEPACS’ Secretary General Abdul Rahman 
Manan quoted in NST 3.3.2002. 
13 For example in the 2002 budget a half month’s bonus was granted. 
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these did not constitute the same manner of attack on the civil service. 
Ultimately, civil servants remained sheltered from the economic conditions 
shaping private sector employment. More successful was the reinforcing of 
political constraints on civil servants, as will be seen in the discussion of each 
strategy that follows.  
 
Malaysia Inc.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, Malaysia Inc. was a largely unsuccessful 
attempt by Mahathir in the early 1980s to ‘improve’ the attitude of the civil 
service towards the private sector. Later research demonstrated that many civil 
servants felt it was consistent with the advancement of Malay interests to adopt a 
critical view of the Chinese-dominated private sector (Biddle and Milor 1999). 
The implementation of Malaysia Inc. had therefore been limited.
14 In 1991 a 
further attempt to improve the interactions between the private and public sectors 
was made. The Chief Secretary to the Government issued a Development 
Administration Circular (No. 9/1991) entitled ‘Guidelines on the Implementation 
of the Malaysia Incorporated Policy’ (MAMPU 1991) in which the civil service 
was reminded that it was ‘… crucial that the public sector ensures the success of 
the private sector’ (MAMPU 1991:1).  
 
One of the key recommendations of Malaysia Inc. was the creation of avenues 
and forums that increased the access of private sector and industry lobby groups 
to senior bureaucrats and Ministers. For example, each Ministry was to hold an 
                                                           
14 Specific reasons for the failure to successfully implement Malaysia Inc. in the 1980s were 
provided in the previous chapter. 
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most enduring and high profile of these is the Annual Dialogue with the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in preparation for which the major 
industry groups offer written submissions. Another important development was 
the creation of the Malaysian Business Council (MBC) in 1991 as a peak body 
that delivered direct access to senior level bureaucrats, deputy Ministers and 
Ministers for Malaysia’s business elite.  
 
These high level forums bypassed rather than reformed the middle levels of the 
civil service and were, to an extent, an indication of the inability to bring the civil 
service effectively under control. The unwillingness to risk more widespread or 
punitive action against the civil service in turn contributed to outcomes that have 
created further contradictions for the government. For example, commentators 
noted a shift of power away from the civil service towards individual politicians 
and their personal business contacts, and the subsequent politicisation of senior 
appointments to government institutions (Leigh 1992:120; Searle 1999:47).  
 
The inability to reform the civil service has restricted the ability of the state to 
engage with small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs), many of which have 
remained distant from the civil service, preferring to operate in the informal 
sector rather than engage with a Malay-dominated civil service that was 
perceived as biased against the Chinese dominated business sector.  
…it has been the practice of the Chinese community to 
avoid…working with the Government…This hands-off attitude is 
a relic of Colonial times, but probably became even more 
entrenched during the New Economic Policy era (Wong 1997:15).  
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government’s ability to address the continued reluctance of SMEs to invest more 
heavily in skills training (Ritchie 2005:752).  
 
New Remuneration System (NRS) and disciplinary measures 
After an unusually acrimonious campaign by CUEPACS for wage increases in 
the mid 1980s, the government commissioned a study by the Special Committee 
on Public Sector Salaries in 1991 that resulted in the NRS, introduced in January 
1992. The existing 574 job classifications were reduced to 274 (UNDP/MDGD 
1998:24). Besides restructuring job classifications and establishing a separate 
remuneration scheme for statutory authorities, the NRS linked wage increments 
to individual performance through the Performance Appraisal System. 
Increments had formerly been granted automatically each year. The new scheme 
was therefore not well received by civil servants or their union, CUEPACS, 
which argued that under the NRS, only five per cent of civil servants would be 
entitled to receive pay increments or promotions.  
 
According to Jomo and Todd (1994:157), the flexibility in determining wage 
increments allowed for greater sycophancy in the supervisor-subordinate 
relationship, rather than guaranteeing improved productivity. Political party 
Gerakan  (2002) claimed the NRS had encouraged ‘gosok kasut’
15 whereby 
employees felt they had to win favour with their departmental heads in order to 
gain salary increments and promotions. In this way, the NRS has been 
understood as a means of controlling individual behaviour rather than being an 
                                                           
15 Translates roughly to ‘apple polishing’.  
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then CUEPACS’ Secretary General, told the media the ‘system was open to 
abuse…the salary adjustment panel has been the judge, jury and executioner of 
the civil servants’ performances’ (NST 31 July 2002). A decade later the NRS 
was still the subject of dissatisfaction and debate, being replaced in November 
2002 by the SSM (Sistem Saraan Malaysia or Malaysian Remuneration System). 
 
The Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations of 1993 aimed to 
increase the level of control over civil servants by broadening the range of 
offences for which a civil servant could be disciplined (UNDP/MDGD 1998:26-
27).
16 Punishments ranged from termination and criminal prosecution, to 
suspension, salary reduction, demotion or warnings. While dismissals from the 
civil service are, according to Siva, ‘almost unheard of’ (interview 2001), a small 
percentage of civil servants have been dismissed over time. The Research 
Institute for Asia and the Pacific (2001:130) reported that between 1977 and 
1997, approximately 5,000 public officers were arrested after investigation by 
the Anti-Corruption Commission. This figure includes all public officers 
including politicians. The Chief Secretary to the Government, while addressing a 
public service seminar, stated that 5,015 civil servants had faced disciplinary 
action in 2000 and a further 4,531 were disciplined in 2001. However, the 
Chairman of the Public Services Commission criticised the leniency of 
punishments handed out, citing a case where a probationary staff member had 
received a pay cut and a warning after a year’s unapproved absence from work 
(NST 28 June 2002). In 1997 the Anti-Corruption Act was introduced, which 
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corrupt practices of other civil servants, thus broadening the range of offences for 
which a civil servant could be charged. It effectively placed civil servants in a 
surveillance role over their colleagues. 
 
Privatisation and corporatisation 
Privatisation of government owned agencies, although an official policy from the 
early 1980s, only began to be seriously implemented following the mid 1980s 
recession and was formalised in 1991 with the Privatisation Master Plan. The 
neo-liberal principles of small government and the assumption of greater 
efficiencies to be gained in a market environment have driven the privatisation of 
public agencies in Europe, North America, Australia and elsewhere. In Malaysia, 
however, the stated motivations for privatisation, and the actual processes by 
which privatisations have been undertaken, are driven by a complex mixture of 
social and political concerns that in many cases have resulted in a continuation of 
political control over the privatised entity. It is therefore important to place the 
political and labour implications of privatisation and liberalisation in a specific 
historical and geopolitical context (Jayasuriya and Rosser 2001:251).
17 ‘While 
not denying the importance of global forces, it is suggested that national 
institutions and values have shaped the form and pattern of privatisation [in 
Malaysia]’ (Tull and Reveley 2001:14).  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 This legislation was later used as a basis to enforce the signing by civil servants of the ‘letter of 
undertaking’, more commonly referred to as the ‘oath of loyalty’ or aku janji (I promise), 
introduced by the government in 2002 and 2003 (OECD n.d.:2). This is discussed in Chapter Six. 
17 ‘…privatisation resulted in a shift of ownership from the public to the private sector, but 
control over the newly privatised assets was still dependent on links to the dominant political 
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as a means of reducing the costs of civil service wages and pensions, but it has 
not significantly reduced the size of the civil service. While significant monetary 
savings have been claimed by the Malaysian Government as a result of the 
privatisation of 474 projects (DFAT 2005:12), this has only acted to slow the rate 
of growth of the civil service, not to reduce the absolute numbers. Since the onset 
of privatisation in the 1980s, an estimated 111,000 jobs have been transferred 
away from the public sector (EPU 2004, cited in DFAT 2005:12). Meanwhile, 
the civil service has continued to increase in size although its proportion of the 
domestic labour force has reduced from almost 13 per cent in 1990 to 
approximately 10 per cent in 2000 (see Table 5.4) As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the opportunities for cost savings are limited as the process of 
privatisation includes guarantees that pro-Malay employment policies must be 
adopted by the privatised entity, and staff being transferred must retain their 
previous level of entitlements.
18  
 
Engaging civil society in the role of controlling civil servants 
From 1987, MAMPU, under the direction of Mahathir, established a Productivity 
and Quality Management Division (UNDP/MDGD 1998:23). A series of 
modernising reforms was initiated resulting in the release of numerous 
Administrative Circulars including, for example, Guidelines on Productivity 
Improvement in the Public Service (No. 6 of 1991), Guide on Total Quality 
                                                                                                                                                             
party…In short…ownership of key strategic enterprises shifted from state to party’ (Jayasuriya 
and Rosser 2001:250-251). 
18 The privatisation of strategic government agencies providing water, electricity and 
telecommunications, have certainly raised concerns in Malaysia but given the relative weakness 
of the union movement, public activism has been more focused on the consumer aspect rather 
than the employment issue. 
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Service Awards (No. 2 of 1993), all of which sought to build on the ‘Excellent 
Work Culture’ incentives of the previous decade. Monetary rewards were offered 
to civil servants who developed initiatives that improved productivity. More than 
500 individuals received prizes in the first 18 months of the scheme operating. 
By 1994, the Chief Secretary, Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid (cited in 
Commonwealth of Australia 1995:84), claimed a ‘shift in paradigm’ had been 
achieved amongst civil servants, a claim that would be somewhat undermined by 
compliance failures later in the decade.  
 
Of interest here is the widespread publicity given to each of these 
announcements (Lim 2002:194) which contrasted with the usual lack of 
transparency that characterises state-society relations. The state has strictly 
circumscribed the extent to which people are able to be politically active. 
According to Mahathir (1995:8 cited in Oehlers 2000:208), ‘…once a 
government has been elected…it should be allowed to govern…’. One result of 
this is the reduced ability of the Malaysian public to exert discipline over the 
civil service. The political repression of Malaysian society had therefore 
contributed to yet another contradiction within the state-labour nexus: in 
repressing civil society, the government was less able to discipline the civil 
service. 
 
The government then invited the public to scrutinise the performance of 
individual civil servants. From the early 1990s, the Public Complaints Bureau 
was given extra prominence with members of the public urged to lodge 
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From mid 1993, each government agency was required to develop a Client 
Charter (Abdullah 1997:72). According to Muhammad (1995:8), the introduction 
of this innovation reflects ‘the commitment of the Government to ensure that 
agencies are customer-focused’.  
 
This extra surveillance of the civil service by the public was not meant to 
encourage more widespread political activism. Rather, members of the public 
were to consider themselves as clients or consumers, and to make their complaint 
on the basis of having received poor service. So, by invoking the image of 
citizens as ‘clients’, the extra scrutiny of the civil service by the public becomes 
a part of the government’s emphasis on the rights of the client or consumer.  
 
Despite the high profile rhetoric though, the role of the ‘client’ in disciplining the 
civil service was still in a nascent stage. In 2000, the Chief Secretary to the 
Government reported to the media that twenty per cent of agencies had yet to 
develop a client charter while those that had often did not put them into practice 
(NST 14 August 2000 cited by Lim 2002:194).  
 
Constraints in the régulation of the civil service 
Despite undertaking a program of privatisations, the government did not put in 
place structural reforms to the civil service that would have resulted in job losses. 
The rate of growth of the civil service was reduced, but the number of civil 
servants has continued to increase each year. In earlier decades, political and 
communal sensitivities presented the greatest constraints to reforming the 
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guarantee that the private sector is willing to employ the Malay-speaking 
graduates of Malaysia’s public university system. Another factor has arisen that 
makes the continued defence of public servants’ conditions worthwhile. 
Increasingly, civil servants have come to constitute a sizeable pool of 
consumption power that political leaders have sought to utilise.  
 
By the early to mid 1990s, wages to public servants comprised almost eight per 
cent of GDP (Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997:41). The present and retirement income 
of civil servants has been usefully targeted by the government in several ways. 
As discussed above, private consumption by civil servants has been used in 
counter cyclical budget initiatives, and to support domestic automotive 
manufacturing. In 1991, the government introduced the Pensions Trust Fund Act. 
This not only provides social security for approximately 300,000 retired or 
disabled former civil servants and their dependents, it has also created a pool of 
funds, the PTF, that is now available to fund policy objectives. Investments by 
the fund are overseen by an Investment Panel headed by the Minister of Finance. 
In the decade since its establishment, the total resources of the PTF have grown 
from an initial start up of RM500 million to just over RM15 billion (MOF 
2000:137). ‘It appears that the domestic provident and pensions funds, such as 
the EPF and PTF, along with cash-rich and profitable state firms such as the 
national oil company Petronas, are to be used as major funding sources’ (Asher 
2000:9).  
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in the attempted shift towards a knowledge based economy. From the mid 1990s, 
with the announcement of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), the 
government commenced a monumental construction undertaking that has 
resulted in the relocation of government departments from Kuala Lumpur to the 
new administrative capital, Putrajaya within the MSC. Housing has also been 
constructed for thousands of civil servants who are expected to relocate having 
been offered low interest loans for the purchase of accommodation.
19 At the 
close of the decade, civil servants owed the state more than RM20 billion in 
housing loans to the government (Bernama 13 April 2002). The construction of 
Putrajaya, and nearby Cyberjaya, a ‘smart city’ which houses a university and 
provides accommodation for workers in the MSC, has provided a fillip to the real 
estate and construction sectors, reinforcing UMNO’s relationship with its 
business connections by injecting capital into the construction sector.
20 The 
usefulness of being able to strategically direct the consumption patterns of civil 
servants is therefore one motivation for the continued defence of civil service 
‘perks’.  
 
However, the government actively pursued efforts to suppress any actions by 
civil servants deemed ‘political’ and introduced anti-corruption legislation that 
effectively obliged civil servants to keep watch on one another. Further 
crackdowns on freedoms of speech in the late 1990s and early 2000s contrasted 
                                                           
19 Media reports stated Putrajaya was to house approximately 500,000 people (Colmey, Times 
Asia, 4 December 1995). 
20 Consultants attached to the project suggested that at least RM28 billion would be invested in 
the MSC over the following decade (Caspian Research cited in The Edge 2.6.1997), while 
journalists offered estimates of state spending of between US$4-5 billion (Chen, AWSJ, 
22.2.2000; Mellor, AsiaWeek 17.8.2001). 
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Information Technology Council (NITC) to be an inherent requirement of a 
knowledge based economy (NITC 1998). While CUEPACS took something of a 
stand against these measures, its activities appear to have had a minimal impact 
on the level of financial benefits or political freedoms directed towards civil 
servants. The organisation was involved in discussions with the state only on an 
ad hoc basis despite the existence of tripartite state machinery that would suggest 
otherwise. Increases in allowances were awarded to civil servants in 1995 during 
a period of strong economic growth, and again in 1999 in the aftermath of a 
politically destabilising row between the Prime Minister and his popular former 
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim.  
 
The government and the private sector workforce 
This discussion portrays the government as having a relatively limited capacity 
to implement changes to employment conditions in the private sector labour 
force. There is little argument that centralised and repressive industrial relations 
legislation as overseen by the Ministry of Human Resources has impacted 
negatively on the organising and bargaining abilities of the trade union sector 
(Jomo and Todd 1994; Kuruvilla and Erikson 2002; Peetz and Todd 2000). In 
this the government might claim it has been successful given declining rates of 
industrial activity. 
 
However, the government proved less able to resolve structural labour market 
problems such as upward wage pressures and supply bottlenecks, relying instead 
on the continued use of low skilled migrant labour even though it was 
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socio-cultural goals.  
A prolonged reliance on foreign labour can generate social and 
political problems as well as give a wrong signal to industries that 
they can continue to rely on foreign labour without having to 
undertake strategic adjustments in moving towards labour-saving 
production technology (MOF 1995:39).  
 
Table 5.5 Strike action and working days lost, 1990s-2000s 
 
Year 
 
no. of strikes 
no. of workers 
involved 
 
working days lost 
1990* 17  98,510 301,978 
1991 23  4,207 23,448 
1992 17  6,110 16,164 
1993 18  2,400 7,160 
1994 15  2,289 5,675 
1995 13  1,748 4,884 
1996 9  995  2,553 
1997 5  812  2,396 
1998 12  1,778 2,685 
1999 11  3,452 10,555 
2000 11  2,969 6,068
a
Source: Maimunah 1999:179; Ministry of Human Resources website. * A national strike by the 
National Union of Plantation Workers accounts for 96,970 workers and 293,885 days lost (Jomo 
and Todd 1994:51). 
 
Despite these concerns, the 1990s was in fact marked by a lack of legislative 
responses to long term structural labour market problems.  
Although Malaysia’s industrial strategy has consequently shifted 
from primary EOI to higher technology-based capital investment, 
the Malaysian labour laws have not changed significantly over the 
period of these developments (Suhanah 2002:56). 
 
The following section examines a range of factors limiting the government’s 
responses towards instituting the reforms widely suggested by a variety of 
international organisations including the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and various agencies of the United Nations, and those requested by 
domestic industry lobby groups.  
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Two World Bank investigations of the Malaysian labour market (Mazumdar 
1991; World Bank 1995) identified serious bottlenecks in the supply of labour, 
both in terms of quantity and skill level. These bottlenecks were considered as 
threatening to future economic growth, reducing Malaysia’s attractiveness to 
foreign investors. Between 1985 and 1991, the skill intensity of the labour force 
declined from 0.43 to 0.35, which, as noted by the World Bank (1995:7), was ‘in 
direct contrast to the government’s declared objective of upgrading the skill 
composition of the labour force to move to higher value added products’. 
Research by the Asian Development Bank (ADB 1997:10-11) identified 
particularly that the education and training sector was failing to deliver an 
adequately and appropriately trained skilled labour force. Malaysian industry in 
general underinvested in training, SMEs particularly (Wong 1997:9). Also 
contributing to the low skill intensity rates was the continued influx of unskilled 
and semiskilled migrant labour and high rates of out-migration by Malaysian 
professionals.  
 
Table 5.6 Employment in the manufacturing sector by skill level, 1990-1995 
Skill level  1990
Share 
(%) 1995
Share 
(%) 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
1991-95 (%)
Managerial/professional 50,281 3.8 88,219 4.3  11.9 
Technical/supervisory 114,592 8.6 184,644 9.0  10.0 
Clerical 88,840 6.7 129,250 6.3  7.8 
General workers  53,620 4.0 63,600 3.1  3.5 
Skilled 351,765 26.4 533,416 26.0  8.7 
Semi-skilled 209,698 15.7 359,030 17.5  11.4 
Unskilled 464,034 34.8 693,441 33.8  8.4 
Total 1,332,829 100.0 2,051,600 100.0  9.0 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1996:271, table 9-4. 
 
  227Malaysia’s rapid recovery from the recession of 1985/86 was evidenced by 
increasingly tight labour market conditions and wages growth of approximately 
ten per cent for skilled workers between 1987 and 1993 (Wong and Gill 
2000:220). For unskilled workers, the increases were an estimated five per cent 
over the same period. According to the World Bank (1995:iii), the widening 
wage differential threatened ‘Malaysia’s excellent record on reducing income 
inequality’. The upward pressure on wages had received negative coverage in the 
foreign press. The Asian  Wall Street Journal for example, carried the story 
‘Wages rise 10% in Malaysia’ (July 13 1990).  
 
Table 5.7 Labour cost and value added per worker in manufacturing  
(US$ per year) 
labour cost (wage)  value added 
Countries 
1980-
1984 
1995-
1999 
% 
change 
1980-
1984 
1995-
1999 
% 
change 
Malaysia 2,519  3,429  36.1  8,454  12,661  49.8 
Thailand 2,305  2,705  17.4  11,072 19,946 80.1 
Indonesia  898  1,008 12.2  3,807 5,139 35.0 
Philippines 1,240  2,450  97.6  5,266  10,781  104.7 
Singapore  5,576  21,534 286.2  16,442 40,674 147.4 
Sth  Korea  3,153  10,743 240.7  11,617 40,916 252.2 
China  472  729  54.4  3,061 2,885 -5.7 
Source: World Bank (2000) World Development Indicators, the World Bank, Washington, pp. 
58-60, cited in Rahmah and Ishak 2003:393, table 2. 
 
Yet despite the labour shortage, the labour force participation rate for women 
remained low at 47.8 per cent in 1990, dipping even further throughout the 
decade (see Table 5.9 below). Participation rates by older Malaysians (over 60 
years) had declined rapidly from over 37 per cent in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1991 
(Ong 2002:table 4.5). 
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In 1990, the Ministry of Labour and Manpower was renamed the Ministry of 
Human Resources (MHR). Inagami (1998:36) suggests the new name heralded a 
change in direction towards the management of labour force issues given that 
Malaysia was officially recording full employment levels throughout the early 
1990s ‘…leading to a strong awareness of the need to control the consequent 
pressure for wage rises on the one hand, and of the importance of human 
resources for a high value-added capital-intensive economy on the other’.
21 In 
the following year, the National Labour Policy was released by MHR which 
suggested a more inclusive approach towards organised labour. 
Unions and management must regard each other as partners in 
economic progress…The parties must also adopt a proactive 
approach to industrial relations which requires close rapport and 
consensus-building…There is a need for management to 
encourage worker participation through consultation such that 
workers are treated as members of the organisational 
family...Trade unions should promote positive work and 
productivity attitudes among the workforce… (Cited in 
Woodiwiss 1998:213-214). 
 
The tripartitism this implies did not eventuate. The peak forum for tripartite 
labour discussions, the National Labour Advisory Council (NLAC) met on an 
irregular basis and was not empowered with decision making authorities. Wangel 
(1999:3) concluded that ‘[t]he labour laws are amended unilaterally by the 
government coalition after superficial consultations within a tripartite system of a 
purely formal nature’. Interviews with staff in the MHR suggest the situation is 
more complex in that the forum is valuable for unearthing and even addressing 
disagreements before they are more publicly expressed.
22 Hence while the 
                                                           
21 When questioned why the change had occurred, then Minister, Lim Ah Lek, told reporters that 
the new name ‘sounded better’ (personal correspondence with Maimunah Aminuddin 2003). 
22 In the following chapter, I discuss the NLAC as a forum in which the MHR seeks to ascertain 
the views of employer and union groups in order to avoid public debate and to present a 
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organised labour movement in Malaysia remained politically excluded. The 
government’s support for the Malaysian Labour Organisation (MLO), 
established in competition against the MTUC in 1989 (Bhopal 2001:12), was a 
clear attempt to further fracture the existing union movement, but as the MLO 
leadership proved unable to garner much support amongst the private sector 
unions and had largely failed to present a challenge to the MTUC, the Minister 
for HR advised the leadership to remerge with the MTUC in 1997 (Rowley and 
Bhopal 2005).
23  
 
Despite these machinations, the government did not have a lot to fear from 
organised labour, particularly in the realm of domestic politics and industrial 
relations. It was the international connections of the MTUC, including its 
affiliation with the ICFTU, its position in the ILO, and its role in pursuing the 
formation of a national union in the US-dominated electronics sector that caused 
the state embarrassment. This led to an awkward show down with the Malaysian-
American Electronics Industry lobby group
24 and the US Government. By 
making the issue a high profile one internationally, the MTUC was criticised in 
the media as lacking a ‘sense of patriotism’ (Editorial, NST 27 July 1992). 
Ghafar Baba, then deputy Prime Minister, told the press that ‘destructive 
methods were being used by a small group of unionists…who were not bothered 
                                                                                                                                                             
consensual view to the public, thus enhancing the view of the government as a sound economic 
manager.  
23 Rowley and Bhopal (2005:15) offer additional reasons for the involvement of the Minister for 
HR in the MLO’s re-merger with the MTUC including the need for MTUC President Zainal 
Rampak, newly recruited by UMNO, to gather more support against the popular MTUC 
Secretary General, Rajasekaran who favoured an alternative President for the MTUC.  
24 The Malaysian-American Electronics Industry is a lobby group representing US owned 
electronics firms operating in Malaysia. It is also a standing committee of the American 
Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM 2003). 
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interests...’ (NST 29 September 1992). Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1995:188) note 
that as a result of the negative international publicity generated by the anti-union 
decision, the ASEAN Labour Ministers met in early 1993, prior to the 80
th ILO 
Conference, to devise strategies in order to ward off further international 
criticism, asking the ILO to give heed to the differing needs and abilities of 
developing economies to implement labour policies. At the Singapore meeting of 
the WTO in 1996, Malaysia’s Minister for International Trade and Industry, 
Rafidah Aziz, rejected, in agreement with other ASEAN members, the 
imposition of core labour standards on trade related arrangements.  
Malaysia also rejects the use of trade measures to enforce labour 
standards, and reaffirms the stand that the comparative and 
competitive advantage of low-wage countries should not be put 
into question (WTO 1996). 
 
Consistent with the Look East emphasis of the previous decade, Mahathir 
continued an anti-Western and anti-globalisation rhetoric that warned Malaysian 
workers of the dangers of ‘Western-style’ unionism. His address to the UMNO 
General Assembly at the close of 1993 described industrial action as ‘primitive’ 
and a ‘manifestation of shallow Western civilisation’ (cited in Wangel 1999:4). 
Similarly, ‘[t]he idea that “something can be had for nothing” permeates the 
present attitude towards work in all too many Western countries…workers 
blithely demand better pay and more benefits…’ (Mahathir 1999:85). The union 
movement was briefly courted by opposition party Semangat 46 in the lead up to 
the 1990 election, and then by Anwar Ibrahim, who, according to Bhopal 
(2001:12), was motivated by a desire to broaden his own support base within 
UMNO. Then President of the MTUC, Zainal Rampak left Semangat 46 and in 
  2311996 joined UMNO. He was appointed a Senator in 1998. The MTUC was then 
forced to defend itself against claims that its leadership was beholden to the 
government (George 2004b). Given low rates of union coverage, limited access 
to the main stream media and internal disputes, it was clearly not the MTUC that 
presented the major obstacle to the government’s stated intention of reviewing 
labour legislation and restructuring the labour force in order to complete the 
transition towards a k-economy. 
 
Figure 5.1 Unemployment rate, 1990-2000 
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Source: Department of Statistics 2001b:147-148, table 8.1. 
 
As the local labour supply dwindled, the shortage of labour, particularly skilled 
labour, posed a far greater challenge to the state’s agenda for labour reforms. In 
1989, recognising the need for stronger coordination of industrial skills training, 
the government had established the National Vocational Training Council. The 
World Bank (1995:92) expressed concerns at the effectiveness of the Council 
whose role placed it at odds with the Ministry of Education, and even the 
Malaysian Government admitted its education and training institutions were 
unable to cope with the demand for skilled labour (Government of Malaysia 
1996:104).  
 
  232Compounding the failure of state institutions to deliver a skilled workforce was 
the widespread reluctance of industry to invest in training given a labour 
shortage situation in which workers were ‘job hopping’, firms were ‘poaching’ 
and the wages of skilled workers were rising (MOF 1995:39; Wong and Gill 
2000:238). The Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) was therefore 
established in 1992 ‘…to stimulate private sector involvement in training and 
retraining of their workers’ (Government of Malaysia 1996:119). A decade later, 
the privatised HRDF was still unable to attract greater participation by SMEs 
(NST 9 May 2002).
25
 
A clash between institutionalised compromises 
Linking this discussion back to the strategies utilised in the régulation of labour 
and the difficulties this created in relation to other government policies, a number 
of existing features within the state-labour nexus can be seen to have impacted 
on the ability of the state to deliver a more highly trained labour force. Firstly, as 
discussed above, the use of MOE to implement government policies to deliver a 
contained Malay nationalism had compromised its role as a provider of suitably 
skilled labour for the workforce. Secondly, the perception that the predominantly 
Malay civil service was anti-Chinese discouraged Chinese business owners from 
registering in government schemes, including the HRDF. Thirdly, the 
government’s pursuit of low wages and political repression had contributed to 
the high rates of emigration by Malaysian professionals, some for better wages, 
others in pursuit of more social and political freedoms (Hing 2000). The 
emphasis on containing wages growth also encouraged high rates of labour 
                                                           
25 By mid 2002, a director of the company overseeing the operations of the HRDF stated that 
SMEs had not participated in the scheme in greater numbers, despite being offered an RM2 
  233turnover amongst workers who were willing to change employers when offered 
slightly higher wages by competing firms (Rasiah 1995:78). Labour turnover 
raises the costs of training and therefore acts as a disincentive to firms. Fourthly, 
the government’s refusal to implement a welfare scheme for unemployed 
workers also exacerbated job hopping as employees sought employers willing to 
offer a wider package of benefits such as termination payments.  
 
Failing to deliver trained workers, the chief governmental response to the 
shortage of labour in the plantation, construction and household services sectors 
was the liberalisation of labour migration, announced in 1991 as a temporary 
measure.  
Table 5.8 Migrant workers in Malaysia by sector, 1991 
estimated number 
(‘000)
sectoral 
distribution( %)
immigrant share 
of sector( %) 
Agriculture and 
forestry 550.5 48 38 
Construction 319.2 28 70 
Manufacturing 41.2 4 3 
Non-government 
services 229.0 20 10 
Total 1,140.0 100 - 
Source: Lucas and Verry 1999:43, table 3.8. Note: includes an estimate for undocumented 
workers. 
 
By 1995 more than 600,000 foreign workers were legally working in Malaysia 
(Government of Malaysia 1996), a figure that increased to approximately 
750,000 by 2000 (EPU 2001:153). Analysts commonly state that the true size of 
the foreign workforce is at least double that number, and possibly as high as two 
million given vast numbers of undocumented migrant workers (Azizah 2000; 
Menon 2001; Pillai 1999). By the close of the decade, official data indicated that 
                                                                                                                                                             
subsidy for every RM1 spent on staff training (NST 9 May 2002). 
  234migrant workers were no longer concentrated in the rural sector (23 per cent) but 
were instead increasingly employed in manufacturing industries (30 per cent). A 
further 20 per cent were women employed in housekeeping duties in private 
homes and hotels (Government of Malaysia 2001:90). Workers employed in 
private homes are not covered by the Employment Act. Edwards (1997:21), in 
analysing the varying estimates of the foreign labour force, forecast that by 2000 
foreign workers would account for a quarter of the work force in Malaysia. 
 
Athukorala and Menon (2001:11), summarise the dilemmas surrounding the use 
of foreign labour: 
By limiting increases in real wages, migrant workers hold back 
structural shifts in the manufacturing industry away from labour 
intensive manufacturing activities and towards high-tech and 
human-capital intensive production. They also tend to jeopardise 
technology transfer as firms are less willing to invest in contract 
workers through training and development of labour skills. These 
influences, in turn, limit factor productivity growth in 
manufacturing. In addition, migrant workers are likely to 
contribute to a widening of economic disparity by depressing the 
incomes of local unskilled workers. 
 
Many of these factors have already been acknowledged by the Malaysian 
government which raises the question of why the government has adopted what 
Pillai (1999) has described as an inconsistent and ad hoc response.  
 
Migrant labour has been critical to Malaysia’s economic growth, contributing in 
ways that have now become embedded in the wage labour nexus. Fold and 
Wangel (1998) argue that employers, particularly in the manufacturing sector, 
have adapted to the labour and skill shortage by relying on imported production 
technologies that require minimal training and can therefore be operated by low 
paid, migrant workers. In addition to the fact that employers have been able to 
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of many migrant workers, this pool of labour is easily dismissed during 
economic downturns, operating largely as a reserve army of labour and therefore 
not entitled to termination or redundancy benefits or to be given notice. In this 
the state colluded by not consistently enforcing the protections of the 
Employment Act, by demonising migrant workers through the press (Crinis 
2006) and by making unionisation difficult for foreign workers.  
 
Tey (1997) provides examples in the mainstream media of migrant workers 
being accused of creating social problems in Malaysia, by allegedly spreading 
HIV and tuberculosis (Star 6 August 1992; Malay Mail 22 October 1992), by 
being a burden on the education and health system (NST 1 December 1995), by 
begging (Star 17 February 1996) and contributing to high levels of crime. Much 
of the data on which the stories were based was released by government agencies 
including the Ministry of National Unity and Community, the Ministry of 
Health, the Department of Immigration and the Malaysian police. ‘Public 
management of migrant identities has produced an ‘insider-outsider’ distinction 
in society that enables the employment of foreign workers, yet mitigates overall 
Malaysian support for legitimate migrant complaints and rights’ (Chin 
2000:1047).  
 
Both the Malaysian government and capital benefit from a large migrant labour 
force in that the costs of reproducing this labour falls on the home country rather 
than the Malaysian economy. This is also the case should these workers require 
welfare support during periods of unemployment. The super exploitation of the 
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funds in the pursuit of other policies, including the delivery of concessions to the 
domestic labour force. In contrast, the migrant labour force experiences high 
levels of income insecurity, subject to the type of labour control consistent with 
Burawoy’s description of market despotism. ‘One reason for the proneness to 
crisis of despotic capitalism was its tendency to undercut labor’s ability to 
reproduce itself…’ (Peck 1996:36). In Malaysia, despotic means of labour 
control can be effectively used against migrant labour given the poor economic 
conditions in the major sending country, Indonesia, and the limited impact of 
efforts made by the governments of sending countries to protect their workers 
abroad. The Malaysian government does not have to underwrite the reproduction 
of this labour force, and it is repatriated during periods of economic downturn.  
 
However, Malaysia’s declining ability to compete internationally on the basis of 
labour intensive manufacturing altered this economic balance and created 
pressures for the reform of these arrangements and of the institutions responsible 
for overseeing the labour market. Government levies on the import of foreign 
labour were doubled in the 1996 Budget. Concerns that this would encourage 
greater use of illegal migrant labour (Edwards 1997:14) have since been borne 
out (figures are provided in the following chapter). The government delayed the 
introduction of more stringent restrictions on migrant labour until 2000 even 
though this was contrary to stated labour policy, but used the intervening time to 
strengthen its case against the use of migrant labour. 
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The government had hoped to reduce some of the dependence on foreign labour 
by encouraging more local women into the labour force.  Despite the labour 
shortage, the rates of labour force participation by Malaysian women were 
considerably lower than those for men, and lower than those recorded by women 
in neighbouring countries (Sen 1999). In searching for a reason, the government 
concluded, ‘The relatively low participation of women despite the increase in 
their educational attainment and the buoyancy of the job market was to a certain 
extent due to the lack of affordable and quality child-care services, and flexible 
working conditions for women’ (Government of Malaysia 1996:622).  
Table 5.9 Participation rates by gender, Malaysia 
  Labour force participation rates 
Gender  1990 1992 1995 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Male  85.3 84.9 84.3 84.9 83.1 83.3 86.3 
Female  47.8 46.9 44.7 46.8 44.4 46.7 45.2 
Total  66.5 65.9 64.7 66.3 64.3 65.5 66.3 
Source: Department of Statistics 2001a:31, table 2.1; Ministry of Finance 2003:xliv, table 6.1. 
 
In 1989, as local sources of labour dried up, the National Policy on Women was 
released which emphasised the importance of women’s participation in 
Malaysia’s economic development. In 1995 the Government of Malaysia 
acceded to the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Employment Act was amended 
in 1998 which ‘provided for flexible working hours and…permitted women to be 
gainfully employed in part-time employment, while allowing them the flexibility 
to meet their family obligations’ (Government of Malaysia 2001:560). In 1999 a 
separate Ministry of Women and Family Development was established and 
guidelines to prevent sexual harassment were published. However, the 
government moved away from enforcing these guidelines through legislation; 
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(Business Times 27 May 2000). 
 
The government announced that tax exemptions were to be given to employers 
for the establishment of child care facilities near workplaces (Government of 
Malaysia 1996:111). Representatives of the union movement agreed that a lack 
of child care posed a restriction on potential female workers (interview with 
MTUC Women's Officer, June 2001; Sun 3 June 2001). In a debate played out 
through the mainstream media from the mid 1990s, the Minister for Unity and 
Social Development urged workplaces to provide child care, a demand rejected 
by the MEF which argued that the move would increase the costs of doing 
business in Malaysia (Business Times 2 August 2001; Business Times 23 August 
2001). The debate continued into the next decade as the government refused to 
force these costs on to employers. In what was essentially a political process to 
determine the distribution of the costs of labour’s social reproduction, child care, 
and the employment of domestic workers, remained the responsibility of 
households.  
 
Summary 
Half way through the 1990s, the government had managed to implement only 
limited institutional and legislative reforms in labour-related areas. In 1994 the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act was introduced, establishing the National 
Council for Occupational Safety and Health and replacing the Factories and 
Machinery Act of 1967. Some care was also taken to reassure the public in 
response to criticisms raised by the MTUC about the EPF, where the retirement 
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increasing numbers of foreign workers in order to deal with wage pressures and 
the shortage of labour and skills. This was a partially successful strategy in that 
by the mid 1990s, wages growth had slowed somewhat (Government of 
Malaysia 1996:269) but it really did little in terms of addressing future labour 
needs or the rising rural/urban income divide. Rasiah (1995:90) argued that 
Malaysia in 1995 was ‘at a critical juncture’, having reached a ceiling in terms of 
further gains from labour intensive industries while yet to put in place the full 
range of policies required to move towards a higher value added, technology 
intensive economy. Strategies to address this situation were contained within the 
Seventh Malaysia Plan (Government of Malaysia 1996) but as will be discussed 
below, the economic and political turmoils of the late 1990s intervened.  
 
The Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000 interrupted 
The Prime Minister, introducing the Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000 
(Government of Malaysia 1996:vi), acknowledged the central importance of 
efforts to address labour shortages and to improve the skill levels of the labour 
force. In summary, firms were encouraged to move away from labour intensive 
production systems and to reduce their reliance on foreign workers. The public 
and private sectors were urged to be more productive, and plans were to be 
introduced to improve the science and technology related skills of the workforce. 
This, it was hoped, would enable Malaysia to improve its ability to compete 
globally. It signalled the government’s intention to undertake a major 
restructuring of the labour market, the labour force, the training sector and labour 
related legislation.  
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of foreign labour for certain sectors of the economy to relieve the 
problem of labour shortages. However the long term solution to 
this problem lies in utilising labour more efficiently and 
productively. This would require reducing the demand for labour 
through labour-saving techniques and processes. In this regard, 
the nation must move up the ladder of production from labour-
intensive and assembly type of processes [sic] towards more 
capital- and technology-intensive as well as knowledge-based 
industries and processes (Government of Malaysia 1996:7). 
 
Two proposals emerged in 1996 to address the issue of labour productivity and 
to increase the capacity of the higher education sector to deliver appropriately 
skilled workers. The first was a discussion paper on productivity linked wage 
schemes (PLWS); the second was the enactment of legislation that allowed the 
emergence of private sector universities and colleges. 
 
In 1996, the National Labour Advisory Council published its Guidelines on 
Wage Reform System (MHR 1996) with the objective of introducing a stronger 
link between productivity and remuneration.
26 The MEF was strongly in favour 
of PLWSs and was able to campaign for their introduction through a column 
written by MEF Director, Shamsuddin Bardin, and published in the Business 
Times ( BT) insert of the NST (see for example BT 6 July 2000 and BT 7 
September 2000). The MTUC rejected the idea, arguing for the introduction of a 
minimum wage as a first step in any reform process. While the NLAC operates 
only in an advisory capacity and has been derided as ineffectual, government 
members of the committee used the forum to assess the strength of the MTUC’s 
opposition (interview MHR staff July 2002) and, failing to reach a consensus, 
                                                           
26 The MHR offered two models for linking productivity to remuneration; the profitability and 
the productivity model. Each model has a fixed wage component but differs in the formula for 
calculating the variable component that comprises the employee's share of increased company 
productivity. See the Ministry of Human Resources (Kementerian Sumber Manusia) website for 
details of the proposed scheme, available at www.jaring.my/ksm 
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rather than required employers to utilise bonus schemes in determining wages. 
The issue of PLWS then appears to have passed to the National Productivity 
Commission (Government of Malaysia 2001:116), a corporatised government 
agency which in 1999 published a more detailed guide, A Handbook on 
Productivity Linked Wage System. In the decade following, the government was 
still unwilling to force the issue and instead utilised the imperative of the k-
economy to encourage reforms to wages schemes. This is discussed in the 
chapter following. 
 
The passing of the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act in 1996 had a far 
more immediate impact. By the close of the decade, six locally owned private 
universities were established, three foreign universities had located campuses in 
Malaysia and more than 600 private colleges of varying quality were operating. 
A Private Higher Education Department was created within the MOE. The 
government’s stated aim in allowing the private sector to operate in this sphere 
was the increased availability of places but the reforms served another purpose. 
By allowing private sector institutions to offer university degrees, the state has 
been able to appease the concerns of those Chinese parents seeking a university 
education for their children who were unable to afford to send their children 
overseas and were unable to gain a place in local public institutions because of 
the quota system which set aside 55 per cent of places for Bumiputera students. 
It was estimated that over 80 per cent of students in private universities were 
ethnic Chinese (Lee 1999). Through privatisation, the government avoided some 
of the public debate regarding the merits of the current quota system and an 
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public higher education. The difficulties confronting the MOE, in bearing 
responsibility for important NEP policies as well as contributing to reforms in 
the education system as demanded by employer groups, are revisited in the 
following chapter given the implications for the producing a more skilled labour 
force.  
 
Recession and political turmoil 
From July 1997, Malaysia, along with a number of other Southeast and East 
Asian economies, experienced a currency and stock market crisis that broadened 
into a financial crisis. For the first time since the recession of 1985, the 
Malaysian economy went into recession, recording GDP growth of minus 6.7 per 
cent in 1998 compared with GDP growth of 7.7 per cent in 1997 (Rahman 
Embong 2000:137). One could assume that this was a period in Malaysia’s 
history where labour was particularly vulnerable, but despite the state of the 
economy, official unemployment data recorded only a modest rise from 2.6 per 
cent to 3.2 per cent in 1998, far less than the 6.4 per cent the government had 
predicted (EPU 1998:115). The true scale of unemployment was disguised 
somewhat by the number of workers whose contracts were not renewed as 
opposed to those officially made redundant and therefore included in the 
government’s unemployment data (Campbell c2000:12).  
 
The brunt of the unemployment generated by the recession was borne by the 
migrant labour force, particularly undocumented workers who lacked contracts, 
many of whom were concentrated in the more vulnerable export and construction 
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(World Bank 2000c:14). The World Bank (2000c:3) argued that the reduction in 
the migrant labour force ‘provided a significant safety valve for the domestic 
labor market’. Another factor differentiating Malaysia from neighbouring 
Indonesia and Thailand, was the flexibility of wage determination in the 
Malaysian labour market. According to the World Bank (2000:3), this prevented 
more widespread job losses as employers were able to reduce wages and thus 
retain staff even at lower levels of productivity. In the manufacturing sector, real 
wages fell by 2.4 per cent in 1998 and overall by 1.1 per cent. Other policy 
measures were implemented that sought to shelter the domestic labour force from 
the recession, including requirements imposed on firms that redundancies be 
reported to the government in advance, and that foreign workers be made 
redundant before local workers. By mid 1999, 407,800 Malaysians were 
officially recorded as unemployed, an indicator of real hardship certainly, but a 
significantly better outcome relative to the regional situation. This better than 
expected outcome had not appeared likely in the early days of recession as is 
discussed below. 
 
By the end of 1997 important differences in policy direction had emerged 
between the Prime Minister and his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, who also held the 
position of Finance Minister. As the initial crisis deepened into recession, Anwar 
instituted a contractionary reform package in December 1997 that not only 
threatened many of the existing relationships between big business and the ruling 
elite, but also posed a challenge to state-labour relations. Pay cuts for senior 
bureaucrats and a freeze on salary increments for middle to top level civil 
  244servants were imposed, while consumption credit, including that for real estate, 
was to be squeezed.  
 
The National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was established early in 1998, 
ostensibly to gain public input into the formulation of a recovery plan. According 
to the NEAC’S Deputy Chief, Victor Wee (1998:369), the team conducted  
…extensive consultations with many people representing Federal 
and State Government leaders, senior and retired government 
officials, captains of industries [sic], representatives from industry 
groups, trade unions, professional associations, media, women 
[sic] organisations, and non-governmental organisations.  
 
While making much of this ‘consultative’ approach,
27 Mahathir also used the 
opportunity to bring back into prominence his former economic advisor and 
Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, who was appointed Executive Director of the 
NEAC (Gomez and Jomo 1999:188). The escalation in political and personal 
differences between Anwar and Mahathir led in September 1998 to the sacking 
of Anwar from both his ministerial post and UMNO. Anwar was later detained, 
charged, and eventually found guilty of a number of offences resulting in a 
prison term.
28 Mahathir assumed the role of Finance Minister until he 
reappointed Daim to the position in 1999.  
 
The NEAC published the National Economic Recovery Plan (EPU 1998) in 
August 1998. Included in its recommendations was an attempt to reduce 
Malaysia’s reliance on foreign labour. The domestic unemployment created by 
the recession placed political pressure on the government to take heed of the 
                                                           
27 A detailed list of the individuals and organizations consulted with was included in the NEAC’s 
major report, the National Economic Recovery Plan (EPU 1998).  
28 After a series of appeals, Anwar was released in 2004 although he was not cleared of all 
charges.  
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foreign workers. It therefore imposed tighter restrictions on foreign workers 
including a freeze on recruitment, the repatriation of unwanted foreign workers, 
and, for those allowed to stay, the imposition of charges for the use of medical or 
educational facilities (EPU 1998:125-126). Foreign workers were also required 
to contribute to the EPF, effectively increasing their cost to employers. 
 
The NEAC did not adopt the more neoliberal economic direction suggested by 
the IMF (Henderson et al. 2002:15) nor the contractionary economic reforms 
recommended by Anwar. In fact, the original development budget in the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan (Government of Malaysia 1996) was increased from RM67.5 
billion to RM89.5 billion, much of it directed towards poorer states with greater 
proportions of Malays (Nesaduari 2000:81-82). In accounting for this, Nesadurai 
(2000:75) argues that domestic political factors posed a restraint on the policy 
choices available to the ruling elite, chiefly the continuing political imperative of 
retaining the ethnic based redistribution program that relied on continued 
government interventions in society and the economy. However, additional 
political and economic factors constrained the cabinet. As noted by Gomez and 
Jomo (1999:200), ‘By December 1997, Mahathir’s position appeared weakened, 
with growing disillusionment setting in among the business and middle 
classes…’. With Anwar’s policy stance indicating a willingness to act 
independently of Mahathir, the Prime Minister moved to impose his own 
economic regime from June of 1998, following which he embarked upon a series 
of roadshows throughout Malaysia designed to shore up his personal support 
(Nesadurai 2000:97). 
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Delivering the 1999 budget speech in October of 1998, in the midst of recession 
and following close on the sacking and arrest of Anwar, Mahathir thanked public 
servants. Their allowances had been withdrawn since January but CUEPACS 
had made public statements of loyalty, stating that all claims on the government 
would be postponed until the economy improved (ICFTU-APRO Jan 20 1998). 
‘The Government is deeply appreciative of the contributions of members of the 
public sector who have always shown their undivided support in the 
implementation of Government decisions and policies’ (Mahathir 1998:20). He 
also announced that public servants would receive a holiday on one Saturday of 
each month, to act as a fillip for the domestic tourism sector (Mahathir 1998:24-
25). Likewise, Mahathir set aside RM783 million for the construction of quarters 
for public servants (Mahathir 1998:18), a move that supported the construction, 
real estate and finance sectors as well as delivering housing to teachers, members 
of the armed forces, customs and immigration staff and the police, the vast 
majority of whom were Malay. In June 1999, as Malaysia’s economy recovered, 
all serving and retired civil servants below the top level were awarded a RM600 
bonus, while staff in statutory authorities were awarded a pay rise, moves 
designed to shore up Mahathir’s public standing (Abdul Rahman 2000:139) as 
well as to further stimulate domestic demand.  
 
Workers in the private sector were not forgotten.  
Unlike in other countries, workers in Malaysia and their 
organisations do not purposely make excessive demands at this 
time even though they face hardships in their daily lives. Allow 
me to say “Thank You” to them (Mahathir 1998, 1999 Budget 
speech).  
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Mahathir’s concern regarding the allegiance of the union movement and working 
class, many of whom were expected to be supporters of Anwar (Bhopal 2001; 
George 2004b). While it was apparently Anwar who sponsored Zainal’s 
membership of UMNO (Bhopal 2001), the appointment of Zainal as Senator 
appears to have been orchestrated by Mahathir. George (2004b) writes that 
Mahathir requested a meeting with MTUC leaders in early August 1998. After 
reportedly agreeing with their claim for the imposition of a minimum wage 
(interview Zainal Rampak 2002), Mahathir then spent 45 minutes alone with 
Zainal, allegedly offering him the Senatorship, an appointment which was only 
made official in November, after Anwar’s arrest (George 2004 b). 
 
What Mahathir’s recovery policies also reflected was the dependence of the 
Malaysian government on both the private consumption and the savings of 
Malaysian and foreign workers. The increased proportion of professionals in the 
labour force, and high levels of employment, contributed to an increase in the 
importance of income tax to government revenues. In 1990, individual income 
taxes contributed approx 25 per cent of income tax. This reached about 31 per 
cent by 1995 (Government of Malaysia 1996:184). Sales and services taxes also 
expanded, partly due to tourism growth and the widening of the application of 
the tax to other services, but also due to increased domestic consumption. In 
1990, sales and services taxes were 24 per cent of indirect taxation revenue, and 
increased to 31 per cent by 1995. The high level of domestic savings, available to 
the government through its management of the EPF, the PTF, the Pilgrimage 
Fund and profits generated by the state owned Petronas, were used to fund the 
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104). During the 1997/98 financial crisis, the National Economic Action Council 
(NEAC) (1998:96-97), urged the Government to introduce legislation that would 
require foreign workers to pay into the EPF for the explicit purpose of increasing 
the funds available to the state to assist in the economic recovery. This was 
enacted from August of 1998. Mahathir implemented an expansionary program 
that encouraged credit and consumption, increasing government borrowings in 
order to issue tenders and contracts that generated economic activity and 
employment. A government-initiated Home Ownership Campaign between 12 
December 1998 and 12 January 1999 generated RM3.5 billion of property sales, 
and was linked to policies that lowered interest rates. The increased liquidity that 
resulted eased household debt burdens and stimulated the domestic economy 
(Rujhan 2000:96). Mahathir also waived all tax on income derived in 1999, 
while also allowing losses to be carried forward, ostensibly to avoid any 
confusion in the introduction of a new taxation scheme to be introduced in 2001 
(Mahathir 1998:22). 
 
The impact of these policies on particular sectors of the economy and the bail 
outs of individual businesses has been discussed in detail elsewhere (Gomez and 
Jomo 1999, chapter 8; Jayasuriya and Rosser 2001:252), but the importance of 
the expansionary economic stance to lower and middle income earners has 
generally received less attention. In neighbouring countries affected by the crisis 
there were sharp hikes in the price of basic commodities, particularly fuel and 
food, and a surge in unemployment. This did not occur in Malaysia where 
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borne by the migrant labour force.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the contradictions and constraints facing the Malaysian 
government throughout the 1990s as it responded to the imperatives of labour 
force reforms. Besides the continuing political saliency of ethnic considerations, 
the chapter also claimed that the economic importance to the government of the 
personal consumption and savings of the Malaysian workforce was exerting an 
influence on government decision making. While labour flexibility may suit 
particular employers, income security is linked to higher rates of consumption. 
The continuing reliance on the large pool of migrant labour, despite being 
contrary to state policy, also proved difficult to address. The exploitation of 
migrant labour effectively helped to fund the concessions delivered to the 
domestic labour force. Responses throughout the decade proved at varying times 
to be limited, contradictory, and ad hoc (Pillai 1999), reflective of domestic 
political and socio-cultural concerns as well as regional and international 
pressures.  
 
DeSilva (1997:11) notes that pressure to restructure the labour force, particularly 
in open economies, is frequently depicted as an outcome of global economic 
forces that demand more flexibility. Kuruvilla and Erikson (2002:171), for 
example, argue that Malaysia’s concern to remain attractive to foreign investors 
has driven reforms to labour legislation that result in the casualisation of 
employment arrangements and increased employment insecurity. These 
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Malaysia given continued employer preferences for temporary migrant labour.  
 
However, this chapter has demonstrated a lack of reforms to labour legislation in 
Malaysia through most of the decade. The government, while active in industrial 
relations, has preferred that employers take the lead in determining the 
conditions of employment. In this sense, the government is able to avoid being 
embroiled in wage disputes.  
 
Conclusions regarding employment conditions need also to take into account the 
segmented nature of the workforce. Civil servants, for example, retained their 
employment security and were largely protected from shifting economic 
pressures. While wage shifts were slight, allowances, free health care and access 
to low interest finance assist in expanding the consumption options of 
government employees. The segmentation of the labour market supports a range 
of labour control strategies beyond those contained in industrial relations 
legislation.  
 
These pressures and the strategies of control adopted in response shifted 
throughout the decade. While Nesadurai (2000:105) concludes that ‘Mahathir 
has been unable and unwilling to fully dismantle the ethnic-based distributive 
policy that favours ethnic Malays with material entitlements’, even the 
predominantly Malay workforce at Proton suffered dramatic wage losses and a 
reduction of twenty per cent of the workforce during the 1998 financial crisis 
(Rasiah 2001a). There was therefore a noticeable disjuncture in the government’s 
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opposed to the economic realities facing some of these workers. The widening of 
the earnings and income gap between rural and urban dwellers and between 
skilled and less skilled workers, amongst whom Malays remained over 
represented, and the widening of eligibility for schemes previously only 
available to Malays,
29 suggested a real shift in strategy that favoured workers 
who would be of use in the creation of Mahathir’s vision for the future, the k-
economy.  
 
Mahathir introduced the notion of a Bangsa Malaysia, attempting to realign 
identification away from ethnicity. This strategy risked the previous Malay 
nationalism that underpinned the NEP. Williamson (2002:420) debated the risks 
facing Mahathir in his pursuit of Bangsa Malaysia when previous strategies of 
control had relied on a vertical division of society and labour along the lines of 
ethnicity.  
…these changes pose several challenges to Mahathir’s rule. His 
corporate strategy aims to usher in an expanded, ethnically 
diverse bourgeois class. In doing so, there is every risk that these 
new coalitions might seek political liberties and power beyond 
what the Mahathir regime is willing to give. 
 
The government appears to have recognised the potential for this. ‘With the 
development of a knowledge-based economy the acquisition, utilization, 
dissemination and management of knowledge will be more liberal and can be 
abused’ (Government of Malaysia 2001:117). In this sense, the k-economy 
rhetoric reflected the same tensions as Bangsa Malaysia. K-economy workers 
were empowered technopreneurs; they were individuals willing to invest in their 
                                                           
29 The share schemes previously created to increase Bumiputera share ownership rates were 
opened to non-Malays. Navaratnam (1998:45) refers to this as a ‘major breakthrough in our 
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empowered and knowledgeable individual was as an ideological justification for 
attempting to shift the increased costs of education onto households, but was not 
meant to extend into the realm of political freedoms.  
 
The k-economy lifestyle was effectively linked to all manner of consumption 
options, from computers purchased through early access to EPF funds, to 
condominiums in high technology residential complexes. By the late 1990s, 
Malaysia’s poor were increasingly referred to as being on the wrong side of ‘the 
digital divide’ and a range of policy responses emerged to ‘change the mindsets’ 
of the poor, to encourage self-reliance and entrepreneurship (Government of 
Malaysia 2001:72).  
 
The emphasis placed on consumption was reflected in government institutions 
from the late 1990s particularly. While Bangsa Malaysia and the k-economy 
were only ever partially embedded, culturally, politically and economically, in 
promoting a consumer economy, the government seemed on more sure ground. 
This claim is explored in Chapter Seven which describes the emergence of 
economic paternalism as an effective strategy in the régulation of labour. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
socio-economic policies’. 
  253Chapter Six: A workforce for the k-economy? 
 
The quality of human resources will be the single most important 
factor that will determine the pace and success of the 
transformation toward the k-based economy (ISIS 2002:31). 
 
Introduction 
The transition to a knowledge based economy (KBE) was originally presented by 
Mahathir in 1995 as a plan to reposition Malaysia internationally, to reduce its 
historical dependence on less skilled manufacturing processes, and to assist 
Malaysia in meeting the development goals of Vision 2020. Then Deputy Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Badawi continued with this theme several years later:  
Our migration to a k-economy is imperative for our long-term 
competitiveness. Today we are stuck in an uncompetitive gap. We 
neither offer labour that is cheap enough nor skilled enough 
(Deputy Prime MinisterAbdullah Badawi 2001, cited in NST 15 
June). 
 
The previous chapter described the mid 1990s as marked by labour market 
contradictions. Wage growth and labour shortages generated criticisms from 
employer lobby groups. At the same time, the highly publicised unemployment 
of  Bumiputera university graduates threatened the economic and ethno-
nationalist credentials of the Malay-based ruling party. Malaysia’s standing on 
indices measuring international competitiveness was declining and the country 
was ranked 33
rd out of 47 countries in terms of the availability of skilled labour. 
The rural population was losing in the competition for work in the plantation 
sector to cheaper migrant labour. This contributed to a widening gap between 
urban and rural incomes. 
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industry and employer lobby groups. Yet the proposed transition generated a 
range of political and economic tensions given the embedded nature of the 
existing institutional arrangements and the, at times, conflicting goals of the 
parties seeking change. Borrowing from régulation theory, this chapter argues 
that the awkward and ad hoc restructuring process was evidence of a situation in 
which particular institutional compromises that had previously acted to support 
socio-ethnic stability began to stymie structural economic reforms considered 
necessary to regain international competitiveness (Lipietz 1987:34). In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the political leadership was unwilling to enact labour 
force policies that would overtly deliver greater managerial prerogatives and 
lower wages to capital, and gave the appearance of acting in an uncoordinated 
fashion in the restructuring of the employment, training and educational systems 
to develop the labour force required for the k-economy transition (Vicziany and 
Puteh 2004). The instances of institutional mismatch that are examined in this 
chapter are cited as examples of the contradictions faced by the government in 
managing labour’s participation in the economy and society. These examples 
further illustrate the transformative nature of state-labour conflicts despite the 
political weakness of organised labour. To alter labour force, training and 
education policies would prove a complex political exercise regardless of the 
economic imperatives.  
 
The following section seeks to capture the nature of the government rhetoric 
surrounding the k-economy from the late 1990s. The k-economy transition was 
consistently portrayed by key political figures as a necessity if Malaysia was to 
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announcements, remarkably little eventuated on the legislative front. The 
delayed, and often contradictory, responses of particular government agencies to 
these tensions and the resulting institutional mismatches that have resulted are 
examined in the remaining sections of the chapter, using the examples of three 
government ministries with key responsibilities for shaping the labour force. 
These are the Ministry of Human Resources, the Ministry of Education, and the 
Home Ministry which is responsible for overseeing labour migration 
arrangements.  
 
Reforming labour for the k-economy 
Malaysia’s industrialisation from the early 1970s was initially underpinned by a 
low wage regime that was, along with Malaysia’s political stability, an important 
factor in attracting FDI from higher wage economies. Yet by the mid 1990s, 
within ASEAN, Malaysia’s labour costs were second only to Singapore. In 2001 
at the 15
th ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Minister for Human Resources, Fong Chan Onn, argued:  
The comparative advantage that our region has been enjoying in 
providing low cost labour is being slowly eroded by the 
introduction of new technologies. We have to embrace these 
changes with a view of facing up to the challenges and tapping the 
opportunities and we should prepare our labour force to meet this 
changing world economic order. 
 
Emphasising the external pressures facing the country, in 2002, Fong told 
attendees at the National Human Resources Summit, again in Kuala Lumpur, 
that:  
…a mere production-based economy is fast becoming 
history…Malaysia cannot escape from the imperatives of the new 
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the marauding challenges of globalisation beating unceasingly 
and incessantly against our shores. 
 
The notion of an external threat was also evident in the 2001 budget speech 
delivered to the Parliament by the Minister of Finance, Daim Zainuddin. He 
informed Malaysians: ‘We must accept the realities of the k-economy. We have 
no other alternative. We shall all become citizens of the k-economy’ (Daim 
Zainuddin 2000a). 
 
Yet it was the government’s intention to convince Malaysians that changes 
within the country were being shaped by strong leadership, despite the pressures 
of globalisation. Daim’s address to the Multimedia Asia 2000 Conference in 
Kuala Lumpur acknowledges the shifting external environment but explains the 
move to a k-economy and k-society as the government’s considered response, an 
initiative  
…to enable Malaysians to compete at a global level and to take 
advantage of globalisation…The fear is that Malaysia and other 
developing nations may be trapped in a quadrant not of our 
choosing if a laissez faire attitude is adopted (Daim 2000b). 
 
Analysis of the KBE models developed by the OECD (1999) and APEC (2000), 
similar versions of which were adopted by the Malaysian Government (Ministry 
of Finance 2000), suggested that in order to support the development of a KBE, 
important structural changes were required.  
The major challenge currently facing the Malaysian economy in 
gaining economic maturity is the upgrading of the workforce to 
create the resource base to enter world trade in high-tech and 
human capital-intensive product areas (Athukorala 2001:51). 
 
Three agencies were most clearly implicated as necessary to this change. The 
Ministry of Human Resources (MHR) was responsible for overseeing 
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job seekers with vacancies, as well as funding a range of subsidised training and 
retraining schemes for the unemployed and those who wished to upgrade their 
vocational skills. The Ministry of Education (MOE) was then responsible for 
most aspects of the state-funded education system,
1 apart from public vocational 
colleges under the direction of MHR. Thirdly, the Department of Immigration 
within the Home Ministry held responsibility for labour migration. Whole scale 
changes such as these generated a number of plans, master-plans, conferences 
and seminars, and involved business lobby groups, NGOs, think tanks and 
government agencies.  
 
Institutional mismatches 
It has been argued earlier that institutions can be considered as sites of conflict 
out of which may emerge resolutions that, when embedded, take the form of 
institutionalised mediations or compromises. ‘Institutionalised compromises 
result from situations of tension and conflict between socio-economic groups 
over a long period…’ (Andre 2002:95). In embarking upon the structural reforms 
related to the k-economy, existing institutionalised compromises would be 
encroached upon. Given the importance of these compromises to the resolution 
of particular past conflicts and the potential difficulties associated with 
attempting to dismantle them, this was a politically risky endeavour. The three 
government ministries under discussion have each been incorporated within a set 
of stabilising mediations. Each is examined in order to highlight how these 
demands for reforms impacted upon existing compromises. In summary, the 
                                                           
1 In 2004, the Ministry of Education was restructured to create a separate Ministry of Higher 
Education. 
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between agencies such that contradictory policy stances and institutional 
mismatches emerged, and there were clear gaps between policy and practice. 
 
The Ministry of Human Resources (MHR) 
In 2000, newly appointed Minister for Human Resources, Fong Chan Onn, 
outlined a timetable of legislative reform to restructure Malaysia’s labour force 
in order to meet the demands of the k-economy. The Employment, the Industrial 
Relations and the Trade Union Acts were all to be amended. The original timing 
for the introduction of these changes was September 2002 in order to have been 
funded in the 2003 budget. Writing in 2006, similar claims regarding the 
necessity of these changes still frequently appear in the press (Bernama 23 May 
2006). Little in the way of reforms to private sector employment related 
legislation has been presented to the Parliament. In fact, the Minister for HR 
claimed only recently that ‘the work at home concept for Malaysian women was 
still at the infancy stage’ (Zulkifli 2006), despite it having been on the reform 
agenda several years earlier. Funding for the Ministry of Human Resources for 
the period 2006-2010 has declined slightly to 1.1 per cent of overall allocations 
(Government of Malaysia 2006:530), which does not indicate that the Ministry is 
about to undertake any major new initiatives.  
 
The labour related legislation and institutions overseen by MHR embody both 
paternalistic and repressive aspects of labour control. The protective provisions 
of the Employment Act and the Industrial Relations Act are demonstrated in the 
decisions of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court. The repressive aspects 
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of which acts to limit the organising capacity of the trade union movement. The 
National Labour Advisory Committee (NLAC), the peak tripartite advisory 
committee, also falls within the responsibilities of the MHR. 
 
The NLAC has been criticised as largely ineffectual given its status as an 
advisory body rather than a decision making forum (Fold and Wangel 1998). 
However, it has functioned in part as a stabilising mechanism, by providing the 
Ministry with insights into the concerns of labour organisations and employer 
groups that it might otherwise be unaware of given the constraints on civil 
society in Malaysia. In other nations, an active civil society can alert 
governments to potentially destabilising issues. In Malaysia, bodies such as the 
NLAC provide a less public forum that nonetheless achieves a similar 
monitoring outcome for the government.  
 
Staff within the MHR have expressed the view that the intent of the Employment 
and Industrial Relations Acts is to provide a level of protection to workers above 
that delivered by the employment contract (interviews MHR 2002; see also 
Anantaraman 2001:2, 29). This view is also evident in the comments of Justice 
Gopal Sri Ram in a decision handed down in an appeal to the High Court in 2000 
on the Employment Act 1955: 
The scheme of the Act thus when viewed as a whole, is to afford 
protection to persons employed under a Contract of service. 
Hence, the Act is designed to afford a degree of security of tenure 
that is not available to a servant at common law. It is therefore 
plain that the Act is a piece of beneficent social legislation. As 
such its provisions must in accordance with well settled 
principles, receive a broad and liberal interpretation that enhances 
its avowed object’ (cited by Muhendaran 2001:1). 
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Further, the decisions handed down by the Industrial Court and the informal 
nature of its procedures, are perceived as more favourable to workers than 
employers (Maimunah 2001:5).  
 
Employer and industry lobby groups have sought wide ranging amendments to 
legislation overseen by the MHR. These include amendments to the Industrial 
Court, the removal of restrictions in the Employment Act relating to the 
employment of females, and some means of preventing staff in ‘sensitive’ 
positions from joining unions. Here the issues of flexibility, productivity, 
retrenchments and training costs will be discussed. 
 
Labour force flexibility 
Within Malaysia, the concept of labour force flexibility has been promoted by 
the National Productivity Corporation since the 1980s, but was revised in the 
1990s as part of the attempt to address issues of competitiveness. The Malaysian 
Employers’ Federation (MEF) has been particularly vocal on the topic, 
presenting the views of its members through a regular column written by its 
Executive Director, Shamsuddin Bardan, in the Business Times, an insert to the 
New Straits Times.  
 
Standing (2002:33) has identified seven forms of ‘flexibility’ that have emerged 
in labour arrangements as an outcome of pressures associated with economic 
internationalisation.  
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organisational flexibility – more turnover of firms, more use of sub-contracting 
and production “chains”, and a tendency to contract out the employment 
function; 
numerical flexibility – more use of external labour, such as contract workers, 
outworkers, homeworkers, agency labour, temporary workers, and teleworkers; 
functional flexibility – more changes in work tasks, job rotation, and skill for 
individual workers; 
job structure flexibility – more changes in the structure of jobs, associated with 
changes in job titles, number of them, etc.; 
working time flexibility – more continuous working, flexible hours, etc.; 
wage system flexibility – a shift from fixed to flexible wages, monetisation of 
remuneration, greater use of bonuses, etc.; 
labour force flexibility – less attachment to sectors, companies or occupational 
groups, erosion of “collective labour”, and greater tendency for workers to move 
in and out of the labour market and labour force. 
(Source: Standing 2002:33) 
 
Of the seven forms, employers in Malaysia have focused largely on those that 
deliver increased managerial prerogatives in the workplace, as opposed to those 
that seek to dismantle a labour force characterised by a high degree of 
regulation.
2 Deyo (2001) usefully draws the distinction between 'static' and 
                                                           
2 This is arguably the case in the more industrialised capitalist economies where centralised 
regulation of labour has been a feature, but does not adequately capture the reality of the 
segmented labour market in Malaysia where many workers are employed in the ‘informal 
economy’ and are beyond the scope of legislation and regulation of employment conditions. 
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utilisation of an appropriately trained, multi-skilled workforce, allowing firms to 
respond quickly and efficiently to ongoing changes in product demand. 
Innovation, as opposed to low labour costs, is the basis of competitiveness. This 
contrasts with 'static flexibility', which, according to Deyo, ‘focuses on short-
term adaptability and cost-cutting…with…negative consequences for labour… 
[Static flexibility] predominates in many countries and industrial sectors in the 
region’ (2001:269).  
 
In contrast, the government states it is seeking to achieve labour force 
flexibilities that will bring about the multi-skilled workforce associated with a k-
economy. Minister Fong announced in 2001 (NST 11 July 2001) that the 
Employment and Industrial Relations Acts were being amended to allow for 
‘flexi-time’. He described these changes as both progressive and ‘in line with the 
emergence of a new work culture in Malaysia, especially with the increased use 
of information and communication technology’. Fong argued the changes were 
necessary for the protection of workers:  
We need to broaden the context and scope so that we can provide 
legal protection to employees in this new environment…The 
primary aim of the amendments is to offer them protection (NST 
11 July 2001).  
 
In doing so, he attempted to reinforce the perception that the Ministry was acting 
on behalf of labour.  
 
When the term 'flexible' workforce was used in conjunction with the k-economy, 
it had many positive connotations. It envisaged workers who were autonomous 
and empowered to make decisions without supervision, and able to apply their 
  263initiative and creativity. Employers would be willing to pay higher wages in 
order to retain these workers, and their knowledge, with the firm. This was the 
model of a worker that figured in the media and government rhetoric surrounding 
the k-economy. ‘The term knowledge workers is not just another new 
buzzword…this new breed of versatile, autonomous and highly skilled 
workers…genuinely add value to information to create new knowledge’ (Mah 
Yong Sun of Andersen Consulting quoted in NST 25 May 1999).  
 
Issues of productivity 
One area that had long been a target for change by employers was the means of 
calculating remuneration. Rejecting calls by the trade union movement for a 
basic wage, the government agencies and employer groups instead advocated the 
linking of productivity to wages. In 1996, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the National Labour Advisory Council (MHR 1996) published its Guidelines on 
Wage Reform System, with the objective of introducing a stronger link between 
productivity and remuneration. In 1998, the Employment Act was amended to 
‘encourage employers to follow an incentive payment scheme’ (Suhanah 
2002:77). It did not require employers to introduce such schemes but it did make 
their introduction possible. 
 
Minister Fong, citing data produced by the National Productivity Council, 
claimed that over 50 per cent of Collective Agreements signed in 2000 included 
a productivity component. Press reports (Business Times 27 June 2001; Sun 21 
July 2001) indicated that schemes were more commonly introduced in operations 
where employee output was most easily measured, such as in garment and soft 
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operations, for example, medical supplies warehouses. Findings handed down by 
the Industrial Court in the late 1990s also supported this conclusion (see for 
example, Braun Medical Industries versus Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja B. Braun 
Industries, Case No. 2/2-114/97, Industrial Law Reports).  
 
Another case before the Industrial Court in 2000 with interesting implications for 
the k-economy transition involved the financial services sector. The Court ruled 
in favour of the association representing employees of HBSC Bank, thereby 
rejecting the company’s bid to link wages with productivity. The judge 
questioned how each employee’s contribution could be measured, given the 
intangible nature of the output (Industrial Court Malaysia, Case No. 7/2-
500/2000). This outcome indicated that productivity related schemes would need 
to operate under a different model for 'k-workers', whose output will often 
comprise services of an ‘intangible nature’, and will often be the product of 
collaboration, raising difficulties of individual measurement. 
 
The MEF argued that linking wages to productivity benefited both workers and 
business owners. 'The improvement of productivity is generally accepted 
worldwide as necessary for sustainable economic growth and for improving the 
quality of life of the citizen' (Shamsuddin 6 July 2000). Productivity linked 
wages schemes (PLWS) are promoted as essential to achieving the flexibility 
required to be competitive. On the other hand, collective agreements, which 
determine wages and conditions in unionised workplaces in the private sector, 
are seen as by the MEF as not affording employers the flexibility required to be 
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additionally because they are argued to have a flow on effect that will lead to 
inflation (Shamsuddin 6 July 2000).  
 
While the introduction of PLWS appeared to be progressing only in an ad hoc 
fashion, Dr Fong nonetheless stated that linking wages to productivity was vital 
to Malaysia's future competitiveness, and encouraged firms to adopt schemes. 
'Such a move will allow bonus, increments and other employee benefits to be 
closely linked to the productivity of workers' (Sun 21 July 2001; see also 
Business Times 27 June 2001). The ideal model of PLWS was a protracted topic 
of discussion by the Ministry of Human Resources, the National Productivity 
Corporation, employer groups and organised labour in the early 2000s, with 
employer groups preferring the option of determining schemes at the workplace 
level. 
 
As stated in the Third Outline Perspective Plan (Government of Malaysia 
2001b:121), ‘skills and knowledge become the main assets for the economy to 
gain competitiveness’ in the k-economy. The more highly skilled labour force 
leads to flatter hierarchies and semi-autonomous work teams allowing ‘better 
interaction…and…active involvement of workers in contributing ideas and 
decision-making' (Government of Malaysia 2001b:121). These claims provide a 
contrast to the emerging experiences of lower skilled worker where, instead of 
increased skill levels becoming more important, it is the physical fitness and 
stamina of workers that will be relied upon to improve productivity, further 
enforced via the insecurity of wages and increased individual scrutiny of 
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those government agencies at the forefront of promoting the k-economy, such as 
the National Productivity Commission and those actually charged with 
responsibility for overseeing labour related legislation, such as the Labour and 
Industrial Courts.  
 
Retrenchments 
Widespread retrenchment is an ongoing reality during periods of economic 
downturn, but consistent with its attempts to promote a ‘caring’ image, the 
government makes a highly publicised attempt to measure and control 
retrenchments through the provisions of the Employment Act and through the 
collection and publication of retrenchments data in the mainstream press. The 
1998 amendments to the Employment Act required employers to advise the 
Ministry of Human Resources one month in advance of impending 
retrenchments and to retrench foreign workers before local workers (NST 3 April 
2001). Relatively generous retrenchment benefits provided under the 
Employment Act are designed to discourage retrenchment.
3  
 
The practice of retrenchment has been a sensitive matter, industrially and 
politically, and there is still a strong sentiment amongst many workers that the 
firm and the government should look after workers (Hing 2000:239-240; Todd 
and Peetz 2001:1378). In the public sector retrenchments were rare (interview, 
Siva Subramaniam, President of CUEPACS, May 2001).  
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employer groups in an effort to challenge the societal antipathy and the 
legislative impediments towards retrenching workers (NST 18 August 2001). The 
model k-worker is personally responsible for keeping up to date with skills and 
will be uncompetitive in the labour market as the result of not maintaining 
relevant skills. The individual becomes increasingly responsible for their 
employment status, lessening the degree of responsibility placed on the firm.  
Today, seniority no longer guarantees employability and better 
positions. The comfort zone has simply disappeared…In the era 
of the K-economy, the business environment seeks employees 
who have the abilities [sic] to learn and unlearn…The K-economy 
also demands employees who have a passion for personal 
development. The faster one learns, the better it will be for him or 
her (Fong 2002a, Opening Address to the National Human 
Resources and Development Conference). 
 
In this case, there exists a degree of unanimity between the government and 
employer groups, for a number of reasons. For employers, it is an attempt to 
reduce costs associated with retrenchment payments, and to avoid so-called 
rigidities in labour hiring arrangements. For both employers and the government, 
it signals an attempt to justify shifting the costs of learning from the state or the 
firm, to the individual. Depicting k-workers as powerful and independent 
provides the government with a continued justification for rejecting demands for 
a minimum wages policy and for refusing to implement a more comprehensive 
welfare system.  
…the government has expressed concern over the cost and 
negative work incentive efforts that such programs may entail. 
They prefer to rely on labor market flexibility and rapid 
adjustment combined with selective as hoc expenditures such as 
those included in the 1999 and 2000 budgets as a means of 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 For employees with less than two years of service, the retrenchment payment amounts to ten 
days per year of service. Those with more than three years of service are entitled to twenty days 
per year. 
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long term growth rates and high sustained investment in education 
and infrastructure as the best way to deliver opportunities to the 
broadest spectrum of the population over time (World Bank 
2000a:12-13). 
 
Press coverage during the 2001 economic downturn was frequently used to 
remind unemployed workers that opportunities existed for their retraining, and 
that despite the high number of retrenchments, there were in fact more vacancies 
than unemployed workers. For example, the Minister for Human Resources 
stated that while 31,000 workers had been laid off if the first 10 months of 2001, 
there were 103,000 vacancies advertised in the same period (NST 24 October 
2001).  
 
When in 2001 the MTUC revisited an earlier proposal for a retrenchment scheme 
that would guarantee workers their entitlements if the firm should prove unable 
to pay, the idea initially received a positive response from the current Minister 
(NST 5 May 2001). The scheme would have imposed a levy of 0.15 per cent on 
employees and employers. The MEF criticised the MTUC proposal, arguing that 
existing protections were adequate (Business Times 1 August 2001). The scheme 
was not introduced and received less attention in the wake of the economic 
recovery.  
 
Despite the efforts to encourage flexible working arrangements in the private 
sector, the events surrounding the restructuring of Malaysian Airlines Systems 
(MAS) offers some insight into the constraints felt by political leaders when 
required to directly intervene in employment matters. In this case, sensitivities 
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MAS was the national carrier.  
 
In 2001 when MAS, experiencing a severe debt burden, proposed retrenching 
3,000 members of its predominantly Malay workforce, the application was 
rejected by the government. Even in 2002, with the decision to sell MAS assets, 
the Minister for Transport moved to reassure workers of continued employment, 
although ‘employees are expected to follow and take up jobs in the companies 
buying over these branches of MAS’ (Star 10 January 2002).  
 
Concerns that MAS was not operating on a profitable basis were proved by the 
release of quarterly data that showed huge losses in late 2004. In mid 2005 the 
Prime Minister reassured the public that plans were in place to address the 
problems (NST 16 July 2005; Star 16 July 2005). The Prime Minister met with 
representatives of the MAS Employees’ Union in early December. The union 
leadership looked to the PM to resolve the situation, telling the media: ‘Let us 
wait for the decision of the Prime Minister. Everything will be decided on that 
day’ (Bernama 28 November 2005). A new managing director was appointed to 
MAS in December 2005 but he initially refused to comment on the likelihood of 
staff layoffs (Sidhu 2005).  
 
By mid 2006, management of the government-owned company announced that a 
serious rationalisation of its domestic routes was necessary. This required that its 
22,000 strong workforce be reduced by approximately one third. According to 
the government newsagency, Bernama, (29 May 2006) workers were to receive a 
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worker and their dependents would receive free medical coverage for a year. 
Union officials reportedly agreed that the amount paid to workers who accepted 
the offer was greater than that laid down in the collective agreement 
(Malaysiakini 23 May 2006).  
 
Bypassing MHR 
By the early 2000s, employers had had only limited success in achieving 
significant reforms to labour related legislation, despite receiving considerable 
verbal support from the Minister for HR and the Minister for International Trade 
and Industry, Rafidah Aziz. The situation became one where the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) under the long term leadership of 
Rafidah, took on some of the restructuring agenda, as well as becoming involved 
in aspects of the higher education sector and industrial skills training. MITI was, 
in many respects, bypassing the MHR and the MOE where change had emerged 
too slowly for some employer groups.  
 
Through high level forums such as the National Committee on Business 
Competitiveness (NCBC, established in July 2001), chaired by Rafidah, and 
through corporatised government agencies, such as the National Productivity 
Corporation (NPC), which reported to Rafidah, efforts were undertaken to 
implement or at least to lobby for, significant changes in the structure, skill base 
and remuneration of the labour force that had not been achieved through the 
Ministries of HR and Education (MITI 2002; NCBC 2002; NPC 1999, 2001). 
The NCBC established a working group on human resources, education and 
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groups (interviews MICCI 2002 and AMCHAM 2002).  
 
This is not to suggest that MITI is sheltered from the political and social 
pressures constraining MOE and MHR. As mentioned earlier, the Industrial 
Coordination Act (ICA), overseen by MITI, was introduced in 1975 as a means 
of ensuring that foreign manufacturing establishments ‘conduct their operations 
in a manner consistent with the requirements of national objectives’ 
(Government of Malaysia 1981:144). That is, as part of licensing requirements, 
foreign firms were required to employ a given quota of Malays. Therefore, even 
while at the forefront of promoting Malaysia as a place for foreign capital to 
operate, MITI has played a role in securing socio-political objectives. However, 
during Mahathir’s term as Minister of MITI (1976-79), the ICA was twice 
amended in an effort to reassure concerned foreign and local investors that they 
would have an adequate level of autonomy in running their businesses. In 1979, 
MITI formed an Industrial Advisory Council which provided a forum for the 
private sector to raise concerns. ‘Through this dialogue disaffected Chinese 
business persons were invited to discuss their concerns directly with (then) 
Minister of International Trade and Industry, Mahathir Mohamad’ (Biddle and 
Milor 1999:16). This has since developed into the MITI Annual Dialogue held in 
the pre budget build up. It is another avenue through which capital can bypass 
the predominantly Malay civil service in order to access senior government 
bureaucrats and politicians. MITI has therefore been more closely aligned with 
the business sector than have other government ministries.  
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unexpected in an economy attempting an economic transition. Nonetheless, the 
nature of the mismatch indicates the particular characteristics of compromises 
embedded within MHR. Firstly, MHR staff interviewed in 2002 expressed the 
view that it is the role of the department to protect workers, particularly lower 
paid workers to whom the Employment Act applies.
4 This was especially the 
case given that the union movement is perceived by some staff as unable or 
unwilling to protect workers. Secondly, MHR staff expressed the concern that if 
they pushed forward with change without gaining the agreement of the MTUC 
and the Malaysian Employers’ Federation, a level of public debate would have 
emerged, leaving the Ministry open to criticism that it was unable to achieve 
consensus. Consensus, or at least the absence of public debate, is central to the 
maintenance of the perception of the government as a sound economic manager 
and a feature of the paternalistic relationship between MHR and the union 
movement. Thirdly, acceding to the demands made by employers had the 
potential to reduce the Ministry’s legislative capacity to intervene in industrial 
relations and employment matters when it was deemed necessary. The 
government has actively enforced its central role in industrial relations, which 
has delivered political as well as labour market goals. However, while the 
government is relatively less active in regulating employment matters, it is 
consistent with the notion of a ‘caring’ government that it retain a protective 
legislative role with regard to lower paid worker even if in practise, managerial 
prerogative remains high.  
 
                                                           
4 Interviews were conducted in 2002 with staff involved in the tripartite committee overseeing the 
amendments to the Ministry’s legislation.  
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the management of the labour force, the Government of Malaysia has 
demonstrated a reluctance to relinquish its legislative role in industrial relations. 
A 2001 study of Malaysian industrial relations concluded that ‘[s]tate 
intervention remains pervasive, managerial control in the workplace continues to 
dominate and labour's ability to bargain collectively remains constricted’ (Todd 
and Peetz 2001:1380). While it is the government’s clear preference not to be 
involved directly in workplace matters, it is nonetheless unlikely to dismantle the 
labour-related institutions currently in place, preferring instead that increased 
flexibilities be built into employment legislation. 
 
The Ministry of Education (MOE) 
The MOE has played a central role in achieving the social engineering goals of 
the NEP, but in doing so, has become an institution steeped in ethno-political 
sensitivities. The MOE has implemented various policies designed to contain 
Malay aspirations within acceptable boundaries by promoting their cultural 
expression in the education system. As noted in earlier chapters, a quota system 
was enacted that allocates 65 per cent of places in public universities to 
Bumiputera. English as the language of instruction in the public education sector 
was progressively replaced with Bahasa Melayu (Malay language) from 1971. 
Despite allocating twenty per cent of all public spending to the education sector, 
a relatively large proportion of this goes directly to households via subsidies to 
Malay university students (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2005:51). 
These were concessions to Malay nationalism that in the aftermath of the 1969 
riots were considered politically and socially necessary. Hence, these measures 
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particular socio-cultural and political circumstances and which are now 
embedded such that reversing them is understood as risking Malay support for 
the government (Lee 2003). However, the government’s increased dependence 
on non-Malay electoral support also made it an increasingly risky proposition to 
overlook the demands of non-Malays for greater access to educational 
opportunities (Heng 1997:277). In the privatisation of higher education, 
therefore, we witness not only a pragmatic, if partial, response to the 
inadequacies of the sector, but also a politically acceptable means of delivering 
greater access to higher education for middle income non-Malays. 
 
According to employer groups, several features of the public university system 
limit the usefulness of public sector graduates to the current workplace. 
Athukorala (2001:47) summarises the criticism voiced by employers. 
…the NEP, despite its remarkable achievement in improving 
general literacy, has had an unintended negative effect on the 
quality of tertiary education…The imposition of racial quotas in 
favour of bumiputeras [sic] meant favouring equity and 
distribution objectives over merit…and the introduction of Bahasa 
Malaysia (the national language) in favour of English…As a 
result, students graduating from local tertiary institutions are 
commonly unfamiliar with English. 
 
Facing criticism from non-Malays regarding the ethnic bias in allocating 
university places, and under pressure by industry to modernise the education 
system to produce more ‘work ready graduates’, in 1996, the Government 
implemented the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act that facilitated the 
establishment of private universities. These institutions offer courses taught in 
English in professional areas deemed economically relevant. In 2001 various 
sources estimated that approximately 80 to 90 per cent of private university 
  275students were ethnic Chinese (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2005:55 
citing EPU 2001; Lee 1999:81; NST 25 May 2001). Therefore, while the 
establishment of private sector universities improved the access to university 
education of middle income non-Malays and allowed the government to delay 
structural reform of the public universities, it is not a strategy likely to provide a 
solution to the problem of poorly skilled and unemployed Bumiputera graduates.  
 
Figures released by the NEAC indicated that in 2002, approximately 25,000 
graduates had registered with the government to participate in retraining schemes 
for the unemployed (Dzulkarnain 2002). The vast majority (94 per cent) of the 
students were Bumiputera. Executive Director of the NEAC, Mustapa Mohamed, 
was attributed with the following statement in the press: ‘This is basically a 
Malay problem. This shows that there are many Malay students who opt for arts 
courses which are not needed by the job market’ (NST 14 March 2002). One of 
the reasons that the government has been unable to redirect students from arts to 
sciences is the inability of the agency
5 charged with translating from English into 
Bahasa Melayu the text books, technical and computer manuals, academic 
journals and other teaching and learning tools required (Yunggar 2005:336). 
Employer groups have stated that these graduates are not suited to the current job 
market and would prefer that industry had a stronger say the curriculum offered 
by public sector universities (Chua 2002; Shamsuddin Bardin, MEF, interview 
July 2002). 
 
                                                           
5 This agency is the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.  
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in Kuala Lumpur was addressed by Paul Low of the Federation of Malaysian 
Manufacturers. He claimed that local institutions were not producing students 
‘suited to the business environment’ (Pacific Bridge 2002). In 2004, the 
Malaysian Education Summit was organised. This forum brought together 
representatives of universities and the major employer groups, MICCI and FMM, 
whose representatives repeated similar claims regarding the quality of graduates 
(Star May 2 2004).  
 
In the past, many Malay graduates were absorbed in the Malaysian Civil Service. 
It is estimated that between 80 to 90 per cent of civil servants are Malay (Sun 3 
June 2001; NST 11 July 2001). However, having made a commitment to reduce 
the rate of growth of the public sector, and given that more than 70,000 students 
now graduate from public universities each year, the government has found this 
option less effective. From the early 2000s, the MHR instituted a myriad of 
training and retraining programs for unemployed graduates, which, in addition to 
fully subsidising the cost of training courses, offered an RM500 per month 
allowance. Given that full time workers in semi-skilled factory occupations may 
earn as little RM400-600 per month, this was a relatively generous allowance. As 
the number of unemployed graduates grew to over 80,000 by 2005, so too did the 
allocation for training programs. 
 
Concerns about the ad hoc nature of reforms to the university system emerged at 
an academic conference in 2004. 
The Malaysian government’s objective in developing an export 
oriented K-economy with highly skilled, Malaysian labour 
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national strategy but one articulated without any proper attention 
to the universities of Malaysia (Vicziany and Puteh 2004:18). 
 
Institutional changes were being introduced in a tentative fashion. For example, 
in June 2001 it was reported that Cabinet had approved an Education Blueprint 
for the period 2001-2010. On a number of occasions since then, DAP opposition 
leader, Lim Kit Siang (2002, 2005) criticised the Minister claiming that he had 
still not presented the report to the Parliament. In 2003, English was reintroduced 
as the language of instruction in maths and science subjects commencing with 
particular years of primary and high school. In 2004, the MOE was restructured. 
The pared-down Ministry of Education retained responsibility for all non-tertiary 
levels of education and the Department of Islamic and Moral Education, while 
the newly created Ministry of Higher Education took on responsibilities relating 
to public and private sector tertiary education.  
 
Lee Hock Guan (2003:26) suggests the government faces a clear policy choice 
between the pursuit of competitiveness or the retention of affirmative action in 
education matters: ‘…a policy that continues to favour Malays does not always 
serve the government’s larger economic vision to put Malaysia on the fast-track 
to developed country status’. In the case of education, Lee Hock Guan (2000:13) 
notes a growing pragmatism coupled with the recognition that Malaysia must 
forge a strong economic relationship with China. He suggests the government 
understands the usefulness of a sizeable population competent in Chinese-
languages and with cultural or other ties to China and that this has been an 
impetus to allowing greater access by Chinese to private sector education.  
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accrued to the government. Allowing the establishment of private universities 
has gone some way to addressing the demands of Malaysia’s middle income 
Chinese community for access to university education. Importantly, this outcome 
has been achieved without incurring greater government expenditure to build 
new public universities, and without requiring the government to immediately 
take on the politically fraught challenge of dismantling the NEP-related aspects 
of the education system.  
 
Secondly, the plight of unemployed Malay graduates is being given a full run in 
the press. While demonstrating that the graduates are being given every 
assistance by the Ministry, as a ‘caring’ government should, the criticisms of 
employers are simultaneously being used to garner support for changes. The 
employer groups voicing these criticisms would not normally resort to the media 
to make such claims as they have direct access to senior bureaucrats and 
politicians. Rather, by allowing this issue to run through the media, the 
government is attempting to influence opinion before embarking on what will 
still be a politically sensitive undertaking. The reforms are being linked to 
Malaysia’s competitiveness and the requirements of the k-economy.  
If we wish to become a knowledge-based economy, if we wish to 
be a developed country and maintain that developed status, the 
development of human capital must be made a priority (Abdullah 
Badawi 2006b).  
 
The new Minister for Education, Hishamuddin Tun Hussein, advised the media 
in 2005 that his Ministry planned to present a five year education blueprint by 
the year’s close (Star 3 September 2005). While there was no reference to this 
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been increased substantially (Abdullah 2006a). In releasing the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan 2006-2010 (Government of Malaysia 2006), efforts have been made to 
reassure those who might see in the move towards the wider use of English a 
devaluing of Malay language and culture. For example, in 2005, the ‘j-QAF’ 
programme was introduced at primary school level in order to teach Muslim 
students a number of skills relating to the practice of Islam, including the reading 
and writing of Jawi and recitation in Arabic of the Quoran (Government of 
Malaysia 2006:242).  
 
Home Ministry (Department Of Immigration) 
In 2001, the government announced the goal of halving the number of foreign 
workers in Malaysia by 2010, which would have reduced the foreign component 
of the labour force to approximately three per cent (Government of Malaysia 
2001:153). In an attempt to modernise the argument against the use of foreign 
labour, the government linked continued access to foreign labour as an 
impediment to the development of a k-economy, arguing that businesses are 
discouraged from investing in new technology and training while they can 
continue to rely on cheap unskilled labour.  
Efforts will be increased to optimize the use of local labour and 
further reduce dependence on foreign labour. The shortening of 
the period of stay for foreign workers will be strictly adhered to so 
that firms will take positive steps to move into higher capital-
intensity production processes (Government of Malaysia 
2001:115). 
 
According to the government, easy access to cheap foreign labour had 
contributed to an environment where little was invested in training and 
technological advances, particularly by small to medium sized enterprises 
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2002). Employers were warned that future access to foreign labour would be 
limited and changes to the Immigration Act were effected in 2002 which were 
designed to increase the level of control over labour migration and which 
imposed higher penalties on both workers and employers in breach of the Act.  
 
Employers criticised the amendments. For example, arguing that restrictions on 
regional labour mobility would increase labour costs, the Malaysian International 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI) stated that any crack down on the 
use of foreign labour would send potential investors to more ‘friendly’ countries 
(MICCI 2001:9-10). According to MICCI, local workers were unwilling to take 
on the jobs generally held by low skilled migrant workers.  
Foreign workers provide a useful source of human resources for 
industries where working conditions or remuneration make jobs 
unattractive to Malaysians…Removing the foreign labour 
component from the Malaysian economy will have a serious 
implication for production costs since foreign labour is generally 
lower paid (MICCI 2001:9). 
 
A number of other employer groups have raised similar fears regarding the loss 
of migrant labour.
6  
 
The fact that the government has at various time been willing to be persuaded to 
resume labour importation against the advice of some of its own agencies 
indicates the level of conflict it faces in trying to institute a new change in 
economic direction. Many employers, particularly SMEs in the manufacturing 
sector, and those in the plantation, construction and real estate sectors, have 
                                                           
6 For example, the Federation of Sabah Manufacturers (Bernama 8.4.2002); the Malaysian 
Employers’ Federation (BT 7.8.2002 ); the Real Estate and Housing Development Association 
(BT 6.8.2002); the Master Builders’ Association (NST 24.6.2002) 
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groups have successfully extracted concessions from the Government that allow 
for continued access to foreign labour. With the support of the Construction 
Industry Development Board (NST 9 August 2002) and the Minister for Human 
Resources (NST 8 August 2002) who made submissions to the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign Workers, a new ‘fast-link’ process for the approval of 
permits was reportedly established by the Home Ministry (Star 14 August 2002; 
NST 18 August 2002). 
 
However, while the economic reliance of fractions of capital on migrant labour 
and their ability to influence government decision making is clearly evident, 
there are other factors constraining the government from taking action to reduce 
the use of foreign workers. Firstly, the availability of foreign labour has assisted 
in delivering a low wage regime which has been important to the government’s 
management of inflation and interest rates. Fold and Wangel (1998) have argued 
that keeping a check on wages has been a central concern of the Malaysian 
Government. ‘The use of foreign labour is the Government’s principal measure 
to maintain a competitive labour market’ (1998:140). They argue that while 
employment related legislation goes some way towards constraining wages 
growth, it is in reality the competitive nature of the labour market that delivers 
wage control. ‘The labour market is competitive to the extent that different 
groups of workers are pitched against each other. Segmentation and polarization 
persist’ (1998:145). Hence, particularly in a tight labour market situation, the 
presence of a large pool of cheap labour contributes, at least in some sectors, to 
keep wages under control. 
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This pool of labour is not only cheap because of its abundance, but also because 
of its marginalised location in the Malaysian labour force and society. Foreign 
workers are frequently depicted in a negative fashion in the local press 
(Dannecker 2004).  
Editions of the government-controlled New Straits Times 
highlight problems concerning immigrants such as the spread of 
diseases in the squatter settlements as well as other social 
problems including drugs, violence, murder, rape and prostitution 
(Crinis 2006:100-101). 
 
By contributing to the demonisation of foreign workers, the government 
reinforces the segmented nature of the Malaysian labour force. This 
segmentation facilitates the differential treatment of labour. Harsher, more 
coercive means of control can be exercised over lower status, less skilled foreign 
labour, particularly undocumented foreign workers. Little political or social 
backlash is generated.
7 The concessions and protections that are extended to 
local workers are not required to be extended to migrant labour, reducing their 
cost to the state and employers. The use of migrant labour as a reserve army, by 
which is meant that they can be repatriated when not required, has provided a 
means of ‘adapting to economic fluctuations’ (Leithäuser 1988:179).  
 
The poor public image of foreign workers also limits the effectiveness of the 
labour movement in Malaysia. Knowing that there is little sympathy for foreign 
workers who are often seen as competitors willing to undersell their labour (Hing 
2000:230-232), the MTUC has found it difficult to garner support on their 
                                                           
7 Rudnick (1996:44-53) argues that Bangladeshi workers are especially vulnerable to harsh 
physical abuse given their heavy debt loads and their poor reputation in Malaysia. In 1995 and 
again in 2000, the Malaysian Government announced a ban on further recruitment from 
Bangladesh. This has since been lifted. 
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has not made a serious recruitment effort. Yet the failure to recruit and organise 
these workers means the union movement is unable to achieve any improvement 
in the conditions faced by either foreign workers or lower status local workers. 
At the same time, while the MTUC has made statements that support the 
government’s efforts to control the number of migrant workers, the reality is that 
large numbers remain, undercutting the already poor bargaining position of the 
local workforce (Edwards 1997; Rudnick 1996:47-48).  
 
Despite the 2001 goal of halving the proportion of foreign workers the outcome 
was a doubling in the proportion of foreign workers in Malaysia between 2001 
and 2005 (Government of Malaysia 2006:250). Out of a total labour force of 
10,894,800, in 2005 foreign workers numbered 1,777,600. Given that these 
figures only represent foreign workers who have been granted permits, and that 
estimates of the number of undocumented workers vary from a million upwards, 
Malaysia’s reliance on foreign labour becomes evident as does the unrealistic 
nature of the government’s earlier targets of drastic reductions. More recently, 
the government has softened its statements: ‘In line with the policy to shift to 
technology-intensive and higher values activities, there will be judicious use of 
foreign workers’ (Government of Malaysia 2006:250, emphasis mine).  
 
It appears that, despite the attempted transition towards the k-economy, the 
government is unable to institute reforms that would significantly reduce the 
reliance on semi skilled foreign workers. Not only are employers in labour 
intensive sectors highly dependent on access to this labour, the government has 
  284also benefited, economically and politically. Politically, the government has 
hoped to avoid the clash with capital that would result from withdrawing migrant 
labour. Economically, international labour migration arrangements have enabled 
Malaysia to avoid the welfare and education costs of approximately twenty five 
per cent of the labour force whose social reproduction is borne by the source 
countries. Conversely, the use of migrant domestic workers has privatised the 
costs of Malaysian women participating in paid labour by allowing the 
government to avoid state expenditure on child care and other infrastructure that 
would support greater labour force participation by women.  
 
In the light of the harshness that marked the repatriations of Indonesian labour in 
2002, the Government of Indonesia has made demands of the Malaysian 
Government with regard to implementing some protections for Indonesian 
workers in Malaysia. Deportations took place again in 2005, but observers 
reported that this proceeded with far fewer incidents of abuse (Muhamad 
2005:42-43). It is likely that the situation of intermittent repatriation of foreign 
labour will continue during times of economic downturn, with approval of large 
numbers of foreign workers during periods of high labour demand. That the 
government has such an inconsistent approach to the situation once again 
indicates a lack of autonomy in determining economic policies, a situation made 
even more complex by the need to negotiate conflicts arising out of the 
régulation of labour’s social reproduction.  
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Conclusions 
Representatives of industry lobby groups have questioned the extent to which a 
pro-Bumiputera agenda can be reconciled with the need to be competitive and 
create a flexible workforce.  
…we are constrained by the need to aim for ethnic balance in employment. 
Hence we may not be able to employ the best person for the most 
challenging jobs. Thus competitiveness suffers. Unless we increase our 
internal competition and liberalise internally, it will be difficult to compete 
externally (Ramon Navaratnam, corporate advisor to the Sunway Group, 
addressing a conference on global competitiveness in Kuala Lumpur, 
quoted in BT 27 October 2001). 
 
In the past the government has defended affirmative action for Bumiputera on 
the basis that uneven economic development between the ethnic groups risks 
social turmoil. Given the emphasis on meritocracy and ‘technopreneurship’ 
evident in the government’s own k-economy rhetoric, the government was forced 
to defend ethnic employment and education quotas to critics yet at the same time 
reassure Malays of their continued support. Dr Mahathir encouraged Malays to 
become more independent. A headline warned: ‘GET READY: Be prepared for 
withdrawal of more privileges to face open competition, Dr M tells Malays’ 
(Star 21 June 2002). 
 
It is clear that the Malaysian Government is willing at times to prioritise political 
concerns above economic ones. Nonetheless, care is taken to appease business 
leaders in various ways. For example, a World Bank investigation (Biddle and 
Milor 1999) has suggested increased opportunities emerged in Malaysia for 
business to influence the direction of policy making. From a regulationist 
perspective, the establishment of high level business-government committees 
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mechanisms that diffuse some of the tensions emerging between particular 
government agencies and the more powerful industry groups such as the FMM. 
This may generate greater pressure on agencies to institute reforms to the labour 
market and education sector but at the risk of increased social and political 
instability unless alternative means of managing tensions associated with labour 
issues can be incorporated within the restructuring process. 
 
The continued saliency of economic and cultural concessions for Malays 
continues to constrain policies as evidenced above. Even where such policies 
threaten economic growth, they have become embedded institutionally and 
ideologically. The late 1990s and early 2000s was therefore marked by a range of 
contradictory and ad hoc policy directions. The appeal of the k-economy was not 
as politically successful in restructuring the basis of UMNO’s legitimacy with 
the Malay population as Mahathir had intended.  
 
However, a feature of Mahathir’s leadership was that he never relied on one 
strategy alone to achieve his goals. In the midst of claims regarding the 
‘empowering’ qualities of the emerging k-society were a range of measures 
which sought to impose greater government surveillance and new forms of 
discipline upon particular groups of workers. In 2000, the Statutory Authorities 
(Discipline and Surcharge) Act was introduced to standardise disciplinary 
procedures in state authorities and the Public Officers (Discipline and Conduct) 
Regulations of 1993 were ‘streamlined to meet current requirements’ 
(Government of Malaysia 2001:621). In 2001 and 2002, civil servants were 
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measures were introduced, again targeting the civil service. The tool most linked 
to the k-economy, the networked computer, became another target of the 
government, reflecting ‘the dilemma of [countries] needing sophisticated 
information systems to upgrade their economies, while at the same time wishing 
to exclude people’s access to information considered to be too ‘liberal’ (de Silva 
1997:13). In 2002, individuals accused of spreading rumours through email were 
detained by the police and in early 2003 a government raid was conducted on the 
offices of web-based independent media outlet, Malaysiakini (Brown 2005:49). 
The twentieth century’s last decade witnessed state 
implementation of new strategies of garnering consent, and the 
invocation of old strategies of coercion that relied on the use of 
physical force and regressive legislation (Chin 2000:1046).  
 
While this chapter suggests that contradictions, inconsistencies and institutional 
mismatches were signalling weaknesses in the mode of régulation, it is also the 
case that Mahathir generally managed to balance a range of institutional and 
policy contradictions for more than two decades. He had developed a powerful 
rhetoric that united and made sense of the seemingly paradoxical (Khoo 1995). 
When criticised for continued interventions in the labour market and the 
economy, Mahathir responded by rejecting neoliberalism as ‘western’ and 
uncaring. He developed a globalisation discourse in which Malaysia was 
depicted as a developing economy struggling against the neocolonialism of the 
industrialised capitalist economies. ‘To be able to manage the pace and direction 
of liberalisation and globalisation, developing countries must be allowed to 
effectively participate in the decision making processes in all international 
institutions’ (Dr Mahathir in a speech to the Malaysian-Russian Business Forum, 
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was used to exhort increased productivity and to remind workers of the dangers 
of industrial unrest: ‘Malaysian workers must be ready for globalisation’: 
(Bernama 30 April 2002). His view of ‘regulated globalisation’ (Salmy Hashim 
2002) was utilised to defend the wide array of political and economic 
interventions adopted by his government in order to manage conflicting demands 
in Malaysian society and economy.  
 
The extent to which Mahathir’s government had policy autonomy was strongly 
linked to the ability to source funding domestically without imposing high levels 
of income taxation. His government’s extensive use of the Employee’s Provident 
Fund for this purpose had attracted criticism in a society developing more 
awareness of financial accounting standards while also concerned to protect 
retirement incomes. At the same time, the social policies that ameliorated 
societal tensions such as free health care, subsidised water, electricity and fuel, 
were increasingly expensive to maintain yet politically risky to remove. This is 
addressed in the following chapter which again examines institutional 
mismatches but focuses more particularly on the economic aspects of the social 
reproduction of labour in the shaping of the state-labour nexus. 
 
  289Chapter Seven: Economic paternalism: Embedded but pressured  
 
…Dr Mahathir said Malaysians generally lead a comfortable life 
as the government has been able to keep the country’s economy 
under control to prevent high increases in the cost of living 
(Bernama 30 April 2002). 
 
…as a matter of principle, the government cannot continue to 
nurture habits which reduce the incentive to increase efficiency 
and productivity. We cannot go on masking our true 
competitiveness in the global marketplace via subsidies and the 
like (Abdullah Badawi 2006b).  
 
Introduction 
Institutionally, some of the most extensive levers of control available to the 
Malaysian government in the régulation of labour are linked not to the 
workplace, wages or welfare, but to savings and consumption. The government 
has consistently avoided involvement in the determination of private sector 
wages and devotes a minute amount of the budget to what is strictly termed 
‘welfare’. In contrast, government agencies, including the central bank, Bank 
Negara Malaysia ( BNM), play a pivotal role in household consumption and 
savings decisions. This institutional capacity was expanded in association with 
the social re-engineering of the NEP, but the role has extended as the 
government negotiates its relationship with the growing proportion of Malay and 
non-Malay middle and upper income earners.  
 
This chapter unravels some of the existing strategies that contribute to economic 
paternalism. In the main, these strategies represent the mediated outcomes of 
previous conflicts over responsibility for the funding of labour’s social 
reproduction. The establishment of the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) in 
1951 was discussed as a case in point in earlier chapters. The EPF today remains 
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time to allow early access to funds by members in order to purchase a home, to 
invest in annuities, and to cover approved educational and health costs. This 
spending has, however, exacerbated the problem of inadequate retirement 
income. While the EPF has served the government extremely well as a means of 
regulating labour’s current income and spending, and remains a vast pool of 
investment funding for the government, in terms of its original purpose of 
providing for individuals and their families during retirement, it has been 
seriously undermined. 
 
Other aspects of economic paternalism are under pressure. For example, 
demographic changes and rising consumption levels have vastly expanded the 
costs to the government of subsidising consumer goods. Additionally, there is 
growing concern regarding the widening of the income gap evident since the 
1997/98 financial crisis. Consumption-led ‘welfare’ appears inadequate as a 
means of assisting households in poverty, particularly if market pricing is 
introduced as a result of the privatisation of the water and power utilities, and if 
the planned introduction of fees for health services proceeds. 
 
International agencies and local business groups representing foreign owned 
firms have lobbied for the implementation of competition policy that will 
directly challenge the government’s interventions in the pricing and supply of a 
range of commodities, and its extensive controls over the banking and finance 
sector. The European Community has used the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) to request the Malaysian government to open to foreign 
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sector. Each of these moves challenges the government’s ability to manage the 
economy in the ways necessary to the support of economic paternalism. 
 
Funding for the distributional policies that reinforce economic paternalism is also 
at risk. Since the mid 1980s, government revenue has been expanded by 
petroleum-related income which, in 2005, contributed 40 per cent of total 
government revenue. Malaysia’s oil and gas reserves are finite in the near future; 
approximately 20 years in the case of oil, and 30-35 years for natural gas. To rely 
more heavily on revenue derived from income taxation will introduce new 
pressures on funding and may raise the level of opposition to distributional 
policies. It is a situation reminiscent of the divisions within UMNO and between 
the coalition partners in 1969 and 1970 regarding the extent to which NEP 
policies could be pursued without risking further political and social unrest 
(Heng 1997; Lee 2005). More than this, opposition by capital and labour to 
politically motivated spending is also likely to figure given their greater 
contribution to income tax revenue in the past two decades. Certain fractions of 
capital have, however, benefited from economic paternalism and the capital 
mobilisation it has encouraged. Changes to the nature of economic paternalism 
will, therefore, be mediated within a complex set of political and economic 
constraints. 
 
The current situation therefore represents another period of uncertainty in 
determining the means of labour régulation. To explore this further, the chapter 
provides, firstly, some specific examples of the forms of economic paternalism 
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some aspects of economic paternalism inadequate and potentially destabilising 
are examined. Thirdly, in contrast to claims by Ramesh (2000:155-156) that the 
government has the autonomy to shift policy easily given its electoral 
dominance, the government’s mixed success in introducing new and modified 
forms of economic paternalism is made evident. Efforts to undo existing aspects 
of economic paternalism are thwarted by their embedded nature and by a lack of 
capacity on the part of the ruling elite to ignore popular pressures. Conversely, 
recent interventions in the financial sector look promising in terms of providing 
new sources of funding and revenue. These options may present the government 
with the means to continue with the use of politically motivated distributional 
policies as a means of regulating labour.  
 
Economic paternalism in the ‘caring society’  
The establishment of a ‘caring society’ was one of the nine goals of Mahathir’s 
Vision 2020. ‘Caring’, in the sense it has been emphasised by the government, is 
demonstrated by providing individuals with the opportunity to advance 
themselves through greater incorporation into the economy, through 
employment, retraining or small business creation, and through home ownership 
(Henderson et al. 2002).  
 
The Minister for National Unity and Social Development, Siti Zahara, explained 
that the Social Welfare Policy implemented from 1990 was driven by the goal of 
‘creating a caring society while inculcating the sense of independence and self-
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1 A Director of the Department 
of Social Welfare described the department’s activities as focused on ‘…the 
attainment of self-reliance, equalization of opportunities for the less fortunate 
and fostering the spirit of mutual help and support’ (Mohd Rashid 2003). Rather 
than the Department of Social Welfare, most funding to assist eligible 
Bumiputera and the rural poor is incorporated into schemes overseen by the 
Ministry for Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development and the Ministry for 
Rural Regional Development with combined funding allocations amounting to 
almost RM17 billion (8.4 per cent of total allocations) over 2006-2010 
(Government of Malaysia 2006:530).  
 
Funding  
Funding has been central to containing the potential backlash to the less than 
transparent ways in which government-controlled economic resources have been 
mobilised in the pursuit of political and social stability. Significantly, the 
Malaysian government has control over income derived from petroleum 
exploration by foreign companies and Petronas. Secondly, through a series of 
moves since the 1970s, the government now wields considerable control over the 
banking and finance sectors (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993). This facilitates 
access to funds held in unit trusts and pension schemes.  
 
The greatest source of funding has been the EPF which holds almost 85 per cent 
of all pension funds in Malaysia, and which, by legislation, must invest the 
majority of its funds in government securities (Government of Malaysia 
                                                           
1 The Department of Social Welfare was previously located under the Ministry for National Unity 
and Social Development. It is now part of the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
Development.  
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financed through the EPF (BNM 2006:112). By the close of 2006, accumulated 
contributions within the EPF amounted to RM280 billion. MacKinnon (1996:46-
47) therefore describes the EPF as having a dual role; that of a ‘provider of basic 
social security…and as the source of long-term investment funds for state-led 
initiatives’. The next largest source of domestic investment funds available to the 
Government is through Permodalan Nasional Berhad ( PNB).  PNB is a 
government owned unit trust manager which oversees a number of unit trust 
funds originally started in 1978 as part of NEP efforts to increase Bumiputera 
wealth through share holding. Investments in unit trusts, annuities and other 
financial instruments have become useful sources of debt funding for the 
government. By mid 2005 the net assets value of government unit trusts was just 
over RM52 billion (Ministry of Finance 2005:102).  
 
The proportion of non-tax revenue has fluctuated from 17 to 24 per cent of total 
revenue over the past 25 years (see Tables 1.5 and 7.6). This reflects the extent 
of government activity in the economy, and is earned mainly from investments, 
with contributions from the issuance of licenses and permits, as well as through 
rents on infrastructure (Ministry of Finance 2005:51). Taxes derived from oil 
production and export constituted almost 23 per cent of the total taxation revenue 
in 2005 (Ministry of Finance 2005:xxix).
2 In summary, these revenue and 
funding sources, being predominantly domestic and not reliant on income 
taxation, have provided some insulation and a degree of autonomy to the 
                                                           
2 Petronas provides both direct and indirect taxation revenue to the state. The bulk is income 
taxation, the remainder is export duties. 
  295government with regard to its spending on politically necessary but economically 
‘non-productive’ policies such as price subsidies.  
 
The government’s interventions in the banking and finance system serve another 
purpose, that of augmenting household consumption. Two principal ways in 
which this is achieved are, firstly, through arrangements that ensure a proportion 
of loans at low rates of interest are directed to low income households, and 
secondly, by encouraging Bumiputera to save and invest in government 
controlled unit trusts that deliver above market dividends. Access to low cost 
finance for consumption purposes has multiplier effects at the macroeconomic 
level. For example, in the case of the near-collapse of the residential construction 
sector in 1998 as a result of the financial crisis, government interventions 
underwrote a massive injection of capital into the sector that served a dual 
purpose. Access to home ownership for individuals was facilitated despite a fall 
in average incomes, and, businesses were relieved of an expensive oversupply of 
housing stock.
3  
 
Inserting Islamic principles into the Malaysian banking and finance system has 
also facilitated increased access to credit, finance and investment opportunities 
for the Muslim population.
4 Syariah compliant insurance and annuity products, 
known as Takaful, an Arabic word meaning ‘joint guarantee’, are now available 
through agencies of the Bank Islam Group. These products are offered at fixed 
rates with dividends shared amongst members, thus removing aspects considered 
                                                           
3 The Ministry of Housing and Local Government (2001:6) estimated the oversupply to be 
93,000 units valued at approximately RM13.8 billion. 
4 Earning interest is against Islamic principles. Interest is replaced by a profit sharing 
arrangement. 
  296non compliant with Islamic principles such as gambling, unfair advantage, 
exploitation and earning of interest (Takaful Malaysia 2005). Insurance and 
annuities can be purchased to cover the costs of education, health services and 
home mortgages. The introduction of Syariah compliant products commenced 
under Mahathir in 1983 and initially made only slow inroads into mainstream 
banking. However, at the close of 2005, Islamic banking accounted for just over 
11 per cent (RM111.8 billion) of assets in the Malaysian banking system (BNM 
2006a:15). 
 
Given the emphasis on facilitating rises in living standards through access to 
consumer finance and mortgages, the control of inflation has been crucial. ‘A 
remarkable feature of the development process of the Malaysian economy is that 
the high growth rate throughout the period has been accompanied by low 
inflationary rates’ (Ragayah et al. 2002:123). The ability to keep inflation in 
check has facilitated the easy availability of credit, particularly low cost credit, 
which in turn contributes to economic and socio-political stability by softening 
the impact of low wages and downward pressure on wages (Guttmann 2002:60), 
as occurs in Malaysia during downturns in the economy. Mahathir used the low 
inflation rates to reject wage demands warning that higher wages would 
contribute to inflation and thus be negated.  
Dr Mahathir said it was important to maintain high productivity 
and competitiveness rather than seeking high wages, illustrating 
that some developed countries saw inflation growing by 1,000 per 
cent, whereas in Malaysia, the figure was only three per cent 
(Abdul Razak and Lim 2001). 
 
  297Paternalism and prices 
The Price Control Act was introduced in 1946 in the aftermath of WWII. 
Officially, ‘interventions took place to rectify market imperfections and 
unwarranted price increases’ (EPU 2004a:29). Price subsidies have since been 
used to achieve a range of economic, political and social goals. Very early in the 
post-colonial era, subsidisation and fixing of prices was a means of supporting 
the advancement of Bumiputera without increasing taxation (Ritchie 2005:747-
748). It was also a means of garnering political support. 
Tariffs and quotas, and various farm subsidies were introduced to 
protect and subsidise rice farmers who traditionally supported the 
ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party 
within the National Front (Rasiah and Ishak Shari 2001:71). 
 
Stabilised and subsidised prices have been important to controlling inflation, 
interest rates and wage levels and offsetting the hardships caused by the absence 
of a universal welfare system. ‘Growth with price stability is essential in 
improving the quality of life of the population’ (Government of Malaysia 
2006:70). In conjunction with the Control of Supplies Act 1961, the Price 
Control Act fixes the price and supply of fuels, a number of metal products, 
cement, fertilisers, chemicals used in rubber processing, and a range of 
foodstuffs.
5 Further to this is a list of food products controlled during the main 
festive seasons of Hari Raya and Chinese New Year.  
 
Basic health care, albeit of varying quality, has historically been provided at low 
or no cost to the bulk of the population. Fees for particular services have been 
introduced although many people retain exemptions from these. All current and 
retired civil servants and their families are entitled to state subsidised health care. 
                                                           
5 See www.kpdnhep.gov.my for a complete list. 
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was also extended to the parents of civil servants (EPU 2005:53). Given the 
limited nature of public health services in Malaysia, the sector has not absorbed 
as great a percentage of the budget as it has in more economically developed 
countries. The government currently allocates from five to six per cent of overall 
spending to health services. A private health care system operates alongside the 
publicly funded system.  
 
Encouraging and facilitating domestic consumption as a counter cyclical tool 
Building on the experience of the 1997/98 financial crisis, the government’s 
response to the less severe 2001 economic downturn was also an expansionary 
fiscal budget that countered the negative impact on employment and earnings 
and attempted to stimulate consumption. Rappa (2002:192) cites an excerpt from 
Mahathir’s address to merchant bankers:  
…under current economic conditions where growth will come 
from domestic sources, bank financing is crucial to lubricate the 
economy. Banks must, therefore, ensure that credit is 
appropriately channeled [sic] to stimulate consumption and 
investment (Mahathir 12 October 2001, speech to the Annual 
Dinner of the Association of Merchant Banks in Malaysia, 
Shangri-la Hotel, Kuala Lumpur). 
 
The government, Rappa (2002:192) concludes, views consumption as ‘…the 
solution that will dissolve the recessionary pressures…[it]represents the salve of 
economic development…’.  
 
To increase take home earnings, employees were given the option of reducing 
their contribution to the EPF by two percentage points. Consumption credit 
remained readily available and interest rates were contained. Rates of personal 
income taxation were reduced and the range of tax rebates broadened. Civil 
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in the hope of bolstering the domestic tourism and retail sectors. A further half 
day per month was granted in 2001 for the same reasons.  
 
Housing  
From the outset, the Malaysian government, preferring to retain low rates of 
taxation, intended housing to be purchased rather than rented (Agus 2002:50).
6 It 
was therefore necessary to ensure that access to finance be widely available 
despite low household incomes and significant levels of poverty. These efforts 
were stepped up from the mid 1970s (Drakakis-Smith 1979).  
 
Through the central bank, BNM, the government directed the commercial 
banking system to allocate a fixed proportion of loans to individuals for housing, 
the rates of which were also mandated by BNM (Doling and Omar 2002:11). 
CAGAMAS, the National Mortgage Corporation, was established in 1986 and 
provides security to home loan lenders willing to assist lower income earners. 
Given the NEP goal of improving the socio-economic status of Bumiputera, 
differential pricing of homes and finance applies on the basis of ethnicity, 
usually being a five per cent discount for Bumiputera (Ong and Lenard 2002:7). 
Advertisements for housing developments in the Malaysian press typically 
display the different prices. Other loan funds administered by the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government are available only to low income earners.
7 From 
1994, individuals have been allowed early access to their EPF account to assist in 
                                                           
6 This in contrast to the stocks of housing owned and maintained by government authorities in 
‘welfare states’ and provided on a rental basis to eligible applicants.  
7 These funds hold minor amounts in comparison to the size of the housing finance market. For 
example, the Housing Loan Scheme for people earning under RM1,200 monthly has a rolling 
fund of RM70 million. 
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housing finance repayments. 
 
The encouragement of home ownership obviously has flow on effects to the 
private sector and the economy more widely. Housing finance extended to 
individuals by commercial banks accounted for RM147 billion out of a total 
RM526 billion loaned as at the end of 2005 (BNM 2006:Table III.12:37). In the 
five years covered by the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, the government has 
stated a need for 700,000 new dwellings. Of these, almost 40 per cent are 
planned to be low and low-medium cost houses. Overall, the private sector is 
expected to provide approximately 70 per cent of the future housing stock in a 
market assisted by the state’s backing of mortgages and capping of loan rates. 
 
While the government’s interventions in the housing sector have reinforced 
particular relationships with capital, issues have arisen over the provision of low 
to medium cost housing. Included in each of Malaysia’s five year plans are 
targets for various types of housing to be constructed and made available to 
target groups, such as low income families, government employees, people in 
particular rural areas and those in urban squatter accommodation.  
Housing and other social services continue to be a priority of 
Malaysia’s development programmes aimed at improving the 
quality of life and contributing towards the formation of a caring 
society (Government of Malaysia 2001:501). 
 
Housing is classified according to relative cost, for example, ‘low cost’ or ‘low 
medium cost’, and is matched to applicants on the basis of their income. As 
explained by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, Umar bin Haji Abu (1996), in return for project approval, private 
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project to low cost housing. The remaining 70 per cent of their project can be 
high cost housing, which effectively subsidises the building of the low cost 
housing. There have been ongoing problems with this arrangement with 
developers failing to build their required share of low cost housing. In 1982, 
builders were required to meet the government’s set price of RM25,000 for a low 
cost house. This price stayed in place for over 15 years until, in the wake of the 
1998 financial crisis, it was raised to RM42,000 (NEAC 1998:177). Builders 
have also abandoned projects in less favourable economic circumstances. 
Sensitive to criticism on housing issues, in 2002 the Housing Development Act 
of 1966 was amended to give the Federal Government greater control over 
abandoned housing projects. A disputes settlement agency, the Tribunal for 
Homebuyer Claims, was also created (Government of Malaysia 2006:438). 
 
To summarise, lacking direct control over much of the private sector labour 
force, the paternalistic relationship between the state and labour has been 
reinforced through the tools of economic paternalism. These examples of the 
government’s attempts to regulate labour’s social reproduction are not exhaustive 
but hopefully serve to indicate the extent to which state agencies can and do 
intervene in private consumption and investment decisions. Whilst many of these 
interventions have been justified by government as necessary to improving the 
lives of the disadvantaged, the benefits have not been delivered evenly.  
Beyond the NEP’s employment quotas, which may only have 
facilitated its induction into manufacturing employment, the 
Malay working class has not enjoyed the forms of subsidies and 
state sponsorship which other classes of Malays have had (Khoo 
1995:336). 
 
  302The shortfalls of the consumption-based system of welfare are outlined in the 
section to come. The widening income gap between the wealthy and those in 
poverty undermines the government’s claims to be ‘caring’. However, this is but 
one of the challenges to the current means of enforcing economic paternalism.  
 
The costs of caring 
Although interrupted by the 1997/98 financial crisis, rates of poverty in Malaysia 
have otherwise been on an almost continual decline since the late 1970s. In 2004, 
however, over 300,000 households remained poor. Almost 70,000 were 
considered ‘hard core poor’ which means the household had an income that was 
inadequate to meet nutritional requirements (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). Seventy per 
cent of these were in Malay dominated rural areas. The greatest reductions in the 
incidence of poverty were recorded by Bumiputera, with slight reductions 
recorded by Chinese households and negligible improvements for Indian 
households.  
Table 7.1 Incidence of poverty and hardcore poverty 
 1999   2004 
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban  Rural
Hardcore  poverty        
Incidence %  1.9 0.5 3.6 1.2 0.4  2.9
Households ‘000  91.7 11.9 79.8 67.3 14.1  53.2
Overall poverty   
Incidence %  8.5 3.3 14.8 5.7 2.5  11.9
Households ‘000  409.3 86.1 323.2 311.3 91.6  219.7
Source: Government of Malaysia 2006:330. Total refers to Malaysia. 
 
Table 7.3 indicates that the average income of Bumiputera households increased 
at above average rates at 6.4 per cent. Despite this, in rural areas household 
incomes improved only marginally, and overall, Bumiputera households 
recorded lower household incomes than Chinese and Indian households. The 
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economic sector and geographic location. 
 
Table 7.2 Incidence of poverty and hard core poverty 
 by ethnic group (per cent) 
   1999 2004   
 
Bumi- 
putera Chinese Indian
Bumi-
putera Chinese Indian 
Hardcore 
poverty  2.9 0.2 0.3 1.9 0.1 0.3 
Urban  0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7  Neg  0.2 
Rural  4.4 0.4 0.5 3.3 0.3 0.5 
Overall 
poverty  12.4  1.2 3.5 8.3 0.6 2.9 
Urban  5.1 0.8 2.4 4.1 0.4 2.4 
Rural  17.5 2.7  5.8 13.4 2.3  5.4 
Source: Government of Malaysia 2006:330. 
 
Table 7.3 Mean monthly household income by ethnic group  
and urban or rural location, RM 
Ethnic group  1995  1999  2004 
Average 
growth rate 
1999-2004 % 
Bumiputera  1,604 1,984 2,711 6.4 
Chinese 2,890 3,456 4,437 5.1 
Indians  2,140 2,702 3,456 5.0 
Others  1,284 1,371 2,312 11.0 
Malaysia  2,020 2,472 3,249 5.6 
Urban  2,589 3,103 3,956 5.0 
Rural  1,326 1,718 1,875 1.8 
Source: Government of Malaysia 2001a:61, Government of Malaysia 2006:333. 
 
‘If we do not address the grievances of those who have been left behind, then we 
risk leaving alone a time bomb’ (Abdullah Badawi, then Deputy Prime Minister, 
cited in NST 19 May 2001). Recent household income data indicates a widening 
of the gap between Malaysia’s rich and poor since the 1998 financial crisis. The 
top 20 per cent of income earners had, by 2004, increased their share of wealth to 
51.2 per cent, while the share of the bottom 40 per cent had declined to 13.5 per 
cent (Government of Malaysia 2006:332). Bumiputera comprise over 75 per cent 
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Malaysia 2006:345), a fact that undermines the successes claimed by the 
government on their behalf. UMNO, particularly in the 1999 elections, appeared 
vulnerable to assertions by PAS that crony capitalism and money politics had 
divided the Malays into rich (UMNO-putras) and poor (Stark 2004:58, see also 
Bhopal 1999:284). 
 
While the consumption-based approach to welfare is challenged by persistent 
poverty and widening income inequality, conversely, the emergence of a much 
larger middle and upper income group is also placing economic paternalism 
under pressure. In 2005, more than 35 per cent of the labour force was comprised 
of white collar and professional workers.
8 An estimated 18 per cent of the 
population held a university qualification, and over 50 per cent of the work force 
was located in the services sector. Civil servants numbered approximately 
1,058,000 in 2005 (Ministry of Finance 2005:54). As indicated in Table 7.4, in 
the decade between 1995 and 2005, Bumiputera professionals increased in 
proportion from 27 per cent to almost 39 per cent of all professionals.  
Table 7.4 Registered professionals by ethnicity  
 Bumiputera  Chinese  Indian 
1995 
no. 10,659  21,298  6,653 
% 27.3  54.4  17.0 
2000 
no. 29,356  42,276  9,909 
% 35.5  51.2  12.0 
2005 
no. 42,414  53,297  11,556 
% 38.8  48.7  10.6 
Source: Government of Malaysia 2001:69, table 3-9 and Government of Malaysia 2006:335, 
table 16-5. 
                                                           
8 This includes the occupational categories of senior officials and managers, professionals, 
technicians, associate professionals and clerical workers. 
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A growing proportion of households now earn above RM3,000 per month. 
Between 1995 and 1999, this grew from to 17.5 per cent to almost 25 per cent of 
households. Using the terminology of the Malaysian Government, ‘middle-
income households’ are considered to be those earning from RM1,500 to 
RM3,500. This group expanded from just over 32 per of the population in 1995 
to 37 per cent in 1999.  
Table 7.5 Distribution of households by monthly income (per cent)  
Income (RM)  1995  1999 
499 and less  10.6  6.0 
500-999 23.9  19.0 
1,000-1,499 19.9  18.8 
1,500-1,999 13.1  13.9 
2,000-2,499 8.9  10.1 
2,500-2,999 6.1  7.3 
3,000-3,499 4.2  5.7 
3,500-3,999 2.8  3.9 
4,000-4,499 3.8  5.5 
5,000 and above  6.7  9.8 
Source: Government of Malaysia 2001a:61 
Overall, the impact of these demographic changes has been to rapidly expand the 
costs of subsidies to the government. For example, in the 2007 budget with a 
total allocation of RM159 billion, the Prime Minister claimed that in its efforts to 
contain inflation, which are linked to price subsidisation, RM19 billion ‘had been 
incurred by Government in the form of oil subsidy and tax forgone’ (Abdullah 
2006a:5). The Ministry of Finance (2005:7) claimed the level of subsidy on the 
pump price of fuel had become ‘untenable’. However, as is discussed in a later 
section of this chapter, attempts to remove, reduce or replace price subsidies 
have been politically difficult to negotiate. 
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While Malaysia’s population is still relatively young, approximately ten per cent 
of people will be over 60 years of age by 2020 (Ong 2001:1). A mandatory 
retirement age of 55 increases the proportion of the retired population. In the 
absence of income support for the aged, and given the rates at which current 
spending of EPF funds has been encouraged by the government, this presents a 
future political and socio-economic policy dilemma. As noted by Gough 
(2001:173) ‘…the employee provident fund provides weak protection against 
poverty in old age…’. In 2002, almost five per cent of households headed by an 
elderly person were identified as ‘hard core poor’ (EPU 2005:72). In response to 
further EPF amendments in 2006 allowing withdrawal of funds to meet mortgage 
repayments, the presidents of both CUEPACS and the MTUC expressed their 
concerns to the media regarding the potential negative impact on retirement 
income (Samy 2006). The requirement that families take on the care of the 
elderly will generate an increased load as the population ages, particularly if 
more women are drawn into the labour force, and if health care costs rise in 
association with privatisation.  
 
The health budget is coming under pressure from the costs of improved health 
technologies, the emergence of medical conditions associated with higher levels 
of economic development, and the ageing of the population (World Bank 
2000c:49). The provision of free, or at least low-cost, healthcare has been 
integral to forging and maintaining paternalistic relations between the state and 
labour. This is now acting as a constraint on government initiatives to expand 
health services which is to be funded by the introduction of fees and the 
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Barraclough (2000) suggests that the tentative nature of privatising health 
services and introducing charges in public hospitals and health centres is due to 
political concerns: 
…Malaysians have grown accustomed to the government’s role in 
providing low-cost services. Moreover, UMNO must take great 
care not to alienate its principal constituency, the rural Malays, by 
appearing to diminish the welfare role of the government 
(Barraclough 2000:350). 
 
Salleh and Meyanathan (1993:23) similarly note that privatisation has posed a 
policy dilemma for the government as it vacillates between concern for the 
budget and ‘…the desire to protect and promote Bumiputera interests…’.  
 
Competition and protection 
The central importance of the institutional capacity to control the supply and the 
pricing of a wide range of products is in complete contradiction to the neo-liberal 
basis of competition laws. In relation to World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
discussions on multi-lateral competition rules, this has caused Malaysia 
difficulties. Cassey Lee (2004:21) explains that to date, ‘[t]he Malaysian 
government’s stance has been to seek deferment of this issue’. While the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs (MDTCA) was in the process 
of drafting national level competition legislation in 2004, Cassey Lee (2004:8-9) 
suggests that competition laws are likely to ‘come into conflict with some of the 
industrial and socio-economic policies that are implemented in Malaysia’. There 
will be real difficulties, she further suggests, in reconciling these social policies 
with an effective competition policy. A national competition policy is yet to 
emerge as at the close of 2006. 
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The extent to which the government intervenes in the finance sector is central to 
the maintenance of economic paternalism and indeed, to the management of the 
economy generally. In the context of economic paternalism, for example, the 
government is able to direct the private banking sector to adhere to wide ranging 
rules that effectively reduce the ability of Malaysians to invest their funds 
outside of the country, but which in return require that higher than market-level 
rates of interest are returned to investors. The Kuala-Lumpur based American 
Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), has, with the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, been involved in the 2006 negotiations for a U.S. Malaysia Free 
Trade Agreement. Not surprisingly, their public submission (AMCHAM/U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce 2006, Section 7) recommends the liberalisation of 
Malaysia’s finance and banking sectors.  
 
At a different level of control, ethnic quotas are applied to the membership of 
boards in the finance sector, which is also rejected as part of the above-
mentioned submission.  
While this is a very sensitive cultural and political area in 
Malaysia, AMCHAM and the U.S. Chamber believe that such 
composition requirements and racial quotas should not be 
mandated in any sectors in Malaysia (AMCHAM/U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce 2006:30). 
 
AMCHAM has also expressed concerns regarding restrictions on the entry of 
skilled foreign workers in the finance sector, arguing that the shortage of local 
skilled workers hinders the ability of foreign firms to enter unless they are able to 
bring in foreign staff (AMCHAM/U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2006:24). That 
professional workers have been shielded from competition has also generated 
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2005:103).  
 
Pressure from the European Commission and the Word Trade Organisation to 
open up these sectors is being exerted under the General Agreement on Trades 
and Services (EC 2002). While the number of Bumiputera professionals has 
increased since the implementation of the NEP, they remain under represented. 
The Malaysian government has shown a reluctance to liberalise the sector and 
restricts the establishment of foreign businesses, but this is generating further 
difficulties in responding to the shortage of skilled workers that has become 
more pronounced with the decision to establish a KBE.  
 
These are but some of the challenges to the existing means of enforcing 
economic paternalism that have emerged out of previously mediated political 
processes. The NEP made explicit that poverty reduction was to be achieved 
through an acceleration of economic growth. On this basis, Trezzini (2001:326) 
argues that ‘…the political stability of Malaysia and the government’s legitimacy 
were grounded in a delicate balance between achieving general economic growth 
(‘efficiency’) and responding to the contending special interests of diverse social 
groups (‘equity’)…’. Some shift in this balance since the early 1990s is evident 
in the language of the National Welfare Policy and Mahathir’s Vision 2020 
statement. Policy statements emphasise ‘efficiency’, and use the discourses of 
‘self reliance’ and ‘international competitiveness’, and, since the late 1990s, the 
requirements of the ‘k-economy’. This shift is not linear, uncomplicated, or 
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made clear above and in earlier chapters. 
 
Changes to economic paternalism essentially amount to an attempt to lessen the 
government’s contribution to the costs of labour’s social reproduction. In 
recognition of this, Gsänger et al. (1998:2) describe Malaysia’s ‘caring society’ 
as an attempt to ‘shift the responsibility for the provision of social protection to 
the market, the family and the community’. Yet this must be carefully 
negotiated. Economic paternalism, despite its costs, has served political and 
economic ends, and, as the following section illustrates, there is no guarantee 
that the political processes currently underway will yield a more sustainable 
means of régulation.  
 
Citizens, consumers and the politics of social policy  
This final section examines the politics of changing the strategies within 
economic paternalism that are now under pressure. Uniting most of the efforts is 
an attempt to reframe citizens and members of ethnic groups as ‘consumers’. In 
some cases the dialogue surrounding the efforts continues the economic 
nationalism of the early 1990s (Williamson 2002), but this is also shown to have 
been ineffective as an argument for encouraging people to do away with price 
subsidies.  
 
Institutionalising consumer rights  
Private consumption spending is forecast to increase by almost seven per cent 
per annum from 2006-2010, increasing its contribution to GDP to over 52 per 
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increase in disposable income and continued improvement in consumer 
confidence underpinned by sustained employment growth…’ (Government of 
Malaysia 2006:70). Efforts to retain consumer confidence are evident in the 
examples examined below. 
 
‘The creation of institutions is an essentially political act…’ (Aglietta 1998:53). 
Since the late 1990s, the Malaysian Government has been particularly active in 
the area of consumer rights and protection. The Consumer Protection Act was 
introduced in 1999. Efforts to protect people against ‘get rich schemes’ and 
pyramid selling drove the introduction of the Direct Sales (Schemes and 
Conduct) Regulations of 2001. According to the government, the implementation 
in 2002 of the National Consumer Policy was to ‘…empower consumers to be 
more aware of their rights and interests as well as promote consumerism’. Credit 
card users have access to the Finance Mediation Bureau while banks and 
financial institutions were directed to establish Complaints Units (Bernama 14 
February 2002). There is also now a Tribunal for Consumer Claims and an 
Insurance Mediation Bureau. BNM is directing consumer education efforts 
particularly with regard to financial services and arrangements regarding 
deposits, insurance and loans. A 10 year Community Education Program, 
Bankinginfo, was launched in 2000 to inform Malaysian consumers about 
products in the banking and insurance sectors (Zeti Akhtar Aziz 2005).  
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forums (Kaur 2005),
9 in 2001 hosting the third APEC Consumer Education and 
Protection Initiative, themed ‘Building Consensus Towards Consumer 
Empowerment’. The Governor of BNM, Zeti Akhtar Aziz, gave the keynote 
address at Third International Forum on Financial Consumer Protection and 
Education, held December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
An emerging governmental concern is the protection of consumers engaging in 
e-Commerce transactions. Consumer purchases online amounted to RM7.4 
billion in 2005 (Government of Malaysia 2006:211).
10 The Malaysian 
Government expects rapid growth in this sector and has planned the introduction 
of a raft of legislation to guarantee the safety of consumers undertaking 
electronic purchasing which generally requires the use of a credit card. The 
planned legislation includes the Electronics Transaction Bill, the Electronic 
Government Activities Bill and the Personal Data Protection Bill. In 2006, the 
government announced the expansion of existing consumer education programs 
and stated that the Consumer Protection Act was to be reviewed ‘to enhance 
consumer welfare’ (Government of Malaysia 2006:220), as it currently excludes 
e-commerce transactions (Kaur 2005:10). 
 
The degree to which consumers are adequately protected by these initiatives 
requires case studies at a much more detailed level than this brief description of 
institutional responses by the state. The argument being put here is that the 
                                                           
9 Kaur 2005 provides a useful outline of ASEAN level consumer forums including those relating 
to e-commerce. 
10 This excludes business to business e-commerce which amounted to RM29.7 billion in 2005 
(Government of Malaysia 2006:211). 
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degree by political concerns. The government is extending its reach into civil 
society in providing a public forum for ‘consumers’ to express their 
dissatisfaction and concerns regarding their treatment as consumers. This is 
noteworthy because it otherwise runs contrary to the restrictions placed on other 
public forums of debate and criticism. 
 
In relation to this, a very public effort has been made by government agencies to 
work with NGOs active in consumer issues, such as the Consumers’ Association 
of Penang (CAP), the Federation of Malaysian Consumer Associations 
(FOMCA) and the Workers’ Consumer Movement overseen by the MTUC. For 
example, the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs (MDTCA) has 
conducted seminars in conjunction with CAP and in 2001, the Secretary General 
of the Ministry officiated at the opening of a seminar on consumer rights 
conducted by the Workers Consumer Movement (Sun 26 June 2001). The 
Ministry then agreed to fund 50 per cent of the costs of a three-year program 
designed to train union leaders in issues relating to consumer rights (interview, 
MTUC August 2002). The Malaysia Consumer Day celebrations in July 2006 
were jointly organised by FOMCA and the Ministry and involved school aged 
children in essay writing and colouring competitions relating to consumer issues. 
The main objectives of these programmes is to create awareness 
and educate consumers on the existence of National Consumer 
Day as well as to inculcate smart consumerism. We hope that by 
participating in the various competitions and activities, consumers 
will be able to better exercise their consumer rights in order to 
create an ethnical trading environment leading to building up a 
prosperous nation (www.fomca.org.my). 
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marginalisation of the union movement in employment and industrial relations 
matters. There may be an effort to engage with these particular NGOs as they 
have been actively campaigning on the topic of privatisation. For example, the 
2005 May Day rally in Kuala Lumpur was organised around the themes of 
opposition to the privatisation of health services and water supplies (Netto 
2005b). Malaysian NGOs including CAP and FOMCA have campaigned against 
the privatising of electricity and water supplies on the basis of the negative 
impact it is likely to have on the poor. The government, as described above, has 
had to act very carefully to justify price increases and remains vulnerable on 
issues relating to the impact of economic changes on low income earners. It has 
tried to negate this by speaking instead about the rights of consumers, and 
emphasising that privatisation will lead to improvements in service delivery. 
 
In a final comment on consumerism, it is also important to government revenue 
that investors be reassured of the safety of their funds and the likelihood of good 
returns. BNM commenced the implementation of the Financial Sector Master 
Plan and Capital Master Plan in 2001, expected to take ten years before 
completion. Included within these master plans is a wide range of initiatives 
aimed at improving the regulation of the banking and finance sectors. 
Initiatives to empower consumers through the provision of 
appropriate information will be further intensified so that 
consumers can take responsibility for their own financial 
decisions. Measures to provide greater consumer awareness and 
activism will be further enhanced through more targeted 
consumer education programmes and by strengthening the overall 
consumer protection infrastructure. In addition, the regulatory and 
supervisory framework will be further strengthened to provide 
better protection for consumers and enhance supervision and 
oversight’ (Government of Malaysia 2006:181). 
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Similarly, those with shares in government linked companies have been advised 
that new standards of transparency and accountability will in turn deliver better 
dividends (Government of Malaysia 2006:29).  
 
Redefining poverty 
Trezzini (2001:340) argues that the language surrounding poverty alleviation 
measures has shifted as non-Malay electoral support has become more important 
to UMNO. He suggests the focus on generating income through the expansion of 
business opportunities for the poor, rather than on achieving set targets, served to 
placate the concerns of business oriented Chinese Malaysians. Henderson et al. 
(2002) noted a similar tendency in the language of the Seventh Malaysia Plan 
1996-2000 (Government of Malaysia 1996). 
 
When presenting the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 to the Parliament, Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi revisited the societal violence of May 1969 and raised 
the spectre of further unrest. ‘If unaddressed, these disparities can threaten the 
harmony and stability we enjoy and consequently, thwart the country’s economic 
development’ (Abdullah 2006b). Attempts by UMNO and PAS to remain 
relevant to rural Malays indicate the continued political saliency of special 
privileges for Bumiputera  and highlight class divisions within the Malay 
population. 
 
That the government must carefully manage its role as the protector of Malays 
while at the same time attempting to reduce spending on government services 
and subsidies, is evident in recent budget speeches, in the Ninth Malaysia Plan 
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April 2006. Reminiscent of the efforts made in 1970 to convince the population 
that NEP was necessary to future economic prosperity for all (see Chapter 
Three), in the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, the government (2006:324) 
similarly contends that persistent social inequality presents a threat to Malaysia’s 
economic prosperity. The ‘balancing act’ between equity and efficiency is clearly 
visible as the government seeks to dispel concerns that Bumiputera are receiving 
too much, while still appearing to ‘care’ by providing assistance to those who 
need it. 
 
The media proved helpful in broadcasting the government’s stance. 
Has poverty increased in Malaysia?…Malaysia is about to re-
engage in a war it thought was well on the way to being won. In 
the Ninth Malaysia Plan tabled on Friday, poverty eradication 
suffused every aspect of Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s 
policy framework for the next five years (New Straits Times, 
Editorial 3 April 2006). 
 
The  NST  Editorial following the release of the Ninth Malaysia Plan quickly 
dispelled any notion that the government would be delivering charity or 
subsidies: ‘…the poor’s salvation lies in sustained and equitable economic 
growth – the overarching objective of the Plan’ (NST 3 April 2006). As the 
Prime Minister explained when presenting the plan to the Parliament:  
The main focus of the poverty eradication programme is to build 
the capacity of the poor by improving their access to education 
and skills training, instil positive thinking and build self-
confidence and motivation. This will encourage active 
involvement [sic] of the poor in economic activities… (Abdullah 
2006b). 
 
Lacking a universal welfare system, only…‘the elderly, the infirm, the disabled 
and the destitute’ (Abdullah 2006b), could expect to receive direct assistance 
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with the names of the poor entered into a ‘national poverty database’ 
(Government of Malaysia 2006:343).  
 
Finally, high levels of inequality were depicted as a threat to social order and 
future economic prosperity which could only be avoided by a government 
willing to take ‘firm’ action. 
The evidence from many other developing and developed 
countries suggests that persistent and growing inequalities may 
eventually cause systemic problems and social instability in an 
economy, unless addressed firmly, effectively and with great 
pragmatism and wisdom for the benefit of the nation as a whole 
(Government of Malaysia 2006:324). 
 
Much of this language appears designed to shore up support for continued 
assistance to those in poverty by reinforcing the message that economic 
efficiencies will flow from doing so and economic growth is at risk from failing 
to do so. 
 
Taxing the people: Consumption and income related taxes 
A greater proportion of government taxation revenue is now earned from income 
taxation (see Table 7.6 below). The lowering of tariffs under international trading 
arrangements and regional (ASEAN) trading agreements has reduced the 
proportion of income earned from import and export taxation. Greater use of 
income taxation to fund social policies risks generating greater levels of political 
opposition from those on whom the tax burden will fall most heavily.  
 
The loss of revenue previously earned by tariffs has in some cases been replaced 
by an excise tax on local resellers of imported products, particularly cars (from 
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cent of indirect taxation revenue. In other cases, excise taxes have been replaced 
by sales taxes, as with imported petroleum products (from 2000). Sales and 
service taxes now deliver almost 40 per cent of indirect tax revenue to the federal 
government whereas in the early 1980s they accounted for just over 13 per cent.  
Table 7.6 Government revenue by source (per cent) 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Direct taxes
a 43.9 35.2 44.5 47.1 50.3 
Companies’ income 
tax 
42.3 43.2 51.6 47.7 49.3 
Petroleum income 
tax 
33.8 28.6 9.6  20.6 27.2 
Individual income 
tax 
18.9 27.1 27.3 24.1 16.1 
Stamp  duty  3.2 7.0 9.7 6.2 4.6 
Others  1.3 1.2 1.8 1.5 2.8 
Indirect taxes
a 35.2 35.5 37.2 29.1 25.4 
Export  tax  24.7 17.5 3.4  5.7  7.7 
Import  tax  33.8 29.5 29.6 20.0 12.5 
Excise  tax  18.5 20.9 27.8 21.1 31.9 
Sales  tax  16.6 22.5 25.7 33.1 28.5 
Service  tax  1.4 1.1 5.4 9.4 9.5 
Others  4.9 5.7 7.0 10.6  9.4 
Non-tax revenue
a 18.8 23.5 16.6 22.8 23.6 
Total revenue
b 21,115    29,521 50,954 61,864 106,304 
Source: Author’s calculations derived from BNM 2006b, table VII.2 
a A percentage of total revenue   
b RM millions 
 
As the following discussion highlights, the government has moved cautiously in 
formalising income taxation arrangements. For example, the Economic Planning 
Unit (EPU 2004a:29) states the many reviews of income taxation are driven by 
‘the concern for the poor and lower income group to have a bigger disposable 
income…[and a desire]…for a reduced income inequality between this group 
and higher income group’. While the institutional capacity to recover income tax 
has been strengthened, the range of expenditures eligible to be claimed as rebates 
has simultaneously been broadened.  
  319 
A more stringent application of legislation relating to individual income tax has 
been underway since the mid 1990s with the creation of the Inland Revenue 
Board (IRB) in 1996 and the imposition on employers to withdraw taxes directly 
from the wages of employees. From 1998, benefits given by employers, such as 
housing, cars, loans and the payment of school fees for dependents became 
taxable. Health benefits provided by an employer are not taxable. Since 2000, the 
number of staff employed by the IRB has increased from approximately seven 
thousand to ten thousand (IRB CEO Zainol Abidin cited in Star 30 April 2006). 
In 2004 and 2005, staff from the IRB created a further 800,000 tax files as a 
result of the stronger emphasis on the collection of income taxation revenue 
(Ministry of Finance 2005:62).  
 
The amount of income tax collected from individuals has varied as the taxation 
system was reviewed and was subject to various exemptions during the financial 
downturns of 1998 and 2001. While rates of income taxation were lowered by 
one per cent during 2000, ‘as a measure to increase the disposable income in 
order to stimulate consumption’ (Daim 1999, Appendix 1), the overall amount 
collected has increased due to wider coverage. Taxation of income earned by 
companies contributed over 50 per cent of direct taxation revenue in 2005, up 
from 40 per cent in the early 1980s. As petroleum derived income expanded with 
rising oil prices in 2005-2006, individual rates of company taxation were 
lowered, from 28 per cent in 2005 to 26 per cent in 2008 (Abdullah 2006a:6). 
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become an increasingly important source of government revenue. The 2005 
Budget contained proposals for a Goods and Services Tax (GST) to replace the 
current sales and services taxes, and was to be implemented from January of 
2007.  
The new tax…will be more comprehensive, efficient, transparent 
and effective…The introduction of the new tax will provide the 
Government with the opportunity to reduce corporate and 
individual income tax rates. The Government will also ensure that 
the low-income group will not be burdened by the 
implementation… (Abdullah 2004:6-7). 
 
Yet there was no mention of the GST in the 2006 or 2007 budgets. The Ministry 
of Finance announced in February 2006 that the implementation of the GST had 
been postponed ‘indefinitely’ to allow the business sector more time to ready 
themselves (NEAC website citing Business Times [Singapore] 18 April 2006).  
 
Consumers and price subsidies 
The Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs (MDTCA) announced in 
2001 that the Price Control Act (PCA) would be abolished and replaced with 
legislation that reflected the government’s desire to be more ‘liberal’ in the 
market (Sun 19 May 2001). Yet in 2006 the PCA remains in force. In 2006, the 
government announced the goal of halving the subsidy allocation by 2010 
(Government of Malaysia 2006:73). Subsidies were actually increased in the 
2007 budget, funded by increased earnings from Petronas as oil prices peaked 
(Abdullah 2006a).  
 
In the 2006 Budget, allocation was made for an additional 745 staff to be 
employed in the MDTCA to enhance the effectiveness of price monitoring 
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larger retailing outlets and hypermarket operators, which are mainly foreign-
owned, to request their participation in a six month campaign aimed at reducing 
price increases. Known as the ‘Keep Retail Prices Low for Malaysian Families’ 
campaign, the effort by the government to prevent costs being shifted onto 
consumers was criticised by employer lobby groups representing foreign-owned 
firms (AMCHAM and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2006:46). At the time of 
writing, little is known about the success or otherwise of this campaign, but it 
represents another occasion when the government has used its relatively greater 
institutional control over foreign-owned businesses in the attempt to impose a 
solution to shortcomings within the state-labour nexus. 
 
The price of transportation fuels has been particularly sensitive in Malaysia and 
has been strictly controlled via extensive subsidies that saw pump prices frozen 
for more than a decade until 2000.
11 The discounted price has become a firmly 
entrenched expectation amongst consumers. Increasing the price marginally in 
2004, the government made reference to the expanding cost of the fuel subsidy, 
which had increased from RM1.5 billion in 1984, to RM9 billion in 2004 
(Deputy Prime Minister Najib, quoted in Alexander’s Gas and Oil, June 29 
2004). Prices were increased twice again in 2005. 
In order to reduce its subsidy burden, the Government has 
increased the pump price of retail petroleum and diesel products 
…Even though those increases resulted in higher costs of fuel, 
retail prices within Malaysia are still amongst the lowest in the 
region (Ministry of Finance 2005:50). 
 
                                                           
11 Price restrictions on petrol have occurred at times despite the wishes of retailers. Rohana 
Ariffin (1997:51) reports one occasion where the government refused to allow a price rise and 
retailers retaliated by restricting supply. 
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‘…to ease the burden…and to cushion the effects…’ (Ministry of Finance 
2005:50). To further compensate, road toll rate increases were deferred, and road 
taxes for smaller vehicles and for low income earners were waived. In August 
2005, the NEAC posted a discussion paper to website of the Economic Planning 
Unit explaining the costs of the petrol price subsidy to the nation.  
…spending on subsidies are one-off expenditures which do not generate 
further income for the nation and its people…If the rakyat [the people] and 
the Government can share the cost of rising fuel prices, thus reducing the 
need for subsidies, a part of the contributions from PETRONAS can 
instead be directed to generate new sources of income (NEAC 2005). 
 
At the same time, the NEAC ran an online poll asking Malaysians whether the 
Government should continue with its subsidisation of oil prices even though this 
would require the ‘sacrifice of other development projects’ [emphasis mine]. 
Over 60 per cent of the 434 respondents voted ‘yes’ (NEAC 2005). A sense of 
economic nationalism had clearly not permeated those who responded. 
 
In late 2005, Malaysians were warned that prices would need to rise again. 
The Government is estimated to incur losses in tax revenue and 
subsidy amounting to RM16 billion for this year. This level is 
almost thee times higher than the RM6.6 billion in 2003 and 
almost one and half times higher than RM11.9 billion in 2004 
(Abdullah 2005:17). 
 
In February 2006 the government allowed petrol pump prices to increase, this 
time by a greater amount. From January, civil servants received a range of 
increased allowances
12 to offset the ‘rising cost of living’ (Abdullah 2005:25). 
The MTUC then demanded a cost of living allowance (COLA) be granted to 
private sector workers (Cruez 2006). In a February press release (MEF 2006c), 
                                                           
12 Note that the increases are ‘allowances’ which means they do not affect base rates of pay. 
  323the Malaysian Employers’ Federation predictably rejected the call for increased 
wages arguing that employers had already allowed for increased living costs 
when determining current wage levels. But the MTUC had questioned the ability 
of the government to protect the standard of living of Malaysian workers, a point 
on which the government, as the protector of the people, was vulnerable.  
 
Deputy Prime Minister Najib attempted to explain the government’s position in a 
specially screened television program (Bernama 1 March 2006). Najib’s 
responses were carefully aimed at shifting criticism onto unnamed non-deserving 
recipients of the fuel subsidies whose abuse of the system had made it too 
expensive to be continued.
13 He mentioned that neighbouring countries no longer 
subsidised fuel prices. Najib encouraged people to use public transport as a 
means of offsetting the fuel price rise, but when questioned by the interviewer, 
he then found it difficult to reconcile this with the government’s encouragement 
that the people should ‘support the national car’.  
 
Government figures showed that increasing car usage (from 47 per cent in 1985 
to 71 per cent in 2004) had contributed to a decrease in the use of public 
transport from 34 per cent to 16 per cent (Abdullah 2004:10) overburdening the 
road network. The use of subsidies to maintain the paternalistic state-society 
relationship had, in this case, not only become expensive to maintain, but was 
effectively contradicting other government initiatives. In the previous year, the 
Prime Minister had outlined his Government’s commitment to reducing traffic 
                                                           
13 Media reports on the previous price hike in July 2005 listed fuel smuggling into Thailand and 
illegal sales of diesel to industry as major rorts of the system (AFP 2005, ‘Malaysia fuel price 
hike could hurt economy, say analysts’, May 5). 
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public transport services (Abdullah 2004:10-11).  
 
Prices of services such as electricity and water have also been extensively 
subsidised. Privatisation has been one means by which the state has sought to 
ease the burden of subsidies. Yet when the provision of sewerage services was 
privatised in the mid 1990s, the winning company, Indah Water Konsortium, was 
initially foiled in its attempts to increase charges to consumers. A highly 
successful campaign by the Federation of Malaysian Consumer Associations 
(FOMCA) saw the additional charges reduced and a more transparent billing 
system implemented (Jayasooriya 2004:23-24).  
 
According to the Prime Minister, the Petronas-funded subsidy on gas for 
electricity production amounted to RM9 billion in 2004 (Abdullah 2005:17). 
Government-owned, corporatised electricity supplier, Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
(TNB), had not increased tariffs since 1997 when in early 2006 it attempted to 
get government approval to increase its rates by ten per cent. Tenaga argued that 
the costs of supplying electricity had risen by 23 per cent over that time.  
People have forgotten that the last tariff increase was in 1997, and 
that since then there have been increase [sic] in costs of all kinds- 
fuel, TNB equipment and labour. We have been like a sponge, 
absorbing the costs but we have reached a level where we cannot 
go on anymore (Tenaga CEO Che Khalib Mohamad Noh cited by 
Bernama 15 April 2006).  
 
The Tenaga CEO further hoped that incremental increases in the price could then 
be made every two or three years. After the claim was initially rejected by the 
Prime Minister, Tenaga responded with a proposal that would have maintained 
the existing price for lower income groups and low level electricity users 
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sheltered from the price hike (Bernama 15 April 2006). This would have created 
an outcome similar to that described in the 2006 Budget speech. Abdullah had 
stated there (2005:23), that electricity tariffs would ‘…need to be adjusted…in 
due course…However, the Government is committed to ensuring that there will 
be no additional burden, particularly for the lower income group…’.  
 
Despite appearing entirely consistent with the government’s budgetary stance, 
TNB’s modified proposal was rejected. The Minister for Energy, Water and 
Communications, Lim Keng Yaik, told the media that in the wake of recent 
increases in petrol prices, an increase in the price of electricity was ‘too much for 
people to accept, so I have to hold on for a while’ (Business Times [Singapore] 
15 April 2006). Adding to the political pressures influencing the government’s 
decision was the publication of a list of government linked companies with large 
debts to Tenaga (Star 13 March 2006).
14 The government was concerned enough 
about a potential public backlash that it was willing to forgo the extra income 
that could have been earned from a tariff increase, and to step back from its 
stated aim of reducing the public’s dependency on subsidies, at least in the short 
term.  
 
Expanding sources of income 
This section looks briefly at some of the attempts to increase government 
revenue that may be effected through the government’s existing institutional 
                                                           
14 Perwaja Steel for example, was cited as owing RM253 million to Tenaga. 
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trusts.  
 
During the period of the Eighth Malaysia Plan  2001-2005, over 40,000 
dwellings were constructed by the public sector for government employees. 
Approximately RM3.4 billion was allocated for this, while RM6.8 billion has 
been allocated during the period of the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010. 
Government employees are able to source subsidised housing loans from their 
employer, and in 2006 owed almost RM30 billion to the government. This 
amount was boosted by the construction of more than 9,200 new dwellings for 
civil servants in the new administrative capital, Putrajaya (Government of 
Malaysia 2006:439-441).  
 
Government staff housing loans have now been developed into a new source of 
revenue by the Federal Government which appointed CAGAMAS in 2004 to 
oversee the initial release of RM2 billion of bonds based on the securitisation of 
these loans. Civil servants who are Muslim, which accounts for the majority of 
Malaysian civil servants, are required to take out a loan based on Islamic banking 
principles. In 2005, just over RM2 billion of the Islamic compliant accounts were 
converted to Islamic bonds (Ministry of Finance 2005:92-94).
15 Market reports 
described the scheme as a model for other governments who may need to offset 
the costs of providing subsidised housing finance to their employees (see for 
example, Arab News 1 August 2005).  
 
                                                           
15 Known formally as Islamic Residential Mortgage-backed Securitisation.  
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become a hub of Islamic banking while also freeing up what were otherwise non-
liquid assets (Ministry of Finance 2005:94). According to the Prime Minister 
(Abdullah 2006a:12), Malaysia has performed well in its attempts to attract 
investors wanting to access a Syariah compliant banking and investment 
environment. The government expects the Islamic banking sector to constitute 20 
per cent of Malaysia’s banking and insurance sector by 2010 (Government of 
Malaysia 2006:184). 
 
As mentioned above, PNB is a national organisation that oversees the 
management of unit trusts originally created to increase Bumiputera participation 
in the non-agricultural economy. More recently these funds have also been used 
as a means of encouraging Bumiputera to plan for retirement and to insure 
against health costs and to save for their children’s education. In addition to the 
original Bumiputera-only funds, in December 1996, Mahathir launched Amanah 
Sahan Wawasan 2020 (ASW2020), which was aimed at people under 40 years of 
age. It was the first scheme available to non-Bumiputera Malaysians. Described 
by Kassim and Saleh (2001:235) as ‘…just one of the numerous efforts made by 
the government to increase domestic savings in order to decrease our dependency 
on foreign funds and investments’, the move might also be interpreted as a 
renewed effort to incorporate the economic resources of non-Malays into the 
government’s sphere of influence.  
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The emphasis on consumerism, individual and familial responsibility is being 
linked with government plans to reduce expenditure on the public provision of 
health through privatisation. The depiction of health care as a commodity 
available for purchase is replacing the previous understanding of health care as 
an instrument of social welfare capable of driving socio-economic improvements 
(Barraclough 2000). Rather, the privatisation of health is described in 
government literature as driven by the demands of sophisticated, educated, 
consumers for a greater variety of services.  
 
Since the mid 1990s, tentative moves have been made towards the introduction 
of fees in the public health system and the privatisation of some formerly state-
provided health services (Barraclough 2000). A National Health Fund 
established in 2002 exists to fund the use of private sector health services by 
patients unable to access required treatment from the public system. A national 
health insurance scheme has been suggested for some years. The most recent 
plans have been filtered slowly to the press in a sketchy fashion. For example, in 
December 2004, the Minister for Health announced the impending 
implementation of a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). In the words of 
the Minister, the scheme would be  
based on cost and risk-sharing across the population, with the rich 
subsidising the poor, the young the elderly, the healthy for the 
sick and the employed for the unemployed (Daily Express 16 
December 2004). 
 
The Minister explained that the NHIS was necessary ‘as the government could 
not continue to cover the rising costs of health expenditure’ (Bernama 16 
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message that free health care is an unfair burden on the government.  
Our government is staggering under the burden of health 
expenditure, paying for the healthcare of approximately one 
million civil servants, 200,000 disabled people, half a million 
pensioners and a quarter of a million hardcore poor and 
unemployed…it is questionable whether the government can 
continue to sustain rising health care costs on public sector funds 
alone (Tee 2005 in Sunday Star 4 September). 
 
In a 2005 media interview (Netto 2005a; Tee 2005), mention was made of a 
National Healthcare Financing Authority which would oversee the coordination 
of the public and private health sectors. These proposals have major implications 
for household budgets and for current employment contracts whereby employers 
provide health care as part of the remuneration package (Gross and Weintraub 
2005:1).  
 
Attempting to soften some of the financial impact of privatisation are changes to 
income taxation arrangements. Rebates for expenditure on health insurance were 
announced in the 2005 and 2006 budgets (Abdullah 2004, 2005). The medical 
costs of elderly parents can be claimed by their children as taxation concessions. 
Hence middle and upper income earners will be rewarded for adopting 
consumption patterns consistent with the state’s efforts to shift the cost of health 
to families and individuals.  
 
Recent planning documents do not provide clarity on the amount individuals will 
be required to contribute to a national insurance scheme. The Ninth Malaysia 
Plan 2006-2010 (Government of Malaysia 2006:433) reveals only that ‘[t]he 
implementation of the health financing mechanism will further enhance 
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freedom of choice in obtaining care…’. As Barraclough (2000) noted, statements 
regarding a need for greater individual contribution to health care have been 
made by the political leadership for more than a decade. It appears that in the 
case of health, the government will continue to adopt a cautious approach with 
regard to lessening its role as a provider. The difficulties of the public sector in 
attracting qualified staff, and the government’s refusal to increase the health 
budget significantly, are likely to drive the attractiveness of the private health 
sector to those able to afford it. Changes to the distribution of health care costs 
between individuals and the government may be effected in this manner rather 
than through a clear change in policy direction. 
 
Building on previous initiatives, such as the Happy Families campaign of 1999 
(EPU 2005:53), the Family First campaign was launched at the federal and state 
levels of government in 2003. As part of the stated commitment to the family, 
civil servants have now been granted a five day working week (Government of 
Malaysia 2006). A ‘caring’ government, in the understanding of the Malaysian 
Government, guides society towards the holding of values that strengthen the 
family unit so that is able to support its own members. This ‘family friendly’ 
initiative is relevant to the wider issue of women’s participation in the paid 
labour force. Rappa (2002) describes women in Malaysia as an ‘untapped 
economic resource’ whose greater participation in the formal economy is 
necessary for the Malaysian government to achieve its Vision 2020 goals. The 
rate of women’s labour force participation at 45.7 per cent in 2005 is below the 
level recorded in 1990 (Government of Malaysia 2006:282). It is important to the 
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participate in the labour force. This will have the effect of raising household 
income but without requiring significant increases in wage levels.  
 
Thus far, however, little in the way of public spending has been allocated to 
overcoming the obstacles identified as preventing women from remaining in the 
labour force after having children. Owners of private child care centres are 
eligible for the range of tax concessions usually offered to pioneer industries, and 
employers have been encouraged by the Ministers for Women and Family 
Development and Unity and Social Development to provide work based child 
care centres and abide by Malaysia’s relatively generous maternity leave 
provisions.
16 The number of child care places provided by employers is however 
inadequate to fill demand.
17 Tax concessions are available to families using child 
care and for employers who provide child care, and the 2007 budget included 
one off payments to public service departments that undertake to build work 
based child care centres (Abdullah 2006a:18). The Prime Minister encouraged 
the private sector to do likewise but the government has refused to enforce 
legislation in this regard.  
 
The greatest response to the need for child care and other domestic work has 
been the liberalisation of migration arrangements for foreign domestic staff. 
‘Foreign female domestic immigration delays demands that the state encourage 
                                                           
16 Malaysian women are entitled to 60 days of maternity leave at full pay for up to five children. 
Maternity leave is paid by the employer, not through social security or unemployment insurance. 
17 The available data states that 86 child care centres near or at workplaces were established in 
the period 2001-2006 (Government of Malaysia 2006:309). 
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(Chin 1997:370).  
 
A range of other initiatives, including reforms of the Employment Act and the 
Industrial Relations Act to address sexual harassment, are forecast in the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan but no funding details are provided. In total, funding to the 
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development for the period 2006 to 
2010 amounts to 0.3 per cent of budget allocations while the Ministry of Human 
Resources is to receive 1.2 per cent (Government of Malaysia 2006:530). These 
amounts are consistent with allocations in previous years and do not indicate the 
emergence of major new initiatives to prepare middle income families for any 
significant changes in their working lives. The Constitution was amended to 
make discrimination on the basis of gender an offence, but the government has 
simultaneously refused to address gender-based wage inequality through 
legislation. 
 
In summary, for many middle income families, in a scenario where education 
and health costs are shifted onto the family, current levels of income and 
consumption will only be able to be maintained if both partners are in paid 
employment. The ‘consumerism’ discourse, much of it aimed at women (Rappa 
2002), acts to encourage women into the labour force to bolster household 
incomes. Families are being encouraged to save and plan for the future through 
the purchase of insurance products, shares and annuities. The challenges for the 
Malaysian government are firstly, whether this discourse of consumption is 
considered ‘plausible’ (Rappa 2002) by the electorate. Secondly, there are 
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result from the loss of subsidies and the introduction of fees for services. Thirdly, 
these reductions are likely to create greater pressures for employees to demand 
wage increases and extra entitlements from employers. In the current labour 
shortage situation, these demands may well be met, but at the risk of creating the 
very inflationary pressures the government has acted to avoid. As the direct 
employer of civil servants, the government has enacted a wide range of responses 
that will shelter this section of the labour force. In the private sector, the outcome 
is likely to be a greater segmentation of the labour market and continued pressure 
by employers for access to migrant labour.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has bought into question the argument presented by Ramesh (2000) 
that UMNO’s electoral dominance since the mid 1980s has facilitated a clear 
shift towards economic spending and away from social spending. While his 
argument is consistent with policy statements by Abdullah Badawi, and 
previously by Mahathir, it fails to acknowledge the variations in policy 
implementation that have been forced on the government as it has attempted to 
negotiate conflicting and contradictory pressures.  
 
Strategies encompassed within economic paternalism impact on the budget and 
particular sectors of the economy and therefore have the potential to trigger elite 
level conflict. Capital has supported many of the strategies because they have 
simultaneously generated economic growth and have been particularly useful 
during downturns. However, as has become clear, the current attempt by the 
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as health and education costs, and the threat to do away with price subsidisation, 
has already generated moves by capital to avoid picking up these costs. It is 
likely that core employees will be able to bargain effectively for greater health 
and education benefits as part of the remuneration package, but this will be 
negotiated privately. The government has pledged greater support for those in 
society who are identified as in poverty, however, this leaves approximately 40 
per cent of Malaysia’s working class in an uncertain position with regard to 
future entitlements. The government’s response has been to encourage greater 
participation in the Employee’s Provident Fund by previously ineligible workers, 
such as the self employed. It has also made it more attractive, through taxation 
relief and Syariah compliant banking, for households to invest in financial 
products designed to provide income protection. This is a project that will take 
time to mature. In the meanwhile, strong economic growth and close to full 
employment conditions provide a cushioning effect to the potentially 
destabilising political processes in play. 
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1
…the Malaysian development experience…required the masterful 
management by the government of a myriad of balancing acts to 
meet the varied demands of a heterogenous population each 
seeking to maximise its share of the nation’s governance and 
growing wealth (Economic Planning Unit 2004a:42). 
 
As societies and economies undergo processes of restructuring, we observe 
changes in employment relations and welfare systems that often appear to be to 
the detriment of the majority of the working class. Under such pressures, we 
wonder then, why more societies do not erupt into disorder and violence, or even 
more so, why governments overseeing these processes are returned to power by 
the electorate? This search for the mechanisms that allow for the adaptation and 
stabilisation of capitalist societies, despite their contradictions and inequities, is a 
central goal of régulation theory. 
 
In resolving this dilemma,
2 I have attempted to reverse the usual order of 
questioning. Rather than asking how economic policy has impacted on labour, I 
have asked instead how existing state-labour compromises have shaped 
economic policies. In the response to this question we uncover both the 
destabilising potential of labour’s contradictory location in capitalism, and the 
attempts to modify those contradictions. Through these attempts, societies and 
economies may adapt and thereby accommodate, at least for a time, the 
contradictions inherent within capitalist social relations. 
 
                                                 
1 Abdullah Badawi, Prime Minister since 2003, chose this as the theme for the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan 2006-2010 (Government of Malaysia 2006:vii). In Bahasa Melayu, this is referred to as 
‘cemerlang, gemilang dan terbilang’. 
2 A dilemma which is essentially the question plaguing all who view capitalism as inherently 
unfair. 
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shifts in Malaysia’s political economy. The New Economic Policy, Free Trade 
Zones, Look East, Vision 2020 and more recently, the k-economy, were 
described as both the product of and an attempted solution to growing pressures 
within the state-labour nexus. Embedded within each were a combination of 
repression and concessions, the balance of which reflected far more than 
economic imperatives. The accommodation of Malay nationalism within the 
public education sector, for example, has not served the interests of employers.  
 
Economic paternalism has become the distinguishing characteristic of the state-
labour nexus having developed out of the growing institutional capacity that 
allowed the government to implement the policies of the NEP. Conflict over the 
funding of aspects of labour’s social reproduction, for example, the provision of 
low cost housing, health and education, public child care, retirement income, and 
the price of food, utilities and fuel, has shaped the nature of economic 
paternalism. These mediated outcomes and compromises have extended 
régulation options to the government but, in turn, have created expectations 
amongst the populace for certain economic goods. The government’s legitimacy 
amongst some of its supporters has come to depend on the delivery of subsidies 
in various forms. In this sense, the leadership is as dependent on the provision of 
subsidies as are the people in receipt of them and the fractions of capital that 
profit by them.  
 
Since Mahathir’s Vision 2020 statement in 1991, the political leadership has 
tried to shift the basis of legitimacy away from its historical position as the 
  337defender of the Malays. Vision 2020, and within it, Bangsa Malaysia, was an 
attempt to impose economic nationalism as hegemonic, replacing the existing 
ideologies of ethnically-based nationalisms (Williamson 2002). The populace is 
however, familiar with the inconsistencies of the ‘syncretic state’ (Jesudason 
1996:131-134). This is a government that frequently makes policy statements 
which are then overturned, delayed or contradicted before ever being 
implemented. This is a government that is willing to intervene in the economy in 
ways that go against the dictates of its own policies.  
 
The most recent attempt by the political elite to shift societal expectations away 
from subsidies has been to focus on consumerism, linking it where possible to 
images of a modern, entrepreneurial workforce and society. This is now clearly 
apparent in the effort to redefine eligibility for government assistance on the 
basis of poverty rather than ethnicity, a move which, if successful, would reduce 
the level of expenditure allocated to subsidies. Through this strategy the 
government hopes to modify the more expensive aspects of economic 
paternalism. Yet this must be achieved without depressing consumption and 
while also facilitating greater private contributions towards labour’s social 
reproduction. For example, an institutional response has been the provision of tax 
relief for those who contribute now to their future health, education, housing and 
retirement needs. This approach may eventually bear fruit for the government as 
middle and upper income earners become convinced that their investments will 
be less profitable under the conditions that support economic paternalism. As the 
income taxation burden becomes heavier, this too may generate electoral support 
for an increased focus on economic development and a decreased allocation to 
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the clientelism and rentier arrangements embedded within state-capital relations. 
 
Lacking the insulation from popular pressures that contributed to the success of 
the ‘developmental states’, the Malaysian leadership is currently reliant on 
existing distributional policies even though there are strong economic 
imperatives to do away with them. While fractions of capital, particularly those 
with overseas interests, have called for the implementation of competition policy, 
there is not a coalition of support for the dismantling of economic paternalism. 
Capital, labour and state agencies are enmeshed in the web of public-private 
transfers that have for the past three decades, contributed significantly to the 
stabilisation of Malaysian society even as they have generated other economic 
and political tensions.  
 
These comments have emerged from the meso-level approach adopted in the 
thesis which has allowed the development of a national-level framework for 
analysis. One means of taking this research project further would be to focus on 
particular social sectors. For example, the government’s stated goal of 
encouraging more women into paid labour has a strong economic imperative yet 
this goal has been thwarted since the 1990s. Some of the failures in the mode of 
régulation that have contributed to this outcome were discussed but this question 
could be pursued in further detail. For example, are there ‘social’ policies 
emerging that will facilitate or, conversely, force more women into the 
workforce? Razavi and Pearson (2004:4) describe this as an under-researched 
area, particularly in the case of export-oriented economies where, as has been 
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than wage setting policies. 
 
Mention has been made here of concerns regarding the ageing of the population 
given the absence of income support for the aged. This issue is yet to create 
significant budgetary pressures in Malaysia but has the potential to do so given 
increased use of EPF funds in advance of retirement and a trend towards the 
elderly living apart from their families. There is a clear contradiction between the 
needs of those households living off investments, such as retirees, and the low 
rates of interest pursued as a social redistribution policy by the Malaysian 
government, a policy that favours households with mortgages and other debts. 
Responding to this, in 2004 BNM devised Merdeka (Freedom) Savings Bonds 
which have a guaranteed return of five per cent. These bonds are available to 
‘senior citizens, retired armed forces personnel and Malaysians who have retired 
on medical grounds’ (Ministry of Finance 2005:79). In 2004, Merdeka bonds to 
the value of RM1.94 billion were released, with another issue of RM1.16 billion 
in 2005. Thus far, the concerns regarding a larger aged population have been 
addressed within the bounds of economic paternalism and the ideological 
reinforcement of ‘family based’ welfare. For example, health care costs incurred 
by the elderly can be claimed through the taxation system, a response that assists 
middle and upper income earners. This issue may be played out in a different 
fashion in less favourable economic conditions that expose greater numbers of 
elderly people to poverty.  
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intersections between geographical location and ethnicity in the state-labour 
nexus. More than 500,000 mostly working class Chinese were incarcerated in 
‘new villages’ and subject to the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign orchestrated by 
the British in their post-war campaign against the Communists. The ‘hearts and 
minds’ campaign has been reviewed as a political and military strategy 
(Sunderland 1964) yet it could also be examined as a very particular form of 
economic paternalism. The remnants of this population now figure prominently 
amongst those rural households living in poverty, yet, in the early 1950s, the 
British claim to have provided housing, piped water, electricity and valuable land 
resources to these new villages to the extent that it raised the ire of the Malay 
royalty on behalf of Malay villagers.  
 
The discussion here has focused on federal government employees, but two 
Malaysian states, Kelantan and Terengganu, have been led by PAS in recent 
times. The federal government determines funding allocations to state 
governments and also has constitutional powers over state level legislation. In 
effect these constitute further institutional locations in which the forms of labour 
régulation would be mediated. For example, when campaigning in the 1999 
elections, Kelantan’s former Chief Minister and senior PAS representative, Nik 
Aziz, portrayed the development of a civil service in which adherence to faith 
and family would be a factor in deciding the weekly hours of work for civil 
servants. Wages for male civil servants were to be determined in part by their 
family size and whether their wives remained out of the paid workforce. The 
Chief Minister had already imposed reductions on allowances for bureaucrats, 
  341including himself, as part of the wider program of Islamisation of the state-level 
administration (Stark 2004:60-61). Yet despite a radical program to reorganise 
employment conditions, the ability of the Kelantanese government to pursue 
these policies was clearly limited by a lack of funding and legislative autonomy. 
Political tensions between the federal government and state governments 
therefore impact on the régulation of government employment at the state level. 
 
The structural changes underway in Australia’s industrial relations, employment 
and welfare policies present a possible comparative study with the nature of 
changes underway in Malaysia. While both Australia and Malaysia have 
centralised systems of industrial relations, Australia has had a more formalised 
system of employment relations that is currently undergoing a process of 
‘deregulation’. While neo-liberal philosophies have proved politically effective 
in Australia, Broomhill (2001:127) identifies destabilising tendencies within neo-
liberal employment relations that could threaten accumulation.
3 Neoliberal 
ideology has not predominated in Malaysia where a more paternalistic approach 
has prevailed, reinforced institutionally through economic paternalism. In both 
cases, however, governments are attempting to redistribute the costs of labour’s 
social reproduction away from the government in a time of high employment and 
rising wages. This would appear to be counter intuitive as it would surely be 
more sensible to attack labour conditions when labour is at its weakest. Yet, 
when dominant segments of the labour force experience rising wages, 
households tend to increase their credit-based consumption which further 
                                                 
3 Deyo and Agartan (2003) also explore the destabilising impact of labour market ‘deregulation’ 
and the potential for a return to social policies as a result. Their focus is East Asian economies. 
Jayasuriya (2006) explores social inclusion and the new welfare governance as ‘workfare writ 
large at a transnational level’.  
  342 entrenches them in wage relations. In Malaysia, this brings households within the 
orbit of state agencies that exert considerable control over banking, finance and 
distribution. This is less the case in Australia which indicates that other strategies 
are operating within the mode of régulation.  
 
Neo-liberal economic goals in the shape of competition policy are amongst those 
presenting a challenge to the nature of economic management in Malaysia 
currently. This is not a new scenario given Malaysia’s long history of 
participation in international trading arrangements. The government has 
demonstrated the capacity to respond creatively to the demands and criticisms of 
international agencies, foreign governments and global markets. Mahathir took 
advantage of regional and international forums to defend his government’s right 
to pursue policies other than those dictated by ‘unfettered globalisation’. 
 
It is in taking advantage of its regional and international connections that the 
government may be able to maintain economic paternalism or advance the 
pursuit of alternative stabilising mechanisms. Petronas now derives 
approximately 35 per cent of its income from activities outside of its Malaysian 
operations. Its ability to deliver funding to the Government of Malaysia, its 
single shareholder, is therefore likely to be extended beyond that of the lifespan 
of Malaysia’s oil and gas reserves. The government is also seeking international 
funding through the promotion of what it calls ‘health tourism’. ‘Health 
Malaysia’ is a joint effort between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Tourism and the Association of Private Hospitals of Malaysia. It has so far 
focused on promotions in the United Arab Emirates and China. Malaysia’s plan 
  343to position itself as the ‘Global Hub of Islamic Banking’, if successful, will 
attract significant investment funds into a banking and finance system over 
which the government extends considerable control.  
 
Finally, the EPF remains as a massive reserve of non-inflationary investment 
funds. These have been called upon to contribute up to RM20 billion of ‘private’ 
investment in the projects outlined in the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 
(Government of Malaysia 2006). The availability of these funds provides the 
government with an opportunity to further delay politically risky processes of 
structural change. As evidenced by the increased allocation to subsidies provided 
in the 2007 budget, an allocation that is in complete contradiction to the stated 
goal of halving subsidies by 2010, the political leadership continues to respond in 
an inconsistent and ad hoc manner to some of the more difficult policy decisions.  
 
In explaining these inconsistencies in policy, some emphasise the constraints 
imposed by international pressures (Kuruvilla 1996). Others (Jesudason 1999; 
Lee 2005; Torri 1997) have highlighted the importance of factionalism within 
and between the coalition partners. Nesadurai (2000) has identified the 
continuing need to accommodate ethno-political concerns in elite decision 
making as a constraining factor.  
 
The contribution of this thesis has been to highlight the impact of the 
contradictory nature of labour’s participation in Malaysia’s political economy 
and the compromises that have been generated out of the government’s attempts 
to manage this. As has been shown, exactly how these difficulties are managed is 
  344 a dynamic, politically contingent process which is simultaneously producing new 
social policies and new sets of conflict. This would not be readily apparent from 
examining the industrial relations environment or labour legislation alone as the 
Malaysian Government has preferred to limit state interventions in the employer-
employee relationship. It is in sites of labour’s social reproduction beyond the 
workplace that we more readily identify the institutional responses that have 
facilitated stabilising adaptations within Malaysia’s capitalist social relations.  
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